SCENARIO: CHECHEN INDEPENDENCE (Part 2)

Vladimir Putin: "The fuel and energy sector, overall, is the goose that lays the golden egg. Killing the goose would be insane, stupid and unacceptable."

The purpose of this scenario is to demonstrate how global guerrilla methods (systems sabotage) might be used in the relatively simple test case: the disruption of energy exports to coerce the Russian state.  Most western economies are more complex and therefore wouldn't be as vulnerable to attacks on a single set of systems.  This development is a natural outgrowth of the innovation we see from open source warfare in Iraq bazaar of violence and recent Chechen activity.  Even though this conflict started as a classical war of national independence, it will likely end as another major engagement in our epochal war against global guerrillas. 

The Moral Objective

To win, the Chechens need to win a decisive moral victory.  The moral center of a nation encapsulates its will to fight.  The disruption of this moral center has traditionally been accomplished by directing menace, uncertainty, and mistrust at the nation's population (Boyd).  The advent of a world dominated by global markets has changed this equation. 

Nation's are no longer self-sufficient, they are interdependent and increasingly reliant on their ongoing ability to perform in global markets.  Fall behind in this competition and currencies collapse, debt becomes exorbitant, and domestic stock markets plummet.  A sharp slap of Adam Smith's invisible hand can quickly turn a weak state into an economic basket case.  As a result of this progress, the target for a moral victory doesn't rest within the nation-state, but rather the global market. 

Within this new calculus, actions that undermine the moral psychology of these markets vis-a-vis the target country, is the new measure of victory.  Market psychology (of investors, trading partners, etc.) is marginally influenced by traditional terrorism.  Systems sabotage is different.  It can radically impact market psychology by building uncertainty (kryptonite for markets), menace to contracted export flows (resources in this case -- 1/3 of Europe's natural gas comes from Russia), and mistrust (a flight to alternative suppliers and investment opportunities).

If Russia can be put to the edge of financial catastrophe due to a moral victory won in global markets, the achievement of the limited objective of Chechen independence is easily possible.

A Strength Turned into a Weakness

In a typical 4th generation warfare practice, Chechen guerrillas can best undermine Russia's ability to compete in global markets by turning its greatest strength into a weakness.  The ongoing strength of the Russian economy today, and in the future, is its energy industry.  It is their strongest connection to global markets and the source of the funding that allows the government the flexibility it needs to take unilateral action.

Unfortunately, global guerrilla systems sabotage -- as we have seen in Iraq -- is extremely effective at energy disruption.  The magic of this method is that it provides extreme levels of leverage through the interdiction of network systempunkts (how this would be accomplished is the subject of the Chechen Independence Part 3).

Indirection and the Horns of a Dilemma

A major benefit of the decentralized open source approach to global guerrilla insurgency, is that it naturally puts their adversaries on the horns of a dilemma.  Simply put, this is a situation when an adversary is forced to attack multiple aggressors and defend a plethora of vulnerabilities with insufficient resources to defend or attack them all.  With multiple groups probing the target state for weakness (Iraq has more than 60 autonomous groups), all critical targets are simultaneously vulnerable.

How the media cover "terrorism" can also provide support for global guerrillas.  Direct assaults on the target population (traditional terrorism like that of the Chechen Black Widows) get the greatest coverage.  It dominates the headlines and therefore will evoke the greatest defensive response from the target state.  Attacks on infrastructure get much less coverage and therefore less attention.  However, the impact of systems sabotage vs. traditional terrorism on markets is entirely lopsided in favor of systems sabotage.  In the parlance of Blitzkrieg, traditional terrorism would be termed a Nebenpunkt (a distracting effort).

This "media effect" in combination with the vast vulnerability of a state's critical systems architecture, provides an amazingly effective means of manufacturing indirection.  As we see in Iraq, the state is in a perpetual collapse due to systems sabotage, while the vast majority of the defensive effort is put towards the defense of the political, governmental, and military targets.  Large attacks against high profile symbolic targets (of traditional terrorism) provides the cover to allow systems sabotage to remain a green field -- a set of targets that are always under-defended and continuously provide amazing rates of return on the violence capital invested.

Comments

[Eric Anderson]

Below are stories that relate to, and illuminate, Mr Robb's scenario. They are taken from David Johnson's Russia List; Mr Johnson is a fellow at the Center for Defense Information (http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/default.cfm):

Mosnews.com
February 2, 2005
Russian Duma Approves Using Military Forces in Internal Conflicts

Russia’s State Duma passed in first reading a bill out of three that would allow the nation’s armed forces to fight in internal conflicts ­ such as the ongoing action in breakaway Chechnya...

