JOURNAL: Iraq's Disrupted Reconstruction

The impact of the Halliburton strategy of system disruption on the US reconstruction effort in Iraq has been substantial. USAID estimates that 22% of all reconstruction costs are dedicated to security. A GAO report on the topic shows that security costs on some projects have reached 35% of all costs. Here's a quick recap (via WP):

• High security costs are cannibalizing some projects and limiting the breadth of others. ...in March, the U.S. Agency for International Development canceled two electric power generation programs to provide $15 million in additional security elsewhere. On another project to rehabilitate electric substations, the Army Corps of Engineers decided that securing 14 of the 23 facilities would be too expensive and limited the entire project to nine stations. And in February, USAID added $33 million to cover higher security costs on one project, which left it short of money to pay for construction oversight, quality assurance and administrative costs.
• Oil and electricity production in Iraq is still below prewar levels despite $5 billion and $5.7 billion respectively in committed funds.
• The government does not have a handle on security costs (or the number of private military companies involved). Estimates are 25,000 personnel in 60 companies. There are still not any standards for companies and personnel. Also, relationships between private military forces and uniformed US military personnel is often strained (i.e. Zapata).

Comments

[Jeremiah]

What's strange about all this is how surprised they act when they're unable to secure the morass of power lines, pipelines and road networks that criscross Iraq.

I wonder how long it will be after the troop drawdown until Bush declares victory, maybe with another designer flight suit photo-op.

Then how much longer until the conventional phase and a Saigon Embassy-style pullout of the last few Americans?

[TM Lutas]

There's a great deal of difference between Vietnam and Iraq but none more striking than the present US' ability to dominate airspace. The Sunni insurgency cannot go conventional because we own the air in a way that we never really did in Vietnam. Even if we pull our ground troops to zero, there's little political cost to air intervention to break up large troop formations or take out imported armor. We went through a decade of higher op-tempo during the sanctions period with little fallout.

The necessary technology to challenge that air dominance is not available to non-state actors and would require the intervention of some first rank military production states. In a practical sense, that's going to be either the PRC or Russia, neither of which would be able to withstand the blowback.

[Sean]

I have been following the posts on this site for a while. I have noticed a lot of cheerleading for the insurgents/terrorists, but I have seen little in the way of sound recommendations for how to DEFEAT THE INSURGENTS/TERRORISTS.

Much like the fourth generation warfare (4GW) folks, every "success" by the insurgents seems to offer validation for "open-source warfare" and its proponents. The concern here seems to be more with saying "I told you so," or validation of an abstract theory of warfare, than with offering sound proposals for victory. Where do the loyalties of the OS warfare proponents lie?

Finally, how does OS warfare fit into a larger historical perspective? Victor Davis Hanson in, The Western Way of War (1989), notes the increasingy fascination in the West, the U.S. in particular, with guerrilla-style warfare and the increasingly popular notion that it represents a virtually unbeatable, "new" form of warfare. However, in this book, as well as others, he notes that through 2000 years, the West, with its general preference for decisive battle, has prevailed over irregulars. The two conlcusions are clear: 1) irregular, guerrilla war is NOT as new as its admirers admit, and 2) it is not an unbeatable form of war against which traditional states/militaries are ineffective. Historically, quite the opposite has been the case.

Thus, it would be helpful if OS warfare were 1) more more firmly rooted in military history and 2) were more concerned with providing a balanced view of the capabilities and shotcomings of OS warfare, 4GW, and other theories of irregular/guerrilla combat generally.

[Jeremiah]

Sean,

I don't think that guerrilla warfare is unbeatable. I do think that it can be extremely difficult to beat it in the insurgency's own terrain.

I also think that the tactics required to win a popular insurgency from the foreign-aggressor end of things are largely inimical to democracy as well as being repugnant on the world political stage.

We can turn Fallujah and all the cities like it into prison camps, at vast expense both financial and otherwise, but that's not doing anything to further the ostensible goal of creating free and democratic societies.

