THE HUMPTY DUMPTY PRINCIPLE

The perpetual collapse of Iraq brings up an important philosophical debate. Is the state an ascendent or descendent institution? Let's dive into this:

If the state (and the state system in aggregate) is still a thriving institution, historical forces will conspire to drive the creation of states. States will spontaneously re-emerge if disrupted. Further, actions taken (read: invasions and regime change) against states will result in temporary chaos followed by easy and rapid stability. If the state system is in decline (ala Martin van Creveld), states will find it increasingly difficult to maintain financial viability, deliver critical services to citizens, control their borders and economy, and maintain a monopoly on violence. States that are disrupted will find it difficult, if not impossible, to re-establish order and functionality. Historical forces will conspire to defeat any attempt at reforming the order of the state.

The evidence seems to point to the latter argument. States are increasingly finding themselves in perpetual disruption or complete failure. One driver of this is globalization. Globalization has diminished state power across the board ("it melts the map"). So, if we want to build a peaceful (and profitable) system that obeys a new rule set (to borrow a phrase from Thomas Barnett), the limits of state power must be a critical factor in its development. This new revised view might be appropriately called the Humpty Dumpty principle of state failure.

Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall,
Humpty Dumpty had a great fall;
All the King's horses and all the King's men,
Couldn't put Humpty together again.

Comments

[wtofd]

What are the alternatives?

[Duncan Kinder]

"What are the alternatives?"

While transnational organizations are usually linked with organized crime or with terrorism, nowadays, remember that the biggest, baddest transnational of them all is the Roman Catholic Church.

[Cardenio]

Iraq may be alomst perfect the way it is ( for our needs ). Equilibrium being the new ' divide and conquer ' principle. Do we really need to DO anything in Iraq other than sit on it until the clock runs out ?

[James Acres]

Shouldn't we qualify the question? "Is the nation-state in decline?" And to that we've several possible successors -- some of which we still recognize as states. For instance Bobbitt's "Market State". Basically the state optimized for globalization.

Another alternative would be neo-tribalism. Not something we recognize as a state -- but something we see the "market" in.

----

Or is it more powerful to ask "Are hub and spoke networks descendant? And scale-free network ascendant?" To me that might be a better question. Because we could look at old Iraq as tribalism (the Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti) meets the nation-state. And perhaps new Iraq is tribalism meets the market-state.

So maybe what's really happening is that the type of structures that can survive is changing. But there is still substanial room for very different structures to thrive within the new fitness landscape. And if the new fitness test is that structures must be able to withstand great violence brought by small bands at critical nodes . . . then only structures that have no critical nodes can survive.

And that means scale-free networks.

[Grant Henninger]

The question of "Is the state an ascendent or descendent institution?" is too broad. The answer will be different for different states. If you only use Iraq as an example then you will of course come to the conclusion that the state is a descendent institution.

However, imagine something disrupting the French government, can you imagine a state not quickly reemerging in France? There are two reasons for this: one, France has a history of being a state; and two, France has a nation behind the state.

The identity of a nation is probably the most important thing for a state to form without it being forced from the outside. Iraq does not have that national identity, so of course a state won't form without us forcing it upon the Iraqis. What most of the Iraqis want is to form states along their national borders, which would make three states out of Iraq. This shouldn't come as any surprise to us, and I bet the only way we will ever see an Iraqi state is using Saddam's method.

[wtofd]

James, what is a "scale free network?"

[John Robb]

Grant, thanks for the post. To define the trend, you need to look at the weakest members. They will feel it first (canaries in the coal mine). In regards to the strongest members (ie. the UK and the US), the recent policy is focus is on border enforcement, control of restive minorities via limits on speech, and a broad enhancement of police powers. Not a sign of ascendency.

[SFnetwork]

'scale-free network'

http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/05/scalefree_terro.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scale-free_network

[wtofd]

Wow. SF, John, thank you.

[James Acres]

Couldn't we view the nation-state as the greatest artifact of Western Imperialism? Western Imperialism was successful in large part because our social and physical technologies gave us a tremendous demographic advantage.

But globalization has conferred those technological advantages on non-western people. And so we lose our demographic advantage.

So maybe the fall of the nation-state outside the core west is a symptom of the decline of Western Imperialism?

[James Acres]

John -- regarding your comments on current US policy. I believe Toynbee argues those are sure signs of a civilization that has lost it's vitality and is becoming decadent.

