IRAQ'S SECURITY SYSTEM MELTDOWN

The most important result of the reduction of the Fallujah TAZ was the decimation of Iraq's security.  From all perspectives, the global guerrilla campaign against the Iraqi security system has been an unqualified success. Here's how it rolled out:

• Pre-action preparation.  Hundreds of attacks, including high profile mass assasinations, have shaken the Iraqi security system to its core.  The net result:  50% attrition within Iraqi national guard groups.
• Test Failure.  In a crucial test of the battle readiness of Iraqi unit, they failed.  In the 24 hours prior to the attack on Fallujah, 100 of the remaining 425 men in Iraq's best-trained battalion, normally 850 men, headed for the hills.  The only troops that remained were reconstituted Kurdish pershmerga.
• Coup de grace.  Since then, attacks on Iraqi forces (mostly against the police, given the national guard has been gutted) have escalated across Sunni Iraq.  For example, attacks on multiple police stations in Mosul resulted in the scattering of ~5,000 policemen.  The commander was fired and there are reports of policemen switching sides.  This was repeated across Sunni Iraq.  Total policemen on-hand in Iraq dropped from 84,900 to 43,900 between August and October.

A Systemic Failure

Iraq's security system is currently in free-fall.  All the major elements underlying its potential for success have crumpled under pressure from global guerrillas (the total numbers of troops on hand have actually decreased since January 2004 -- see chart):

• A crisis in the state's legitimacy.  The interim Iraqi government, due to ongoing attacks on infrastructure, has been unable to deliver the basic services required to legitimatize the government.  Iraq is in failure and economic collapse.  The net result is that the state is required to rely on market factors to build its security system.
• Market failure.  The all-volunteer security model initially worked due to widespread unemployment (estimates are as high as 75%).  However, ongoing attacks have distorted the the employment equation.  A high probability of death or dismemberment is now part of the job description for positions in the police and national guard.  These troops stayed in place as long as things went well.  They have since proven they will melt away at the first sign of danger.  This market failure has thrown the Iraqi government back onto ethnic loyalties.
• Loyalist paramilitaries.  To fill the ranks, the Iraqi system attempted to build on the loyalty of Shiite and Kurdish fighters.  However, lukewarm support for the interim government by Shiites (at least until the elections) and the promise of tough fighting has left only the Kurds (reconstituted peshmerga) in the ranks. 

Globalization in Free Fall

The systemic failure of Iraqi security, creates the following situation:

• Ethinic passions on the rise.  The use of Kurdish fighters in both Fallujah and Mosul has exacerbated the insurgency. 
• The US in the hot seat.  Left with the security burden, the US is in a tough position.  Its firepower intensive tactics (force protection 2GW methods) are causing more damage to the Iraqi government's legitimacy than it provides.  Further, we also don't have the troops in country to even approximate what is needed to provide a modicum of basic security.
• Complete system failure.  This has set the stage for ongoing attacks by innovative guerrilla entrepreneurs on all other aspects of globalization in Iraq (people, resources, and investment).  The economy will remain in failure, as will the state.

Comments

[Mighty Mike]

So much pessimism, so little time. You really need to inject some objectivity in your Fallujah portrayal. Germany took how long to reconstruct? Fallujah took a week to overtake? Insurgents without a Iraqi home base? Get real

[Greg]

I believe a major part of several of these previous posts has been that Fallujah isn't and hasn't been an actual center or base for the insurgency. The nazi germany comparison misses the issue of system disruption entirely, since that technique wasn't a factor in the very limited resistance of a nation already gutted by 6 years of war. The model for rebuilding may not be completely off, but Germany/Iraq or Japan/Iraq comparisons overlook some major differences.

anyway, it seems that even the Iraqi government understands that attacking Fallujah is not eliminating an insurgent base. The hope was that it would serve as an example, but the plan seems to have backfired. I guess only time will tell for sure.

[praktike]

psst: Mighty Mike--how many US troops and German government types were killed in the reconstruction of Germany?

[Eric]

Germany/Iraq or Japan/Iraq comparisons miss another important element: NATO. Also, remember, Germany was divided (East and West) between two superpowers that then fought about it for the next fifty years.

[Ricardo]

Comparisons between German-Japan and Iraq are truly ignorant. If one is looking for parallels in history look at Lebanon, Somalia, Vietnam (French and American), Algeria (French), Angola (Portuguese), Etc.. The examples are plenty, and I ask you a question: was there ever a case of an occupier eliminating a home grown insurgency? Of a modern western army winning a 4gw conflict?

