THE IED MARKETPLACE IN IRAQ

This is a horrible story to start the day with: Fourteen marines were killed early today when their troop carrier struck a gigantic roadside bomb in the western town of Haditha, marking one of the single deadliest attacks on American troops since the invasion here in March 2003.

To get a sense of the decentralized, commercial process of the Iraq's open source bazaar, let's take a look at the IED industry in Iraq. Here's a ground breaking article from the current Defense News based on American intelligence:

Number of IED events a day: 40 (exploded or disarmed) Number of US soldiers killed by IEDs in 2005: 209+

Greg Grant for the Defense News lists his sources:

The following revealing picture of how these cells operate and why they remain so hard to penetrate comes from extensive interviews with military intelligence officers with the U.S. Army's 3rd Infantry Division in Iraq, briefing documents, and interviews and presentations at an Army sponsored counter IED conference June 13-17 at the Army's National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Ca. Much of what U.S. officials know about IED cells was gathered through the interrogation of captured Iraqi insurgents.

Decentralized Structure:

Traditional insurgent groups follow a highly centralized, hierarchically organized model. Counterinsurgency forces have long studied the pyramidal model, with strong leadership at the top and the group expanding in size at each lower level, to the foot soldiers at the bottom. That type of guerrilla organization was highly vulnerable to a decapitation strike that would often lead to its collapse. The groups in Iraq have no hierarchical structure, the officers said. Vast numbers of small, adaptive insurgent cells operate independently without central guidance. There may be some loose coordination of attacks, but then the cells go their separate ways. This highly decentralized characteristic of the IED cells makes them nearly impossible to penetrate. Their small size allows them to focus on specific American units, learn their tactics, patrol schedules, transportation routes and readily adapt to counter-IED techniques. One U.S. intelligence officer said that if you capture the leader of an IED cell, the leaderless foot soldiers simply get rolled up into another cell or start their own splinter cell. By cutting off the heads, you don't fix the problem, as other heads emerge. Taking down the foot soldiers causes a temporary disruption, as new people must be recruited. But even then, the cell is disrupted only for two weeks or so. The only way to get rid of the cell is to target the whole group - and there are a lot of cells.

Commercial Connections

Small, highly skilled IED cells often operate as a package and hire themselves out to the more well-known insurgent groups, such as Amman Al Zarqawi's al-Qaida in Iraq or the Sunni group Ansaar al Sunna. They advertise their skills on the Internet and are temporarily contracted on a per-job basis, but otherwise remain autonomous. This more linear, rather than pyramidal structure, means a decapitation operation is not an option. The IED cells are patient and methodical and they follow an identifiable operational cycle. Five days is usually spent conducting reconnaissance of prospective targets, conducting pattern analysis of U.S. patrols and looking for vulnerabilities.

Target Selection (with PR through media exposure -- which also acts as a means of stigmergy between groups)

The insurgents try to discover why and at what times American patrols travel along specific routes. Insurgents have even used hoax IEDs placed in plain view so they can watch the American response and gather intelligence on security methods and bomb disposal team operations to prepare for future attacks. IED target selection is done with the intent of maximizing casualties and media exposure. Favorite targets include convoys of civilian SUVs, as they believe these transport American government officials and intelligence agents. They also target fuel tankers, as the flames and billowing smoke from a burning fuel tanker makes for compelling television footage. "If the insurgent has a burning fueler or bodies in the street, he wants to get Arab media," said Col. Mike Formica, recently returned from Iraq, at the June IED conference. The target site must also have multiple escape routes. The components are then assembled at a well-concealed bomb factory and then moved from any area likely to be searched by American patrols to a holding area until the weapon is placed. IEDs are often kept in what the military calls "rolling weapons caches," cars with false bottoms or trunks loaded with explosives that blend into the thousands of vehicles on Iraq's crowded city streets. Five days of preparation are then followed by 10 days of heavy IED attacks, then the cycle starts again. After a successful attack or if a device is detected by a U.S. patrol, the IED cell evaluates the results and adjusts its tactics accordingly for the next strike.

Training

Nine times out of 10, the military and intelligence officers said, the insurgents videotape IED attacks. The insurgents scrutinize the tapes - much as a coach watches postgame films - to prepare for future attacks. They're also used as motivational tools for new recruits and to advertise a cell's technical proficiency.

