IRAQ'S SECURITY SYSTEM MELTDOWN

The most important result of the reduction of the Fallujah TAZ was the decimation of Iraq's security.  From all perspectives, the global guerrilla campaign against the Iraqi security system has been an unqualified success. Here's how it rolled out:

• Pre-action preparation.  Hundreds of attacks, including high profile mass assasinations, have shaken the Iraqi security system to its core.  The net result:  50% attrition within Iraqi national guard groups.
• Test Failure.  In a crucial test of the battle readiness of Iraqi unit, they failed.  In the 24 hours prior to the attack on Fallujah, 100 of the remaining 425 men in Iraq's best-trained battalion, normally 850 men, headed for the hills.  The only troops that remained were reconstituted Kurdish pershmerga.
• Coup de grace.  Since then, attacks on Iraqi forces (mostly against the police, given the national guard has been gutted) have escalated across Sunni Iraq.  For example, attacks on multiple police stations in Mosul resulted in the scattering of ~5,000 policemen.  The commander was fired and there are reports of policemen switching sides.  This was repeated across Sunni Iraq.  Total policemen on-hand in Iraq dropped from 84,900 to 43,900 between August and October.

A Systemic Failure

Iraq's security system is currently in free-fall.  All the major elements underlying its potential for success have crumpled under pressure from global guerrillas (the total numbers of troops on hand have actually decreased since January 2004 -- see chart):

• A crisis in the state's legitimacy.  The interim Iraqi government, due to ongoing attacks on infrastructure, has been unable to deliver the basic services required to legitimatize the government.  Iraq is in failure and economic collapse.  The net result is that the state is required to rely on market factors to build its security system.
• Market failure.  The all-volunteer security model initially worked due to widespread unemployment (estimates are as high as 75%).  However, ongoing attacks have distorted the the employment equation.  A high probability of death or dismemberment is now part of the job description for positions in the police and national guard.  These troops stayed in place as long as things went well.  They have since proven they will melt away at the first sign of danger.  This market failure has thrown the Iraqi government back onto ethnic loyalties.
• Loyalist paramilitaries.  To fill the ranks, the Iraqi system attempted to build on the loyalty of Shiite and Kurdish fighters.  However, lukewarm support for the interim government by Shiites (at least until the elections) and the promise of tough fighting has left only the Kurds (reconstituted peshmerga) in the ranks. 

Globalization in Free Fall

The systemic failure of Iraqi security, creates the following situation:

• Ethinic passions on the rise.  The use of Kurdish fighters in both Fallujah and Mosul has exacerbated the insurgency. 
• The US in the hot seat.  Left with the security burden, the US is in a tough position.  Its firepower intensive tactics (force protection 2GW methods) are causing more damage to the Iraqi government's legitimacy than it provides.  Further, we also don't have the troops in country to even approximate what is needed to provide a modicum of basic security.
• Complete system failure.  This has set the stage for ongoing attacks by innovative guerrilla entrepreneurs on all other aspects of globalization in Iraq (people, resources, and investment).  The economy will remain in failure, as will the state.

Comments

[Mighty Mike]

So much pessimism, so little time. You really need to inject some objectivity in your Fallujah portrayal. Germany took how long to reconstruct? Fallujah took a week to overtake? Insurgents without a Iraqi home base? Get real

[Greg]

I believe a major part of several of these previous posts has been that Fallujah isn't and hasn't been an actual center or base for the insurgency. The nazi germany comparison misses the issue of system disruption entirely, since that technique wasn't a factor in the very limited resistance of a nation already gutted by 6 years of war. The model for rebuilding may not be completely off, but Germany/Iraq or Japan/Iraq comparisons overlook some major differences.

anyway, it seems that even the Iraqi government understands that attacking Fallujah is not eliminating an insurgent base. The hope was that it would serve as an example, but the plan seems to have backfired. I guess only time will tell for sure.

[praktike]

psst: Mighty Mike--how many US troops and German government types were killed in the reconstruction of Germany?

[Eric]

Germany/Iraq or Japan/Iraq comparisons miss another important element: NATO. Also, remember, Germany was divided (East and West) between two superpowers that then fought about it for the next fifty years.

[Ricardo]

Comparisons between German-Japan and Iraq are truly ignorant. If one is looking for parallels in history look at Lebanon, Somalia, Vietnam (French and American), Algeria (French), Angola (Portuguese), Etc.. The examples are plenty, and I ask you a question: was there ever a case of an occupier eliminating a home grown insurgency? Of a modern western army winning a 4gw conflict?

[Strategic Armchair Command]

The basic difference between Germany/Japan and Iraq is that with Germany/Japan, we were attempting to shift an already homogenous nation-state that existed for centuries from dictatorship to democracy.

In Iraq, there is no nation-state. We are trying to build one from scratch. This is a challenge that is an order of magnatude more complex than what we faced in Germany/Japan. Given the tribal and primitive realities of the Middle East, it is most likely a fool's errand.

That said, it would be nice John if you provided the source information for your portrayal of the meltdown of Iraqi forces. Not that I don't believe you, but without sources, it does appear more of an opinion than a fact.

[Usher]

The Germany/Iraq comparison doesn't match simply because the spirit of the German people was destroyed and they were thoroughly defeated as a people. This was a necessary consequence of the complicity of a willing majority of their country in many of the worst atrocities the world has ever seen. Japan was similarly defeated, destroyed and completely at our mercy as their crimes across Asia ultimately and sadly warranted.

