LOYALIST PARAMILITARIES

Iraqi uniformed forces are being rapidly trained to fight the growing insurgency in the country. This effort is showing signs of failure. These include:

• A lack of government legitimacy. The Iraqi government appears to be a puppet of the US (for lack of a better term). It has also been unable to deliver basic services (for example: electricity and street level security) to the Iraqi people that are at the core of claims to legitmacy. Soldiers won't fight for an illegitimate government regardless of how well trained they are.
  
• A successful campaign of FUD (fear, uncertainty, and doubt) by the guerrillas. Constant attacks against Iraqi forces (over 700 deaths this year) has driven up turnover (as high as 40% in some areas), adversely impacted recruiting, and forced Iraqi forces into a protective posture.
  
• Infiltration. Evidence is mounting that the low level of due diligence in the recruitment of Iraqi forces has resulted in force riven with insurgent sympathisers.

The Latin American Solution
The secret sauce of US counter-insurgency efforts in the post-Vietnam era are loosely controlled loyalist paramilitaries. This policy option is now very likely under consideration given the recent appointment of John Dimitri Negroponte as the Ambassador to Iraq. Negroponte was the Ambassador of Honduras during the establishment of the Contras and other Central American paramilitaries. These units enjoy multiple advantages over uniformed forces including:

• Legitimacy and loyalty. Unlike the uniformed Iraqi forces, militias draw on tribal, ethnic, and religious loyalties. Close knit units can be formed on the basis on long-standing relationships. This increases their ability to fight.
  
• Rapid ramp-up. These militias require little formal training. They can quickly leverage existing relationships and lines of loyalty to build units.
  
• Effectiveness. Decentralized militias have a record of effectiveness. They innovate rapidly and can draw on the same sources of strength available to global guerrillas.

Unleashing the Genie
The establishment of a counter-bazaar of loyalist paramilitaries in Iraq would quickly put the insurgency on the defensive. Over the next year, their establishment would likely result in a level of "controlled chaos" sufficient to allow the US to withdraw its forces. Additionally, these militias could operate while the government maintains a fig leaf of democracy. However, there are some negative consequences we can expect if this option is selected. These include:

• Institutionalized corruption. These militias would likely involve themselves in illegal activities. A government abetted franchise for their counter-insurgency activities would require inaction in regards to their criminal actions.
  
• Human rights abuses. These militias will operate within the same rule set used by the guerrillas they are fighting. This means assassinations, hostage taking, etc.
  
• Long term instability. While the militias will be able to put a lid on the growth of the insurgency, they will likely be unable to eradicate it. This means that Iraq will be stable enough for the US to leave but will suffer long-term instability.

NOTE: This is not an endorsement of this option, it is merely a exploration of what is possible.

Comments

[Strategic Armchair Command]

Interesting topic to digest. One thing straight off the bat, though. The contras were not a COUNTER-INSURGENCY MILITIA. They themselves were the insurgents, generated to fight an existing Communist government. Yes, the sandanistas were guerrillas at one point, but by the time the Contras entered the picture, the Sandanistas had won their guerrilla war against Somoza and had established a full fledged state government. The nature of the fight between the Contras and the Sandanista government is different than a potential right-wing militia vs. insurgent matchup.

Perhaps right wing miltias may be used by Allawi to augment the Iraqi Government's order of battle and do some dirty work, but they could never fully replace the more traditional Army, National Guard, and Police forces required to even attempt to govern effectively.

[John Robb]

I understand that. I spent a good portion of time in the 80's working in Honduras, Colombia, and El Salvador.

NOTE: I am going to rework this post as I continue to do research on the topic.

[Watching Them, Watching Us]

So what has been learned from the financing and use of regional and tribal warlord militias in Afghanistan ?

Are they not simply part of the problem ? Local militias inherently prevent any really free democratic election process, by intimidating or killing opposition candidates or voters in their local areas .

Perhaps a more Byzantine Empire approach is needed, where local military and civilian officials were appointed to rule towns or provinces well away from their own ethnic groups and familial or tribal power bases.

[tim fong]

John,
Intellectually you raise an interesting point about deniable, loosely controlled loyalist forces. You might also want to take a look at Fred Wakeman's book "Policing Shanghai," as well as other material about the Republican era in China.

The Kuomintang party started as an insurgent movement utilizing drug gangs and private armies. They ended up using the same gangsters to keep their hold on power, and against the Communists. In Japan as well, the Black Dragon (Kokuryukai) ultranationalist group functioned similarily against Japanese socialists/communists etc. Black Dragon operatives also worked as an intelligence arm in Asia. Some of the best stuff I've read on the subject came from more serious martial arts/oral history material.

I think the Asian example is intereresting because it "worked" relatively effectively in Taiwan (until the 90's) and Japan (ongoing). I'm not sure, from a transparency perspective, however that it's necessarily worth the cost. These type of loose network loyalists groups are ideal for running drugs, (secrecy/loyalty/shooters/covert trade routes) and hard to shut down when you are finished with them. And there is also the significant risk that they will co-opt your government (or become it!), which we saw in Taiwan until very recently. Anecdotally, I think the ongoing silent force of yakuza driven corruption has significantly hindered Japan's attempts at banking and finance reform.

By having large, nontransparent forces it adds a real transactional cost to the economy in the form of corruption, as you stated.