[Strategic Armchair Command]

The basic difference between Germany/Japan and Iraq is that with Germany/Japan, we were attempting to shift an already homogenous nation-state that existed for centuries from dictatorship to democracy.

In Iraq, there is no nation-state. We are trying to build one from scratch. This is a challenge that is an order of magnatude more complex than what we faced in Germany/Japan. Given the tribal and primitive realities of the Middle East, it is most likely a fool's errand.

That said, it would be nice John if you provided the source information for your portrayal of the meltdown of Iraqi forces. Not that I don't believe you, but without sources, it does appear more of an opinion than a fact.

[Usher]

The Germany/Iraq comparison doesn't match simply because the spirit of the German people was destroyed and they were thoroughly defeated as a people. This was a necessary consequence of the complicity of a willing majority of their country in many of the worst atrocities the world has ever seen. Japan was similarly defeated, destroyed and completely at our mercy as their crimes across Asia ultimately and sadly warranted.

Iraq is clearly a different case. It was not entirely at our mercy in 2003 and our moral legitimacy (rightly or wrongly) has been roundly criticized since before the invasion.

That said, it is very different from Vietnam too. There, simply demonstrating our willingness to stand and fight, was an important show of strength to our larger and well defined Soviet adversary. In Iraq standing and fighting is not enough. We have to win because a losing means a failed state from which we can be threatened more capably than Saddam would have ever dared. Vietnam was lost in "the hearts and minds." Germany and Japan's peace was secured through the hearts and minds...we offered them a credible path to something better.

I don't envy the job of President Bush as the security of the entire free world may rest on his ability to win the hearts and minds of Iraqis.

[Marcello]

So much pessimism, so little time. You really need to inject some objectivity in your Fallujah portrayal. Germany took how long to reconstruct? Fallujah took a week to overtake? Insurgents without a Iraqi home base? Get real

Yes, because as everybody know at the end of 1946 american troops were engaging panzerfaust toting former regime loyalists in pitched battles, while the air force pounded german cities on a daily basis...
Except of course that nothing happened (save in Condi's mind, maybe).
The USA suffered precisely zero combat casualties in the occupation of Germany.And as far the reconstruction goes, the question is if we are rebuilding Iraq even just only slighty faster than we and the insurgents are blowing it up.Again that is comparable to Germany...How?

[F.Baube]

The peshmerga begin to sound like the Czar's Cossacks. Not a promising way to mend inter-ethnic fences. What's next? The Kirkuk Wall?

[b]

@Strategic Armchair Command said:
In Iraq, there is no nation-state. We are trying to build one from scratch. This is a challenge that is an order of magnatude more complex than what we faced in Germany/Japan. Given the tribal and primitive realities of the Middle East, it is most likely a fool's errand.

You must be a deep racist. Iraq is a nation at least since 1921 - three generations - longer than many other nations.

What you call "tribal" is the normal "big family" bands that are well known in many "western" countries. The have a social function and in this are emphezised when the state fails. They are reduced when the state is able to take over its socuial function again. There is notheing special ME in this.

What are "primitive realities" in Iraq? Those the US is inducing there. Before there was a mostly secular state, with high education levels and good social/medical infrastructure and open boarders.

[nathan]

Ricardo--here are some examples of nation-states defeating insurgents, off the top of my head which are from this half of the century. Greek revolution. The Britons in Belize. The U S in El Salvador. East Timor (through the heavy use of SAS mercenaries from Executive Options) and--I don’t know why I’m drawing a blank--but at least half-a-dozen African countries since 1960 or so (also all with much capacity bolstering from the infamous EO).

John--I love your site. You are a great analyst, able to take disparate facts and weave them together into fresh insights. This shows imagination as well as intelligence and is a superior form of thought to simply regurgitating facts. You do good work here.

Over thing I have noticed is a newer trend on your part. I believe that your research on global guerillas has led you to a certain sympathy or romanticism with the terrorists. I’m not talking about their cause, but rather the human tendency to root for a David vs. a Goliath. This takes the form of reading into every guerilla action consequences which are dire to the extreme for the U S and profitable beyond measure for the terrorists.