Iraq is clearly a different case. It was not entirely at our mercy in 2003 and our moral legitimacy (rightly or wrongly) has been roundly criticized since before the invasion.

That said, it is very different from Vietnam too. There, simply demonstrating our willingness to stand and fight, was an important show of strength to our larger and well defined Soviet adversary. In Iraq standing and fighting is not enough. We have to win because a losing means a failed state from which we can be threatened more capably than Saddam would have ever dared. Vietnam was lost in "the hearts and minds." Germany and Japan's peace was secured through the hearts and minds...we offered them a credible path to something better.

I don't envy the job of President Bush as the security of the entire free world may rest on his ability to win the hearts and minds of Iraqis.

[Marcello]

So much pessimism, so little time. You really need to inject some objectivity in your Fallujah portrayal. Germany took how long to reconstruct? Fallujah took a week to overtake? Insurgents without a Iraqi home base? Get real

Yes, because as everybody know at the end of 1946 american troops were engaging panzerfaust toting former regime loyalists in pitched battles, while the air force pounded german cities on a daily basis...
Except of course that nothing happened (save in Condi's mind, maybe).
The USA suffered precisely zero combat casualties in the occupation of Germany.And as far the reconstruction goes, the question is if we are rebuilding Iraq even just only slighty faster than we and the insurgents are blowing it up.Again that is comparable to Germany...How?

[F.Baube]

The peshmerga begin to sound like the Czar's Cossacks. Not a promising way to mend inter-ethnic fences. What's next? The Kirkuk Wall?

[b]

@Strategic Armchair Command said:
In Iraq, there is no nation-state. We are trying to build one from scratch. This is a challenge that is an order of magnatude more complex than what we faced in Germany/Japan. Given the tribal and primitive realities of the Middle East, it is most likely a fool's errand.

You must be a deep racist. Iraq is a nation at least since 1921 - three generations - longer than many other nations.

What you call "tribal" is the normal "big family" bands that are well known in many "western" countries. The have a social function and in this are emphezised when the state fails. They are reduced when the state is able to take over its socuial function again. There is notheing special ME in this.

What are "primitive realities" in Iraq? Those the US is inducing there. Before there was a mostly secular state, with high education levels and good social/medical infrastructure and open boarders.

[nathan]

Ricardo--here are some examples of nation-states defeating insurgents, off the top of my head which are from this half of the century. Greek revolution. The Britons in Belize. The U S in El Salvador. East Timor (through the heavy use of SAS mercenaries from Executive Options) and--I don’t know why I’m drawing a blank--but at least half-a-dozen African countries since 1960 or so (also all with much capacity bolstering from the infamous EO).

John--I love your site. You are a great analyst, able to take disparate facts and weave them together into fresh insights. This shows imagination as well as intelligence and is a superior form of thought to simply regurgitating facts. You do good work here.

Over thing I have noticed is a newer trend on your part. I believe that your research on global guerillas has led you to a certain sympathy or romanticism with the terrorists. I’m not talking about their cause, but rather the human tendency to root for a David vs. a Goliath. This takes the form of reading into every guerilla action consequences which are dire to the extreme for the U S and profitable beyond measure for the terrorists.

Fallujah is what you described in Alexander the Great and the Scythians. In a guerilla war anytime the larger conventional force can trap/gather/coax the scattered cells into a battle to fight head-to-head it is a good thing. It is the only way to publicly defeat (other than capturing leaders) and humiliate a phantom enemy. It is a foundational principle of counter-insurgency (I believe the Shiite cleric was lured into Sadr City for just such a purpose). Also Arab culture (not being racist here, I’m paraphrasing Mohammad, Xerses, and Lawrence of Arabia) is one that fights victory based --motivationally that is--like the French under Napoleon. This is as opposed to an example like the Texans after the Alamo or Russia after earlier defeats allowed Nazi Germany to push deep into its country. Each public, bloody defeat may cause a public clamor on Al-Jazeer but as far as promoting a rally to the cause, it slows actual fighter recruitment.

Finally, you seem selective about your use of information on the Iraq armed forces. I give you the police, whole heartedly--how useless, what cowards, what traitors to their own country. But the National Guard? Reports abound how they are congealing into war-fighters. 36 Commando is one of the best units in the country, including conventional American forces. Have some been less than great, sure. Not all. Just saying you seem to (slightly) be loosing the objectivity which makes your observations so strong.

By the way, the comparison about Kurds and Cossacks was a very astute one to whoever wrote it.

[Ricardo]

Nathan:
Greece and El Salvador were civil wars, not an insurgency against an occupier, so they are good examples either. And I have never of Executive Outcomes (not Executive Options as you posted) in East Timor. East Timor is in actually a case were the insurgents won and sent the occupiers packing. The British in Belize were supporting the government, not an occupier either.

