OPEN SOURCE WARFARE IN LONDON

The hunt for the perpetrators of the London attack is in full swing. The forensic evidence will be collected (including CCTV footage and Internet traffic), sifted, and analyzed over the next couple of weeks to identify the culprits and their origin. Unfortunately, what we may find is that this group had few, if any, direct ties to known al Qaeda entities. In fact, it is likely to be an operation accomplished completely by terrorist entrepreneurs that are using it to gain entry (through contribution) into al Qaeda.

The reason this is a likelihood, is that al Qaeda is not a cohesive organization anymore (it was a loose affiliation network to begin with). Their network has given way to an even looser but more potent form of development: open source warfare. In this model, autonomous groups arise, innovate, plan, and act locally without any central direction or support. Al Qaeda's recognized leadership merely serves as the final arbiter of the attack's efficacy to the articulated war plan -- endorsement of the action and the group, comes after the operation is accomplished. Success, in this model, is the only barrier to entry.

Remember, al Qaeda (and to a lesser extent the US) set this new organizational structure in motion by providing a plausible premise for the war. This premise includes:

• The US and its allies can be attacked successfully. 9/11, Madrid, and Iraq.
• The US is at war with Islam. The ongoing situation in Iraq and Israel (and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Lebanon, and Pakistan).
• New groups can gain favor with al Qaeda through successful operations. The embrace of Zarqawi and the Madrid bombers last year.

This group's adoption of system disruption as its primary means of attack merely shows that prior innovation (which has been endorsed by al Qaeda) has been widely disseminated and accepted. This group even added their own innovation to the development of the systems disruption model (for other groups to adopt in the future): the bombs were exploded while the trains were in the tunnels rather than in the stations. This maximized disruption at the expense of body count.

A cautionary note: The organic nature of this type of warfare explains why there was zero prior knowledge of an attack. It also implies that future intelligence efforts will fail since there isn't a cohesive organization to infiltrate. It's important to understand that an open source movement is much more virulent, innovative, and dangerous enemy than the hierarchical organization that al Qaeda had on September 10, 2001. As long as the plausible premise stands intact, this war will continue to accelerate.

Comments

[Mike]

For what it's worth, the AP says that the Israeli consulate was warned that an attack was possible, so I'm not sure that there was "zero prior knowledge," unless you're referring to something else.

http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20050707/ap_on_re_mi_ea/israel_britain_explosions_3

Netanyahu had "real-time" not "prior" knowledge... Cheers!

[Mark]

If what you're saying is true, then it seems there is no end to this. The groups are small, diffuse, decentralized and numerous. As you note, this makes them exceedingly difficult to even detect, let alone infiltrate. But aren't they also too small to accomplish anything other than more disruption, death, and destruction?

Of course, any single group may cause enough disruption to affect certain courses of events. One group may get what they want (or they'll get an opportunity to consolidate power, but will fail due to their former "allies"), but that's only one group. The others will keep fighting for whatever it is they want.

In effect, it seems like the bazaar, once established, will dominate. Chaos becomes the norm, as governments and military organizations cannot provide security, yet no single group can be powerful enough to subdue other groups.

Is there no way to stop this?

[John Robb]

Some thinkers argue isolation. Bill Lind recommends that we cut ourselves off from sources of chaos in order to preserve the remnants of order that we do enjoy.

http://www.amconmag.com/2004_11_22/cover.html

[Mark]

Interesting. I've been reading some Lind articles recently, but none that had a wide overview like that one.

However, it seems to me that connection with order and isolation from disorder strategy he advocates, while arguably wise, is only really an action that delays the inevitable. Further, I'm not sure such a thing would be politically possible. The "Roman response" he articulates seems particularly unrealistic (politically and morally speaking - the actual mechanics of doing so would be rather simple, I would think).

And connection with order seems wise, but also opens us up to the sort of anti-globablization attacks that global guerillas seem so good at.

But I guess it's a start. Thanks for the pointer...

[Ali]

Unfortunately I think you are entirely correct here. The rational response is perhaps to shrug off the casualties and get used to doing that.

funny!

"Even though it's really not a good metaphor, it's great that you used it anyways, as it'll make people think twice before using open source software!"

[PeeDee]

For a humourous fictional exploration of the isolation response, see "This Other Eden" by Ben Elton.