But Toynbee also points out that sometimes what seem to be a civilization's greatest achievments and dominion over others comes after this decay begins.

For example -- one could imagine the USA learning to play by GG rules and using our power to brutally enforce our core moral norms.

[Federalist X]

John, compelling analysis. I remember reading a treatise on the decline of the city-state in Europe (post-renaissance), unfortunately, I can't for the life of me remember who wrote it (sorry, its the weekend, and I'm a couple pints under already). Anyway, in the treatise the "limitation of power" concept was key. The argument was something like: because city states devour resources on such a large scale, they will need to control those resources. Once they have controlled those resources, they are no longer a city-state, and have correspondingly less control over their satellites (essentially they based this all off of classical greece and their colony system-with its resulting failure).

The long and short of this is, we are witnessing a natural system, but not necessarily an evolution. In other words, the treatise writer would argue, we are moving back in forth, in flux between two poles, not progressing towards any one fixed point. So then the critique of your two views would be that both are true, states are perpetually moving into non-states, which perpetually move into states. Over the grand scale of history, that appears to be more consistent with the evidence than merely moving in one direction.

[Steve G.]

I think the question should focus more on the type of state as some of the other commenters have proposed. There are actually more independent states today than 50 or 100 years ago. Large federations (federated by force, sometimes) appear to be unstable when the balance of economic and military power are not homogeneous across the constituents.

On a related note, a book was written many years ago about the 7 politico-economic 'states' of the US had how they have different foci for their interests. I can't recall the name of it, but the author proposed that the US really had seven different areas of interest which pulled regions away from a centralized federal state.

[Federalist X]

Steve: that's an interesting hypothesis. did this book deal with cultural issues, or was it strictly economic?

[Greg Burton]

Steve, were you refering to "The Nine Nations of North America", by Joel Garreau? I'd give the biblio data but here's the amazon URL instead.

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0380578859/103-7136359-0751049?v=glance

[James Acres]

Along the lines of "Nine Nations of North America" but more recent in Robert Kaplan's "An Empire Wilderness."

In this work Kaplan is primarily concerned with what a post-nation-state North America looks like.

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0679776877/qid=1125194588/sr=2-1/ref=pd_bbs_b_2_1/104-2469499-2154331?v=glance&s=books

[Cardenio]

" I remember reading a treatise on the decline of the city-state in Europe (post-renaissance) ..."

I'd like to know who wrote this too.

[gmoke]

If the age of cheap oil is coming to an end, things are definitely going to change for the nation states around the world.

[Stein XL]

Self organization into protective polities far precedes the foundation of the nation-state, and will survive it, regardless of technological evolution.
However, just as the United States of America could have been 50 states, yet behaves as one - we'll be seeing a greater shift towards federation, as nation-states must pool their resources in order to meet extra-national challenges from other polities.

Iraq can't be used as illustration here. It's not a nation, and never was - it's a construct, scribbled with pen on a map by a colonial regime looking to indicate manageable borders, disregarding ethnicity in the process.

Iraq is three nations (and possibly two). Kurdistan in the North, which the Turks will be at war with one day, and Sumer in the South, which will merge with Iran - leaving Sunni Iraq in the center, to strike at both.
Seeking evidence of the descendant nation-state in an Iraq that is incapable of reuniting into pre-Saddam statehood is silly. The removal of Saddam ensured that the tribes and factions of the region are "free" to rearrange themselves into their more legitimate shapes, as they become de-Balkanized.

[Vince]

Grant and Stein,

The french example given by Grant is a good one. As Grant says, France is a long time nation with a strong state tradition. Yet, french state is much weaker than it was in the sixties.

Just to give a few examples, over the past two decades french state has lost control over his currency (replaced by Euro) and his budget policy (european stability treaty), it is by now selling its highways to private companies and is facing a growing lack of legitimacy because of massive unemployment.

French state doesn't appear to me as very ascendant and we are talking of one of the oldest and strongest state system in the world.

[John Robb]

Exactly Vince. What are you getting for your tax dollars now?

Alex, I don't see any shift towards federations of states. Kyoto, NATO, and the UN are all under pressure. The US had to scrape the barrel for allies in Iraq. Also, under your premise I suspect all failed states (like Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, and others) are exceptions.

Fed X, I am greek in spirit in that I like cycles of history. However, the difference between that model and this is that states are now mutually interdependent. Retreat, disconnection, is state death. I think we need to look for another cycle to credit for that.