Suggestions that we fight the root causes of the insurgency rather than throwing gasoline on the flames have been met with the same old "why do you hate America" bullshit.

The "kill 'em all and let god sort 'em out" crowd seem to continually forget that the hearts and minds battle isn't won with cluster bombs.

TM Lutas-- "Conventional Phase" doesn't necessarily mean that they're going to bring the T72s out of their hideyholes. In this case, I imagine that it'll mean an escalation of the tactics that have worked for the insurgents so far. After all, when a strategy is doing so well, and the enemy seems powerless to stop it with all their cash and firepower, why change?

I mean sure, we could kill all the muslims down to the last little child. But the battlefield isn't Fallujah, it's in the heads of the people, and we're losing that war right along with the moral high ground and the alliances we've squandered over the past two years or so.

[Sean]

Hmmm...I think that I am more in agreement with TM Lutas. I don't see Iraq as analogous to Vietnam as is often proposed. There is an important difference that gets overlooked: The Vietcong had the NVA. It WAS NOT a pure insurgency. The insurgents had the support of a regular army and an air force which was a very capable force. The Iraqi insurgents do not have that. Nor are they as unified as the Vietcong. There is no unified alternative vision for the future of Iraq--something that the democratically-elected Iraqi government DOES offer--that the insurgents are capable of proposing to the Iraqi people to win their hearts and minds, not in the same sense as the Vietcong.

I have noticed that the "hearts and minds" crowd, specifically the 4GWers, disparage the efforts to keep the political process on track. But, isn't keeping a positive vision of the future on track a key to the hearts and minds debate?? Murderous dictators can provide electricity, water, etc., as evidenced by the fact that oil and electricity production are still not at pre-war levels. But, isn't their more to winning hearts and minds than that?

4GW, netwar, OS war, etc., etc. folks like to quote Mao, but Mao insisted that guerrillas needed the support of a regular army to be effective, that they could not be effective on their own. This is an aspect of Mao's writing, and of the practice of guerrilla warfare in Vietnam, that conveniently gets ignored.

Finally, for those who like to use the American Revolution as an example of effective guerrilla warfare, review Weigley's, The American Way of War. He notes what Mao had argued, that militias/guerrillas/insurgents rely on regular forces. Washington's Continnental Army, by remaining concentrated, prevented the Brits from dispersing their own forces to counter the attacks from militias. He only needed to keep his army intact, not win battles, which is what he did. It worked.

Again, the Iraqi insurgents do not possess the same capability. U.S. forces are able to kill and capture, and to destroy weapons cache's with impugnity, from the air and the ground.

Finally, on the hearts and minds battle, I am not sure that we are doing as bad as many suggest. Remember, the goal is NOT to get the Iraqis to like us. The goals are 1) to get them to not hate us enough to actively fight us--which is the case now; MOST are not fighting and many who are are foreigners--and 2) to get them to, over time, lend support to their democratically-elected government. There is evidence that that is happening. (See the recent DOD progress report to Congress with polling data indicating that Iraqis increasingly trust the Iraqi police forces, have optimism in their political future, and understand their role in their own political future.) I have also noted recently that many press releases from the Coalition forces contain "story lines" which include Iraqi citizens offering tips to U.S. or Iraqi forces which lead to the killing or capturing of insurgents, or the destruction of weapons caches.

Why is it that daily car bombs or IEDs with a handfull killed constitutes "success" for the insurgents but daily raids which result in the killing or capturing of insurgents, often the result of intelligence tips from Iraqis themselves, is NOT indicative of success?

If the devil of success or failure is in the details, then the details of BOTH sides daily activities matters, not just those of one side. Some of my friends/colleagues and I have started a site to highlight the "successes" on a daily basis (http://gwotmonitor.rhetorical-devices.net). This is NOT to say that the U.S. has been perfect, that we are not having setbacks, or that we cannot still lose this war. But, it is to indicate that media coverage hsa been biased and that there is more evidence of success than is commonly admitted. Constructive comments and contributions to the effort are more than welcome.