[nathan]

Greece and El Salvador, Yes the they were civil wars--you’re correct. Indigenous insurgents attempting a take over (uprising)of the sitting government who are defacto occupiers, they "occupy" their own country.This is like Iraq; America has troops on the ground, Iraq now has its own government. The larger point is guerilla forces against conventional ones, however I agree my examples were in this broader sense and not precisely concise. You are right on this technical matter.
The insurgents/terrorists I was referring to in East Timor were the pro-Indonesian militia forces fighting the UN program/Local Government. This group was defeated. Much of the counter-insurgency warfare was conducted by mercenaries working for Sandline International which emerged from the disbandment of EO (thank you for pointing out my error in name) by order of the South African government under international pressure. Like EO, Sandline (think “Son of EO”) is notorious for filling its ranks with SAS veterans. Sandline was working for international copper mining interests. The Copper mines were not nationalized but remained under influence/ownership of the companies which funded Sandline. Morals might be called into question in this situation, but not that the UN backed government defeated a pro-Indonesian influence militia.
Ok, Britain was helping a local government against a rebellion in Belize. Much as the US is doing with the UN mandated government in Iraq. The examples are of irregular forces being defeated by regular/conventional forces.
Did I write a little clearer this time? (not being sarcastic, I genuinely wish to be understood)--Nathan

[Maru]

The difference between Germany and Iraq was that in Germany, we were reconstructing a western market democracy gone temporarily insane.
It is like the difference between trying to heal a paranoid, and trying to program an AI from scratch.

[Greg]

well I think the biggest problem we're having here comes from the simple fact that the winners write the history. any military occupier will put a local regime that favors them in power. if they lose the war, then they were an evil invader who got kicked out with their lackies. if they win, they were supporting a local government. see the problem? in any case, I buy the argument that an insurgency can be defeated in general by a foriegn power.

I think John has pointed out some good reasons why attacking Fallujah could have negative consequences for the US. are they definately enough to doom the occupation? well of course not. are they enough to make the attack not accomplish what it intended? that much is possible.

It seems to me that some of the allegations of racism and extreme pessimism floating around are not appropriate to the discussion. Iraq does have tribal militias. my family doesn't run its own little army. that much seems to suggest that saying there are tribal allegiances at work in Iraq is not racist, and there are some differences between what's going on here and say the United States. perhaps some pessimism is in order, in any case. I remember when suggesting there would be an insurgency at all was called pessimism. perhaps if back then more planning had gone into dealing with that eventuality, a lot of Iraq's internal problems could have already been sorted out. who knows? in any case the way I see it some limited pessimism is justified, and may help bring out better solutions for possible future problems than saying "oh, Fallujah was a definate and unquestionable success. we're now on the road to victory" is likely to.

[Ricardo]

I don't think that claiming that the current government of a country qualifies as an "occupier". Cases of a modern state defeating an insurgency are a dime a dozen. If one wants to be pedantic about it, I meant a "foreign occupier". I am sorry about the omission, but I thought that it was obvious. The current govt. of Iraq is in a lot of ways alike all the "puppet" govts seen throughout history, like Vichy in France. So again, I ask for an example of a "foreign occupier" and/or its puppet gvt ever eliminating a "homegrown" insurgency. Isn't that the case in Iraq? And the answer is relevant, it shows that culturally and psychologically a foreign occupier never has the political will to defeat the "tribalism" will of the homegrown insurgents.

On another note, I don't remember anything about Sandline in East Timor either. They were dismantled after the debacle in PNG. Nathan: could you please point me where I can find anything about them in East Timor? I will interested in reading.

[nathan]

Greg.
Who are you and what are you doing on these boards? I demand an answer!
Constructive pessimism as a learning tool? Mistakes seen as a pathway to fine-tune stradegy as opposed to evidence of the Overwhelming Undefeatable Hand of Doom? Surely not, sir!
You sound like. . .like. . .
the voice of reason. ;>

[Greg]

me? I'm Greg. I wandered in while looking for a site keeping track of the insurgency in Iraq besides http://www.icasualties.org, which really doesn't address the overall issues of the conflict (except to link to various news articles). I'm not sure I'm a voice of reason in general. on politicalcompass.org I come out way down in the libertarian section and just a little bit to the right. I'm personally opposed to organized religion. oh, and in my spare time I sing heavy metal. so I may not always seem to be the reasonable side of the conversation ;)

I just feel that a lot of these discussions tend to get bogged down when people refuse to see anything besides what they want to (this happens to both the political right and left from time to time, but right now it's the right wing that seems to be more caught up in trying to see how things MUST be working out in Iraq instead of how they can maybe change things to work there in the future) and start throwing around slightly veiled insults. I mean presumably nobody's here rooting for fundamentalist Islam, and it's counterproductive to get worked up over pessimism. the fact is things are not going particularly well (and even if they were, there would be plenty of good reasons to point out the few things that were going wrong because those are the issues that have to be dealt with) and it makes sense to look at what and why.

I think the real question when dealing with Fallujah is not how much damage it has done to the US or to the insurgency (because it certainly doesn't seem to be fatal to either one), but whether or not it is a workable approach for dealing with the insurgents in the future. John thinks not. I'd be inclined to agree. in any case, he has made his prediction and if you disagree the thing that makes sense is to watch and see if they come to pass. This is what our military analysts are (or damn well better be) doing on their own with their own predictions. this will tell us whether Fallujah is a solution or a mistake not to be repeated, and ragging on someone for a pessimistic prediction misses the point entirely.

