THE BAZAAR OF VIOLENCE IN IRAQ

A major difference between the guerrilla war we are fighting in Iraq and previous insurgencies is its lack of center of gravity as we commonly understand it (an ideology/party, ethnic independence, etc. or hierarchy). The real center of gravity in Iraq is a bazaar of violence. This bazaar is where a combination of local and global "hot" money is funding a diverse set of groups, each with their own methods of operation and motivations. Groups engage in co-opetition to share resources, intelligence, and funds (see the attached simplified diagram). They even expand operational reach by purchasing amateur mercenaries (not pictured).

A bazaar of violence is a hallmark of global guerrilla warfare. When a state collapses, as it did in Iraq, global guerrillas quickly arrive with money and violence. Through this funding, terrorist violence, and infrastructure disruption; global guerrillas create conditions ripe for the establishment of a bazaar of violence. In essence, the bazaar is an emergent property of global guerrilla operations within a failed or collapsed state. Once established, it builds on itself and creates a dynamic that is almost impossible to disrupt.

While it remains to be seen (although we will soon see it tested in Saudi Arabia) whether global guerrillas can collapse a weak state, it is clear that global guerrillas are more than capable of keeping a state in position of failure/collapse. By analyzing the feedback loops (ROI on attacks) for global guerrilla operations, the following pattern of activity can be discerned:

• Terrorist attacks. Car bombs, mortar attacks, snipers, etc. These attacks have a high return early in the process of destabilization. The media coverage is intense and the public is psychologically traumatized. The nascent governments reaction is often harsh which serves to alienate the people. It also serves to create new groups that either want to mimic active groups or those that want revenge for retaliatory government strikes. Over time, these attacks suffer diminishing returns (negative feedback) due to a lack of media coverage and population desensitization.
  
• Targeted killings (assasinations). These attacks, particularly if focused on relief or reconstruction organizations, can have an immediate and long-lasting impact on state recovery. It can break apart national coalitions and cause the withdrawl of companies and organizations that are critical to reconstruction. These attacks can also be used to dissuade participation in the government.
  
• Infrastructure disruption (network attack). These attacks are the bread and butter of global guerrilla operations. It deprives the emergent government of the ability to deliver those services necessary for legitimacy and economic recovery. It also, particularly in the case of Iraq, deprives the government of funds necessary for reconstruction and ongoing security. The rate of return from these attacks is by far the highest of all attack types.

Comments

[Chris]

I understand that the conditions we see today in Iraq (and Saudi Arabia) provide an excellent marketplace for violence.

But perhaps I'm a little foggy today - I don't really understand how the diagram illustrates the subject. Blue triangles mean financing? Do the arrows show cooperation or buyer-seller? Your outputs seem to be stated in terms of methods vs objective results.

Why not tighten up the diagram and consolidate some of these groups based on primary interests - for instance, the fedayeen and senior Baathists objectives are strongly overlapped, ie Baathist control of Iraq would seem to be a primary objective, with more focus on infrastucture attacks that have internal (Iraqi) impacts vs Zarqawi's focus on breaking up of the coalition. A clustering diagram with objectives (not methods) would provide a stronger visual that would be helpful in thinking about this topic. I want to know where they want to go. Attack/defense methods are then derived from those objectives.

There has to be some sort of vision these terrorists are seeing regarding an outcome. Anarchy for anarchy's sake is for malicious teens, which may be the case for some but not all of them.

Any emergence of a guerrilla effort into a statehood would provide a primary target for retaliatory strikes, particularly with a 9/11 repeat. Reversal of American foreign effort (ala Vietnam) through manipulation of the US population seems to be another objective (and one that worked in Spain), but unlike Vietnam there is an underlying resource that will be continously fought over until an alternative is found or the world ends.

[John Robb]

I added some detail to the diagram. Thanks for the feedback.

Some of these groups do have similar objectives, however, the bulk do not. Grouping them would make the diagram unintelligible (this was meant to provide a simplified "feel" for the marketplace).

Global guerrillas, particularly al Qaeda, see great benefit in Iraq as a failed state. Don't assume that control of the state's machinery is the objective of all groups.