Business Process: Financier

While all IED cells in Iraq are not alike, they tend to follow a similar organizational pattern. They are almost exclusively made up of Sunni extremists. The typical IED cell numbers no more than six to eight people who collect intelligence on American forces, gather explosive materials, manufacture the bomb, place the device, carry out the attack and then evaluate the results. At the top of the IED cell is the planner or financier ("hot money"), a "money man" who is most often a well educated and intelligent former Baathist government official or military officer. He is ideologically motivated in his fight against the American occupation. These "white collar" leaders are the most difficult cell members to identify, explained Formica. Even if fingered by an informant or other means, the leaders are so good at covering their tracks it's nearly impossible to develop sufficient evidence to detain them. And if captured, they're smart enough not to say anything. Only 5 percent to 10 percent of the insurgents captured by the Americans are cell leaders.

Business Process: Bomb Maker

Below the financier is the bomb maker. He also is typically ideologically motivated, a former regime member or Sunni Arab angered at the American occupation. As with the financier, American officers said the only way of getting the bomb makers to stop the attacks is by capturing or killing them. Initially, IEDs were constructed by former Iraqi Republican Guard or Special Republican Guard soldiers. That skill has spread throughout the country over the past two years. According to Army intelligence officers, outside expertise also has come into the country, both from Hizbollah, which has extensive bomb-making expertise, and from Iranian intelligence. Bomb-making skills proliferate rapidly among IED cells in Iraq via the Internet, used by insurgents to share skills. The insurgents' technical proficiency has increased over time with experience. In recent months, shaped-charge explosives have become more common, Votel said. Also called platter charges, these devices combine an explosive charge with a low melting point metal like copper that is shaped in a concave way. When the blast occurs it shapes the metal into a molten slug that can penetrate the heaviest armor. That technical expertise wasn't in Iraq when the insurgency began and is suspected as having come in from Iran or Syria, said Lt. Col. Shawn Weed, an intelligence officer with the 3rd Infantry Division. The military has found no appreciable decrease in IED attacks when a bomb maker is killed, and it represents at best a temporary setback for the insurgency as that talent is easily replaced.

Business Process: Emplacer

The next person in the cell is the "emplacer." This person usually has some military expertise and is skilled at moving unnoticed into and out of an area while transporting an IED. While some IEDs are small, 60mm or 81mm mortar rounds, more common is the wired 155mm shell that can weigh 100 pounds. Moving these objects around unseen and placing them along high-trafficked roads takes experience and daring, as he knows if he's spotted placing an IED he'll be killed. He is familiar with American patrolling tactics and techniques and is often supported by lookouts armed with cell phones who will tip him when a patrol nears. The emplacer's primary motivation is money. He is a foot soldier, is often paid as little as $50, and told to place an IED in a specific location at a specific time. A common technique is to pull a car over to the side of the road to change a tire or appear as if it's broken down. He places the IED - 75 percent of IEDs are placed in a hole previously used for the same purpose - covers it up with something, turns the switch on and drives away. Often they don't even stop, as insurgents use cars with a hole cut in the floor so they only have to slow down and drop the device onto the road. Of all the members of the IED cell, the emplacer's skills are the most difficult to replace. When taken out, an IED cell's activity is at least temporarily disrupted as a replacement is sought.

Business Process: Triggerman

The next person in the cell is the triggerman, the one who lies in wait until an American convoy passes. Often in a car, the triggerman detonates the IED either by remote trigger or command wire. Remote detonation is the preferred means, as it allows the insurgent to be further away from the blast. Captured triggermen said they prefer to hit the second vehicle in a patrol. The first vehicle passes the IED and they time it, then they hit the second vehicle. Like the emplacer, the triggerman's primary motivation is money. Sometimes these lower-level operatives will hire themselves out as a package, changing affiliations based on money. If an alternative means of earning money is provided for the emplacer and the triggerman, they can take them out of operation, Formica said.

Business Process: Suicide Car Bombers

Suicide car bomb cells are similar in structure, although the bomb maker's technical expertise is usually greater as the triggering often requires engineering skills. Car bombs are assembled in a factory assembly line-like process that begins usually in small towns south of Baghdad. There, a vehicle is modified in an auto chop shop, with space cleared inside the vehicle to fit the explosives, suspensions strengthened to carry the additional weight and windows blackened. As the vehicle is driven north to Baghdad, where most car bombs are detonated, additional components are added. This decentralized construction process makes it more difficult for American intelligence to identify a car bomb factory and eliminate it. Intelligence gathered from a captured would-be suicide car bomber, who was a member of Zarqawi's group, provided U.S. officials with the best insight into the inner workings of a suicide car bombing cell. The cell is kept small and focused, and contact with insurgents outside the suicide group is strictly controlled. Suicide bombers are selected on a first-come basis, with no shortage of recruits. The bombers are most often foreigners and enter Iraq from Saudi Arabia or Kuwait with the specific intention of martyrdom. The only training they receive is the target information and instruction on how to trigger the device. Two vehicles are commonly used. The first transports the bomber to the location of a pre-positioned car bomb and then follows behind to guide the bomber along the route and videotape the attack. The captured car bomber said it would be easy to drive around Baghdad and pick out up to 20 soft targets.