[Steve G.]

The Nine Nations of North America was it! Thanks. Yes, the main focus of this was economic and cultural. The part I best remember is that much of the southwest from Texas to southern California has more in common from economic and cultural-linguistic perspectives with Mexico than with the rest of the U.S. There are some problems with the homogeneity of the US populace, but it would be interesting to reexamine the arguments in light of the internet (the book came out in 1981) and the 'death of distance' generated by that. There have been several articles in a range of journals about how the internet and computers have enabled smaller populations spread over wide areas to join in common cause (not always warlike causes) to support a sub-population in a country.

[Duncan Kinder]

"French state doesn't appear to me as very ascendant and we are talking of one of the oldest and strongest state system in the world."

Actually, once upon a time, the South of France had more in common with Barcelona and northern Italy than the rest of France.

And to the north, the Duchy of Burgundy was quite an outfit.

[jomama]

The trend is in place, starting with the
break-up of the Former Soviet Union.

There are innumerable secession movements
going on, and have been going on for some
time.

The state will soon be found wanting, for
solutions as well as taxpayers and other
sycophants.

The net is to the state what the printing
press was to the Holy Roman Church.

Devastating.

[Cardenio]

Isn't this what " The Shield of Achilles " Philip Bobbit all about ? Has anyone read or tried to read his book ? I mean seriously, I counted one sentance to be 260 words long. Is there a " Marketstates for Dummies " as an alternative ?

[James Acres]

Cardenio --

I say this with all respect and no ill-will. Unless English is not your first language, if you want to think about these things you simply must build the literacy to read works such as Bobbit's without it being too painful.

Yes -- Bobbit is a law prof and therefore a hideously and unnecessarily complex writer. But he's really about as good a writer as you're going to get from academia. :-(

[Jeremiah]

Because of communications technology, many of the traditional powers of the nation state have become disseminated.

Also, and rather disturbingly, numerous events across the globe indicate that the nation state appears to be losing its monopoly on paramilitary and para-commando violence.

Electronic communications and commodities trade already have little respect for national boundaries. Pride in the "official national tribes" of flag, country, local sports teams are gradually being replaced by tribal affiliations based on other things than locality.

Rising fuel costs may diminish the powers of centralized authorities over wide areas, and thus power will percolate down to lower levels.

Groups, military and otherwise, without long logistical tails will begin to show ever greater economic advantages over long tail-to-tooth ratio groups. Logistics train disruption at the military and economic levels will become more and more effective.

Guerrilla techniques, weapons proliferation, computer assisted machining and transportations and logistics problems will favor local secessionist movements and insurgencies based on cultural, ethnic and metatribal lines.

Nationalism is arbitrary. The boundaries of old empires and ancient moyo lines will lose relevancy and mindshare.

WMD and area-denial weapons proliferation disfavor centralized authority. Biological weapons proliferation and emerging viruses may strongly discourage heavy flow of goods trade and travel, favoring the isolatable enclave model of community development.

Frontless wars and WMD further favor dispersion.

All in all, I think things are not looking good for the nationstate.

[Cardenio]

That's the same thing I tell people about reading ' Ulysses ', but ' Ulysses wasn't written with some kind of infernal dictation software and I suspect " Achilles " was.

No one can edit Bobbit's book ? There aren't any graduate students to put on the book project ? It's not really any different than reading Kant, some one has to interpret this guy. Otherwise what he's saying, which could be critical to understanding the future at a critical time, is going to get shelved.

[Valdis]

James A. posted a comment...
"...then only structures that have no critical nodes can survive.
And that means scale-free networks."

Wrong James.

Scale free networks[SFNs] are resilient to random attacks -- the attacker does not know the network map so he attacks what he knows. But SFNs are very vulnerable to intelligent attacks -- the attacker knows the map and can access the vulnerable nodes. The vulnerable nodes in a SFN are the massively connected hubs -- just need to remove/restrict a few of those and disruption is rampant.

For all of the gory details on SFN vulnerability read this short academic paper with a long URL...
http://www.nd.edu/~networks/Publication%20Categories/03%20Journal%20Articles/Physics/ErrorAttack_Nature%20406%20,%20378%20(2000).pdf

BUT, not all networks are scale-free, therefore finding the critical nodes is not as simple as counting links!