[Sean]

Sorry, bad link. Here it is: http://gwotmonitor.rhetorical-devices.net

[James]

All this talk, get out of the people's county and stop trying to steal there resources/set up a puppet govt/build bases etc. Many forget that this in illegal occupation. I would fight like a fierce warrior as the Iraq have been if someone invaded my county. Yes, Iraq should not be considered a Vietnam, but they are rewriting the arts of urban warfare, which will make it more deadlier. Given time, the body count of soldiers will rise. This war is a complete diasater for all of mankind.

[joe]

I agree, we have a chance to lead this world but we throw that all out for destruction, war, greed, oil, and power. Success for the Iraqs is preventing the progress of the imperialist forces. For the coalition forces, success is effectively setting up a prop government, iraqi soldiers to fight/control the population, securing/controlling the flow of oil, etc. Overall it's a battle of wills which will trully coin success. The iraqis fighting have a nationalist idealogy driving them, the coalition forces are paid to do their jobs-which of these will will overcome?
And whats with calling people terrorist in other countries that we invade? and Whats wrong with other people coming to help you fight (ie muslims from other countries coming to help their Iraqi brothers). We have the coalition forces helping each other! Well i cant blame the mainstream media for making this popular, they are owned by the 1% of our population.

We brag about air/land/sea superiority but still we can't defeat iraqis fighting with primitative weapons-goes to show you something.
What's the use of sending a $2 million missile into a $10 tent to hit a camel in the butt?
- George W. Bush
My condolences to all the families of victims of this war.
To close:

Wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men.
- General George Patton Jr

"War is delightful to those who have had no experience of it. "--i.e. Bring em On!!
- Desiderius Erasmus

"In war, only the simple succeeds."
-Field Marshal Paul Von Hindenburg

[Sean]

So far, folks have only lent support to my initial assumption: that there are a lot of insurgent cheerleaders hanging around this neck of the cyber-neighborhood.

Is there anyone out there interested in U.S. victory? Or is everyone on the same page in arguing, "Gee whiz those terrorists are smart, and so with the'information age', and rightly too, because they deserve to win"??

Just curious.

I would be interested to know how many folks reading and commenting here:

1) Think it is possible to win,
2) Think that we should win, that it would be a good thing, AND/OR
3) Think it is possible to win WITHOUT adopting the same OS, network-centric, etc. warfare tactics as the enemy.

[joe]

My dear Sean,
When you realize that there are no winners of war, it is then you will truly understand the questions you ask.

[Ken]

2,000 years ago you could defeat an insurgency by reducing the insurgents' main city to rubble, killing all the men and then selling the women and children into slavery.

Coming up to the present, the only example that Victor Hanson could find, in a recent article, of a succesful counter-guerrilla war was Malaya - and he conveniently overlooks the fact that the guerrillas were ethnic Chinese and that the majority Malays were only too pleased to help the British root them out.

The simple truth is that if the guerrillas are well-supported by the locals, then they will usually win in the end. The FLN did not defeat the French, but the French withdrew from Algeria. The costs of the war in political and economic terms just made its continuation impossible.

[Sean]

Joe- Ah yes, the old knee-jerk "there are no winners in war" argument. By it's logical extension then, we can conclude that the world would have been as well off if Hitler would have prevailed in WWII. There is a difference between victory and defeat, and it is usually spelled in the lives of millions who either die or are subjugated. War is a serious matter, as Sun Tzu once reminded us. The discussion here is in need of more than Moveon.org talking points and quaint antiwar slogans.

Ken- Good point on Hanson. I too find some (much?) of his work unsettling/lacking at times. However, I respect his knowledge of military history and think that he therefore deserves to be taken seriously.

Why should we privilege only recent examples of (counter)guerrilla warfare? You seem to be arguing that because examples from the more distant past illustrate the willingness to win by using extraordinary means that they are not valid as examples or teaching tools. Yet, I think they are valuable teaching tools precisely BECAUSE of the argument you make, which illustrates implicitly one of Hanson's arguments as well: Our inability to achieve victory is NOT the result of a lack of capabilities; it is the result of a lack of willpower, a loss of faith in the rightness of our own cause and the values of our society, a lack of willingness that our values and society are good enough or moral enough to fight and die for.

