GLOBAL GUERRILLA SWARMING

Swarming tactics have been used successfully in wars throughout history by a variety of organizations from the tribal Parthians (horse archers) to 20th century Germans (U-boats). Global guerrillas (next generation terrorists) will likely use swarming tactics as part of their doctrine. This technique, in combination with new market-based financing techniques is what's called a killer combo.

Definition.
A good place to start an analysis of swarming is Sean Edwards' "Swarming on the Battlefield (PDF downloads). Here's his excellent definition of swarming: a primary maneuver that results in an attack from multiple directions (all points on the compass) by 5 or more (semi) autonomous units on a single target/unit.

Benefits.
It's easy to see the advantages of this type of maneuver:

• It cuts the enemy target off from supply and communications.
  
• It adversely impacts the moral of the target.
  
• It makes a coordinated defense extremely difficult (resource allocation is intensely difficult).
  
• It radically increases the potential of surprise.

Types.
Swarming is typically divided into two types:
Massed swarming -- Swarmers begin as a massed unit. They break apart and then swarm on target.
Dispersed swarming -- Units are dispersed (geographically) from the start. Once a target is identified, they converge to attack. This is the most difficult of the two types of swarming to defend against since the attacker never presents a massed target.

Effectiveness.
Historically, swarming is successful only when it scores high in the following areas:

• Elusiveness -- either through mobility or concealment.
  
• Long range firepower -- standoff capability.
  
• Superior situational awareness -- having more information about the enemy than they have about you.

Swarming contra infrastructure systems: guerre de course
Given this background, how will global guerrillas use swarming? First, the target for global guerrillas won't be isolated military units but rather urban infrastructure systems. The objective of these attacks will be damage that results in economic attrition. Let's examine how global guerrilla's will leverage swarming tactics to accomplish this objective.

The effectiveness of Global Guerrilla swarmers.
Global guerrilla swarmers will maintain their effectiveness across the vital swarming attributes in the following ways:

Elusiveness. Global guerrillas attain concealment through anonymity in large urban environments. Reliance on the local population isn't necessary. High degrees of mobility are accomplished by leveraging public transportation networks.

Superior situational awareness. Open source intelligence is easy to accomplish (via the Internet, the media, and other sources). Further, encrypted global communications, via the Internet, enables global intelligence sharing information sharing. The small size of operational cells limits the potential of discovery and counter-guerrilla intelligence development.

Standoff attacks. Like many historical swarming attacks, global guerrillas will have significant standoff firepower potential -- the ability to attack from a distance. However, this firepower isn't a traditional weapon, rather, its the global guerrilla's ability to use attacks on infrastructure to impact downstream systems miles (perhaps hundreds of miles) distant. Attacks will be rotated among infrastructures in a modern variant of horse archer tactics.

How global guerrilla swarmers will surmount traditional limits to operations.
Historically, swarmers have been limited by terrain, logistics, and communications. Global guerrillas will not be constrained by these limits. This makes global guerrilla swarming unique to history as can be seen in the attached 2x2 matrix. The upshot is that global guerrillas will be able to conduct dispersed swarming maneuvers on the operational level. Here's how global guerrillas will surmount the traditional limits on swarming:

• Ubiquitous public transportation networks (roads to airlines) enable rapid, low-cost transportation for dispersed units.
  
• Logistics requirements can be met via open economic transactions and don't require population support. The requirements for operations are relatively limited (damage to infrastructure requires low-tech tools). Additionally, the small size of the cells (~5 people) requires little housing/food/etc and in most cases would fall well below the threshold of detection.
  
• Real-time, anonymous, wireless communications (both data and voice -- VoIP, e-mail, Web, cellphones, etc.) enable global guerrillas to coordinate dispersed operations on the operational level. Tactical operations will be of a conventional type, typically by a single unit or individual.

Comments

[Albert Law]

Hi, I'm glad to have found your website. Besides Boyd, what military thinkers/philosophers do you read most?

Pardon the rookie question: What is a power law system?

[John Robb]

There's so many. I grew up reading Hart and Fuller. Most of the people I am reading right now wrote the books listed to the right of the site. A power law is a mathematical distribution that shows up as in graphs of different attributes of complex systems. Here's a good explanation (it explains a Zipf distribution which is basically a power law):

http://www.useit.com/alertbox/zipf.html

[Watching Them, Watching Us]

Interesting article, but a few questions spring to mind:

Given the lethality and range of today's weapons, isn't a "swarming" attack just a recipe for "Blue on Blue" or "Friendly Fire" casualties ?

Surely even elite forces like the SAS etc. obey the wisdom of putting their forces on one side of an ambush rather than risking "Friendly Fire" ?

In most combat situations isn't an attack from only two directions e.g. also from the flank or from the rear sufficient to win a battle ?

Is there not a military doctrine of allowing an enemy to flee a battle, without their weapons and supplies, rather than stand and fight to the last bullet, if they are totally surrounded ?

Is there any realistic prospect of efficient "Identitfy Friend or Foe" technology ever being developed - something which has eluded the miitary since WW2 and has been so evident in Iraq or Afghanistan ?

Isn't the reliance of "Global Guerillas" on say mobile phone networks also one of their primary weaknesses ?

[John Robb]

Great questions. I will answer them here soon.