[Adam]

This is a tough question. If we accept that nation states were organised for the purposes of war then there is still a strong role for the nation state in defence. Certainly no one can imagine a war in which Europe, Japan, China, India or the US gets invaded. But in the 4GW world huge armies and immense navies are pretty much irrelevant.

So my answer is, if 4GW can continue and prosper, then the reason for the nation state as originally constructed may fracture.

[g510]

(I also believe that history is cyclical rather than linear. However, centuries-long cycles may as well be linear trends for those presently living.)

---

The market state has a number of potentially fatal flaws.

I'll start with the question of "values in time of war," and if anyone thinks this is worthwhile, I'll have more to post about other aspects of the problem.

Consider what occurs when a state is effectively forced to shift its resources from supporting the material wellbeing of its citizens, toward protecting them from a rising tide of diversified threats. This is a shift from "building" to "defending," which is characteristic of a civilization in a state of war, but with the difference that this new state of war is unbounded: for all intents and purposes it is permanent.

But now consider the entire premise of "market." By definition it is the realm of commodity, trade, and exchange of value: everything that is convertible to *price.* It was not designed for, and does not do a good job with, things and values that are not tradable. Notably, these things include the "intrinsic" (irreducible) values that form the core of Western democracy and also the Western tradition of a professional military.

What is the price of being "created equal and endowed by (one's) creator with certain inalienable rights"? What is the price of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"? What about honesty, honor, integrity, duty, commitment, etc.?

What do we say about a student who buys the answers to their exams? We call that person a cheat. What do we say about a public official who buys or sells votes for money? We call that person corrupt. What do we say about a soldier who trades duty, honor, loyalty, and integrity for a price? We call that person a traitor.

We have other words for other examples, including plagiarist, fraud, con-man, and prostitute. We use these words out of recognition of a deeper moral premise: that some things should not be tradable, some values should not become commodities bought and sold for a price denominated in currency.

And yet the ascendency of a market mentality or market culture, necessarily strains these core moral boundaries toward a breaking-point, precisely at a time -during a state of war- when the intrinsic values are all the more important, perhaps even vital to national survival.

---

Other issues to address (in subsequent postings if anyone's interested):

Geography and deterrence.

Social infrastructure (e.g. education, science).

Opportunity and responsibility.

Social Darwinism is neither.

Citizen, or consumer, or subject?

No Correlation; a question of motives.

[Duncan Kinder]

Chalmers Johnson’s Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power suggest one thing that distinguishes Iraq from prior guerilla uprisings.

According to Johnson, the peasantry, prior to oppressive foreign occupation, was not nationalistic. It formed a nationalist feeling which, Johnson said, Communist insurgents exploited.

Nationalist reactions to foreign occupation predate WWII. Nineteenth century German nationalism was a reaction to Napoleonic occupation. The many little states of which Germany had been comprised no longer were so cosy. Instead, they seemed crippled, weak. The drive toward Bismarck’s Germany began with this post-Napoleonic era nationalism.

In contrast, American occupation of Iraq is engendering no such Iraqi nationalism. Instead, if anything, it is engendering factionalism within Iraq.

[Marcello]

"nowadays, remember that the biggest, baddest transnational of them all is the Roman Catholic Church."

I assure you that you can survive it.
Usually.

More seriously I often wonder if the current situation which favors strongly irregulars against state forces isn't just a parenthesis.Much like the technologically and socioeconomical realities prevalent at the time favored defense over offense during WW1.A trend which was broken by the development of reliable tanks, increased motorization and improved tactics.
Maybe in the future the development and deployment of improved surveillance tools and the roboticization of the battlefield, as well as a few others developments on the economic front might give the state a chance against "weaker" non state opponents.
This is purely speculation on my part, of course.

[Danger]

Isn't the idea of The State being on the decline a dangerous idea?

Thugs, be they State-sponsored or others will bitch-slap me about....but isn't questioning a decline of The State a dangerous idea?

[Cardenio]

Maybe we should rename America " Safe-mart " or " Valuetopia " ?

[lancer]

"Is the state an ascendent or descendent institution?"

Depends which state we are talking about.

If we mean the nation-state, in which the role of the state was to ensure the quality of life for the nation by controlling its borders and regulating heavily inside those borders, and calling upon the young men of the nation to defend those borders when necessary, then I would say it is descendant.

If we are talking about what is coming next, the market-state in Bobbitt's terms, where the job of the state is to ensure market access (and exactly what that will entail is up in the air), then I say this state is ascendnat.