Fallujah is what you described in Alexander the Great and the Scythians. In a guerilla war anytime the larger conventional force can trap/gather/coax the scattered cells into a battle to fight head-to-head it is a good thing. It is the only way to publicly defeat (other than capturing leaders) and humiliate a phantom enemy. It is a foundational principle of counter-insurgency (I believe the Shiite cleric was lured into Sadr City for just such a purpose). Also Arab culture (not being racist here, I’m paraphrasing Mohammad, Xerses, and Lawrence of Arabia) is one that fights victory based --motivationally that is--like the French under Napoleon. This is as opposed to an example like the Texans after the Alamo or Russia after earlier defeats allowed Nazi Germany to push deep into its country. Each public, bloody defeat may cause a public clamor on Al-Jazeer but as far as promoting a rally to the cause, it slows actual fighter recruitment.

Finally, you seem selective about your use of information on the Iraq armed forces. I give you the police, whole heartedly--how useless, what cowards, what traitors to their own country. But the National Guard? Reports abound how they are congealing into war-fighters. 36 Commando is one of the best units in the country, including conventional American forces. Have some been less than great, sure. Not all. Just saying you seem to (slightly) be loosing the objectivity which makes your observations so strong.

By the way, the comparison about Kurds and Cossacks was a very astute one to whoever wrote it.

[Ricardo]

Nathan:
Greece and El Salvador were civil wars, not an insurgency against an occupier, so they are good examples either. And I have never of Executive Outcomes (not Executive Options as you posted) in East Timor. East Timor is in actually a case were the insurgents won and sent the occupiers packing. The British in Belize were supporting the government, not an occupier either.

[nathan]

Greece and El Salvador, Yes the they were civil wars--you’re correct. Indigenous insurgents attempting a take over (uprising)of the sitting government who are defacto occupiers, they "occupy" their own country.This is like Iraq; America has troops on the ground, Iraq now has its own government. The larger point is guerilla forces against conventional ones, however I agree my examples were in this broader sense and not precisely concise. You are right on this technical matter.
The insurgents/terrorists I was referring to in East Timor were the pro-Indonesian militia forces fighting the UN program/Local Government. This group was defeated. Much of the counter-insurgency warfare was conducted by mercenaries working for Sandline International which emerged from the disbandment of EO (thank you for pointing out my error in name) by order of the South African government under international pressure. Like EO, Sandline (think “Son of EO”) is notorious for filling its ranks with SAS veterans. Sandline was working for international copper mining interests. The Copper mines were not nationalized but remained under influence/ownership of the companies which funded Sandline. Morals might be called into question in this situation, but not that the UN backed government defeated a pro-Indonesian influence militia.
Ok, Britain was helping a local government against a rebellion in Belize. Much as the US is doing with the UN mandated government in Iraq. The examples are of irregular forces being defeated by regular/conventional forces.
Did I write a little clearer this time? (not being sarcastic, I genuinely wish to be understood)--Nathan

[Maru]

The difference between Germany and Iraq was that in Germany, we were reconstructing a western market democracy gone temporarily insane.
It is like the difference between trying to heal a paranoid, and trying to program an AI from scratch.

[Greg]

well I think the biggest problem we're having here comes from the simple fact that the winners write the history. any military occupier will put a local regime that favors them in power. if they lose the war, then they were an evil invader who got kicked out with their lackies. if they win, they were supporting a local government. see the problem? in any case, I buy the argument that an insurgency can be defeated in general by a foriegn power.

I think John has pointed out some good reasons why attacking Fallujah could have negative consequences for the US. are they definately enough to doom the occupation? well of course not. are they enough to make the attack not accomplish what it intended? that much is possible.

It seems to me that some of the allegations of racism and extreme pessimism floating around are not appropriate to the discussion. Iraq does have tribal militias. my family doesn't run its own little army. that much seems to suggest that saying there are tribal allegiances at work in Iraq is not racist, and there are some differences between what's going on here and say the United States. perhaps some pessimism is in order, in any case. I remember when suggesting there would be an insurgency at all was called pessimism. perhaps if back then more planning had gone into dealing with that eventuality, a lot of Iraq's internal problems could have already been sorted out. who knows? in any case the way I see it some limited pessimism is justified, and may help bring out better solutions for possible future problems than saying "oh, Fallujah was a definate and unquestionable success. we're now on the road to victory" is likely to.