Comments

Interesting.

[Cardenio]

Six of the marines killed on Monday were from the same Ohio based battalion as the fourteen killed today too.

[Kevin]

The suicide car bombs are effective because they manipulate tactics into alienating the general population- which fuels the insurgency. Coalition forces are forced to react violently toward an Iraqi nationalist that aimlessly wanders into a half mile long convoy. One cannot understand the seriousness of this until you have had to experience the aftermath of a VBIED and peel a soldiers guts off the hot desert concrete. Lets say a countermeasure(ramming a car off the road, shooting out tires, ect) results in an accidental death of a civilian. According to arab culture, blood demands blood- regardless of the circumstances the group(family, tribe, ect) is demanded to seek revenge or forgoe the groups honor. In my opinion, this is how the insurgency survives- by creating its own passive support. The insurgents incide distrust toward the common local national and shape how coalition forces react with them on a day to day basis(ie force protection).

[tim]

Why can't we just disable the internet, except for cleared nodes, in the countries named as originators of advertising for IED services?

[butch]

I remember reports in the beginning of the war that Iraq was getting help from former Soviet military in ways to prepare for the American occupation, is this true?

Is is possible that Iraqi leadership knew that defeating the Americans invasion was impossible, but defeating the occupation was/is possible with simple IEDs?

I also heard the much of the guerrilla tactics, IEDs etc. were also learned from American special forces tactics to train South American contras etc.

[twinkle]

Very difficult tactics to defeat, if not impossible. This looks like a modern day version of the Battle of Algiers. Eventually, we will have to come home. They live there. We don't.

[oz]

Fascinating that our military still hasn't learned how to win hearts and minds. Blundering about, getting blown up... There was several months back an Arab American reporter, fluent in Arabic, who blended in with the locals and observed. He reported robo-cop American troops, reasonably fearing for their lives, losing hearts and minds every minute of every day.
Throw in Abu-Ghraib... damn. I am so disgusted with our "leadership". Bush et al are out of their league entirely. Not surprising, given their record when they were young and their country called on them.

[Kevin]

My opinion, IEDs are the poor mans answer to standoff weaponry.

[kevin]

" I am so disgusted with our "leadership". Bush et al are out of their league entirely."

Cut the bullshit. That has nothing to do with the executive "leadership"- it has everything to do with a couple loose cannons at the some of the lowest levels of leadership.

[Jeremiah]

It's interesting that this process sounds very similar to that in used by inner-city drug rings in the US and elsewhere to avoid detection and capture while engaging in production, goods transfer and distribution. It seems that minority gangs might offer Al Qaeda an existing and to some degree sympathetic network, and one already familiar with weapon smuggling, stealth and clandestine fund raising.

[Ian Wedegartner]

I just had a very odd experience reading this very well written article. As I read about the strategies mentioned above it suddenly hit me where I had heard of them before, from a book I read in the 80's called "The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism" by Hakim Bey. Indeed, this sentence, "They advertise their skills on the Internet and are temporarily contracted on a per-job basis, but otherwise remain autonomous." reads like a Burroughsian cut-up of Bey's book. Thanks for reading!

[John Robb]

Ian, it is funny you mention that. I use Bey's TAZ concept:

http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/11/counterinsurgen.html

[Jeremiah]

I just now mentioned autonomous zones in an article on the connections between naval piracy and the growing insurgency.

http://organicwarfare.blogspot.com/2005/08/piracy-and-global-insurgency.html

It would be very interesting to graph the relationships between actors in the clandestine marketplace, from narcoterrorists to smugglers and arms dealers.

[Matt]

"highly decentralized characteristic of the IED...if you capture the leader...leaderless foot soldiers simply get rolled up into another cell or start their own splinter cell. By cutting off the heads, you don't fix the problem, as other heads emerge."

As commented here before me by wiser people, this is not Vietnam and the 'insurgents' are not bound together by some unifying identity or ideology other than killing Americans (and those perceived as helping with anything the Americans touch) hoping we'll go away.