States are organisms comprised of millions of humans, thousands of organizations, hundreds of institutions and thus they will evolve and change.

So to answer, the nation-state is a descendant institutions while what-comes-next (PB's market-state?) is in the ascendant. Thus, much of the perceived chaos and confusion in the world system.

[Jordan Dawe]

The main problem with this analysis is that it doesn't examine other possible reasons for the failure of states, beyond the spread of networking technology and general globalization. For instance, the mass failure of states could also be explained by overpopulation, in several ways. There could be too many people competing for too few resources, making it impossible for a large state to supply the neccessary infrastructure to remain stable. Large populations could make tribal groups more powerful and more willing to attempt succession from a state. Lack of farmland in agrarian societies contributes to refugee problems/illegal immigration, which blurs the concept of states.

I'm not saying that nation-state failures can all be explained by overpopulation; I just use this as a counter-example. It could just as well be environmental damage, or the spread of communications, or widespread resurgence of anti-government feeling, or nearby failed states disrupting a state's stability. In fact, it's probably a different set of these factors for each state that fails. Asking if "The State" in general is an ascendant or descendant institution oversimplifies the issues.

[vox]

The nation state is unambiguously in the ascendant. The most telling sign is the increase in the number of nations, more than a double in the fifty years following the end WWII; however, the proposition that disrupted states should spontaneously re-emerge from disruption doesn't necessarily follow from that premise.

Rather, the lowering of trade barriers changes the political calculus such that it is more effective, politically and economically, for certain minorities to form new nations that better represent themselves, and, that permit them to become the majority within the new nation. Instead of relying upon the security of a larger nation to access a larger country market and resources, they trade with customers and suppliers in other countries.

With more nations in total, it's also easier (unless we're talking about Taiwan) to find other nations that will validate the new nation by recognizing it.

[naboo]

vox - nice point.

[vox]

One of the more amusing examples of nation building is the establishment of Sealand, a monarchy. See www.sealandgov.com .

In Sealand, they've decided to exploit their national status by hosting the Havenco secure colocation business. Essentially, they'll never respond to a request from any other country to divulge the data on the Havenco servers. See www.havenco.com

[John Robb]

The proliferation of nations isn't a point in favor of states. It may mean (like in Yugoslavia's case) that large states are falling apart. Also, if you qualify Sealand as a state, I don't think we are thinking about the same thing. Sealand is a company with the trappings of a state.

[bonaa]

John - How are you defining a state in this context?

[vox]

Sealand is an unusual state but it is still a state. That’s not just a matter of their say so. UK courts do not consider themselves to have the right to exert jurisdiction over Sealand. Since Sealand has its own unified government and is not a part of any other state, then Q.E.D.: it is an independent state.

Regarding Yugoslavia, that transitory state reverted to wild type—new states (really very old states) finally emerged free of any artificial scheme of consolidation. That the Serbs failed to create a “Greater Serbia” is a proof of the ascendancy of states.

When ambiguous entities, such as the Trust Territory of Pacific Islands, give rise to independent states, such as Palau, it’s a sign that people who didn’t have their own government have gained one. Ascending states!

When East and West Germany reunited, yes, we lost a state, but the reformation of a united Germany signaled an ascendant German state. It would be perverse to argue that the government of East Germany was really a government of the East German people and not a puppet regime of the U.S.S.R. The same goes for Poland and all the other peoples liberated by the breakup of the U.S.S.R.: nations finally became states and began to govern themselves under unified governments (more often than not, including a loyal opposition). The same goes for the dozens of nations liberated from the English (or any other) empire. Ascending states, again!

When a tiny country of immense strategic value (such as Malta or Singapore) can gain its independence (and keep it despite the presence of ambitious neighbors) it is another sign of ascending states.

In modern times, dozens of states, formerly considered “The White Man’s Burden” have managed to make good upon their independence. The number of success stories is far higher than the number of countries, such as Zimbabwe, that squandered the opportunity.

For the contrary to be true, states would be unwillingly consolidated within empires to their detriment (Tibet) or they would fall apart such that the remnants would not meet the definition of a state (Somalia).

In modern times, the number of states that succumbed to the tragedies of colonization within an empire (i.e. Tibet) or disintegration is far less than the number of states that have realized their liberation from an empire and prospered thereby.