[nathan]

Good post, thanks Greg--just teasing--thanks for the response.
Ricardo--here is one of several e-dresses http://www.asiapac.org.fj/PJR/issues/next/2000kopassus.html
I found with a quick google.
My original instance of coming across this tree in the forrest of our discussion was in a Denver Airport reading a SOF issue. I didn't think A) you'd want me to try and mail you a subscription, lol, or B) you'd take it as an unimpeachable source.
The article I read dealt with counter-insurgency ops in releations to copper mining industry. This seems to show a triangulation of involvment by Sandline/EO.Part of the reason international bodies came down so hard on them in the first place.

As to your original question. I think your suggesting that excamples of coventional forces defeating guerillas isn't good enough. That the philisophical energy of a righteous uprising against forgein occupiers (we disagree on the use of the US in Iraq as an example--but whatever)puts this in a special light, Is that right?
A guerilla rebellion is not a guerilla rebellion (from a purely tactical view point not morally or ethnically)but something diffrent? All invaded peoples throw off the yoke of oppression? Just trying to see exactly what you mean, thanks--Nathan

[phil jones]

"I ask you a question: was there ever a case of an occupier eliminating a home grown insurgency? "

The one normally given in the British in Malaysia. Which seems to have been won on a massive hearts and minds effort.

[Ricardo]

That is what I am thinking: I don't believe that a foreign occupier is capable of defeating/eliminating a homegrown insurgency. Guerrilla is a tactic, an expression of warfare, it doesn't describe motivation. Insurgency/rebellion does. Still, an example?

How is the US not an occupier? We invaded, defeated the soverign regime (no matter how corrupted or brutal, that is not in question), and installed a regime of our own chosing without consultation. How is that this is not an occupation? The fact that we are (hopefully) benevolent in this whole affair does not change the way that it is perceived by the country being occupied.

[nathan]

I think you make a valid point in general, in specific I think Phil answered it better than I did.
As a point of clarification (again we won’t specify Iraq as you don’t like that example) but do you think there is no difference between liberator and occupier? I don’t mean this as a question of propaganda about how to look at Iraq in specific at this moment, but on the concept/meaning that the words stand for as a whole? If you do not think there is a difference between these words in general than discussing them in terms of Iraq is probably a waste of time. If however you agree that one can be a liberator, using occupation as a temporarily necessary tactic until a freed people can build a strong government of their own, then a comparison to Iraq could be made on a point by point basis.

[nathan]

Ricardo, sorry about posting twice in a row--something about the spiritual/philosophical nature of your question didn’t let me wrap my mind around it correctly (on my part I mean). Phil gave you a recent example. Recent. I think that is a pertinent point. The recent/modern history of post-WWII world affairs was not just wrapped up in communism/anti-communism. It was also directly affected by the rise of anti-colonialism. That is as democracy (American) emerged into the for front the population of America began to question the practice of colonialism in European allies and in (shock!) itself. There for as African, Asian and Central American countries attempted to escape from colonialism the populations of the oppressive countries saw the actions as wrong and held back support for maintaining such enterprises. Thus foreign sovereign nations emerged in all those place. Some by use of guerilla warfare. But as a world wide movement the use of arms against the Superpowers didn’t turn the tide so much as public opinion within those Superpower countries.
Up until that change in paradigm by the public just about every country in South/Central America, Africa and the South Pacific could be seen as examples (noted exception being an India) of numerous populous uprising occurring being defeated by occupiers. For a tiny example: Honduras, El Salvador, Haiti by extensive use of US Marines just prior to to WWI. The population was forced by corrupt puppet governments to pick bananas for the United Fruit Company as virtual slaves. The people rose up in one country after another, defeated loyalist forces. The Marines came. The people went back to picking bananas. Ugly, but numerous legitimate examples.

[Ricardo]

First: Phil, you are right on. The Brits in Malaysia is the classical example, and it was won by a massive hearts and minds campaign and very precise SAS operations. There are other examples too that nobody mentioned: the Brits again in Kenya using witchcraft (I am not kidding) and the Brits in the Boer wars. But all these insurgencies were in sparsely populated areas where the British were a well established colonial power. But again, I can’t remember a case of an invader-occupier winning against an insurgency. The examples on the contrary are so numerous and current that I decline to mention them.

Nathan: that is exactly my point: the public opinion, and therefore the political will, of the “occupier” is an integral part of the equation. It is the “aversion to casualties” that we talked about in the post-Vietnam era. The difference in ”will” between occupier and occupied that is the main power behind the success of insurgencies.

Now, I do distinguish between occupier and liberator, but the real question is do they? Do the Iraqis really see us as liberators? Do the Sunnis? It is not enough to claim that you are a liberator and go ahead and cause 100000 casualties among the people you are trying to liberate? It is a very though position to maintain.

[nathan]

Riccardo, if you had numerous examples in answer to your question, why did you post it as a question?

I think your right about public opinion/political being integral part of the equation. The Sunnis, and the Sunnis alone resemble the ideal you have put forth as seeing the US as occupiers. They prospered under Sadam, would like to see their minority dominant again. Shiites suffered, attempted uprisings, were crushed. Even Al Sadr is an aberration of a clergymen and not a nationalist symbol, he is not a popular uprising but the head of a cult--and has been brought to heel. Shiites want a representative government, are indeed part of the one that now exists. Ditto plus a factor of ten for the Kurds. Shiites and Kurds do not see the provisional government as a “puppet.”