[Srgtroy]

This new story from AP implies that the insurgency in Iraq is not as diverse as once thought, and is indeed primarily made up of ex-Baathist Sunnis, not jihadists. They are motivated primarily by the desire for a stake in the new power structure in Iraq, and not by religion. We finally seem to have a more complete picture of the insurgency.

AP: Iraq Insurgency Larger Than Thought

http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=514&u=/ap/20040708/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_insurgency_3

[John Robb]

This reinforces the bazaar concept. It demonstrates that the US military now thinks that there are significant nationalist/Baathist forces still in operation, despite prior claims that it was purely Jihadi now. Also, with Saddam gone, there isn't a clear leader of the Baathist guerrillas, and it is likely a highly fragmented movement. This is pure bazaar. Thanks for the link.

[WeSaferThemHealthier]

John,

There seems to be a vicious cycle here, I'm wondering how you think it could be broken ( if I am right that it exists ).

As long as the security situation is bad, very few companies want to come invest in Iraq and very few people with expertise that would help make the economy better want to risk dying. Also, few people want to cooperate with the government and the US military. Money is lost through sabotage.

As long as that happens, the economy and government services are quite bad. That creates malcontents which creates guerillas and also gives them a sea in which to swim. It makes the population unsure as to who will prevail and which horse to bet on so to speak. It also makes some poor people have to sign up with a militia just to get money for their family. All that ( I'm sure you can think of more effects ) makes the security situation worse or prevents it from getting much better.

So, to solve the security situation, government authority/services and the economy must get better and if the economy is to get better, the security situation must improve. A bit of a pickle.

Am I off the mark? If not, how can one turn this vicious cycle in a "virtuous cycle"?

[John Robb]

You are right. It is a vicious cycle, part by design and part through organic development. The solution is complex and may not be possible with the current security/defense system we have in place.

[Stirling Newberry]

Asking for clarification on the theory. Are you saying that "global guerillas" - what the French used to call "the dogs of war" -

1. are the catalyst for the formation of a marketplace for anarchy - I'm not going to use violence because that isn't specific enough here.

2. are drawn to nascent markets for anarchy?

or are you saying that the bazaar is demand driven - that groups look to fund anarchy, and the GG's, being specialized suppliers, move in, as military contractors gravitate towards occupation zones - in search of opportunities.

If so, what is the "ignition point" for the market?

[John Robb]

Global guerrillas are drawn to failed states. They can create the conditions necessary for the extablishment of the bazaar.

[Stirling Newberry]

So are they necessary, or merely sufficient for the creation?

That is, do you attribute all bazaar's for anarchy to "global guerillas"?

[Watching Them, Watching Us]

Reuters have an interesting report about how allegedly heavy handed and unintelligent tactics are fueling resentment and rebellion against the US occupation/liberation forces in Iraq:

http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=worldNews&storyID=7361812&pageNumber=0

"Iraq Rebels Vent Frustrations at 'Peace Conference'
Tue Jan 18, 2005 07:53 PM ET"

'"The conference was the third of its kind to be held in Baquba, a mixed city of Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims 65 km (40 miles) north of the capital. But virtually all of those invited to the conference were Sunnis, like Jasem al-Obeidi, who has felt increasingly marginalized since the U.S.-led war that toppled fellow Sunni Saddam Hussein.

"I was arrested by the Americans and spent five months in Abu Ghraib (prison) because they accused me of being a Wahhabi," said the 64-year-old former army officer, referring to radical Sunni Islamists blamed for many bombings and hostage beheadings.

"I may be a Baathist, but I am not a Wahhabi. They have raided my house three times since then. I live across the road from a National Guard station. Every time someone attacks it they raid my house." '
'"Some Iraqis say the Americans and the government should not assume all rebels were radicals determined to derail the elections. But night-time raids, checkpoints and arbitrary arrests were merely creating more enemies.

"The raids happen around 3 a.m.," said shopkeeper Mohammed Kamel. "We open the door before then so they don't knock it down."'