On balance, it is unambiguous that far more polities are becoming states than super-states or non-states. The interesting question is how these states succeed or fail in the creation of loyal oppositions to their governments. The lesson learned is that states that won’t tolerate internal political tension and recognize the rights of minorities, or, those whose opposition elements do not engage the government loyally, tend to become fossilized, backward and vulnerable to disintegration or revolution.

[Greg Burton]

mmm - vox - look at the map. A great many entities have been formed, but to simply add and subtract to determine ascendency is kind of silly. Are they effective states? Look at Africa.....and that's not even considering what AIDS is likely to do there over the next 10 years. It's worth noting that in Iraq, private security forces (corporate, non-state) make up the second largest contingent, well ahead of Britain in numbers. A key feature to watch will be to what extent states are unable to maintain their monopoly on violence - and I'd suggest that we're globally approaching the point where many can't.

Valdis - great point on network topology. In a previous discussion, we looked at one of your maps, and began considering the implications for nodes emerging on their own, and then connecting. What could you tell us about (I don't even know what to call it) an "emergent" network that configures with x number of different nodes at y points in time, but with a different apparent topology at each instant? Does this make sense related to the "attack" side of the attack/defend equation? Does it make sense at all?

Jordan - 4gw is not a cause of declining stateness - it's a reaction to it.

Overall, it's rather impossible to tell at this juncture what's happening to the idea of the state. Further, acceleration of change will make it increasingly difficult to measure all of the components at once. What we can say with some assurance is that more states are near-failure now than a decade ago, that open-source warfare has emerged as a viable approach to conflict, and that globalization of communications (in particular) seems to have exacerbated the issues while speeding the rate of change.

All of this is laid over a global economic and state system that still is constrained by the needs of state-based regimes. A variety of non-state institutions, ranging from multinational corporations to religious sects may or may not support "their" states at any point in time.

The trend appears to be a relative decline in state power relative to other agencies - we'll have better analysis and better data, I bleieve, over a rather short period of time.

[Valdis]

Greg asks...

"What could you tell us about (I don't even know what to call it) an "emergent" network that configures with x number of different nodes at y points in time, but with a different apparent topology at each instant? "

You have described my biz life. I work with A, B, C, and D on project X, then project Y starts with B, D, E, F, G and H while another group plans project Z after the holidays with A, C, H, J, and K. Yes these are "emergent networks" and all of the people mentioned [A thru K] are probably no more than 1-2 steps away from each other. Most know each other well, others are just aware of the rest of the group. The whole network is built on trusted ties established over time and via direct work experience in projects like X, Y, and Z above. These trust networks exist but are not always obvious, because network ties are not always activated. These networks also don't have obvious hubs like those in Barabasi's models.

For an outsider looking in, it would take a while to figure out the whole net and the various sub-nets and who is working on what -- and we are not trying to hide! This task would be much more difficult to do on a group that was trying to be stealth.

[vox]

Greg,

In the context of John's suggestion that the preponderance of some nebulous concert of "conspiring historical forces" is evidence that the state system is in decline, it's not "silly" to cite the fact that, given all the alternatives, the preferred choice of humanity in my lifetime has been (and continues to be) to organize itself politically as a state. This isn't some trivial exercise in "addition and subtraction". It's not even a close call.

With reference to John's thesis:

"Globalization melts the map"... If true, then the trend would be towards some kind of internationally molten polity. The UN would be on the way up. That's not how it working out.

To get the most out of any international initiative, such as the Kyoto Accords or the International Criminal Court or..., where a state surrenders some of its sovereignty in return for some degree of supra-national order or harmonized code, you have to be a state in the first place or you don't get to play. Once you become a state in a globalized world, you gain power.

Globalization doesn't "melt" the map, it increases the map's resolution (and accuracy) by stimulating the formation of states. In politics, it tends to reward the formation of small states in the same way that the U.S. Constitution handed disproportionate benefits through the institution of the Senate to tiny states like Delaware and Rhode Island. Polities choose to form new states because it increases their power.

Within the U.S., one of the clearest examples of this phenomenon is the rush of Native American tribes to achieve recognition by the federal government so that they can enjoy the powers of a sovereign state. For example, the Pequots didn't exist as a political entity just a few decades ago. The few persons who could claim Pequot ancestry lived in ghettos and other underdeveloped areas. As a sovereign state, the Pequots are now one of the wealthiest people in the world. The remergence in very recent years of the formerly non-state American Indian tribes as sovereign states--despite one of the most inarguably disruptive experiences in human history settles the argument in favor of the idea that people can recover from even the severest disruption if they choose statehood.

