SCENARIO: CHECHEN INDEPENDENCE (Part I)

Moscow.  Jan 27, 2007.  Vladimir Putin was about to sign something that he never thought possible just one year ago.  He was about to make it possible for Chechens to vote on their independence from Russia.  They would almost certainly opt to leave.  In the moments before he put pen to paper, he reviewed the events of the last year that led him to this point.

It all began with the crack down on Chechen guerrillas after the slaughter in Beslan.  The counter-terrorism efforts were working.  Chechen guerrillas were on the run.  It was perhaps the weakness in the face of these successful attacks that led the guerrillas to change their strategy of terror, or it may have been Basayev's willingness to learn from the events in Iraq.  It didn't matter, change came and the rapidity of its impact surprised the Kremlin and the world.

The new Chechen strategy, enabled by a small percentage of the tens of thousands of Chechen exiles scattered throughout Russia, emerged with multiple attacks on the critical sections of Gazprom's natural gas pipeline network to the north and south of Moscow.  The simplicity of the attacks were alarming.  Many were done merely with a propane tank.  In one hour, access to 500 b cubic meters a year of output was cut off.  The damage in the attacks was extensive enough to require 2 weeks of repair work. 

This would have been containable, given the system's forward storage system, if it only occured once.  However, attacks continued along the hundreds of miles of vulnerable natural gas pipelines in the critical sections.  This radically reduced supply.  The net effect was a 70% delivery shortfall to critical European export markets and western domestic customers in the first three months of the new campaign.  It couldn't have been planned better -- storage levels were are their nadir following a particularly cold winter.

The attacks didn't stop with Gazprom.  Transneft, the Russian oil pipeline monopoly, was next.  This time, critical sections to the northeast of Moscow stopped the flow of 3 m barrrels of oil to western export markets.  The attacks were so perfectly selected that the average delivery loss was 1/2 of Transneft's capacity or 2 m barrels a day.  Losses from oil alone were running at $80 m a day.

Despite a massive manhunt, there were few meaningful arrests.  The areas were too vast and the vulnerabilities too numerous to defend.  This was a bloodless campaign. 

Where it was bloody was in the financial accounts of the federal government and major corporations.  Government revenue shortfalls of as much as 20-30% were expected if this campaign continued.  This, in combination with the added costs of the security effort was about to drive Russia into deep deficit spending. 

Internationally, the outcry was deafening.  The German, Italian, and Eastern European ambassadors were virtually camped outside Putin's office with demands that he resolve this conflict quickly.  Their economies were being devastated by the shortfall in irreplaceable deliveries.  Something had to give.

It did.  Putin, faced with the option of a decade of delay in Russian economic progress or Chechen independence, chose independence.  A cease fire was called in October of 2006 to negotiated the referendum.  It culminated in the document he was to sign today.  Chechnya would be free.  Global guerrillas had won.

Author's note:  This is a bare bones, unedited scenario overview.  It will become more detailed in time.  Next:  How they did it... (part 2 of Chechen Independence)

Comments

[Ken]

I have a question: how does this make the insurgents "global guerrillas"? Surely they are just nationalist guerrillas who have hit on the idea of destroying their enemy's infrastructure?

Consider Zimbabwe's war of independence. In 1976 they were deadlocked, yet by 1979 the Rhodesians were ready to call it quits. What happend was that the Zimbabweans hit on the tactic of killing the national herd - the millions of head of cattle that made up the basis of Rhodesia's abilty to pay for the war. Once the Rhodesians could no longer pay for their war they were forced to negociate its end.

What is the difference between Zimbabwe and Chechenia?

[Eric]

"How does this make the insurgents global guerillas?"

1) Importing open-source strategies: "...or it may have been Basayev's willingness to learn from the events in Iraq."

2) Importing political pressure: "Internationally, the outcry was deafening. The German, Italian, and Eastern European ambassadors were virtually camped outside Putin's office with demands that he resolve this conflict quickly. Their economies were being devastated by the shortfall in irreplaceable deliveries."

I don't know much about the Zimbabwe case. If global elements were significant, please post them.