Russia transferred control over operations in Chechnya to the Interior Ministry, in part as an effort to declare that there was no “war” there. In theory, the new law could allow the army to be redeployed in Chechnya.

===

Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye
February 1, 2005
Report by Aleksandr Babakin and Igor Plugatarev:

"Army Losing Confidence in Its Leadership. More Than 80 Percent of Officers Take Negative View of Law
on Abolition of Benefits"

The situation in military units regarding the monetization of benefits reached a critical point last week. A high-ranking general at the Defense
Ministry told that immediately after 1 January "servicemen in the garrisons began, on a mass basis, filing statements to their commanding officers to
the effect that they do not have the ability to transport at their own expense Russian servicemen who are due to perform service on guard duty or patrol, and also to the effect that it is extremely burdensome on their family budget to have to pay cash to travel to their place of service on the suburban electric trains -- the tickets are too expensive."

===

(Anderson: Not surprisingly, the following MSM piece does not explicitly mention system disruptions. The nvestment critique seems focused on infrastructure degradation, not security.)

Financial Times (UK)
February 2, 2005
Putin's policies threaten global oil supplies
By J. Robinson West

The writer, a former US assistant secretary of the interior, is chairman of PFC Energy, strategic advisers on global energy based in Washington, DC

The problem is that the Kremlin runs the risk of destroying its petroleum sector rather than building an envied national champion. The tactics employed by the Kremlin to jail Mr Khodorkovsky, bankrupt Yukos and capture its best asset demonstrated the imprecision and politicisation of the Russian legal system. It frightened both Russian and foreign investors, even if they had no sympathy for Mr Khodorkovsky. There may be large oil reserves in Russia but without massive investment and management skills, it will not flow. In spite of the hype about Russia, more oil industry investment has flowed to west Africa. The risks in Russia were already large and have mushroomed.

The impact of the Yukos affair could be enormous. Russian production, now the world's second largest, could slide, not surge, and with it the Russian economy and prestige. PFC Energy estimates that Russian production, now 9.2m barrels per day, will peak at just over 10m barrels a day in 2008, and then, without a huge infusion of capital, technology and management for further exploration and production, begin to plateau and decline. Billions will be needed as well to expand its export capacity. Without a stable legal and operating environment, Russia will fail to meet its production targets. The world needs every barrel of Russian oil. With growing Chinese and Indian demand, plus the insatiable appetite of the US, markets will be tight and even more reliant on the Middle East.

[WeSaferThemHealthier]

John,

I follow your thinking about using traditional terrorism as a diversion of resources but I think it's seldom worth it for guerillas, especially if they want other countries to trust them with a state. If you really want politicians and senior bureaucrats to get pissed, attack politicians and senior bureaucrats. You don't even have to actually hit them for them to get scared. Also, attacking the government will not give one as bad a press as killing kids in a pizzaria. If all a guerilla group does is cripple infrastructure, kill poliicians and bureaucrats and organise peaceful marches that are filmed and broadcast, it might even look more civilised than the state it's attacking.

Imagine how it looks: a David that fights cleaner than a Goliath and Goliath can't even decisively beat David.

[dialectic]

Well, wouldn’t ‘ya know I would be among the first to respond to Part 2 of the Chechen Independence Scenario. Probably too bad for all concerned. :-)

My primary objection is that in the midst of John Robb’s otherwise excellent structural and tactical analysis, the core assumption remains fundamentally flawed. And that assumption, as appears so manifestly clear throughout his writings on the subject, is that the Chechen independence struggle is essentially autonomous. Specifically, that the Chechen independence movement is focused strictly on independence for the Chechen homeland and its people. That it is, in short, a INDEPENDENT guerilla-based movement which has, or conceivably might begin, to partake of the new forms of Global Guerilla activity as have been developed and ‘operationalized’ (!) in the various Islamic liberation struggles.

But the Chechen independence movement is not autonomous, I aver, but rather is only one component among many in the continuing – and actually accelerating – rivalry between the traditional Great Powers. The current nexus of the historical “Great Game” has shifted northward, now centered (as a metaphorical expression, not necessarily as a literal/geographical referent) on the Caspian Sea.