Remember these insurgents, or any 'rebel' or 'terrorist' group, include criminals who participate for the joy of killing or destroying. The opportunist component also includes those that seek power for the sake of power (this includes many of the religious leaders, which were able to fill the power vacuum as a result of a poor transition strategy after the end of 'major combat operations', but I digress from my main comment). We mislead ourselves if we think they are pure in any sense. (Even gangs like Bieder-Meinhof and the Red Brigades, with their supposed ideological purposes, were more opportunistic criminals when you scratch the surface and look at how they interpreted their mission, their responsibilities, and what they emphasized in their memoirs.)

Members (aka individual insurgents) have fluid alliances because they are manipulated to fight (blind acceptance, lack of individualism, need for money, lack of facts, etc), fight because they enjoy it (preventing Am or Br or Ir policing allows all sorts of 'fun' and 'games'), or because they seek to make money (kidnapping, drug dealing, theft... all require the destruction of security). Acknowledging the liberal economy of violence providers requires ceasing to attempt to mold them into a cohesive unit when they are not.

Let's not be surprised at how they form, seemingly like liquid-metal-man in the movie T2. They are not a single being with a single purpose. Many are opportunists. They are not Maoists and 4GW is only a theory of tactics. They are learning that cooperation pays and like American Revolution, everybody has a different reason for participating or not. Hopefully they will not have an implicit (we withdrawal before functional, promulgated structures are in place) or an explicit (withdrawal without any structures in place) victory.

IEDs account for 70-80 percent of the US deaths in Iraq according to CentCom spokesman LtCol Steven Boylan.

[What?]

Very interesting article INFO wise.

However IED's and VBIED's So What? Yes they kill a FEW of our soldiers here and there every once and a while. But IF WE are as commited to capturing and killing terrorists as they are of killing us, than our resolve to work past this misquito bite of a tactic shouldn't be any big deal.

The fact is that the constant parade of IED's and VBIED's are only as effective as we allow them to be in effecting our morale and resolve. And with Bush in office for another 3 years ultimately our resolve isn't gonna be a problem no matter what the opinion polls are saying.

If all these terrorsits can do is What? they are doing now, they should and will lose in the long run because ultimately this fight in Iraq, only 2years and 4months in, is not that of the Coalition but that of Iraqi's for the soul and future of Iraq. I am disappointed in pace of the process and the apparent lack of urgency on the part of the everyday Iraqi's to see their country functional instead of dysfunctional.

However the day is coming closer every day where Coalition troops will be stepping back and Iraqi's will have to do things pretty much on their own. The day when commited Iraqi's are competently ready for that is most definitely within the next 3 years.

At the OUTSET I thought it a reasonable expectation that transforming Iraq for the good in a tangible way was a 5 YEAR process and I just don't see how sophisticated IED cells are gonna stop that at this point.

[Jeremiah]

What exactly are the facts that you base those assertions on?

"If all these terrorsits can do is What? they are doing now, they should and will lose in the long run because ultimately this fight in Iraq, only 2years and 4months in, is not that of the Coalition but that of Iraqi's for the soul and future of Iraq."

Was that supposed to be a syllogism? Your reasoning is specious. Should and will based on what? They will lose because the fight is not that of the Coalition's but that of a grossly underarmed, undertrained and fractious third world puppet government?

"I am disappointed in pace of the process and the apparent lack of urgency on the part of the everyday Iraqi's to see their country functional instead of dysfunctional."

Maybe that's the problem. Maybe their definition of functional has something to do with a US-installed puppet dictatorship not being in place.

"However the day is coming closer every day where Coalition troops will be stepping back and Iraqi's will have to do things pretty much on their own. The day when commited Iraqi's are competently ready for that is most definitely within the next 3 years."

You're contradicting yourself. The current system in Iraq is unable to maintain the poorest semblance of order even with hundreds of billions of dollars in funding and support from the only remaining superpower. Precisely how do you think "Iraqi's" will be able to fend for themselves if they can't do it even with the full weight of the US military behind them?

Examine your assumptions. They don't make sense.

Thank you Jeremiah, well said.

[Kevin]

"IEDs account for 70-80 percent of the US deaths in Iraq according to CentCom spokesman LtCol Steven Boylan."

Your statistic is false. Maybe 70 percen of "all casualties" (to include minor injuries) but not deaths. I have heard statistics state that small arms fire account for the majority of fatalities. Even then, it is a misleading statistic. I have also heard that over 90 percent of all IEDs are found and disabled, and of the 10 percent that detonate on coalition troops, something like only 15 percent have been fatal. I might be slightly off but the facts remain- The bark is worse than the bite.