[James Acres]

Hey Ken,

By your argument we'd have to call Gen. Sheridan of the US Army a global guerilla. He targeted the economic resources of the American Plains Indians after our Civil War.

----

You're right in that they are all purusuing indirect attacks. Applying their strength to an unexpected and undefended weakness. To me this is the critical element of the GG strategy.

But I'd argue what makes them GLOBAL is that they are:

1) Learning directly from the techniques and experiences of geographically and perhaps ideologically remote guerillas. Robb is arguing the Chechnians might copy the Iraqis. Combined with his other arguments, one might even imagine the Chechnians importing Iraqi veterans.

Did the Zimbabweans do something similar?

2) Robb argues the Chechenians might attack Russia's links to the global economy. So not just Russia gets hurt -- but also those linked to Russia. In this case Europe. This acts a a force multiplier by effectively bringing the Europeans into the fight. In this case, on the Chechenians side, camping outside of the Kremlin and making economic threats if Putin doesn't make the Chechens stop.

[Marcello]

I am not an expert on the chechen issue but if I recall correctly the chechens got an independence of sort after they defeated the russians in the first war.
Correct me if I am wrong but I also got the impression that it did not work very well,with the country turning into the local equivalent of a mafia state.
So giving independence to Chechenya would not exactly be like France giving independence to Algeria.

The second factor is more general.Guerilla warfare is warfare of the weak.
Usually when a great power is fighting a counterinsurgency campaign, it is not fighting for vital reasons.More often than not, it is not even fighting for what could be described as good reasons.
Prolonging the life of a colonial empire on its deathbed was not a life or death struggle for France.
Losing in Afghanistan or in Vietnam was not decisive for both the USSR and the USA.The USSR was going down anyway and the USA suffered only a temporary setback.
The fact that the great power is not fighting for its own survival or at least very vital interests but rather in the name of abstractions ("Brezhnev doctrine", "democracy" and when all else fails "prestige") or some vague and dubious geopolitical advantages usually puts some limits in what the great power will do.I imagine the United States could have turned North Vietnam into a radioactive parking lot if they had wanted.
That would have surely boosted the self perceived manhood of today keyboard commandos.But the adults (Nixon, Kissinger,etc) obviously knew better.It was not worth it.
For the same reasons killing every iraqi on sight while you are filling your mouth with "freedom and democracy" would be a bit counterproductive (even if I have to say that I am not sure that adults are in charge now).

However one sabotage campaign like the one described is an entirely different matter.The existance of the already weak russian state would be put on the line.In Russia and maybe in some places in Europe people would be freezing to death.The russian and the european economies would be flushed down the toilet.It would be less spectacular than 9/11 but it would be far,far worse in terms of actual consequences.
In these sort of situation the gloves tend to come really off.

Remember what i said about warfare of the weak? What happens when the strong decides that since its life is threatened maybe going after the weak with a sledgehammer and beating it to a pulp is the only option left after all ?
How much would it take to round up all the chechens in Russia and stuff them in concentration camps?
Would the russians protest? Probably no, they would be freezing.
Would the europeans protest? See above.
Would the americans protest?
They might.But since the rounding up of the basically harmless american-japanese population during WW2 is now starting to be described as a good thing in some quarters with an eye to the american muslim population
such protests, if they even took place, would not carry much moral weight.Does anyone honestly believe that the USA would not round up its own muslims if its economy was put on the line by muslim saboteurs hiding among the population? Hell some people will probably start to argue for doing just that "preemptively" and "just in case".

[Ken]

James,

Yes, and before Sheridan you had Chevington who was a real Cromwellian lunatic. And before him.... It gets silly to go so far back.

The Zimbabweans learned from the Chinese and they adopted Mao's strategy of ignoring the cities and creating basies in the countryside. Fidel Castro Ruz did the same thing in Cuba.

I take your second point, a global guerilla is someone whose actions affect the global economy. If the Chechens attack oil and gas pipelines that will screw Europe quite nicely.

[dialectic]

Perhaps it can be established that any attack on energy infrastructure constitutes a GG event. The world energy system is so interdependent that the consequences of an attack anywhere are tantamount to an attack everywhere.