What you have in Iraq is not a populous uprising against a foreign occupier. You have a government representative of a populous majority (the Shiites) and a significant minority (the Kurds) being attacked by an insurgency movement emerging from an ethnic minority, the Sunni. America is helping the representative government defeat an internal threat to security (yes bolstered by outside sources). Shiites may complain about the government (what citizen in what country doesn’t?) but only in the Sunni triangle do you see the creation of TAZs and true populous support for people who don’t want to see Iraq escape the threat of anarchy.

You wrote:
“It is not enough to claim that you are a liberator and go ahead and cause 100000 casualties among the people you are trying to liberate?”

If the choice is cause those casualties or loose, then you cause those casualties. (not saying the dichotomy is truly this simple, but I am saying that if you reject the idea of losing completely from your lexicon of planning than any choice other than surrender is an option.)

“It is a very though position to maintain.”

Yes, your absolutely correct, it is though. That doesn’t mean you don’t try.

[Kevin]

There are only five relevant historic models of post-WW2 insurgencies vs. great power match-ups.

Algeria 1954-1962 where the FLN defeated France.
Indochine 1945-1954 where the Vietminh defeated France
Vietnam 1954-1975 where the Viet Cong / NK defeated the US / SK
South Lebanon 1982-2000 where Hizbollah defeated Israel
Afghanistan 1979-1989 where the various Mujahadeen groups defeated the Soviet Union

These models all are relevant because they involve the Western power deploying large forces in theater and the insurgents employing both nationalist and universalist (Communist, Islamist, anti-Colonial) ideologies. The British defeat of the insurgency in Malaysia does not count because the British never deployed a large number of troops and the insurgents were primarily Chinese nationals who were greeted with hostility by the Malay locals. One could consider including the Chinese invasion of Tibet but in that case an insurgency never really formed.

There is no point in referring to pre-WW2 successful anti-insurgency campaigns--and they do abound—because our present reality is different from the days when at least half the world was dominated by Western colonial rule. In those days the British Empire controlled an Indian population of 300,000,000 with 5,000 colonial officers. The equivalent situation in Iraq would be the US controlling the entire nation with 416 troops. Gone for ever are the battles such as at Omdurman where the British inflicted more than 42,000 casualties on the native forces while only suffering 48 dead themselves. Things changed after WW2; for one thing automatic weapons, mortars and bomb making became more easily obtainable for insurgent forces. Pre-WW2, counter-insurgency consisted of manning entrenched machine gun positions and mowing down hordes of charging natives armed with spears. The second reason is the spread of Maoist guerilla war tactics in which the strategic goal is too spread your overwhelmingly superior enemy as thin as possible, and at the maximum point of his over-extension you counter attack relentlessly his weakest point. The most important change is the exponential increase in costs imposed on a Western power in order to keep a technologically advanced army in the field and the subsequent strain this imposes on an industrial economy.

I am not pessimistic by nature; I’m sure if the US had really put its collective mind to the task of solving this problem, they may have come up with a solution. Instead, however, in lieu of planning for ways to defeat an insurgency, American intelligence agencies were too busy trying to figure out ways to distribute small American flags for the adoring Iraqi masses to wave at the passing troops after the initial invasion. Things have only gone downhill since then.

[dingo]

Much is made of the strategy of 'winning hearts and minds' of the local population to win at an insurgency, but what's not discussed is that the difficulty in meeting this goal varies depending on the parties involved, the goals of the occupier or government, the existing social system, and historical relationships. It's not all about building schools and handing out candy to kids.

I know this is probably an obvious point, but when a Christian nation with a close, close tie to Israel rolls into a Arab muslim population to change not just its government but it's social system as well, all in the context of competing religious and ethnic groups vying for power, you have to figure that the process is going to be more complex than rolling into, say, Germany, where the social structure, religion, and economic system was similar to our own.

[Kevin]

For the comparisons to post-WW2 Germany and Japan to make any sense, we will have to wait until (if) we defeat the armed forces of Iraq before we start making them. You see, the armed forces of both Germany and Japan unconditionally surrendered; now that may have been the impression taken away by a casual observer as to what happened when our forces swept into Baghdad in April 2003, but it is now clear that the Iraqi military just decided to switch conflict typologies of us. In a conventional state vs. state tank battle type conflict, the Iraqis were sure to be defeated; by melting away only to regroup a few months later, the Iaqi armed forces switched to a guerilla war typology, one which gives them a very good chance of victory.

This war is nowhere near over folks, we are struggling to contain an insurgency that effects only 20% of the population. If the Shiites don’t achieve power in January, it is very likely they will also take up arms and then we are really going to have our work cut out for us.

[Greg]

here's something that may be relevant. if you look at this graph of US military deaths per month: http://icasualties.org/oif/USChart.aspx you will notice it takes a definately different shape following last April (a month that is a huge spike in US casualties). sure enough, the mean US death per month rate before April comes out to around 46. excluding April as an abnormal spike and excluding this month (which isn't done yet, and will probably be a spike as well) the mean US death per month rate since has been close to 64. this trend is apparent if you look at the graph, but comes through more obviously when you actually calculate it. so what changed last April? isn't that around the time of the first US Fallujah attack and the resulting truce that left insurgents more or less in control of the city (my source on the dates: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/fallujah.htm)? of course there are other factors at work here, but perhaps if the casualty trend between April and November is related to the consequences of attacking the city and failing to secure it, the casualty trend following this month will show the consequences of attacking the city and successfully securing it. I predict and upturn, but if I'm wrong that MAY indicate taking Fallujah was worth it (from a military perspective, in any case)

there may be more meaningful ways to analyze this data, which I leave up to whoever has an idea on the subject.