[PeeDee]

The evolutionary answer to this challenge is dispersion of targets and robust system topologies (think Internet, or the immune system). Unfortunately, with current technology the reductions in economies of scale would imply a much reduced standard of living (if not populace) for the developed world. Things might well improve for the rest.

Just my thinking aloud.

(Personally, I live on a remote farm in a remote country, and work over the internet.)

[John Robb]

Two points of clarification. First, open source is a process and not a metaphor. Second, I really don't care about the open source vs. Microsoft software wars. If this model is predictive (and it is), I am going to use it.

[GregB]

John, just found your site here, and am enjoying it.

I believe that Lind's isolation posture has more to do with his political/social philosophies than with his formidable strategic grasp - a blind spot, as it were. Disorder (or chaos, if you will)seems to be a prerequisite for innovation. And failing innovation, we lose. Isolating also slows down the OODA loop, and that's the last thing we need in our current circumstances.

It seems like PeeDee's comment probably has the seeds of a solution. I think he's a bit too pessimistic about how reducing the "economies of scale" would affect the developed world. It also seems clear that the costs of launching physical attacks on reasonably secure dispersed centers would render them less likely.

[a z]

Mr. Robb,

Reading over at Informed Comment that Mr. Cole performs a cursory lingual deconstruction of the released statement. His conclusion is that the attackers are likely Egyptian or Sudanese. He reports other things I haven't read (not most informed) about the attack methodology.

Regarding open source, network warfare, I understand your main theses. But it just hit me recently that such a process does tend towards decentralized resources. The US, Russian and Chinese responses to these challenges seem to rely on blaming and attacking state actors. What is your perspective on taking on network terrorist operators by instigating conflict against states?

Additionally, one means of securing a system would be decentralization with multiple points of redundancy. Do you see that as a policy alternative to military actions, a supplement, or something to be ignored altogether?

Thank you.

[Mark]

"Additionally, one means of securing a system would be decentralization with multiple points of redundancy."

PeeDee and GregB both mentioned that, and I think such a thing is somewhat feasible in certain areas, but perhaps not much in others. A decentralized power grid would be nice in Iraq, as it would make things difficult for terrorists to interrupt and the technology sort-of exists (even if it would be challenging to implement from an engineering standpoint). But there's no way to decentralize their oil industry without losing economies of scale...

[John Robb]

Greg -- You may be right. There is a conflict between the transparency necessary for global integration and vulnerability to terrorism/disorder. We may end up (using Barnett's thesis) with a situation where both the Gap and Core combine to create a new hybrid. States that disconnect will fail to produce economic gains, those that stay connected will suffer plagues of disorder from the Gap.

AZ -- the problem with attacking states is that you create disorder. States are fragile, particularly due to the ongoing decline of state power due to globalization/Internet. If you collapse a state, you may not be able to re-establish it in any time periods that are relevant.

Mark -- Decentralized infrastructure is a strategy that may work, but only if the costs of centralization rise to a level to make it possible.

[PeeDee]

I keep coming up with rape as an analogy for OSW. There are no schools for rapists (other than possibly prisons). There is no rapist organisation yet there is an available culture of rape. And they keep happening - because there is a vulnerability and a twisted emotional payoff.

I think a good starting point in forming a strategic response to OSW would be the assumption that communication will be ubiquitous, costless, and secure (for both sides). If there are no structures to topple, and if I can see the enemy coming in time or space, then the cost/benefit of terror rises dramatically. A society of monads that are nevertheless linked in the noosphere with only a bare minimum of meat-space interaction. How do we get there from here?

[David]

If you have not seen it yet, download a copy of the BBC documentary "The Power of Nightmares"

http://www.archive.org/details/ThePowerOfNightmares

Even if you do not agree with the ultimate conclusion of Adam Curtis, the documentary gives a precise account of the development of the extreme fundamentalist Islamist movement.

It's become very evident that there is no centrally organized system under the direction of James Bond style super villains. What there is a bunch of groups connected only by ideology.

[enigma_foundry]

Winston Churchill had said something like this: "The next world war will be fought only periphially in the battlefield, and the center of the battle would be in the minds of men." I would submit that Al-Qaeda understand this, and the US/Great Britian/Alliance (with exception of the Poles--I would refer all to Stanislav Lem's recent articles in Tygodnik Powszechny) do not. As evidence, compare the Madrid train bombings, (highly effective and public opinion savvy) with the frequent misstates of GWB. The crusade quote comes to mind.

