THE NEW BLITZKRIEG

In all cases of radical improvements in warfare, the actual improvement is made much more through new thinking on how to fight than from innovations in weaponry. These innovations in theory typically don't occur via a linear process of evolution but rather through rapid breakthroughs. A breakthrough of this type was made by the German General Heinz Guderian. In the early 1930’s he read the innovative theories of armored warfare written by Liddell Hart and JFC Fuller as was convinced they represented a radical change in how war can be fought -- as opposed to the stalemate of defense typified by WWI. In secret he practiced the methods he learned with cardboard tanks. Years later, he rode real tanks in a Blitzkrieg across France in 1940 with devastating effect.

Our current situation is characterized by a similar stalemate of defense. America and Israel are fighting a bloody war of attrition with terrorists with neither side able to achieve a decisive result. To trace the development of this new form of warfare, it is necessary to examine the how armored warfare achieved its success. There are strong similarities between it and what is coming.

The success of Blitzkrieg rests on a brilliant insight: modern militaries are heavily reliant on extremely large and ponderous logistics and communication systems. The relationship between fighting men and the people that support them is called the tooth-to-tale ratio. That ratio has been growing at a furious rate over the last century -- it is currently at high of 10 support people for every “trigger-puller.” The objective in maneuver-based armored combat (Blitzkrieg) is to separate the forward deployed fighting forces from their logistics and command system by driving to the rear of the enemy. Given the ongoing and immediate needs of the mass of forward deployed soldiers for copious supplies and strict command/control, the interruption caused by armored forces operating in rear areas rapidly results in a collapse along forward deployed line, pell-mell retreat, and capture.

In this new substrate (nation-states vs. non-state networks within a global, information economy), global guerrillas will use a similar insight to win decisive battles. In this context, the conventional armies of nation-states aren't the target, a nation-state's economic and societal infrastructure is. Specifically, our large urbanized population centers are reliant on a complex set of relatively automated infrastructures. The operational objective of the global guerrilla warfare will be to separate a large urban population from its infrastructure and take advantage of the collapse and chaos that results. Global guerrilla operations will rapidly maneuver to or swarm on an urban center's infrastructure, attack it as quickly as possible at critical junctures to cause systemic collapse, continue the attacks as long as practicable, and disappear until the next operation.

Comments

[Srgtroy]

Hmm. Guerrilla Flash Mobs? Interesting. I think you're onto something here. But will the enemy be sophisticated enough to pull off an attack of this nature inside the United States now that we have awoken to the general danger. They would still have to be able to infiltrate, arm, and communicate, something they have yet to do successfully since 9/11. Also, their very nature is to be decentralized, so this kind of activity might only take place at the granular intra-cell level. The minute they organize in a more inter-cell fashion, they will significantly heighten the chance of exposing their operation. Still, real interesting, I think.

[Andrew Batwash]

I look at your analogy from the perspective of the force facing the blitzkrieg. If you are correct, in order to adapt to the new methods of "warfare" it would seem to imply a need for the re-organization of not only the military, but of government agencies as well. As it stands we (as a government) are organized for one type of warfare, essentially the nation-state model, and are fighting a completely different one, a guerrilla model. The question then becomes, can we win as we are currently organized and if not can we adequately re-organize?

[JThomas]

Something tells me this isn't going to be too disruptive to Londoners. Their grandparents huddled together in some of those same tunnels during the real Blitz.

Point made, however, about distributed infrastructural warfare.

I'd be interested in seeing you write something about reflexive control measures, and how the true damage of attacks such as these comes not from the attacks themselves but from the involuntary immune-system response to the attacks.

I contend that the real, underlying purpose of terrorist attacks such as these is to provoke the target governments into becoming police states, thereby attacking our free and open societies, which are, after all, our only true advantage.

[Kevin]

Could it be that the attacks are timed according to a business cycle or possibly other hidden social patterns/rythems, in order to maximize collapse?

[John Robb]

J, reflexive actions are problematic and I will cover it in the future. The danger isn't that we will slide into police state, but rather that isolation/protection is at odds with the global economic environment (which is getting more integrated and open by the day). The more closed we are, the worse we do economically. Over the long term, this is a recipe for defeat. Economic attrition is the reason the cold war was won.

Kevin, these factors are being considered. Cold weather and gas/oil use. Hot weather and electricity and water (Iraq). Summer season for tourism (Egypt and Turkey). Morning rush hour for tansportation (London). Higher utilization puts systems close to collapse and creates the opportunity for cascades of failure.

[enigma_foundry]

1 "The success of Blitzkrieg rests on a brilliant insight: modern militaries are heavily reliant on extremely large and ponderous logistics and communication systems." or in one word: they are networks.