This is not to deny for a moment the reality and seriousness of the Chechen independence movement taken on its own terms. There undeniably exists an authentic, indigenous desire on the part of many – perhaps most – Chechens for their complete national sovereignty. However, the movement itself cannot be understood apart from the wider historical context in which it is taking place. What is currently happening vis-à-vis the Chechen struggle is an extension of the ceaseless, centuries-long attack initiated and sustained by Western capitalist powers against Russian (Tsar-ist, Commun-ist, Putin-ist) hegemony in the central Asian region.

For perhaps slightly more than two centuries, the West has been engaged in breaking up – or thwarting – the presence and extension of Russian influence southward to the Black Sea and beyond. In recent decades, the Western capitalist interests have scored major and probably irreversible victories. But the Game continues regardless, and non-stop Western financed and directed de-stabilization programs continue unabated. In only the last month, with the effective “cleaving off” of the Ukraine, the Russian State entity suffered the largest blow to its integrity and viability since the historical Duchy of Moscow began its primary expansion in the 14th century.

And if anyone seriously believes the Ukrainian “Orange Revolution” wasn’t, at crucial forms and levels, a product of Western Intelligence Service manipulations, then I have a wonderful, darling little bridge to sell you. The CIA, to take only one such organization, poured millions of dollars into the Ukraine to influence (successfully) the outcome of the vote during the recent “election,” via its standard and usual proxies.

Here again, this is not to say that there did not exist authentic Ukrainian aspirations for independence, but rather to point out that the “maturation” of authentic aspirations for independence, whether Ukrainian or Chechen or any other, arises as a result of CRUCIAL INTERVENTION AND DIRECTION by Western state and capital interests.

My thesis:
The degree to which Global Guerilla tactics and strategic aims will be utilized by such “independence” struggles as that taking place vis-à-vis the Chechen situation will be a function NOT of any inherent advantage of GG-type activity, but will express the needs and direction of Western destabilization programs instituted against the Russian State. If GG activity is what it takes to further break up that state entity, then such activities will be instituted and allowed to proceed. If, however, in the face of changed historical circumstances and needs (specifically, capital valorization dynamics) it is seen that GG activity is counter-productive to Western capitalist imperatives, then we can expect to see a diminution of GG activity in the given locale.

To recap:
The underlying thesis of John Robb’s scenario implies, if it doesn’t altogether posit, that the potential and/or viability of Global Guerilla activity in the Chechen situation is – or will be – a function, essentially, of Chechen independence aims occurring substantially in isolation from the extent to which those aims are exploited and directed by Western interests. “Isolation” in this case refers not to the techniques of GG activity, for those techniques are, indeed, being disseminated throughout the world. Rather, “isolation” refers to the putative autonomy of the Chechen independence movement eo ipso. In contrast, I suggest that an analytic focused on the aims and methodologies of classic “Great Power” rivalry better serve to reveal the fundamental historical forces and impulses currently unfolding in that besotted region of the world.

<< dialectic.

[dialectic]

And now, after my critique posted above, a little gift of appreciation for John Robb.

-- vis consilii expers mole ruit sua --

Horace

That is not a criticism from me, nor even a caution, for clearly you don’t need it. I only offer it for your use, as you might see fit.

<< dialectic.

[Eric Anderson]

dialectic, your analysis lacks only clarity, evidence, and plausibility.

[Josh Koenig]

Dialectic, the notion that "independence" movements are not 100% independent is not exactly novel. The American Revolution recieved significant military and economic support from the French (hence streets in NYC named Laffayette). More recent examples of varying degree abound.

But this is not surprising. In an interconnected world, no modern state or would-be state (aka "independence" movement) can ever be completely independent.

The two questions before any succesionist movement are of political sovrignty and economic connections. Chechens want sovrignty, and presumably the liberty to make connections where they will. The Ukraine already has functional political sovrignty, so the "independence" movement there is about making a shift in connections.

While it's true that the Orange Revolution was supported by varios NGOs with CIA and MI6 ties, it's also true that the Russian head of state actively campaigned for his preferred candidate on Ukranian soil. It's also a bit much to suggest that the Ukranian state is now somehow a "puppet" of the west in any political sense. There's a long history of outside-funded insurgencies (violent and non) rejecting the hand that fed them. It's almost tradition.

[Marcello]

The USA supporting the chechens?
Well,that would be news for me.And that must be news for the russians too.Because quite frankly if something like that became known the noise coming from the russian nationalists would be heard even here, thousands of kilometers away from the russian border.