From the above, globalization does not "diminish state power across the board". It's a non-zero sum equation that offers power to the tail of small states by letting them join the party while it reinforces the inequities in the network of the surviving states. When the U.S.S.R. dissolved, each of the daughter states gained rights and powers they formerly lacked, and, all the other countries increased their power thanks to the deletion of the number #2 node in the network of nations.

"States increasingly find themselves in disruption or complete failure." Compared to when? The 14th century? 1862? 1939? 1979? It's a careless and poorly defined argument.

[Greg Burton]

vox - in your lifetime, yes. And it may continue to be for decades, even if the thesis is correct. If fourth generational warfare theory is correct, we appear to be seeing the breakup of a structure around 500 years old, give or take. It may be happening, it may not. We can't (or at least I can't) tell for certain, not from inside. But that doesn't matter.

What matters are the best predictive theories and strategies that we can develop - nothing more, and nothing less. I strongly believe that 4gw theory, and particularly the direction that John has taken, are going to provide us with those strategies and theories at this time.

[Steve L]

From a ‘management’ standpoint it is always easier to have a structure, which allows one to apply pressure at a few key points in order to turn the ‘organization’ in the desired direction. I think that you are missing the forest for the trees.

As always, it’s a fight about resources.

20 plus million barrels of oil a day is more than we are able to produce internally and thus our relations with the Middle East, Africa, the Caucus Region, and South America are key to meeting this habit.

Our objective must be a stable situation in these key regions, which allows us to purchase oil, as we need it until we get serious about energy independence. Without adequate energy America will crumble, and so this is a deadly serious issue.

Whether or not you agree with starting the war in Iraq, we are stuck with coming up workable solution for our country. So how do we influence the events in Iraq with the least cost to the US while reaping the greatest benefit?

1) US Forces in the region must have superior communication, mobility, and firepower at all times. This is something that we are doing well at. We must employ this firepower discriminately…this is easier said than done.
2) ‘Joe-Iraqi’ must have security in order to live and rebuild his country. Sufficient numbers of highly trained soldiers and police provide security. Either we provide US personnel for this job or we must train Iraqi’s to do the job. We are doing the right thing for America by training Iraqi’s to do this job, but it will take more time and money to get it done.
3) ‘Joe-Iraqi’ must have electricity in order to live and rebuild his country. No electricity means your refrigerator does not work…how do you feed your family with no electricity? Electrical plants cost around a million dollars a megawatt. There are plenty of educated, jobless, and motivated Iraqi’s who would love to be able to fix this problem. We are doing a poor job of creating the conditions for Iraqi’s to fix this problem.
4) We must enhance or foster strong relationships with the Kurds, Sunni’s, and Shia’s to stabilize the country. Adequately funding and manning Special Forces, Civil Affairs, PSYOP, USAID, and the State Department is key. We need to do more in this arena.
5) We must identify, coerce, or kill hard-core opposition. Additional linguist/cultural experts must be identified or developed. You cannot effectively operate in Iraq without these experts and we are critically undermanned in this arena. OGA and DOD intelligence efforts must be increased and adequately funded.

There are some truisms when it comes to war that may help to clarify things. Look strong enough so no one wants to fight you. Always maximize your options. Know all about Dodge, including exits, before entering Dodge. If you must fight, do not give or ask for quarter. Remember that no plan survives first contact. Simple is best. Necessity is the mother of invention. Keep moving. Stay focused on the objective.

God bless America.

[enigma_foundry]

I do believe the nation state is in decline, but it is a relative decline. Remeber that the state as an instituttion came into a position of unprecedented power and importance, thus a relative decline does not mean the nation is in any danger of disappearring, certainly.

The reasons are more economic than related to issues of open source warfare that is the center of discusssion here at GG.

I would highly reccommend the following book as a starting point for those wanting to understand why the nation state is in decline.

It is approachable by lay person without much economic background, and yet has a depth of understanding that is missing from quite a few more 'scholarly' works:

Scott, Allen J. Regions and the World Economy: The Coming Shape of Global Production, Competition, and Political Order. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998

[Cardenio]

At some point it will all be companies with the trappigs of states. An index of companies : okay that's a ' nation ' now. Next all " Americans " will have to wear mandatory pieces of ' flair '.