2. JT: Well case in point: the response to the London attacks lead to situation in which the Brazilian was killed. Obviously, this is the most important part of these operations, because it isolates England. (Remember our friend Boyd here, and his thought about isolation.) Remember also the song by Buffalo Springfield "Paranoia strikes deep,
into your life it will creep
what a field day for the heat..." Now this paranoia building in the minds of a category of people fits with deep ergonomics (see below)

3. "Something tells me this isn't going to be too disruptive to Londoners. Their grandparents huddled together in some of those same tunnels during the real Blitz."

The idea is different. The enemy would lose quickly if they got Londoners "huddled together in tunnels." They don't want that! This war is different, in the sense that there is an understanding of deep ergonomics, and they importance of Public Opinion. That is how people react as people, not how the might react as rational beings.

Reflect for a second on something a rabbi had said: Jews have withstood 1000 years of persecution, but three generations of prosperity in America, that will do us in. Rationality vs ergonomics. rationality in this case is really just a superficiality, as can be seen by several observations of behavoral evolution.

Now, I don't want to get distracted here on the Jewish people, but I think we need to center our understanding of this war on the importance of Public opinion, in democratic states, in which public opinion is the source of power. They will use the characteristics of our Society against us in this war, and the ultimate goal, a road to victory for the enemy, John is quite correct, is attrition of the connectivity of our networks, social, economic and also political. The problem is, that there are many ways to attack networks.

4. Getting back to the blitzkrieg, recall that the goal was to keep the enemy off balance, through errattic, fast and unpredictable actions, leading to the systemic failure of the enemy network. In this war, the actions have been errattic and unpredictable, but the speed element is one that they are having problems with. That suggests a failure mode for their operation, doesn't it?

5. "If you are correct, in order to adapt to the new methods of "warfare" it would seem to imply a need for the re-organization of not only the military, but of government agencies as well...."
Very important point, I don't think this can be underestimated. This is total war, in the sense that every possible avenue, every possible culture of knowledge is being organized conceptually to carry out the attacks. However, our defenses are not organized across disciplines and cultures of knowledge, and they need to be. 9/11 was one example. Another possibililty, that we really don't like to think about, certainly, is the extent that a properly crafted biological (or even just barely conceivably, a chemical attack) could cut across these disciplines to create truly horrific casualties, while possibly not leaving fingerprints.
This is worst case scenario: horrific casualties, no fingerprints.

6. Suggest some study of cellular automata, how they react and change to building emergent phenomena, and how small changes to rules by which the automata grow or die lead to changes in their large scale structures.

Also, playing go gives you a certain intuitive feeling about connections are made and how they fail, that is certainly valueable. Knowledge vs feeling.

[Kevin]

Would you consider 9/11 to be timed according to a peak in the business cycle(3/2001), to steepen the contraction and maximize contagion, forcing a recession?

[Other Kevin]

No, I would call that a strike at a moment of opportunity - the first chance they got.

[jaimito]

Against what the article presumes, no terrorist attack was ever registered in the developed world. Guerrilla attacks in Afganistan etc. blowing up electricity piles is not what you are talking about. In fact, no terrorist ever attacked a water supply system, an electricity source, or phone central, however easy is to do that. The cause of why the terrorists do not do what you suppose in your article they should do, is that most are unfamiliar with the working of modern urban infrastructure, they are unable to identify the weakest points. Also modern infrastructure is full of redundance, so it will be repaired soon with no during consequence.

[John Robb]

Jaimito, the required sophistication to do this is being learned in Iraq right now. The impact from the loss of Iraqi oil produciton due to these attacks has been felt globally (it is behind the current price you pay at the pump). Chechen terrorists have attacked Russian infrastructure in the past and even claimed responsibility for the recent Moscow power outage. This capability is growing but it is still in the early exponential stage. By the time it emerges from the background noise, we will have an amazingly difficult problem on our hands.

[Tom Smith]

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[james mASSEY]

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[Adam]

Jaimito,

Just to point out that Bin Laden has a degree in management and economics, and has experience in running one of the worlds biggest civil engineering companies. I think we can assume that he knows a few things about how systems work. We can also assume that he has passed this knowledge on.

"In fact, no terrorist ever attacked a water supply system,"

Again a minor point but Fatah in the 1960s ran a semi-successful campaign against such targets. Their first attack (Jan 1965, IIRC) was an attack on the National Water Carrier which is basically the water lifeline from North to South. Without the NWC, Southern Israel cannot operate. Protecting this water supply from Syrian dam-building was a major part of Israeli objectives in the 6-day war and remains one of the reasons that Israel still holds the Golan Heights.

Anyway Fatah's campaign ran for 2 years until the 6 day war, targetting Israeli settlements key infrastructure such as water pipelines.

"an electricity source, or phone central, however easy is to do that."

Probably not a direct target but the World Trade Centre 1993 knocked out the main electrical power line. This then took outa number of radio and television stations in New York. It also hit the telephone system. IIRC it was a week before things were resolved.

More direct terrorist attacks on nuclear power stations occured in 1982 (South Africa, attempted ANC sabotage using limpet mines). I suppose that these could be called attacks on electricity stations though their nuclear nature made them more tempting (way more bang for the buck, so to speak).