WAR'S NEW EQUILIBRIUM

In technology, particularly in information based systems, advances can occur almost overnight. This likely applies to warfare as it becomes more information-based. As in technology, patterns and methods of warfare tend to stay within bounded equilibria depending on the type of war being fought. When an improvement arrives, the equilibrium point changes and warfare undergoes a rapid shift.

One of the ways to measure a equilibrium point was first demonstrated by Lewis Richardson over 50 years ago. He calculated that the distribution of casualties in conventional wars follow a power law distribution. Updates to his work show that this pattern of distribution continues to hold.

In a new paper by Johnson, Spagat, and others called "From Old Wars to New Wars and Global Terrorism," (PDF) the authors demonstrate that a new pattern of war is emerging. To do this, they analyzed the frequency-intensity distributions of wars (including terrorism) and examined their power law curves. They found that conventional wars had a power law exponent of 1.8. An analysis of terrorism since 1968 found that the exponents were 1.71 (for G7 countries) and 2.5 (for non-G7 countries). This makes sense, conventional wars and G7 terrorism are both characterized by periods of relative non-activity followed by high casualty events (highly orchestrated battles). Non-G7 terrorism is a more decentralized and ad hoc type of warfare characterized by numerous small engagements and fewer large casualty events.

Here's where the analysis gets interesting. When the author's examined the data from Colombia and Iraq, they found that both wars evolved towards the coefficient for non-G7 terrorism (although from different directions). This finding doesn't fit the prevailing theories of warfare. A conventional understanding of fourth generation warfare, such the one posited by Thomas Hammes in the Sling and the Stone posit that 4th generation warfare began in earnest with Mao. However, within Mao's formulation (and Ho Chi Minh's variant), guerrilla wars are but a prelude to conventional war to seize control of the state. The power law for these wars should, based on this theory, tend towards the coefficient we see for conventional wars. In fact, we see the opposite. Guerrilla wars in both Colombia and Iraq have stabilized at a coefficient far from conventional warfare.

This has broad implications for 4th generation warfare theory -- which clearly dominated the types of wars we saw in the latter half of the twentieth century. The patterns of conflict we see today in Colombia and Iraq are a break from the previous framework (which may be an example of punctuated equilibrium). Unlike the previous models of guerrilla wars which sought to replace the state, these new wars have moved to a level of decentralization that makes them both unable to replace the state and extremely hard to eliminate. Is this new evolutionary equilibrium a fifth generation of warfare? It is extremely likely. This new form of warfare, or what I call open source warfare, is what this site (and my book) is dedicated to understanding.

Comments

[Greg Burton]

John - is there any similar trending data on Afghanistan? I would think that it should also be trending in that direction, especially given the reports that Taliban fighters have been training in Iraq and bringing techniques back home with them.

[John Robb]

I suspect there would be although the trend data would be pretty sparse until this spring.

[Adam]

"Unlike the previous models of guerrilla wars which sought to replace the state, these new wars have moved to a level of decentralization that makes them both unable to replace the state and extremely hard to eliminate."

It certainly seems that, in Iraq, there are any number of political and social organisations that are broadly in sympathy with the guerillas. At the moment when areas of Iraq are destabilised the other organisations step in, much as they have in Basra and the TAZ areas. In short the guerillas eliminate the presence of the government and a group that the guerillas are willing to tolerate steps in. This is new as traditionally guerilla groups had political parties attached (Sinn Fein, Hamas or Hezbollah leap to mind)

In Iraq the guerillas don't seem to be bothered about who runs the place as long as they aren't American, and as long as they are religiously inclined.

In management speak, the guerillas have, from a point of view, outsourced the government functions whilst focussing on their core competancies.

[Adam]

Apologies. Meant to point out that Afghanistan has had the worst winter for years. That would certainly skew some figures.

On the other hand later this year (Afghan spring) the British are apparently going to start going after Afghan farmers growing Opium, so the prospects for a battle between the local tribesmen and the British is the best since Waziristan in 1919 (better than 1842...)