Hence my questions above: Does anyone here believe in victory? If not, then James is correct, "all this talk" is just that: talk. If the answer is "no," then of course insurgents/guerrillas/terrorists/whoever will prevail. It has nothing to do with their supposed innovations in technology or tactics, their being in touch with the information age, or our own capabilities. If we do not want to win, do not think we deserve to win, then we won't.

I am starting this discussion not so much to start a big fight as I am to get a feeling for the community of readers/commentors for this sight. I am writing my Ph.D. dissertation on the rise of theories of warfare which posit an epochal, generational, etc. shift in the nature of warfare, and the relationships among those theories, shifts in U.S. military doctrine since 1975, information technologies, and nonlienar science.

OS warfare seems to me to fit into the intellectual lineage, through its current sympathies with the 4GW theory, running back to John Boyd and the military reform movement of the late 1970s and early 1980s. If anyone here could expand on that lineage (or lack thereof) I would be interested to hear what you have to say.

Finally, I do not mean to give the impression that I am completely hostile to the OS warfare, 4GW, netwar, etc. theories. I find them quite fascinating and I think there are a lot of important insights. However, I think that there are some shortcomings as well, that I have tried to raise here. Thus, I do not seek to refute these theories as much as to engage them critically so as to make them better.

[J. Dunbar]

I agree, Ken. Certainly it would be "bad PR" to kill and/or enslave large numbers of the invaded population, both in the "civilized west" and the mid-east. And, while I sympathise with Joe's perspective that there are "no winners", I think those detached nihilists playing the game of mono-poly-geo-politique do see this in absolute terms. As "God's Banker" Roberto Calvi would say, the only book you need read to understand the way the world works is "The Godfather". While it's true that the acquiescence or direct support of a population is a valuable non-mineral resource (i.e. "hearts and minds"), does anyone ever get the feeling that the human element has been primed to become less significant once more, and that the stakes are about to be raised?

Speaking of which, I'm still morbidly fascinated with all this talk out there about the suspicious FEMA nuclear-terrorism exercise in Charleston SC. I guess we'll know in a few days...

"Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me —-you can't get fooled again."

[Ken]

Sean,

There are two pretty crucial differences between the ancient and modern worlds. In those days you could slaughter a whole populaton and nobody cared very much. Today, thanks to modern communications, even if the will was there the consequences are too much for a putative neo-Roman Consul to think about. The Romans did not have to worry about the effects that their wars had on the balance of payments back home... The Chimp will be only too aware that his war against Iraq relies on monies loaned by Asian bankers.

Secondly, and coming forward to the modern age, previous empire builders had modern weapons and their opponents didn't. This is true whether we are talking about the internal empires that the Americans or Russians built in the 18th and 19th Centuries, or the similar activities that the Europeans carried out in Africa.

From the mid-20th Century onwards, it was no longer politically possible to exterminate a whole population and, in any event, the locals tended to be tooled up with weapons that were the equal of the westerners that they were fighting.

So what do you do? The French hammered away at Algeria for eight years. They pretty much won the war on the ground, but by that time the conflict had so divided Frenchmen that they were fighting on the streets of Paris. Do you keep on breaking your economy and society like that or do you call it a day and up stumps?

The notion that this is about willpower is strange. The assumption seem to be that if every American supported the war and if all means were used... Yes, well, if my bitch had a dick, she'd be a dog, wouldn't she? Dreaming about what should be cannot substitute for facing the reality of what is.

[Ken]

Just a point about Fourth Generation Warfare and why it is important. In the past a guerrilla movement was usually fighting to replace somebody or other as a state's rulers. You could talk to them, bring them to Lancaster House and hammer out an agreement.

4GW is very, very differnent because the fighters are not battling to take over a state. They are what emerges when a state falls apart and they draw on a far older tradition for their ideology.