[Ricardo]

I don't think that claiming that the current government of a country qualifies as an "occupier". Cases of a modern state defeating an insurgency are a dime a dozen. If one wants to be pedantic about it, I meant a "foreign occupier". I am sorry about the omission, but I thought that it was obvious. The current govt. of Iraq is in a lot of ways alike all the "puppet" govts seen throughout history, like Vichy in France. So again, I ask for an example of a "foreign occupier" and/or its puppet gvt ever eliminating a "homegrown" insurgency. Isn't that the case in Iraq? And the answer is relevant, it shows that culturally and psychologically a foreign occupier never has the political will to defeat the "tribalism" will of the homegrown insurgents.

On another note, I don't remember anything about Sandline in East Timor either. They were dismantled after the debacle in PNG. Nathan: could you please point me where I can find anything about them in East Timor? I will interested in reading.

[nathan]

Greg.
Who are you and what are you doing on these boards? I demand an answer!
Constructive pessimism as a learning tool? Mistakes seen as a pathway to fine-tune stradegy as opposed to evidence of the Overwhelming Undefeatable Hand of Doom? Surely not, sir!
You sound like. . .like. . .
the voice of reason. ;>

[Greg]

me? I'm Greg. I wandered in while looking for a site keeping track of the insurgency in Iraq besides http://www.icasualties.org, which really doesn't address the overall issues of the conflict (except to link to various news articles). I'm not sure I'm a voice of reason in general. on politicalcompass.org I come out way down in the libertarian section and just a little bit to the right. I'm personally opposed to organized religion. oh, and in my spare time I sing heavy metal. so I may not always seem to be the reasonable side of the conversation ;)

I just feel that a lot of these discussions tend to get bogged down when people refuse to see anything besides what they want to (this happens to both the political right and left from time to time, but right now it's the right wing that seems to be more caught up in trying to see how things MUST be working out in Iraq instead of how they can maybe change things to work there in the future) and start throwing around slightly veiled insults. I mean presumably nobody's here rooting for fundamentalist Islam, and it's counterproductive to get worked up over pessimism. the fact is things are not going particularly well (and even if they were, there would be plenty of good reasons to point out the few things that were going wrong because those are the issues that have to be dealt with) and it makes sense to look at what and why.

I think the real question when dealing with Fallujah is not how much damage it has done to the US or to the insurgency (because it certainly doesn't seem to be fatal to either one), but whether or not it is a workable approach for dealing with the insurgents in the future. John thinks not. I'd be inclined to agree. in any case, he has made his prediction and if you disagree the thing that makes sense is to watch and see if they come to pass. This is what our military analysts are (or damn well better be) doing on their own with their own predictions. this will tell us whether Fallujah is a solution or a mistake not to be repeated, and ragging on someone for a pessimistic prediction misses the point entirely.

[nathan]

Good post, thanks Greg--just teasing--thanks for the response.
Ricardo--here is one of several e-dresses http://www.asiapac.org.fj/PJR/issues/next/2000kopassus.html
I found with a quick google.
My original instance of coming across this tree in the forrest of our discussion was in a Denver Airport reading a SOF issue. I didn't think A) you'd want me to try and mail you a subscription, lol, or B) you'd take it as an unimpeachable source.
The article I read dealt with counter-insurgency ops in releations to copper mining industry. This seems to show a triangulation of involvment by Sandline/EO.Part of the reason international bodies came down so hard on them in the first place.

As to your original question. I think your suggesting that excamples of coventional forces defeating guerillas isn't good enough. That the philisophical energy of a righteous uprising against forgein occupiers (we disagree on the use of the US in Iraq as an example--but whatever)puts this in a special light, Is that right?
A guerilla rebellion is not a guerilla rebellion (from a purely tactical view point not morally or ethnically)but something diffrent? All invaded peoples throw off the yoke of oppression? Just trying to see exactly what you mean, thanks--Nathan

[phil jones]

"I ask you a question: was there ever a case of an occupier eliminating a home grown insurgency? "

The one normally given in the British in Malaysia. Which seems to have been won on a massive hearts and minds effort.

[Ricardo]

That is what I am thinking: I don't believe that a foreign occupier is capable of defeating/eliminating a homegrown insurgency. Guerrilla is a tactic, an expression of warfare, it doesn't describe motivation. Insurgency/rebellion does. Still, an example?

How is the US not an occupier? We invaded, defeated the soverign regime (no matter how corrupted or brutal, that is not in question), and installed a regime of our own chosing without consultation. How is that this is not an occupation? The fact that we are (hopefully) benevolent in this whole affair does not change the way that it is perceived by the country being occupied.