If one truly accepts that the battle is truly Primarily being fought "in the minds of men" I think a profound difference would arise in how the war is conducted. A radical idea, would be, for example, to wage no wars after 9/11, (except perhaps a targeted raid or two in Afganistan) and proceed through international treaties and organizations towards bringing those responsible to justice. This could have either succeeded or failed in its stated objective of bringing those responsible to justice. But it would have succeeded, IMHO, in its unstated objective: to not squander the moral/PR/agitprop advantage of being the victim, and may have put al-Qaeda in a very weak position for getting recruits.

Now compare with the results of the present strategy: al-Qaeda is getting recruits like mad, with every new story of Arabs or Muslims being killed driving the anger against US. And many of the perpetrators of 9/11 are still not brought to justice. So the way to fight a network of belief (feed by the belief in the rightness of destroying the US) is not to destroy those who hold that belief, but to attack the credibility of that belief itself. However, by attacking the way we have done, we have added credibility to the belief, feeding the network that we think we are fighting. This requires conceptual thinking far beyond beyond anyone in the present US administration, so I must conclude we will loss the war.

What al-Qaeda is waiting for is a sufficiently massive atrocity to be committed by the allies so they can use their WMD's (yes, they have them) without lossing to much of their support in the Muslim world. They will have then won the war.

We are radically underestimating the very real chance we will lose this war. Bring those responsible for 9/11, certainly a good idea, has to take a lower priority then: winning the war we are fight. We must keep our eye on the ball...

[D.]

Enigma, good post.

However I think you underestimate the current US administration. Dick Cheney definitely knows his warfare and strategy. He studied under John Boyd during the 80's and early 90's.

[GregB]

John,

I think it's quite possible that Barnett's thesis got us into our current mess in the first place. Certainly, his thesis calls for a long-term occupation of Iraq, with the understanding that the current phase is just a phase.

More importantly, his Gap/Core division is about as informative as the two-color state maps we were "treated" to after the presidential elections. County by county showed a quite different picture, and a finer resolution on "gap areas" and "core areas" might show something equally different. While the current likely candidates for "feral city" status are indeed in Barnett's Gap there is no particular reason to believe that they will remain so over the next several decades. Nor do non-state forces need cities per se - a dispersed cluster of "feral towns" would work quite as nicely for staging areas. In this regard PeeDee's comment on costless, ubiquitous, and secure commentications bears close attention.

Our experiences with drug smugglers demonstrate that committed non-state organizations are perfectly capable of routing around the areas where they have especially high risks. So Barnett's frontline countries could be routed around as easily.

All that aside, I'm really struck by the Open Source model and networks that exist only in potential until some node takes action.

I'm struck by the similarities to various attacks in the US - Oklahoma City and the Atlanta Olympics come to mind.

Mike German wrote about this in a Washington Post op-ed piece last month:

"The fact that these individuals, after being exposed to extremist ideology, each committed violent acts might lead a reasonable person to suspect the existence of a wider conspiracy. Imagine a very smart leader of an extremist movement, one who understands the First Amendment and criminal conspiracy laws, telling his followers not to depend on specific instructions.

He might tell them to divorce themselves from the group before they commit a violent act; to act individually or in small groups so that others in the movement could avoid criminal liability. This methodology creates a win-win situation for the extremist leader -- the violent goals of the group are met without the legal consequences.

Actually, there's no need to imagine this. Extremist group leaders produce a tremendous amount of literature, including training manuals on "leaderless resistance" and lone wolf terrorism techniques. These manuals have been around for years and now they're even available online."

While his focus is on avoiding "legal" issues, it's easy to see how this could relate to an OS or bazaar model.

[John Robb]

Thanks Greg, there is reason to believe that Barnett's model may cause more harm than good. The underlying assumption of the model is that uniformed US forces can rebuild/connect states (via a sysadmin force). Or that states can be connected via external pressure (to reform and become democracies). This is proving to be a false assumption.

[Felix Deutsch]

This group even added their own innovation to the development of the systems disruption model (for other groups to adopt in the future): the bombs were exploded while the trains were in the tunnels rather than in the stations. This maximized disruption at the expense of body count.

While it's true that it maximised disruption, I strongly disagree about "at the expense of body count".

First, the carriages were packed at that time anyway and to inflict a greater number of casualties at a station (passengers and/or people on the platforms) they would have needed larger amounts/different type of explosives.

Second, it is very likely that the small confines in the tunnel made for greater overpressure effect of the explosives.