Take Europe in the middle-ages. Families and clans fought wars. So did regions and cities. A lot of fighters were pure mercenaries who hung around waiting for someone or other to hire them for the next war.

In the case of Iraq, it looks as if the guerrillas are fighting to expell the westerners from their land - a classical war of liberation - but what if it isn't? What if the men doing the fighting are more concerned with family, clan and tribe than their are with abstract concepts like nation? If that is the case then there is nobody to negotiate with! Talk to one and all he speaks for is his tiny group. The rest carry on fighting.

[enigma_foundry]

From post above: "There's a great deal of difference between Vietnam and Iraq but none more striking than the present US' ability to dominate airspace. The Sunni insurgency cannot go conventional because we own the air in a way that we never really did in Vietnam. Even if we pull our ground troops to zero... through a decade of higher op-tempo during the sanctions period with little fallout."

Well, obviously the one crucial similarity is that we still haven't learned if we think that armour is relevant in this war. The war is taking place, as Churchill had predicted "in the minds of men"

The network that we are fighting is a network of belief, which has an ever morphing structure in it's manifestation as a network of people.

Our failure to realize this is the one reason the war is un winnable.

Do we deserve to win? Well, let's define all our terms who is we and what do we mean by win?

In my view, the meaning of win is to reach a state in which the casualties are reduced, if not eliminated, while granting those who live in the different countries (Kurdistan, Iraq) in the region as much self determination as possible. Those are, to some extent contradictory goals, and ones that are probably not on the Bush administration's agenda.

The "We" for me does not include the Bush Administration but it does include America.

[Jeremiah]

Sean,

You have a very facile way with words, like many of the other chicken hawks. It's a little different on the ground.

You might think about putting some of your book learnin' to good use in the battlefield. I'm sure some of the gunnies out there would really love the benefit of your expertise.

You could tell them how airpower wins guerrilla wars and how all they need to do is just keep a positive attitude.

To do this would give you an understanding of warfare that you're never going to get any other way. So why don't you go out there and share in this great military adventure of yours. Think of all the people you'd be helping!

Otherwise you're just a paper pusher in a cozy air conditioned academic ivory tower while other better men do the dying.

[Sean]

Ken- Thanks for the nice reply. This is what I'm trying to get at: What are the subtle differences between all of these terms (guerrilla, 4GW, terrorist, insurgent, etc.)? Often, each of these get tossed around together, making it difficult to figure out what's new and different about what we are seeing.

Jeremiah- I think I have tried to avoid name-calling in all of this. So, maybe we can keep the discussion civil?

Additionally, if you read my last post, I think you will find that I am not necessarily in complete disagreement with you. I'm trying to get at the root of your, and others', beliefs on these matters. For my future book I would like to be able accurately to describe theories like OS warfare, how they relate to Boyd, 4GW, and maybe even your own emerging theory of 5GW.

Words don't count, only deeds? Then why do you and others spend so much time in the land of words, reading, writing, and arguing on this site and so many others like it? And do only people with prior military service get the right to speak? That doesn't sound like the American, democratic tradition of civil-military relations to me.

I do not believe that airpower wins guerrilla wars.

You are correct: I do not have an understanding of war on the ground. I do however have a profound respect for those who serve and put themselves in harm's way and, yes, I do hope that some day, in some small way, my research can contribute to better policy, doctrine, tech acquisition, etc. and therefore make a contribution to keeping these guys safer and more effective.

And yes, often I do feel that they are better people than me because they chose to serve. I had an opportunity to attend the Air Force Academy and, for whatever reason at the time, chose not to. Now I'm on the path that I'm on and there's no going back so I have to make the contribution that I can with what I have and what I have done. I hope that you, and others, will forgive and understand.

I would not think to go to the field and preach to gunnies about what they should do. But, if one were to go and preach in the field, how helpful would the message I have been hearing here really be? "The war is unwinnable. The insurgents represent a new form of war for which there is no cure. We do not deserve to win. Look how innovative the insurgents are! Look, another infrastructure attack, my theory is correct. . . ." Do gunnies want or need to hear that message? Is that helpful to them?