But more crucially, I think the real problem is that
loyalist paramilitaries are an example of a solution which fails the grand strategy test--they significantly deteriorate our moral standing/isolation. Unlike Japan and Taiwan 50 years ago, it's difficult to get stem the flow of information about the actual people in control, as well as the atrocities that will undoubtedly follow. I know you are a big Boyd fan. It seems to me that it would be difficult for the U.S. to maintain the moral high ground if, yet again, we support non-accountable gangs of criminal assassins.

[Brice Tebbs]

Some variant of this is likely to be 1/2 of our policy to get out of Iraq. This allows for a counter insurgency force to be really nasty while keeping much of the actual (if not moral) blood off of our hands.

The other 1/2 of how we get out of Iraq without it being considered a failure is that we will redefine success down to something we can achieve. Starting on Nov 3.

[Chui]

In East Timor, the Indonesian military funded loyalist paramilitaries to wreak havoc when the the East Timorese voted to seceed from Indonesia. However, these loyalist never gained legitimacy in the eyes of the East Timorese, because of the wanton violence that was unleashed upon the general populace.

It is more important for the US government to work on the illusion of legitimacy, through propoganda, and in schools. A lot of Iraqis would be happy to live through some semblance of normalcy after the craziness that has occurred over the last 24 months, that this alone may be sufficient.

[phil jones]

In a sense, aren't Al Quaeda themselves the result of supporting such "loyalist paramilitaries" in Afghanistan against the Russians in the 80s.

[haydar]

There are already plenty of competing militias in Iraq, just not under any semblance of government control. The Sadrists would have swept most of southern Iraq if local Shia' militias hadn't kept them in check. The British and Italians have had to rely on these "friendly" militias in order to maintain their positions. The IG itself is essentially a coalition of militias. Not exactly the makings of a liberal democracy.

The selection of Allawi and Yawar reflect a desire to cultivate renewed loyalties amongst the Baathists and the Sunni tribes. If some of these groups can be convinced to change sides, you have the makings for that "secret sauce". I don't see any evidence of success in that endeavour either, but then, in the chaos of Iraq that wouldn't be immediately obvious would it? Hard to tell who's zooming who.

[nathan meyer]

The issue of loyalist paramilitary units seems to come down to which historical group you use to illustrate your point? The examples of the use of anti-communist Yakuza in post war Japan was very effective. The use of the mob under Lucky Luciano by Naval Intel during the war to "police" the docks of the East Coast is also an example of it working. El Salvadorian death squads killing nuns, less nice, and Columbia is utilizing/being utilized by "loyalists" paramilitaries at the moment with rather mixed results.

Perhaps the idea of a super "block-watch" level of paramilitary groups might work. Loyalty is very regional, no cross-nation coordination, easy to isolate and control with federal forces after their need is done. A larger framework organization working at least nominally under control of a centralized political party or charismatic leader (like Delta Force for Republicans, if you will, lol) would be a horse of a different color.

Navy SEALs used PRUs--Provincial Recruit Units-- in Viet Nam to great effect. Basically they functioned like a combination locals-only National Guard and pro-government guerrilla cells. They knew the land, the population and had no idea of political affiliations beyond their own “county.” This might prevent disruption of long term planning but bolster war options on the local level.

[ali]

Yes paramilitaries are a likely method, and I have been gob-smacked that the US has not drawn heavily on its extensive ‘dirty war’ experience in the 20th century when faced with Iraq.

But in South America did the situation on the ground remotely resemble Iraq? Death squads have their uses but the US now faces multiple mutually hostile enemies in Iraq. The main danger is that the insurgency escalates into full blown civil war. I’d have my doubts that a few bought Baathists can tamp down the insurgents.

Rule#1 with an insurgency is: do not let it get legs. Machiavelli recommends vigorous atrocity at the start of a conquest. The time for Syrian solutions was 2 years ago. War is like that, dithering is a sure path to defeat.

[John Robb]

Thanks. Lots of great feedback here. Unfortunately, very little analysis exists on this topic (particularly in the form of general rules on how to build, use, and contain these paramilitaries).

It terms of complexity, Iraq is vaguely similar to Colombia, which had multiiple narco terrorist groups as well as a leftist insurgency. However, Iraq is a much more difficult problem. The reason is the number of external sponsors of the insurgency -- which didn't exist in Latin America.

From the independent violence capitalists like bin Laden and Zarqawi to the traditional regional state sponsors like Syria, Pakistan, and Iran -- Iraqi insurgents are getting the support they need to flourish. Due to this external support, the US is at risk of a *reverse* Afghanistan (the most successful strategy the US has used against the Soviet Union during the cold war).

[tim fong]

John,
One more Asia related topic. This is from memory so I may screw up some details. In the ramp up to the Boxer Rebellion in China there were village self protection groups formed. Some of them, taught by people who would later attack the foreign legations. The Boxers were anti-foreign/loyalist militias run amok. I seem to remember that it was based on the old imperial pao/jia system of household responsibility. Joseph Escherick wrote a book about it, _The Origins of the Boxer Rebellion_.

[Culloden]

In Highland Scotland, the Campbells of Argyle funtioned as enforcers for the government, keeping such malcontents as the MacDonalds under heel.

[Watching Them, Watching Us]

Reuters reports, quoting Newsweek, that maybe Latin American style death squads are now on the agenda for Iraq

"U.S. Considers Elite Hit-Squads for Iraq -Report"
http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=7272484&src=rss/topNews

[NoParty]

I guess now we'll give them at least 6mos notice so they'll be caught by surprise when we finally get this pushed through. I a perfect world, this would have been news being uncovered that happened a year or so ago.

[raoul]

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