What some people seem to forget is that the soviets and the czarists before them have pissed of A LOT of people.
Now that Russia is on its knees for many of them it is payback time.
If the USA wants to find anti russian forces with some legitimacy it has only the embarass of the choice (for now).There is absolutely no need to compromise themselves with a crazy tribe like the chechens.

[Joe]

John,
Your observations ref 'nebenspunkt'and the media effects on defensive focus are right on target. I noted one of your respondents claimed using overt terrorist action as a screen for the subtle and often not attributable acts of infrastructure sabotage as "seldom worth it". I've worked as an intel analyst for 40 years and can assure you that the current threat is using precisely the tactics you have outlined. They are doing so with full knowledge of the inability of govts to satisfy the dual requirements of public safety and critical infrastructure protection. Joe L

[WeSaferThemHealthier]

Joe,

Well, besides the WTC, what US economic infrastructure did Al-Qaeda target before the invasion of Iraq ( that leaves about 18 months to perform large scale economic infrastructure crippling )?

Before you say "the oil in Saudi Arabia", remember that the US gets litlte of its oil from the KSA and there were few attacks before the invasion of Iraq.

"Perhaps the US gets little of its oil from the KSA but Europe does so Europe could pressure the US"= The big EUropean players, as we have seen don't have much pull over the US, not even Blair could get Bush to require a second resolution to invade Iraq.

Infrastructure sabotage needs to be attributed ( at least from the point of view of the decision makers you're trying to wrest concessions from ) in order to be used as a form of gunboat diplomacy.

[Rububula]

I think the analysis is spot on as far as the mechanics of a successful Chechen revolution, but are the Chechen "rebels" actually aiming for the kind of revolution that John proposes?

The problem lies in the involvement of islamist guerrillas and independent criminal/mercenary organizations in the Chechen independence movement. Dudayev is dead and the bulk of the Chechen nationalism died with him. The people causing trouble since then have been mercenaries representing criminal groups that profit from the chaotic state of wartime Chechnya, the Russian army itself, and the most dangerous group, islamist guerrillas like Shamil Basayev, who has well established ties to Osama bin Laden.

The Chechen "independence" movement isn't a nationalist movement at all anymore, but rather a theater of the current global islamist campaign. Their aim isn't necessarily an independent chechnya, but rather destabilizing the russians and therefore western markets in general. Islamist GGs operating out of chechnya could care less about Chechen nationalism as long as western markets have to scramble after disappearing russian oil.

[Cardenio]

LONDON, England (AP) -- Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev, who claimed responsibility for last year's brutal terrorist attack on a Russian school, was quoted as saying Thursday that the separatist rebels are planning more such operations.

[John Robb]

The Chechens are already attacking infrastructure:

http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/12/chechens_find_r.html

[joe]

When we think of war within conventional context, conflict duration is finite. The warring parties either pass or fail. Asymmetrical warfare is much different. It is of indefinite duration. As with conventional war it is an extension of political will but does not aim at the massing of armies and decisive engagements. Death and destruction are secondary to effective psychological and economic pressure. When these type adversaries strike they claim events designed for psychological impact and remain discrete in events aimed at gradual economic deterioration. Since the Beslan event there have been many critical infrastructure events that have gone unclaimed. The same is true here in the US.

Aiming at the economic will of the US requires constant and discrete pressure. It is a form of 'battlefield shaping'. Instead of molding terrain troops and tactics in conventional terms, it is the basis for shaping the economic battlefield. Joe

[WeSaferThemHealthier]

Got it Joe, thanks.

[joe]

2003-2004 were banner years for sabotage of critical infrastructures. The energy sector was the primary target with rail systems taking a lot of hits. 2004 started with a major burn at the Australian 'Moomba Gas facilty on 01/01/04 followed quickly by the Algerian Skikkda LNG plant destruction on 01/19/05. Pipeline and refinery events in the US, Pakistan, Iraq and Europe resulted in the boosting of crude (and other energy sources) prices to $50 USD by October. Curiously the attacks on Saudi interests were not aimed at destroying refinery facilities but rather at the foreign technicians that ran them. I say curiously because the attackers were inside major Saudi plants and pointedly avoided damaging them. None of the petrochemical events that occured during 2004 (save the ones in Iraq and Saudi)were claimed by the IIF. I needn't go into the economic effects of the energy events other than to note that as the price of crude spiraled up there was a correspondingly sharp rise in the price of cordwood in the US Northeast from $80 to $140 USD. I provide that example to illustrate the 'connected'effects of energy related events.