[nathan]

Kevin great post.
Frankly one of the best I've read on this site. Sometimes I read so many posts that back up their claims with opinion-driven statements which preach about some sort of demonically driven, undefeatable enemy, encouraged because of the massive, total unmitigated evil of a corrupt and power mad US cartoon villain. Like the Empire in Star Wars or some such nonsense.

Your post is, in my opinion, correct. A shift in mind-set and methodology is necessary for the US to counter this problem. I believe examples of success are just as prevalent for those who wish to look beyond just the evening news. Mistakes are being made, which means opportunities for learning are being discovered. Long way to go yet, though. 4GW has come along like the horse, chariot, and tank to change the face of warfare. The people utilizing the strategy are not invincible, their methods are perfect for the times. Given time and study and experience 4GW will be countered exactly like the Blitzkrieg was.

I do think, in your examples, an important element is overlooked. I would be interested in your opinion on this. I disagreed with another poster about the example of the Mujahadeen. I don’t believe they defeated the Soviets. I think history shows the Soviets were winning. Then add CIA money, American Advisors and the Stinger missile. The Soviets were defeat by the US by proxy, not by the Afghan peasants. Then I realized all of your very accurate, legitimate examples were just that; war by proxy in one form or another.

Being a veteran and ethnocentric patriot (;->) I saw the US as a counter balance to the Soviet Union. Americas detractors saw the Soviets as a counterbalance to us. These restrictions are gone, this is a huge, important and overlooked/under discussed element. For good or bad the US holds unique capabilities in the world. Yes, China still affects things in North Korea, as they influenced events in Vietnam, but they are still not a world wide military power--though they are a growing economic one.

A primary example would be the invasion of Iraq. Due to something like 22.3 billion dollars worth of corruption in the oil-for-food program the UN failed the US, the Security Council failed the US and what could have been solved with hard diplomacy was forced into war. If the Warsaw Pact had still existed the US could never have risked splitting NATO, they would have been at the mercy of the will of foreign countries. Whether you see it as right or wrong the US was/is able to act across the globe the way we have in the Caribbean/Central America for centuries. Unilaterally. This is a watershed moment.

This ability allows the US to move fast and flexible. Fast and Flexible is a foundational principle in 4GW or counter-4GW warfare. 9/11 can be alluded to as a “Desert One” in 1979. A bitter, crushing, humiliation that led the Pentagon to rethink itself and create and fully support the Joint Special Operations Command--a brilliant, unadulterated success. Combine a historical unique world-reach capability in speed and flexibility of reaction (a transformation underway now) with a will to fight, an ability to learn (not just give-up) from mistakes and you have a nation more than a match for disparate, decentralized, technologically inferior enemy. The result; stunning, easy, and complete victory with parades throughout the world’s capitals? No. A long, bloody campaign that degenerates 1st, enemy capability and then enemy will to fight? I, myself, think this is as viable an outlook than unadulterated doom which the overly pessimistic critics bemoan. The Goths have not sacked Rome, as it were.

Did I just over simplify? Of course. Start with a thesis statement--keep it simple, begin execution, work hard.

[nathan]

Greg--nice analysis. I would be interested in seeing how what you say plays out. I predict (based on your narrow parameters of only taking into account Fallujah) they deaths will then fall).
I have already stated that I beleive Arab culture will-to-fight is victory based, so I will stand by this in your isolated case. Defeated, licking wounds, and scattered they will not be able to mount the number or strength of attacks they did when they had a TAZ in Fallujah.
If your right then Fallujah can, honestly and logically, be extrapolated as a model for Afghanistan and Iraq in general.
If I'm wrong I will post my admission and apology in great capital letters. I will then treat myself to a very nice dinner in honor of the valient guerrilla insurgent.
Question: Would US deaths (48 or so, I think?) sustained in taking Fallujah count in your model? I would think only deaths not attributed to that fight would be statistically pertinant (sp)--Nathan

[Ricardo]

Nathan: The examples I mentioned, that is Malaysia, Kenya and the Boers are not representative of what I had in mind because they were insurgencies against a well established colonial power in very sparsely populated areas and where nowhere close to the scale of Iraq. To the list proposed by Kevin I would add Somalia and the Palestinian Intifada. The latter has not resulted in victory for the insurgents because of the unusual asymmetry of the conflict and the high stakes for Israel of the occupation/assimilation of the territories. And Israel seems poised to withdraw from Gaza, finally yielding to an untenable situation.

To Kevin’s comment: I am not pessimistic either, and I am sure that if failure in Iraq was a immediate and direct threat to the US, the US would pour resources in fighting the insurgencies and would probably keep it in check. That would involve for example a much larger troop/population ratio, probably three times what we have today. It would be feasible only with a major expansion of the US armed forces, maybe even a draft. Here again is the question of political will. What Pres. Bush still be reelected if a draft was on the table?

[Greg]

well, I gave you the link so you can see those casualty figures yourself (the greatest problem I think is that I'm working only off of deaths because I have no similar up to date break down of all casualties by months) but when I calculated I excluded both last April and this month because I figured the same as you did that actual deaths in taking the city were not part of the wider trends. I'm not sure how useful this information is or how completely it does relate to Fallujah. what would be really interesting to see is an analysis of WHERE US deaths increased after the first major clash centered on the city and where they increase or decrease now... BUT at least trends in US deaths say something about the success (or lack thereof) of the counterinsurgency effort, and Fallujah is definately a big part of that overall effort.

