TARGET: THE FALLUJAH TAZ

Fallujah is a TAZ.  A temporary autonomous zone that is being used by global guerrillas for regional operations.  It isn't a central hub of the insurgency, because there isn't any central hub.  The insurgency is a decentralized entity composed of many small networks that coordinate their activities through the open source bazaar.  A good definition of Fallujah (and other locations like south Wazirastan) is that it is:

• A lawless zone
• that is locally controlled and
• fiercely independent.

What a TAZ provides

A TAZ is not a major source of funding, manpower, or supply for the insurgency.  It doesn't power the insurgency at a root level.  It is merely a geographic zone that is free of state control -- an organic byproduct of a failed or weak state.  Global guerrillas find sanctuary in a TAZ because they fight the same enemy.  The state.  A TAZ provides:

• Basic shelter (housing, etc. that can be bought).
• Freedom of movement (it is a no-go zone for forces of the state).
• Open commerce (interconnections with other groups, trading, etc.)

Collapsing the TAZ

The current operation to take Fallujah pits US Marines (and their reconstituted Peshmerga and Badr Brigade allies) against local boys, organized by neighborhood, mosque, family, or tribe.  Most of the global guerrillas previously operating in the city are already gone.  However, some will stay for the fight (as payment for the support provided and/or due to a strong affection for the city's people).  The net result will be:

• A good fight.  The city is being defended by people that are fighting for their homes.  This isn't Najaf (which is often cited as the model for Fallujah), where the militia was bused in.  Think Grozny lite (to the limited extent that traditional Arab warfare can translate to siege warfare).
• Little damage to the insurgency.  Most of the people and equipment we want to kill or capture is already gone.  The US/Iraqi government telegraphed their desire to retake the city months ago.  Further, many other locations are available (the US does not have enough troops in country to make a full court press on every TAZ in Iraq).
• A moral loss.  The first target seized by the US military was Fallujah's hospital.  The reason:  to limit information (or disinformation) on the number of casualties generated by the firepower heavy Marine assault.  Despite this action, the media will deliver the moral message.  A weak force of local "freedom fighters" has been crushed by a powerful US military.  As a result, we will likelly see a Sunni boycott of the elections.

Comments

[Watching Them, Watching Us]

Even if the US and Iraqui Government forces rapidly re-take Fallujah, how does anyone expect free democratic elections to be held there in January or February ?

The Iraqui Government has now declared a 60 day state of emergency everywhere except in the Kurdish north:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3990141.stm

Even Communist dictatorships do not risk their credibility by conducting their fake "elections" during a state of emergency.

[Tom Grey - Liberty Dad]

This does seem like a crucial point -- if the Sunnis boycot the election, then what? (Split into 3 countries, with the Sunnis in the middle, with NO oil? I do not think so. But maybe.)

On the other hand, if there is an Iraqi freedom fight victory in Fallujah, followed by the most free and fair elections of any Arab Islamic country (low bar, but why not? "most free" seems a pretty good standard), will you then believe the Iraq war was worth it?

How good does Iraq have to be before it IS worth it? Or is it possible? And does your criteria refer, as well, to Sudan?

[Strategic Armchair Command]

Fallujah is a sanctuary not because of its physical characteristics as a defensible city, but primarily because it has a large population which at the very least tolerates the insurgents and allows them to "hide" within the population.

As most of the population has left Fallujah, the real sanctuary is already gone. However, once all the civilians return, so will the insurgent 'sanctuary', and all the insurgents who previously left with it.

The bottom line is that the only a political solution that convinces the Sunni minority that they have a stake in a democratic Iraq will end this insurgency. Since we have failed to 'entice' them, and admittedly it's a hard sell, we are essentially just trying to coerce them, which won't work, and only will engender a vicious cycle.

Barring a moral disaster, clearing Fallujah out will have a positive but only temporary effect.

[nathan]

While as John states, a "full court press" is not possible, should not TAZs, as a rule of consolidation, be dealt with? If, as is stated, most foreign operators are gone then shouldn’t national dissidents be brought to heel? Jefferson Davis and General Lee were not given carte blanche after French advisors bailed out. Sherman ‘marched to the sea,‘ as it were. First entice, then warn, then promise, then deliver. After awhile maybe the Sunnis will get tired of dying, this happens in war--the enemy is simply defeated, not cajoled. The next time a Zarqui shows up maybe someone who suffered defeat at the hands of the Marines and who is not eager to do so again, will inform intel for the reward money?

[Dinger]

Seems like this attack may be like trying to catch fish with your hands. We may get some, but when we walk away how many are left to swim free and breed in the pond?

Still, it will give the conventional forces guys a nice operation to exact 'payback' for IED and mortar attacks they suffer. Could it be that this is as much about improving moral of the grunts as it is to catch rebels?

[haydar]

http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5744,11314459%255E2703,00.html

The above link is a short but powerful read about the progess of the Algerian anti-colonial struggle.

According to Ghaith Abdul Ahad, there are plenty of foreign fighters in Fallujah, but they are the cannon fodder, not the masterminds. Rest assured that there is an inexhaustible supply of young Arab men ready to fight for Arab honor (for all they talk about Islam, this a definite subtext), and unlike occupied Palestine, Iraq is very easy to get to. It is also convenient for the various Arab governments to turn a blind eye, as this siphons off popular dissent in their own countries.

We are, of course, winning the battle of Fallujah handily, and we will establish control of what is left of the city, just as the Russians have established control of Grozny. Next up, Ramadi. And then Baqubah, and maybe Samarrah again, and eventually the big fish, Mosul. This could get very circular.

[Sam]

I was under the impression that Falluja was the largest concentration of militants. Is Mosul even bigger?!

[Watching Them, Watching Us]

The censored media reports about the military operation in Fallujah seem to be rather like the Vietnam war, with figures for the number of for "insurgents"/ (Viet Kong) killed compared with US casualties, seemingly the only measure of military success.

Who knows if these were all really "insurgents" or not ?

How many civilian casualties were there ?

How many prisoners have been captured alive ? Are they being treated according to the Geneva Convention, or are they going to be shipped off to Guantanamo Bay ?

How effective were the forces who were allegedly sealing off the Fallujah area (including the United Kingdom's "Black Watch" battalion), rather than those actually involved in the assault ?

Have the "insurgent" leaders escaped elsewhere ?

What happens now to Fallujah ? When the "embedded" journalists go back to Baghdad, will the town be forgotten ?

Where is the carrot of immediately improved
living conditions to go along with the big stick ?

How can a free or fair election possibly be held in Fallujah in January ?