DESTABILIZING TERRORIST NETWORKS

Counter-terrorist forces (Mossad, CIA, DoD, etc.) routinely use assassination to disrupt terrorist networks. However, despite the apparent success of this approach (moral and propoganda), experience indicates that this technique is not very effective. Terrorist networks such as al Qaeda have proven to be extremely resiliant despite attempts at "decapitation."

The reasons for this are complex but understandable. Let's dive into this topic by first listing what organizational/network disruption means. Kathleen Carley, Ju-Sung Lee, and David Krackhardt in their paper "Destabilizing Networks" propose a well constructed set of criteria:

• The rate of information flow through the network has been reduced (perhaps to zero).
• The network, as a decision making body, cannot reach a consensus.
• The ability of the network to accomplish tasks is impaired.

However, evidence indicates that terrorist networks aren't susceptable to these measures of disruption due to leadership removal. The reason is that in a distributed terrorist network, intra-networking between emergent leaders radically reduces the impact of leadership removal. The removal of leadership from a distributed network is rapidly repaired. The reasons for this are:

• Redundant design. Existing leadership ofthen suppresses emergent leaders by acting as gatekeepers. If leadership is removed, emergent leaders quickly ascend to central positions by "turning on" connections that are already in place.
• Meta-matrix design. Distributed networks are actually composed of a meta-matrix of networks -- networks for information transfer, knowledge sharing, task completion, etc. This layered approach network design reduces the impact of removal of leadership from the social network alone.



• Dynamic design. Relationships in the network aren't dictated by assigned hierarchical relationships, rather they are based on a complex panoply of factors that are constantly changing. Therefore, the structure of the network is in constant flux in response to learning and adaptation by the individual nodes.

This analysis indicates that assassination isn't effective in disrupting terrorist networks. The belief that it will have a disruptive impact may be due to the "mirror imaging" of counter-terrorists that work in hierarchical networks. In fact, leadership removal may make the network more opaque to future analysis given the emergence of new leadership that may not be known.

Comments

[Srgtroy]

This is a rather 'quantative' analysis that doesn't take into account the 'quality' of the leader. In most cases, I would probably agree with it, as few leaders really stand out. But Yassin is an exception. Taking him out is a serious psychological and strategic blow to Hamas. Will they fold? Of course not. But they are a weaker organization without him.

[Michael Bernstein]

Obviously, in a network-like organization, it isn't the leaders that you want to remove (if such even exist in a network), but the Mavens and Connectors.

However, to the extent that Terrorist organizations *are* heirarchical, removal of leaders is viable. Of course, such organizations are thus forced to become more network-like, and therefore less vulnerable to this tactic, so it's utility is self-limiting to a degree.

[Watching Them, Watching Us]

The "Destabilizing Networks" paper recognises blood kinship ties between humans, but does not appear to try to model them in the simulation.

Don't terrorist (and other social) networks actually exist within a wider population of potential and actual supporters some of whom have blood relative ties with active network members ?

How can you be sure that by removing a particular leader, that this does not make him into a Martyr, which increases the membership of the active terrorist network ?

How can you be sure that by removing a particular leader that a more ruthless, more active, more competent or just luckier one does not rise up the ranks to replace him ?

If you are a non-active supporter of the cause, and one of your blood relatives is killed or murdered or arrested and tortured by the perceived enemy, then are you not even more likely to join the terrorists out of revenge ?

Does the Richard Dawkins "Selfish Gene" theory apply ? Isn't the next generation of terrorists being bred and indoctrinated by the families and clans of the "martrys to the cause" ?

[jj]

MRS Hassan should non have been shot and mutalated in this way, to cut off her arms and leggs. then SLASH her face after she was dead,is beyond me,as it sinks in the more BITTER i become,the more BITTER i become, the more RESENTFULL i become, I now belive the time has come to destory the the serpent,AND DO UNTO OTHERS AS THAY HAVE DONE TO US, and dont stop untill the HEAD is severed from that SERPANT (and dont think iam just talking about the about the the fighters in iraq

[nathan]

Micheal--would you mind expanding on "Mavens and Connectors?" You seem to have pointed at an internal weakness other than the traditional one of leaders. Very interesting.

As for the rest--in war you kill the enemy. Given a choice it is always more effective to kill an "officer" over a grunt. Also, I'm beginning to lean towards the emerging belief that Martyr is a conceptual reality in the Middle East but is showing less and less true tangible results--i.e. picking up the AK and going to duplicate your dead Martyr sacrifice--as the conflict goes on.