[Ricardo]

Greg, I would recommend using the wounded numbers instead of death numbers to determine the level of activities of the insurgency. The death numbers, because are relatively low, are prone to be more affected by spurious events. For example: the crash of a troop transport helicopter downed by enemy fire can substantially increase the number of deaths in give week but would barely affect the number of wounded. Isolated events like this that are in general not representative of the average level of activity can make the data noisy and hard to interpret.

Look here: http://icasualties.org/oif_a/Lunaville.htm and notice how the trends in the "wounded" plot are so more obvious and less noisy than on the "dead" plot.

Just my two cents.

[Ricardo]

Nathan:
The link that you provided earlier linking Sandline to East Timor doesn't mention East Timor except on the title. It talks about some operation in Irian Jaya, not Timor. I am still not sure if Sandline, as a company, has ever been involved in East Timor.

[nathan]

Ricardo, I'm not going to start giving MLA format on my responses--I'm long winded enough. The article states that Sandline trained, lead and advised Indonesian forces for and in operations involving East Timor. I also told where I read the article pertaining to mining intrests.
Does the exact name or incarnation of the PMC matter to what you're arguing? Are you arguing mercs were not involved--be they Sandline employees or Sandline "vetrans?"--at all. Surely not. Let's chop down this tree and look at the forrest. I think you write well and make valid points, this particular point is starting to feel like a game of Trivial Pursuit. Though I am glad to see I was able to answer enough of your other questions in order to allow you to concentrate on this one insignificant manner.

[Ricardo]

Nathan: chop down this tree we should. It is not that I was looking for trivia or focusing on this "insignificant matter", but I am really interested in private military organizations and thought that I had missed something big about Sandline. My question was out of sincere curiosity, I was not trying to prove you wrong, and I apologize if I sounded confrontational.

I don't see this as a contest, you trying to answer my questions and me relenting. I see this as a healthy debate, and by no means want to argue about who is right about what. This group is an unusual one for the breadth of its knowledge and the skills of it writers.

[haydar]

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/17/opinion/17press.html

The New York Times weighs in with an opinion. I tend to agree with this analysis as well as this blog's, but do consider the Shia' community to be a wild card. I have pretty good evidence that there is a great deal of support there for the assault on Fallujah. This does create a "both ends against the middle" scenario which works in the U.S. favor, and could potentially overwhelm the insurgency. A couple of problems however:

One, as the Sunni middle correctly perceives that the U.S. is using Kurd and Shia' forces to suppress the insurgency in Mosul and Fallujah, they may become more radicalized and the number of fighters may swell dramatically. Recruitment and fund raising across the middle east would also be bolstered.

Two, the Shia' community doesn't actually have much stomach for the fight. That is, they don't see the U.S. as their friend and ally, but are happy as long as they are killing Sunnis. As one person put it to me, "We want the Sunnis and the Americans to keep killing each other, until we are able walk in and take over." That scenario may not be a long term positive for the U.S.

Anyway, I will speculate that Fallujah will continue to smolder for some time, inhibiting the promised reconstruction and tying up a lot of troops. Until the rubble is down to about knee high or so, the ruined buildings will be ideal places from which to ambush U.S. forces. It is a very difficult task to stabilize a city that is 99% hostile, and I would not be surprised to see women and children suicide bombers. The battle for Fallujah has not yet been won.

[nathan]

Ricardo--no need to apologize. I'm online doing this and that between work and school and tend to fire off these posts--that one came across as curt I now realize--I apologize. Not being in competetion and simply trading ideas is an ideal I've held out to others, and I gladly echo it from/to you in this case. To the best of my knowledge the remnants of Sandline/EO in one PMC incarnation or another,are all over the place and operate in everyway through out Austrialian-influenced South Pacific and Africa. Hard not to sound curt when trying to be concise. Also your point about wounded vs. kia is probably exactly on and I'm modifying my self bet to the point.
Haydar--are you saying a Shia majority rule in Iraq is bad long term? You see Shia insurgency/terrorism as rising to the level of Sunni Wahabism (sp)? I admit to looking at the Sunni/Shiite split as a possibility in a united Islamic fundamentalist front against western ideals? Not a true possibility at all? Only a short-term one?

[haydar]

Nathan,

This is an interesting read. http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2004/0411.hirsh.html

I personally don't have a problem with a Shia' dominated Iraq, I am just saying that it won't serve the U.S. geo-strategic interests. If empowered they will forge a very independent path that will be closer to Iran than the U.S. I don't have time for a long discussion concerning your other questions right now, but the U.S. and the Shia' world certainly consider militant Wahhabism a mutual enemy, but have little else in common. The above referenced article should somewhat address this for you.

[Ricardo]

Does anybody have an opinion on whether the Sunni population is large enough and concentrated enough in urban centers to have enough critical mass to sustain an insurgency by themselves? If the coalition would entice the Shia population to remain out of the insurgency and the Shia/Sunni animosity would be sufficient to prevent cooperation, could the Sunnis eventually be brought to the table? Or do you think that a civil war would be the natural outcome?