That being said, I suspect there is a case to be made that the European reaction, at least, could go “either way.” Specifically, rather than Europe weighing in on the side of the Chechens, they might line up with a Russian “pacification program” (i.e.; massive slaughter) for the purpose of getting their oil supplies flowing again. The Chechens are indeed playing a dangerous game.

Russia has an interesting “resource” potentially available to it, which it has not traditionally deployed, or at least not to a significant degree in its international policies. That resource is “Psychotic State Behavior” (PSH), a condition which refers to a state seemingly being capable of doing anything, such that its actions are completely unpredictable and irrational. The Untied States DOES deploy this resource on a regular and consistent basis. It is a legacy of Nixon-Kissinger diplomatic protocols.

For the purpose of this point, the bi-polar, cold war era system of mutually assured destruction doesn’t apply, in that it evinced a sort of “logic” – specifically, a “logic” of stability.

<> <> <> <> <> <> <>

John Robb wrote:
“Internationally, the outcry was deafening. The German, Italian, and Eastern European ambassadors were virtually camped outside Putin's office with demands that he resolve this conflict quickly. Their economies were being devastated by the shortfall in irreplaceable deliveries. Something had to give.”

<> <> <> <> <> <> <>

But what if Russia decides not to “give.” Already facing an unceasing American funded and directed program of cleaving off more and more parts of the former Soviet Union, Russia is facing complete devolution into a failed state: TOTAL breakdown of civil society; TOTAL anarchy. The US is pushing for this outcome relentlessly.

In reaction, Russia might have no choice but to go – or threaten to go – entirely psychotic. All of a sudden having no capabilities left other than blind – albeit counterproductive – striking out, Russia might try to force a re-alignment of interests. While North American and Western European capital might prefer a fracturing Russia, they might have to forego their desired goal if Russia goes “ballistic.” Until massive, space-based, nuclear-pump laser weapons systems are deployed above Russia – currently not projected to be operational until 2018 at the earliest – that country will continue to hold the ‘nuclear terror’ card. If the Europeans observe that the Russia leadership is cracking under pressure, their ambassadors might not be camping outside the office of the President of the Russian Republic, but outside the offices of the Republic’s Minister of Defense, demanding the opportunity to “assist” Russia in its “hour of need.”

This is not chess. On the chessboard you do not go “psychotic,” for then you will simply, inevitable wind up in checkmate. States, however, can and do go “irrational.” This is a card the Russians could play. If Russia is not able to afford the gigantic effort of guarding its energy delivery systems – as seems to be the case – then in the extreme situation of a looming devolution of its national integrity a credible threat of “psychotic lashing out” might be able to ‘blackmail’ the Europeans into footing the bill.

[dialectic]

Marcello wrote:

“Usually when a great power is fighting a counterinsurgency campaign, it is not fighting for vital reasons. More often than not, it is not even fighting for what could be described as good reasons.”

<> <> <> <> <> <> <>

I suspect that does not apply in the scenario John Robb elucidated above. In the case of Russia and the Chechens, Russia may well be fighting for its very existence, and the shear and literal existence of its civil society and culture. Russia is under ceaseless and intensifying attack from US policies seeking to break it up into smaller and smaller pieces. The recent – probably permanently successful – cleaving off of the Ukraine is a case in point. For not only the former S.S.R’s of the old Soviet Union can be wrenched out of the Russian orbit, but even extensive parts of Russia “proper” as well. It is a datum of American policy – stretching back more than four decades – that all of Northern Russia is to be made independent of Moscow (including St. Petersburg), all of Russia east of the Urals, and all Russian access to the Black Sea. “Historical” Ukrainian territorial claims are now being made as far east as the Caspian Sea. The US has been pushing those claims for many years now, and has already begun funding Ukrainian exile groups for agitation in that region. The ongoing Wall Street and City of London program is to cleave Russia relentlessly until it is reduced to only, more or less, the borders of the ancient Duchy of Moscow.

The Russians are acutely aware of North Atlantic intent in those regards. With the Russian state entity having started to recover from the collapse of the former Soviet Union, its leaders seem to have decided that no more can be lost. The recent humiliation in the Ukraine must compel greater resolve on their part, lest the Russian state system implode very, very soon.