[nathan]

I think you make a valid point in general, in specific I think Phil answered it better than I did.
As a point of clarification (again we won’t specify Iraq as you don’t like that example) but do you think there is no difference between liberator and occupier? I don’t mean this as a question of propaganda about how to look at Iraq in specific at this moment, but on the concept/meaning that the words stand for as a whole? If you do not think there is a difference between these words in general than discussing them in terms of Iraq is probably a waste of time. If however you agree that one can be a liberator, using occupation as a temporarily necessary tactic until a freed people can build a strong government of their own, then a comparison to Iraq could be made on a point by point basis.

[nathan]

Ricardo, sorry about posting twice in a row--something about the spiritual/philosophical nature of your question didn’t let me wrap my mind around it correctly (on my part I mean). Phil gave you a recent example. Recent. I think that is a pertinent point. The recent/modern history of post-WWII world affairs was not just wrapped up in communism/anti-communism. It was also directly affected by the rise of anti-colonialism. That is as democracy (American) emerged into the for front the population of America began to question the practice of colonialism in European allies and in (shock!) itself. There for as African, Asian and Central American countries attempted to escape from colonialism the populations of the oppressive countries saw the actions as wrong and held back support for maintaining such enterprises. Thus foreign sovereign nations emerged in all those place. Some by use of guerilla warfare. But as a world wide movement the use of arms against the Superpowers didn’t turn the tide so much as public opinion within those Superpower countries.
Up until that change in paradigm by the public just about every country in South/Central America, Africa and the South Pacific could be seen as examples (noted exception being an India) of numerous populous uprising occurring being defeated by occupiers. For a tiny example: Honduras, El Salvador, Haiti by extensive use of US Marines just prior to to WWI. The population was forced by corrupt puppet governments to pick bananas for the United Fruit Company as virtual slaves. The people rose up in one country after another, defeated loyalist forces. The Marines came. The people went back to picking bananas. Ugly, but numerous legitimate examples.

[Ricardo]

First: Phil, you are right on. The Brits in Malaysia is the classical example, and it was won by a massive hearts and minds campaign and very precise SAS operations. There are other examples too that nobody mentioned: the Brits again in Kenya using witchcraft (I am not kidding) and the Brits in the Boer wars. But all these insurgencies were in sparsely populated areas where the British were a well established colonial power. But again, I can’t remember a case of an invader-occupier winning against an insurgency. The examples on the contrary are so numerous and current that I decline to mention them.

Nathan: that is exactly my point: the public opinion, and therefore the political will, of the “occupier” is an integral part of the equation. It is the “aversion to casualties” that we talked about in the post-Vietnam era. The difference in ”will” between occupier and occupied that is the main power behind the success of insurgencies.

Now, I do distinguish between occupier and liberator, but the real question is do they? Do the Iraqis really see us as liberators? Do the Sunnis? It is not enough to claim that you are a liberator and go ahead and cause 100000 casualties among the people you are trying to liberate? It is a very though position to maintain.

[nathan]

Riccardo, if you had numerous examples in answer to your question, why did you post it as a question?

I think your right about public opinion/political being integral part of the equation. The Sunnis, and the Sunnis alone resemble the ideal you have put forth as seeing the US as occupiers. They prospered under Sadam, would like to see their minority dominant again. Shiites suffered, attempted uprisings, were crushed. Even Al Sadr is an aberration of a clergymen and not a nationalist symbol, he is not a popular uprising but the head of a cult--and has been brought to heel. Shiites want a representative government, are indeed part of the one that now exists. Ditto plus a factor of ten for the Kurds. Shiites and Kurds do not see the provisional government as a “puppet.”

What you have in Iraq is not a populous uprising against a foreign occupier. You have a government representative of a populous majority (the Shiites) and a significant minority (the Kurds) being attacked by an insurgency movement emerging from an ethnic minority, the Sunni. America is helping the representative government defeat an internal threat to security (yes bolstered by outside sources). Shiites may complain about the government (what citizen in what country doesn’t?) but only in the Sunni triangle do you see the creation of TAZs and true populous support for people who don’t want to see Iraq escape the threat of anarchy.

You wrote:
“It is not enough to claim that you are a liberator and go ahead and cause 100000 casualties among the people you are trying to liberate?”

If the choice is cause those casualties or loose, then you cause those casualties. (not saying the dichotomy is truly this simple, but I am saying that if you reject the idea of losing completely from your lexicon of planning than any choice other than surrender is an option.)

“It is a very though position to maintain.”

Yes, your absolutely correct, it is though. That doesn’t mean you don’t try.