[Kevin]

Nathan,

Thank you for your kind words.

To start with, the verb defeat that I used in the list of the five examples is only really accurate in the case of France against the Vietminh in 1954. In the other four cases a better description would be that the insurgencies withstood or survived the conflict with the great power. This is actually a critical point, the bar is set so low for the insurgents to achieve “victory” (the withdrawal of the great power’s armies) that really all they need to do is keep the fire going and eventually the great power will, for whatever reason, give up. The most extreme case was France in Algeria where the FLN was reduced to hiding 30,000 fighters in Tunisia in order to keep them alive. The French military was unsurpassed in its ability to hunt down and kill the insurgents. The French lost on a political level, they claimed Algeria as part of France but could never offer the Algerian population a one-person one-vote settlement because that would have changed the entire political landscape in France with Algerians holding 40% of the seats in the parliament. As time dragged on de Gaulle saw the futility of fighting a colonial war, he had much bigger and better things to do, like become a nuclear power and stake out a foreign policy independent of the United States.

You are correct about the sorry performance of the insurgents in Afghanistan, just as the Soviets were completing their withdrawal in 1989 the Mujahadeen (including bin Laden) attacked at Jalalabad with the goal of grabbing a small piece of Afghanistan on which to set up an alternative government; they got crushed. After more than ten years of taking on the Soviets, it took them two more years of fighting against the Russian puppet government before they were finally able to control some real estate.

Except for Algeria, the other four conflicts were all proxy wars in one way or another. The Soviets and China supplied Ho Chi Minh’s forces, Iran helped Hizbollah, and Saudi Arabia and the US, with Pakistani assistance supplied the Mujahadeen forces. In Iraq, Saudi Arabia is quietly aiding the Sunni insurgents while Iran is gearing up for an eventual Shiite insurgency. Syria involvement is being exaggerated; it is an 80% Sunni country run by a 20% Shiite “elite” (that are traditionally peasants). If the Sunni insurgency gains power in Iraq, Syria will to some extent be threaten. If anything Damascus will help the Shiites.

As for the Cold War, Phillip Bobbitt calls it part of a triangular Long War, from 1914-1990, between Fascism (or Tribalism), Communism, and Parliamentary Democracy. In my opinion the US, champion of the best of these ideologies, made a huge error after WW2 by not honoring the promises made in the 1941 Atlantic Charter, which pledged, “to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.” Instead, once the war was over, we turned our backs all the third world independence-oriented groups that had helped us and instead we choose to assist our European allies in keeping their empires, thus instead of offering the world our ideologically superior Parliamentary Democracy, we were stuck defending Colonialism and forced people across the globe to choose between colonial oppression or Communism, which at the end of the day isn’t really much of a choice.

As for our actions in Afghanistan, in the light of later events it was obviously overkill, the Soviets were actually kind of fighting the good fight there, if you look at their declarations at the time they were saying many of same things we are saying now. Worse of all our actions there helped the Saudis to spread the ideology of Wahhabism through out the region. We will pay dearly for this in the future. Hindsight is 20/20 of course.

I think that we are on the right tract now in Afghanistan. The keys to success are a small military footprint and a good ideology. It will be many, many years though before success will be assured.

You are right, there are lots of great thinkers—especially our host John Robb—who are coming up with outstanding theoretical underpinnings for a 4GW strategy. The problem is that I am reading their work on the web instead of it being force fed into the current administration. Worse yet, where were John Kerry and the Democrats on all of this? Perhaps I missed it but I never heard him discuss 4GW. It’s the CIA that's forced to pick up the slack and act as an opposition party because the Democrats refuse to do their job. The GWoT is truly a 4GW conflict but we are cramming the round peg of intrastate conflict into the square hole of combating non-state actors.

The problem in Iraq was the “ending” of the Gulf War of 1991. We had two choices going into that war; conduct a limited campaign and then conclude a peace treaty with Saddam or undertake a total war and install a new government. We tried to finesse these choices into a limited war followed by an unlimited low-intensity conflict. Saddam did in fact disarm after the war, we had defectors come and tell us just that. The problem was political; no President could be seen as being soft of Saddam. By not choosing total war in 1991, and later deciding peace with Iraq was impossible with Saddam in power, all we did was give the Iraqi military twelve years to prepare for an insurgency, we are now reaping this bitter harvest. We broke Machiavelli’s maxim that if war is inevitable, never delay to your enemy’s advantage.

We are now struggling to bring Iraq back just to the level of sanity that existed before we invaded—in fact we would now consider that a huge victory. In other words, our soldiers are dying and our treasure is depleting and strategically we’ve worsened our situation. We have nine divisions tied down in one way or another because of this conflict. Now perhaps that will all turn around after the January elections, I just can’t see Allawi stepping down from his office and handing power over the Sistani and the Shiites. Time may well prove me wrong; I certainly hope so. If this conflict continues though, eventually a situation is going to develop elsewhere that will force us to make some very hard choices. If it had been up to me, after 9/11 I would have pressured Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Pakistan to start real reforms towards parliamentary democracy. I would have used the political capital and Arab street cred built up from these moves to then start pressuring Saddam to change. At first the gestures his would have been cosmetic, but eventually, with the right amount of pressure (special force-type interventions, not huge conventional army invasions) applied at just the right time, we could have evolved that country into something better without completely breaking it in the process.