[John Robb]

This isn't a guerrilla war in the classic sense. Pacification won't work.

The disruption of energy infrastructure works extremely well within the Russian context. It represents the majority of the country's exports (its major connection to global markets). Pressure on it will ripple throughout the Russian economy (25% of which is in the oil and gas industry). This won't always be the case.

[Marcello]

"I suspect that does not apply in the scenario John Robb elucidated above. In the case of Russia and the Chechens, Russia may well be fighting for its very existence"

That's why I wrote

"However one sabotage campaign like the one described is an entirely different matter.The existance of the already weak russian state would be put on the line."

[Osama_been_forgotten]

The Kleptocrats maintain power by concentrating wealth.
Technology was a crucial factor in helping that to happen in manufacturing, by introducing automation.

The same thing applied towards warfare, replaces the firepower of hundreds of thousands of paid soldiers, with manufactured devices, which, may cost the taxpayers more, but their very manufacture funnels profits mainly to the executives at the top of the ladder. This has been Rumsfeld's goal. The Automation of warfare.

So far, this technology has been directed at large-scale, state-invasions. There's little technology that's manpower-saving when fighting guerillas. That's why, where possible, the US has outsourced guerilla wars (Contras, Haiti, Afghanistan, etc.). When that option wasn't possible, the US pursued a costly war in Iraq, using the "automation" approach, with a few new wrinkles aimed at counterinsurgency (UAV's, robots, etc.) without much success. Obviously.

When guerillas can attack industrial infrastructure with impunity, the only solution, still, is to guard that infrastructure with massive numbers of troops. Which goes against the philosophy of concetrating wealth. As paltry as US troops are paid, they're eager to turn this whole mess over to locals. Who lack the experience, and will, to undertake this war.

*********
Now, the TERROR war is something totally different. The target there is Public Opinion. Every beheading works in the neocon's favor. Every car bombing, is another reason why "them brown skinned people is evil". No wonder guarding hundreds of tons of HDX wasn't a priority.
As long as the terror element remains, they (the neocons) can continue to get away with exploiting US troops for their gain in this conflict, at taxpayer expense.
I'm not saying that specific neocons are behind the terrorism, or supporting it - I'm just saying that it's not in their best interest for it to end.

***********
I would think that if there truly WAS a Global Guerilla war against US infrastructure going on, that Gasoline would be something like $10/gal, and our economy paralyzed, rationing, martial law, drafting of domestic boys to stand guard over pipelines, etc.

Either the terrorists are too egotistical or stupid to try an actually effective campaign, or somehow, it's easier to suicide-bomb a well-defended green zone checkpoint than it is an unguarded pipeline 200 miles from anywhere in the desert.
Or maybe their ideology demands that they actually kill infidels, which doesn't happen when they blow up a pipeline. I dunno.

[marcello]

"somehow, it's easier to suicide-bomb a well-defended green zone checkpoint than it is an unguarded pipeline 200 miles from anywhere in the desert"

At least in theory, it may well be true.In principle in an open area you could deploy high tech sensors for surveillance (recce drones etc).Everything that stands out would be automatically suspect.
In a city you can hide in the background far more easily.

[WeSaferThemHealthier]

Marcello,

Right, flat terrain does allow more automation.

But pipelines and pumping stations located near cities and in suburbs could allow GGs to hide, strike and hide.

Others have mentionned that very harsh methods could be used against GG populations. One has to look at the symbolism. Killing Russian civilians might, for some, justify operations that end up killing more Tchechen civilians but making the price of gasoline and heating go up might not, in most people's eyes, justify spilling Tchechen innocents' blood.

I don't think Russia would be fatally threatened by such attacks either. It would be a major inconvenience, but not enough to put an end to the Russian state. Most people's bills would go up ( perhaps to the level that was seen in California a few years ago, the effect would be great but diffuse ) and gov't revenue would go down. I wonder how much politicians would be able to justify long, large scale conventionnal operations, especially if the GGs sent pictures and tapes of the collateral damage to NGOs, the media and Internet. Special operations units and intelligence assets are something else entirely, of course.