[John Robb]

Sean, if we can drop the political buzzwords, we can make better progress with this discussion. This is not a political weblog.

I do not claim that OS warfare represents a unwinnable threat. It is, however, much more dangerous than vanilla 4GW as practiced by early guerrilla groups. OS warfare in combination with systems disruption radically improves on existing 4GW theory (as blitzkrieg did with 3GW maneuver theory).

Most of my time is being spent just analyzing the threat. IF we can at least get that right, solutions will follow.

[tim fong]

Sean,
I'm still not clear on what you define as a "win." Without understanding what you view as a desireable end-state, I think it's difficult for anyone to offer a means to create the end state.

[joe]

Here is a way to "win"
1- Slowly Pullback/Withdraw of American troops from towns. In Sunni towns, you can't replace them with the current Iraqi soldiers who are Shites because of mainly ethnic differences. If you leave sunni towns it will become a hotbed for the resistance.
2-A sincere diplomatic effort to adress the concerns of the insurgency-which will be difficult because we are not well liked. Oh, I forgot America don't negotiate with Terrorist or freedom fighter, call it what you want.
3-Break up Iraq into three seperate states through the encouragement of secretarian strife, which is being attempted, but only a few is falling for this. In addition, this may backfire because an alliance may form betwen Sunnis/Shites because of the Rich Oil fields in the North and Turkey would not allow a independent Kurd terriority.
4-Blow up Iraq, well sound good to the nintendo soldier but not an option (draw your own conclusions)
5- Use Chemical and Degraded Uraninum on other Sunni towns, like what was done in Falluja. This may not work because the insurgency has no central command and will disperse into other towns, as seen. You cannot "break the back of the insurgency"
6-Bring more moderate Sunnis into the political process. That can't work either because they are seen as American agents.
7-Continue Abu Garhab type atmosphere and continue to kill fighters. That can't work either because it just breeds more fighters.
8-Bring more troops to Iraq. That can't work either because of budgetary issues and plans to attack other nations sovergnity i.e. Iran. Theres always the draft (well).
9- We have to ask ourselves what constitutes winning for each side. For the real terrorists in Iraq it may be the field training they received or the killing of vast amount of Americans, or the Sunni (if they comply-never happen) it may be fair representation), or the tribal clan, it may be that they avenged the kin which was killed, well we know what the real goal of the coalition goals are.
10--I could keep going all day, but because of the lack of post war planning, the agressors will be defeated by the fourth generation warfare being utilized by the Iraqis and their brothers. This county is not prepared for this type of warfare and their enemy will use what works i.e. suicide bombings, IEDs etc. Don't forget about public opinion, are Amercians prepared for an unending war.

[Kevin]

Success in Iraq involves increasing division amongst the Iraqi nationalist/former baath party loyalist and the foreign islamic extremists.

[John Robb]

Kevin, that is a 4GW way of thinking. The way to do that is through deescalation.

[kevin]

;)

[Adam Ward]

Is it possible for the US to win? Who knows? That does rather require an idea of what winning would look like. Iraq becoming Iran circa 1979 or Somalia, or for that matter, remaining Iraq 2005 isn't a win. Maybe winning could be phrased as: "if Iraq became a vaguely stable country with some form of government that keeps the oil flowing and the slaughter of civilians to a minimum" but that's Sadaam Hussain v2 and not really a significant victory.

Is it possible for the US not to lose? Assuming that losing looks like Iraq collapsing into a failed state, like Afghanistan. Probably, but not certainly. However at a cost of $900 million a week sooner or later the US goes bankrupt. At a certain point Iraq will cost too much for the Asian-based US treasury billholders to continue to suport.

The Iraqi resistance are playing for time, if the war takes a decade or two well so what? The US hasn't got any time, despite Rumsfelds comments on a 12-year war. This time-money-resistance interface is the essence of both Taber's War of the Flea and modern Network Centric warfare.