[John Robb]

Joe, right on. You should go back and look at some of my earlier briefs, particularly those that anticipated the run-up in oil prices.

[joe]

John, I just reviewed your 29 May comments. Good vision. Do you want to take a look at TTP for 911 and bring it up to date? Joe

[joe]

OK People, $52.00 per Barrel is firm. That's the launch pad. 43% over last year. 18 of 104 Nuke generation sites in USA under 50 % production as of 03/02/05. Max gas demand coming. OPEC cuts Production in April. Joe L

[enigma_foundry]

I would like to add a little perspective to the comments above, because I think something is being missed here.

1. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: Very Important, but (from the above post) not entirely correct:
"This is not to deny for a moment the reality and seriousness of the Chechen independence movement taken on its own terms. There undeniably exists an authentic, indigenous desire on the part of many – perhaps most – Chechens for their complete national sovereignty. However, the movement itself cannot be understood apart from the wider historical context in which it is taking place. What is currently happening vis-à-vis the Chechen struggle is an extension of the ceaseless, centuries-long attack initiated and sustained by Western capitalist powers against Russian (Tsar-ist, Commun-ist, Putin-ist) hegemony in the central Asian region."
The word that doesn't belong in the above post: "capitalist" The war is between cultures, Western v. Russian, and as such predates modern capitalism. Ideas about national self-determination are key here, as dialectic correctly notes. The nationalist sentiment of the Chechens is quite high, and it is primarily nationalism that motivates the Chechen people. This, perhaps differentiates them from many other Global Guerillas, in terms of their aims and motivation, but their methodology is clearly derived from the GG paradigm ( I think we can use that term), and they have had the oil gas infrastructure in their sights for some time now, dating back to the Second World War, when there was quite heavy fighting in the region near Chechenya for oil & gas resources. (let's remember our History, again) This the Chechens clearly remember. They won't forget any of their history as they begin to act in the open source type of warfare, as GG's.

Unfortunately, the atrocities committed by the Russians themselves have radicalized the Chechen nationalists, and driven them deeper and deeper into a loosely networked way of fighting, out of necessity. No one is in control of this now. Which brings me to point:

2.US INVOLVEMENT: dialectic made above about the US seeming to support the Chechens, the answer is a definite Yes, it could SEEM that US is supporting Chechens, (expecially to Russians, with their world view, and their History). Poland, for example has taken a leading role in this regard, naming a square in Warsaw after one of the Chechen rebel leaders, for example. But although their moral support may be there, in some quarters, their control is (entirely) lacking, as is any hard support. The less formal the network, the less support it really needs. Its dispersion and unpredictabilitiy are its strengths

3. EXIT STRATEGY AND REGIONAL DESTABILIZATION: Poland's interest is: stability in region (yes, really) and they believe the best solution is to de-radicalize the Chechens now so that when the Russians leave the new government is not dominated by Islamists. They believe that a Chechen state would drive the hard line Islamists out of power, and destroy a key recruiting motivator to the radical Islamists in the region. Defusing the situation is their goal. To that end they have extended some proposals to Russia, which have been rejected. Russians here are unable to see that a stop to this war is really in their best interests. All should be concerned with the way they chose to fight GG's that the don't reinforce and strengthen the ideas they are trying to defeat. The USA has made exactly the same mistake in Iraq. Both the French and the Poles warned them about making exactly that mistake, BTW.

4. Dialectic's point about CIA supporting the involvement in the Orange Revolution in Ukraine: I don't doubt that they are happy about the development, but they actually realized (believe it or not, I still have a hard time with this amount of foresight from the CIA) that their support would weaken the Orange Revolution and kept away. Their recent experience of supporting certain factions in Iraq, only to see those whom they supported completely discredited because of the US support, and their cover blown in the discrediting process certainly factored into this decision.

The point here is that although dialectic raises criticisms of John's analysis, (and more history would be appropriate here, John) John's analysis is essentially correct.

My analysis here is that the Chechens have already broadly succeeded in their war aims which are:

"To win, the Chechens need to win a decisive moral victory."

The legitmicizing voice Poland has given the Chenchens encapsulates this moral victory, relevant quote from John R above: "..Nation's are no longer self-sufficient, they are interdependent and increasingly reliant on their ongoing ability to perform in global markets." Here I might say it is a global market place of authentic nationalities, the currency which is recognition by other nations.