[Marcello]

"Right, flat terrain does allow more automation."

As I said, in principle yes, although that may not be so easy in practice with the technology available here and now.The future of automation and 4GW is a subject that deserve its own treatment.Perhaps when I will have a bit more time...

"Others have mentionned that very harsh methods could be used against GG populations. One has to look at the symbolism. Killing Russian civilians might, for some, justify operations that end up killing more Tchechen civilians but making the price of gasoline and heating go up might not, in most people's eyes, justify spilling Tchechen innocents' blood."

There are a few problems with that.On a theoretical basis most people,apart from some american jingoes, will agree with "No blood for oil" slogans.In practice things will probably be different.Something on the scale described is going to hit Europe hard.We use that gas for cooking, heating and as fuel for some of our most modern power plants.That is probably going to hit people directly with shortages in what are basic necessities and surely indirectly in terms of layoffs etc.In Russia heating is a matter of life or death.I doubt that people here and in Russia will shed tears if the FSB starts to round up the chechen diaspora.

"I don't think Russia would be fatally threatened by such attacks either. It would be a major inconvenience, but not enough to put an end to the Russian state. Most people's bills would go up ( perhaps to the level that was seen in California a few years ago, the effect would be great but diffuse ) and gov't revenue would go down. I wonder how much politicians would be able to justify long, large scale conventionnal operations, especially if the GGs sent pictures and tapes of the collateral damage to NGOs, the media and Internet. Special operations units and intelligence assets are something else entirely, of course."

You seem unaware of how low has Russia sunk since the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was not exactly a paradise to start with.I suggest you remain so unless you can stomach pretty brutal informations, because the statistics and the descriptions are rather depressing, to put it mildly.
Things have started to improve a bit under Putin but they are still ugly.A few years ago the collapse of the russian state was well in the cards.
Russia cannot be compared to California, because Russia is essentially a resource based economy,with large portions of the population who are just surviving as it is.

[Osama_been_forgotten]

My brother adopted a Russian baby a few years ago.

He brought back an incredibly depressing videotape of the Russian countryside, from the 6 hour drive from Moscow to the orphanage. People living in mile-after-mile of row-after-row of run-down public housing. People wandering alongside the roads, looking for plants to pick for food.

My brother, ever the Conservative, decided that this economic devestation was simply fallout from the Soviet Union, (it's all the commies fault) and that things would get better as Capitalism took hold. Though, he acknowledged that much of the old Soviet authority network (who bribes whom to get things done) was apparently still in place. He wouldn't acknowledge that what this really was was a symptom of anarchy run amok, gangsterism. On the brink of warlordism.

I can only imagine that the only reason the government remains in power, is because they've struck deals with organized crime.

[dialectic]

And now, a more direct criticism of the Chechen independence scenario sketched by John Robb, above.

I think it very likely that Chechnia will attain independence from Russia, and may well do so via “System Disruptions” targeted on the Russian energy transmission network.

BUT: It won’t be as a result of Global Guerilla activity. Rather, it is overwhelmingly likely to come about because of CIA – Special Forces destabilization activities put into operation in those regions and funded by the US.

For this reason, the Global Guerilla thesis so ably developed on this site is NOT the appropriate model. Instead, the US funded campaign against the Soviet era occupation of Afghanistan is much the more applicable historical referent.

To put it starkly, Chechnia is likely to gain its independence from Moscow, but only because it will be “cleaved off” as a result of a “freedom fighter” campaign directed by the Pentagon. Still another applicable model in this regard is the US funded and directed program of destabilization against the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua in the 1980’s.

Thus an inherent danger of the Global Guerilla thesis emerges. It can too readily be thought of as “explaining” situations of regional turmoil, whereas in fact what’s actually going on is something more akin to ‘classical’ state vs. state rivalry. In effect, the Government of the United States is already conducting military operations against Russia, on Russian territory (Chechnia), though those US military operations are currently being conducted through proxies. Unless the Global Guerilla thesis is to be stretched wildly out of proportion, then we perhaps ought not to try to cram its ‘Round’ guerilla shape into the ‘Square’ hole of traditional Great Power conflict.