On the issue of blood ties creating more enemies. In order for the model to be valid (and it may well be) then it would work both ways. Kill a terrorist, his younger brother joins up. Ok, valid. Kill a Marine and a younger brother joins up. As the battle of Fallujah was one roughly 300 casualties (to include wounded) to 1300 then this means that even given a propensity to out populate the US, things are no exactly dire.

[Valdis]

Mavens and Connectors...

Carley & Krackhardt DO discuss these roles, they just use different terms. Social network analysts have a finer way of dividing up Connectors than Gladwell's simple definition. There are many types of connectors, each with its own unique strengths and weaknesses. To really understand connectors, and their MANY flavors, you need to dig deeper which Carley and Krackhardt are expert at.

[Alan Blair]

One could argue from a Small Worlds approach, that if you find the connective links you can kill them to disagregate the network. Right now we do not know enough about who to Kill.

Longer term I think biometric authentication is the way to go. Terrorists will find it hard to hide if they are known and their transactions moniteered. Of course this means that most privacy will go away. In some ways the developed world will be like a Small Village. Everyone will "Know" everyone else. This kind of knowledge means you can cut up the networks much more effectively.

In terms of Iraq, the most likely approach is to let the contending elites (Sunni, Shite, Kurd) fight it out. Our forces can prevent consolidate of an unfriendly regime at a relatively low cost. The Cost will be a generation of violence and misery for the Iraqies, but it should be no worse then what they already suffered with via Saddam for the past 30 years. If a stalemate occurs then perhaps a Democracy can evolve.

[I WANT TO FIGHT]

ALMOST IF NOT EVERY PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED BY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS.
its when you make things complex that the shit hits the fan

road side bombs? capture the guy that puts them there, torture him for info, EVERYBODY TALKS IF YOUR RAGHEAD AINT TALKIN AFTER TORTURE YOUR DOING IT WRONG

hearts and minds? try rewarding the hearts and minds of poeple one at a time starting with the ones who inform on your enemy. As for the rest, well they will learn first to cooperate ..then to hate those who take that which you give to them.

pesky insurgents? create a network of nationalist, patriots and spies. LET that information flow! get your own team of URBAN insurgents with no legel bounds! stop thinking defensive attacks and start think paralyzing sweeps.REMEMBER, nationalism is underrated: the proud french poeple of paris( DURING WWII NOT NOW!!!)fought off the germans to near submission before being "liberated" by deguale. The HItler youth (some of them 8 years old held their ground longer than many during later battles of the war, why? they were to proud to question what they were told.

terrorist media got you down? Hire a team of hackers! you might wonder: if everyone has an agenda then what is that of these websites posting these videos! Perhaps they are PAID to do so?! find out where this money comes from and you have yourself some HIGH DOLLAR BOUNTIES! of course if one where to thick headed to catch on to that or not have contacts with world best hackers *my email* then you could get a overpaid techie to help you crash websites hosting encrypted messages or videos.

[WeSaferThemHealthier]

I want to fight,
Thank you, that was great. Have you thought of submitting this to Fafblog?

[g510]

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Re. Alan Blair:

Biometric ID is no better than photo ID, and is easily spoofed (technical details omitted for the usual reasons). In the end, all forms of ID involve data stored on computers, and the risk does not go away when a photograph of your iris or your fingerprint is used instead of your face.

The arguement that we should give up our privacy is isomorphic with an entire series of arguements that sum up to: the only way to beat a given enemy is to become like him in some way. That, to my mind, is the worst kind of defeatism.

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Re. I Want to Fight:

Torture doesn't work; it gets you exactly what you want to hear. Read your history, the interrogation techniques that worked during WW2 did not involve torture. In fact, we got better intel by treating POWs with decency.

See also my comment above, re. not becoming like one's enemy.

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Re. disrupting terr networks:

The present Administration has hardly been discreet, with its frequent comments about "picking up terrorist chatter" and so on. This puts the enemy on notice, with the predictable results in terms of switching to hand-couriers and other non-technical means of communication.

A key characteristic of these networks is their reliance on cultural cues based on intimate localized knowledge. That makes them terribly difficult to penetrate via the normal HUMINT methods. Seems to me the key to this one begins with a few highly-placed defectors.