[rich]

"Precisely how do you think "Iraqi's" will be able to fend for themselves if they can't do it even with the full weight of the US military behind them?"

Kurds and Shia will simply eliminate the Sunni in Iraq. What countries will object or intervene to stop it?

[Jeremiah]

Kevin,

I have to disagree with you, your statement regarding relative lethality of small arms fire appears to be incorrect.

Here is the breakdown of in-country casualties thus far, from public statistics released by the DOD:

explosion 11
IED 485
bomb 9
car bomb 100
suicide bomber 23
suicide boat bomb 3
suicide car bomb 31

These do not include RPG fatalities, which equalled 73.

Out of 2021 fatalities thus far, a total of 662 have been caused by explosions of the above types. Notice that the article does not make any distinction between IEDs and VBIEDs of various kinds, and suicide bombs are certainly IEDs.

I've heard that the lethality and technical sophistication of IEDs has been increasing dramatically in recent months. We just had fourteen marines killed in a single incident.

478 deaths have been ascribed to "Hostile Fire" other than the above, so your assertion that small arms have been responsible for more casualties than IEDs was in fact incorrect and in fact IEDs have been responsible for 20% more fatalities than small arms fire.

To extrapolate from the statistics you quote, 1.5% of IEDs have been responsible for 33% of US deaths in Iraq. Since lethality and efficiency of delivery mechanisms have both been increasing, we can expect to see a sharp rise in the number of United States fatalities.

Furthermore, your statistics fail to take into account the number of Iraqi police and military fatalities due to these devices. There have been 1500 Iraqi civilian and police casualties in 2005 compared to 1300 in 2003 and 2004. I suspect that lethality and delivery efficiency have both been far greater on Iraqi troops and police; low lethality figures among coalition troops are largely because of high-technology armor.

Nor do you statistics account for the rate of woundings caused by IEDs. Official estimates of total US military wounded in Iraq are at 13,500. Other estimates including that by the British Medical Association go far higher. It is reasonable to assume that many of these wounds are caused by fragmentation effects of IEDs.

I'm interested in precisely what the sources were for your statistics that cause you to question the veracity of Steve Boylan. My primary source is the DOD.

[Jeremiah]

Rich:

"Kurds and Shia will simply eliminate the Sunni in Iraq. What countries will object or intervene to stop it?"

When I say "fend for themselves," I'm referring to the fledgling democracy in Iraq. A Shia/Kurdish state founded on the genocide of the Sunni minority group doesn't sound like much of a solution to me, nor does it sound like a regime that would be very friendly to the West in the long term.

Furthermore, a Shia state would likely be friendly with Iran, and it does not sound like the process of putting such a regime in place would be serving US interests in the region, unless the goal is to set up a terrorist-friendly Islamic police state.

Did we depose Saddam so that the Shiites and Kurds could descend on and commit genocide upon the Sunni minority? Where's the moral high ground?

Meanwhile, what was that river we just crossed, was that the Tigris or the Rubicon?

[rich]

A Shia/Kurd state will include 80+% of the population of Iraq. Of the remaining 20% - 4+M people or so - about 200K are former Baath and assorted thugs. The Shia will be friendly to Iran no matter what - with or without the Sunni. Presuming that he Sunni+Shia in Iraq will be Iran neutral is, IMHO, wishful thinking. We deposed Saddam for a number or reasons - removing one source of bad stuff in the midst of a lot of bad stuff. Philosophical debate to follow, no doubt, including moral high ground.

Me, I'd rather have a neutral government in Iraq, with US bases in Anbar, to deal with Iran and Syria.

Something about how if you have them by the logistics their hearts and minds will follow ... someday.

[Jeremiah]

"Philosophical debate to follow, no doubt, including moral high ground."

Not from me. It's a shit situation and that I'm sure we agree on.

I just reread the original post-- talk about thread drift-- and noticed the fact that they're now using EFPs.

Not only does it mean a drastic increase in lethality versus armored vehicles-- EFPs and self-forging fragments produce hard kills against even main battle tanks-- but it is yet another indication of a high and escalating technical capacity among the insurgents. Even more disturbing is the fact that the IED makers are now including encryption in their detonation command signals.

This stuff is bad news.

[pjr]

Another perfect time for a vacation, reasons Bush; freedom's on the march my ass.