If we begin to insist on seeing Global Guerilla activity where it is not happening, we risk undermining the viability (i.e.; the explanatory power) of the Global Guerilla thesis in toto.

[WeSaferThemHealthier]

Marcello,

Yeha, good points. I must say that I was thinking in terms of what other groups in richer countries might try. E.g.: ETA, IRA, a potential revival of separatist Quebec GGs. Do you think that Robb's strategy of attacking the energy sector might give them at least a part of what they want? I don't think Western governments would have the heart to bomb/undertake large-scale operations to fight Christian or post-Christian middle-class whites. Mabye I'm wrong.

[WeSaferThemHealthier]

Hmm, what I meant in the last part referred to such things as dropping 1000 lbs bombs in residential areas, using MBT guns, using artillery and generally having a shoot-first-ask-questions-later SOP.

[Cardenio]

They, none of the ' they ' wether they're in Chechnia or wherever, actually want ' independence ' or any of that. They wouldn't have a clue what to do if they somehow became independent. They'd autodestruct like Cambodia.

They want their cut. As long as they feel their not getting enough pie or any pie, then the mighty struggle will continue. But that's all just a bunch of crap that keeps the rest of the non-thug population in tow. These clowns are the same everyplace.

Maybe Chechnia will get their version of Saddam and things will get a little more organized, but Thugland is Thugland. Some thug will emerge to put the rest of them in line.

[marcello]

"Do you think that Robb's strategy of attacking the energy sector might give them at least a part of what they want?"

That is a difficult question.I think that in principle european governments will try to deal with the issue with a mixture of political/economical concessions and police investigations.It has worked in the past for some separatists.If that does not work things could indeed get interesting. However it is possible that the people, pissed of by shortages which would affect them far more than the assassination of a cop or a politician nobody cares about could turn against them.In that case things would get ugly for them.
I am not sure if these boutique terrorists are willing to risk that.A few power lines blown up, maybe.But they have already done that in the past, it is not exactly a novelty.

"They'd autodestruct like Cambodia"

"Some thug will emerge to put the rest of them in line"

Don't hold your breath while you awaiting that...

[WeSaferThemHealthier]

Marcello,

Economic sabotage vs assassinations:

I've wondered which one had the most advantageous intput/output ratio.

Economic sabotage affects everyone, but that can go either way as you're said if the people gets pissed.

Assassination of politicians and important bureaucrats ( advisors, people with highly valuable technical knowledge, managers ) implies blood being spilled, which doesn't look pacifist at all but it would be difficult to sya that it's just wanton violence agains the civilian population when it's only a very small % of the populatioon that's being targeted. A while ago, I was quite surprised to learn that a Supreme Court judge had been assaulted while taking a walk; no escort for a supreme?!?

[Marcello]

At any rate I am not sure how many of these european separatists are serious about carving up their little silly statelets.
One could suspect that for these organizations the struggle has become an end to itself.Maybe most are in for the thrill and for the prestige and the admiration they will get in some quarters.
If that is the case then they need only some carefully targeted violence to remember everyone that they are still players, that they are still around.Systemic sabotage would not suit them.

[Sleipnir]

This Chechen attack scenario is not realistic.

1. This level of coordination require a lot of computer/communication savy participants. The Chechen diasopra in Russia mostly is not tech-savy. Most of educated Chehens are in busness, not in high-tech.

2. The Chechen diasopra is not dedicated enough to commit to such scale of attack. The wealthy Chechen communities integrated into russian shadowy economy and wouldn't want to disrupt status-quo.

[John Robb]

Sleipnir,

Thanks for the feedback. This is a low tech method. Computers are not needed for anything but the planning (if network analysis is used to select optimal locations). The success of low tech guerrillas in Iraq demonstrate how easy this is to do.

Further, it would require few people to accomplish. If only a small percentage of the diaspora participate, it would be more than sufficient to provide sufficient redundancy and geographical breadth to the operation.

[Chris Phoenix]

Dialectic wrote that the US would be funding this hypothetical campaign: it wouldn't be homegrown.

But I can't really see the US funding a large-scale energy disruption, with global supplies as tight as they are and the US importing as much as it is.

Chris