EFFECTS BASED OPERATIONS

"Those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without battle. They capture his cities without assaulting them and over-throw the state without protracted operations." Sun Tzu

The success of the allies during the first Gulf War was due to a new approach to the employment of airpower called Effects Based Operations (EBO). It was formulated to take advantage of the following:

• Precision guided munitions (PGM). Bombs that can hit targets with an extremely high degree of accuracy. This minimized the number of aircraft and sorties needed to eliminate a target. It also allowed for minimal damage to the target site to accomplish set goals.

• Stealth. A set of technologies that prevent the detection of aircraft. These technologies eliminated the need for force protection packages and extensive pre-attack preparation. Stealth was synergistic with precision guided munitions.

• A modern target. Iraq, unlike most of the enemies we had fought since WW2, was a semi-modern nation-state. It had extensive networks that were vulnerable to disruption.

The emergence of EBO

It was apparent to airpower enthusiasts that this combination of factors allowed airpower to become a decisive instrument of conventional warfare -- it moved it beyond ground support and carpet bombing (of dubious value). Due to the influence of Boyd and emerging systems theory, they developed a method that went beyond the simple destruction of enemy forces to the systems approach that emphasized the effects these attacks would create (for a nice overview of EBO, read Brig Gen David Deptula's paper, "Effects-Based Operations"). These effects included:

• Ubiquitous system disruption. Stealth and precision enabled parallel attacks against all systems virtually simultaneously. Systems leverage, available due to Iraq's modern urbanized infrastructure, created the opportunity for cascades of failure -- small attacks had system-wide impact. This also completely eliminated the need for the complete reduction of a target set. If the attack took the system down, only those minimal attacks necessary to maintain the condition were necessary.

• Rapid psychological isolation. This worked in two ways. First to isolate the leadership elements of Saddam's government/military to force them into moral collapse. Secondly, to minimize the isolation of the US/allied governments due to the conflict -- speed was essential.

• Minimal collateral damage. Essential to reduce moral outrage (willingness to fight) and manage global public opinion.

The Global Guerrilla Solution

Unfortunately, warfare is a conflict of minds. The opposition learned from the experience of the first Gulf War. This amazing demonstration (who doesn't remember were they were the first night of the attack on Baghdad?) taught the value of systems disruption to both the Iraqi leadership (at ground zero) as well as the entire universe of potential foes. It certainly informed Iraq's strategy for the second Gulf War. Iraq purposely created forces to replicate the USAF's Effects Based Operations with small cells of guerrillas. This has in turn been taught (through a percolation of innovation in Iraq's Bazaar of violence) to other autonomous guerrilla groups. Here's how guerrillas conduct EBO:

• Precision and stealth. Small groups of guerrillas are nearly impossible to detect and neutralize, particularly when they bypass military formations and hard targets to attack systems. Small, precisely aimed/timed attacks by these guerrillas against target systems can drive them into cascades of failure (for example: Iraq's northern oil fields have been nearly inoperative since the end of the conventional war, The attackers have suffered few casualties.).

• Continuous state failure. Iraq's basic services are in a continual state of failure. The state's leadership is in deep isolation due to its inability to deliver political goods to the population.

• An emergence of Primary Loyalties. A primary goal of Iraq's guerrillas is to fragment the country's loyalties -- ethnic, religious, tribal, etc. A hollow, non-functional state that is increasingly reliant on loyalist paramilitaries (Badr Brigades and Peshmerga) is precisely the desired outcome.

NOTE: I've applied the EBO method to a war with Iran (see the brief: Collapsing Iran).

Comments

[Dan]

John, your blog IMO is the most succinct, insightful and innovative war/strategy blog on the net. How's the Global Guerilla's doctrine coming along?

Keep up the good work man.

[Dan]

Brilliant.

[Ryan]

If the 'hollowing' out theory you suggest is of some worth, why is it that the Iraqi Army is therefore able to lead assaults and attacks in increasing number against insurgent positions?

Political goods are being delivered, hence the stable confidence in the government in the ability to protect civilians, hence operations lightning in Baghdad. Car bombing decreased from 12 to 2.

[Dan]

John,

To what extent does the primary loyalties strategy rely on Sunni Arab belief that they are an absolute majority (http://tdaxp.blogspirit.com/archive/2005/06/11/delusional_iraqi_arab_sunnis_slouching_toward_lakotization.html)? Throwing a state into ethnic strife is a briliant strategy to win, as long as you aren't the third largest group.

[John Robb]

Ryan, if you dig into Lightning, you will find it is almost completely PR. Also, whenever the city is locked down, it is inoperative. This contributes to economic ruin.

Dan, if the country continues as a failed state these groups can continue to operate. That is an end in itself. Winning is state failure. Also, thanks for the kind words.

[vox]

John, I think the "effects based operation" of the week is the G-8's decision to cancel approximately $40 BB of poor country debts and offer to make further cancellations in other countries subject to improved governance. Let's hope Nigeria is paying attention. This latest move follows the cancellation of about $40 BB of Iraqi debt in Q4'04-- a gigantic stimulus that I doubt the GGs can offset.

It's very important that many of these loans were described as "odious debts". That says a lot to both the lenders and the borrowers. It also precisely targeted the qualifying countries (for whom modernity is the target) and morally isolated the countries that didn't qualify.