[Chuckles]

I will attempt to answer Watching Them, Watching Us's questions for you. A swarming attack from six directions does not have to have all elements converge on an objective at once. Two groups can close to contact from the SW and SE, lets say, while two more elements could stand off to the NE and NW, with the target within the range of their weapons. These groups could provide surveillance of the target to all other teams. A cordon would be affected that would allow the target to fall back into an area that is thought as safe, but is really a kill zone. A further two elements would be posted as reserves/target-rescue-attempt reaction teams, say directly North and South of the assaulting groups. The equipment for the teams would be distributed as such: the assault teams will need high volume of fire close-in weapons (SAWs) or infrastructural attack materials and heavy personal armor in all instances. The Stand off/surveillance teams will need long range accuracy and anti-vehicle devices (my suggestion is a .338 Lapua cal. Sako Finnbear and some form of rocket, or similar gear. .308s suck). The need for armor should be minimal. The reaction teams will need anti-vehicle/anti-aircraft devices and possibly short range indirect support assets. These last two teams will harbor any vehicular assets. The Southern reaction reserve would replace one of the assault teams in the event of a disaster on the part of one of the assault teams to continue the assault, albeit in an uncoordinated manner, or at the least maintain an effective cordon should time permit. Or they could join the assault team to pile firepower onto a recalcitrant target. Either of the stand off teams to the North could act as an impromptu E or W reaction team, but only one could do so during an engagement, otherwise the cordon would be lost. The point to all of this is to unbalance and uncoordinate the target, while providing security to the attacker from outside interference from close by enemy elements. The creation of friction through confusion is the pinnacle of the military art. Sustained and overwhelming enemy effort aimed at cordoning the cordoners is to be avoided at all costs, including up to HALF of all involved personnel if need be in the event of a breakout from a disaster. Communications should consist of frequency hopping encrypted voice communications, not cell phones. Now six separate elements is nearing the effective control sphere of any commander and may necessitate two sub commanders for the North and South groups respectively; thus bringing the formation more in line with a regimental type (3*3) hierarchy. Friendly fire is still a concern, but not the haywire situation of five or six converging groups. Urban terrain lends itself rather nicely to the four element cordon. The cost for all of this? Not as much as one would think. Assault team SAWs could be replaced by homemade 40 cal. SMGs. Armor could be dispensed with (though cheap armor is available and can be doubled up to provide superior protection at increased weight). Anti-armor rockets can be made. 30-06 hunting rifles do the job for the NW and NE teams. Anti aircraft devices? Just bite the bullet and buy them; they are indispensable. The com system can be put together with reliable commercially available components at a fraction of the cost of similar military systems. Viola, a secure, cheap, hard hitting and flexible swarm.

[matthew]

if kids can take over a 50,000 square foot school building then 5 real determined guys with ak's and 2 way walkie talkies can get bush...cell division is what i think of. 1 part becomes2.then 2 is 4 and ect...terrorist by city bus,and cabs would be so easy

[Chuckles]

My above post is intended for the outlining of a squad or section level organization which may be tasked to engage a specific target of forces of a more regular nature. It is not intended for the ifrastructural attack role. However it should be noted that most infrastructual networks can have their higher level nodes protected by more than automatic surveilance. That is, while most govt's cannot afford to protect every infrastuctural element that exists within their territory, like local step-down transformers, it is possible to post gurds/raction teams on those infrastructural elements that would have the most impact in the event of an induced failure. If an operation were to require a greater or more perminant infrastructural impact, than it may be necessary for the type of small unit action listed above. Such an organization represents a greater level of capability than most guerilla units are now capable of. The standard ambush and run tactic does not cut it for the operations needed for major infrastructural attack.

[tim fong]

Manual track back:
http://www.xanga.com/item.aspx?user=edg176&tab=weblogs&uid=324008525

[Duncan Kinder]

Overt military swarms can be supplemented by low level psychological swarms.
Orwell, in "Shooting an Elephant" descibes how, when he was a colonial police officer in Burma, he frequently was targeted by such psychological swarms:

http://www.online-literature.com/orwell/887/

"In Moulmein, in lower Burma, I was hated by large numbers of people – the only time in my life that I have been important enough for this to happen to me. I was sub-divisional police officer of the town, and in an aimless, petty kind of way anti-European feeling was very bitter. No one had the guts to raise a riot, but if a European woman went through the bazaars alone somebody would probably spit betel juice over her dress. As a police officer I was an obvious target and was baited whenever it seemed safe to do so. When a nimble Burman tripped me up on the football field and the referee (another Burman) looked the other way, the crowd yelled with hideous laughter. This happened more than once. In the end the sneering yellow faces of young men that met me everywhere, the insults hooted after me when I was at a safe distance, got badly on my nerves. The young Buddhist priests were the worst of all. There were several thousands of them in the town and none of them seemed to have anything to do except stand on street corners and jeer at Europeans."

Orwell then proceeds to describe how these psychological pressures caused him - against his own judgment - to shoot a rogue elephant in order to please the crowd.

His loss of control was a microcosm of how the British Empire, in general, was loosing effective control at that time.

[tbrucia]

Interesting swarming techniques involving distributed attacks (but informed by a central core) is found on the internet. the creation and distribution of computer viruses, the creation of 'zombie networks', infiltration by tracking cookies, and on, and on, and on... All provide analogical parallels to global guerrilla techniques. Even when 'terrorist organizations' are not involved in these (and they seldom are), the lessons and knowledge to be derived from this 'virtual war' are more often than not very useful in the study of their military analogues. Can nation-state militaries learn from Symantec (just to name one company)? (I am not asserting that folks WILL learn from those involved in internet virtual warfare, simply wondering if they CAN)?