The effects of such relief are very wide ranging and discouraging to the GGs. For example, in Iraq, despite the war damage and the ensuing sabotage by the GGs that you so ably describe, Iraqi GDP will likely end 2005 at a level that is 50-60% higher than it was in 2002. Iraq is no success but it is failing upwards. Iraq is already better off than a lot of other poor countries that aren't plagued by insurgencies. I wouldn't be surprised if Iraqi GDP/capita overtakes that of Syria and maybe Egypt in the not too distant future. What would that say for single party Pan-Arabianism?

Respecting the realization of that success, I am more concerned that the Iraqi government will discourage investment in electricity production by leaving Saddam's nationalized infrastructure and subsidiy schemes intact, and thus, it will waste power and hamstring the development of private utilities.

[Marcello]

"Iraqi GDP will likely end 2005 at a level that is 50-60% higher than it was in 2002"

Even if that happens a bigger GDP does not automatically means that the majority of the people will be better off to a substantial degree.Furthermore income is only part of the equation. Security (spending your new pay raise can become rather unpleasant when a car bomb goes off near you at the market) and public utilities are critical too.

"Iraq is already better off than a lot of other poor countries that aren't plagued by insurgencies."

It was so even before.Lots of really shitty places in this world.

"What would that say for single party Pan-Arabianism?"

A spent force and not exactly since yesterday.

"it will waste power and hamstring the development of private utilities."

Are you willing to invest your money into power plants construction in Iraq?

[vox]

Well put, Marcello. Clearly it's better if the GDP is rising because thay are making cars there than if the local production of concertina wire is rocketing for local consumption.

Unfortunately, it's very hard to get good data on what the income distribution was/is. Broadly, it appears that more communities have a shot (i.e. Kurds and Shias) than they did when the Boyz from Tikrit stole it all for themselves. As for the latter, they're probably looking at some pay cuts.

Relative to other countries, lately Iraq is up is the standings from near the bottom at the end of Saddam's regime.

No, I wouldn't invest in power generation or distribution because they'd have to give me the inputs practically free to make any money on the output. I'd be better off investing in an energy intensive business like chlorine production or smelting to take advantage of the underpriced electricity and fuel.

Cheers.

[Marcello]

The problem is that the country is at war, which is to say is a special situation.That 50-60% increase may actually take place but it may simply be the result of oil prices, the USA pumping billions into it and various activities such as smuggling into others countries.Mind you, some of that might improve the situation of the average guy directly or indirectly via increases in policemen/soldiers/teachers paychecks but that may be offset, as I noted previously, by others considerations.And ultimately if a civil war cannot be avoided, if crime and terrorism cannot be put in check and if electricity cannot be delivered in a reliable manner due to sabotage a further productive economic growth is pretty unlikely.Nobody is going to make significant investments in such environment.

[Ryan]

'Ryan, if you dig into Lightning, you will find it is almost completely PR. Also, whenever the city is locked down, it is inoperative. This contributes to economic ruin.'

Of course it was PR, however it does not lead to economic ruin, thats total bollocks, the safety and confidence in the security services in being able to control the violence and minimise it within the capital will enhance the peoples ability to do business in peace (somewhat) besides, this operations was to control all entry points (which a government should take control of) searching of suspected terrorist houses, and establishment of checkpoints within the city to control the flow of violence and foil the amount of intended terrorist activity.

'Dan, if the country continues as a failed state these groups can continue to operate. That is an end in itself. Winning is state failure. Also, thanks for the kind words.'

Hence the reason the US and its Allies must stay until Iraqis are able to defend themselves properly.

'It was so even before.Lots of really shitty places in this world.'

I don't think so, Sunni domination of Shias and Kurds is not an effective system of governance I'd say was superior to the one currently in Baghdad now. The only reason violence is prevailent in this system is that it encourages people to take action for their rights rather than raising an entire village which opposes you.

Sunni Kurd and Shia cooperation is a much more viable system than the Sunni domination of Iraq.

[Tim]

While your analysis of the air campaign against Iraq makes good sense, you over-estimate the novelty of the targeting doctrine. The idea of knocking out an advanced industrial society by means of striking and disabling a few critical systems was developed by air staffs in the post World War I era and was even attempted in a halting fashion against Germany in 1943-45. The very costly attacks on Schweinfurt, for example, were based on the (correct) understanding that disabling German production of ball bearings would cripple the German war effort. The Germans knew this, which is why they defended the target so ferociously. And, WW2 American "precision bombing" propaganda aside, the technology of the attackers did not permit anything other than carpet-bombing, which you so rightly dismiss. For more info, consult Tammi Biddle's excellent book on strategic bombing in WW2, or the much older RAND study (by Sallagar) on the road to total aerial warfare in the same war.

[John Robb]

Tim,

Thanks for the feedback.

The AF EBO planners that came up with this approach (see the document linked in the brief for more) were well aware of the WW2 experience. Their analysis of WW2 bombing campaigns showed deficiencies that they corrected in the EBO approach. I believe their analysis.

If your argument is that the Gulf War air campaigns broke no new ground, I think you should bring it up with AF planner crowd and not me.