[Matt McIntosh]

This is tangential to the main point, but please don't reference Stephen Jay Gould. "Punctuated equilibium" is nonsense and real biologists view him as a crank:

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Biologist John Maynard Smith wrote that Gould "is giving non-biologists a largely false picture of the state of evolutionary theory"; another biologist, Ernst Mayr, wrote of Gould, and those who agree with him, that they "quite conspicuously misrepresent the views of evolutionary biology's leading spokesmen."
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[John Robb]

Matt, I understand the complications in citing Gould. I don't have any intention of sticking my nose into that internal debate.

[Cardenio]

Gould wasn't really a biologist as much as he was a Marxist theorist. It's just kind of funny that while ' Punctuated Equilibrium ' doesn't really cut it as a biological theory, it does work as social theory ( which is what he was really espousing ) and works for how you're characterizing the shift from fourth to fifth gen. warfare. I bet any math that Gould and Eldrige used with PE, ' power law curves ' etc, is going to work for you expressing G4 to G5 warfare too.

[jeremiah]

According to "catastrophe theory," in such events as earthquakes, momentum towards change builds up until it can counter inertia. Then, when it has reached that point, there is a sudden explosion of change; the system reaches a slippery slope and rapid change ensues until the system reaches a new compromise with itself. Miniature earthquakes all along the faultline tend to resolve themselves, shifting into equilibriums on a microscale without perturbing the balance of the whole.

An example in warfare is blitzkrieg: the necessary technical and industrial knowledge had existed for years, but the larger system did not change until one final, comparatively small idea reached critical mass.

It could be said that the idea of blitzkrieg had had an earthquake of its own, and conditions had become right for it to spread. Then and only then could the larger earthquake begin: thousands of tons of metal tumbling from place to place.

There is an RMA earthquake happening right now in the Middle East and elsewhere, and its chief catalyst, I think, has been information technology, which allows insurgent and terrorist groups to engage in defacto collaboration in the development of new doctrine.

At the same time, on the other side, we have overextended technology-heavy forces way past the point of culmination. They've already lost the hearts and minds battle, and the insurgents are in effect sitting on their supply train: the fuel cost of maintaining the occupation is so high that it's easy for the insurgency to render it cost-ineffective in numerous ways, further attacking Western economies.

[jeremiah]

Another thing-- I think of this as "the long RMA."

Because of the increasing pace of technological development, it's possible that the system may simply not reach an equilibrium in our lifetimes if at all.

[yarrrrr!]

Matt - You may be interested to know that the shrinking numbers of Pirates since the 1800s are a direct effect of global warming. I have linked to a graph below, and as you can see, there is a statistically significant inverse relationship between pirates and global temperature.

http://www.venganza.org/piratesarecool4.jpg

Pirates can prevent global warming, but as the number of pirates diminishes, they are less able to influence climate change. But why would pirates be concerned about global warming?

Think of every pirate you've ever met, what do they all have in common? They have buried treasure. And where is the treasure always buried? On the shore of some uninhabited island.

No doubt you can see where this is going - if the climate warms, the sea levels rise, and the pirates can no longer find their treasure which is now underwater. Even their treasure maps would no longer be useful.

[vox]

A little biological clean up. What John describes is not punctuated equlilibrium, it's "saltationism".

Punctuated equilibrium, often contrasted with phyletic gradualism, is actually an extension of gradualism that adds on new tempos to the process of gradualist speciation: statis and rapid speciation. Punctuated equilibrium is concerned with explaining the fossil record through a broader understanding of the rate of change rather than the degree.

Another quibble: punctuated equilibrium is not about the development of an evolutionary advantage from within the core population. According to the theory, such advanatges tend to be diluted by the wider population. Instead, according to punctuated equilibrium, the species enters a domain for which it is marginally adapted. This marginal population then adapts to an environment that is different from the one occupied by the core population.

More BS filtering: No, Cardenio, while Gould's parents were socialists, he was not a socialist. He was a professor of zoology. Really.

Otherwise, he had his critics, as tends to occur in any field that relies on peer review. However, his detractors tend to focus upon Gould's tendency to faltter himself and exaggerate the originality of his work, not whether or not there can be periods of statis or rapid speciation.

[John Robb]

Thanks vox. I probably shouldn't have put the biological reference in at all given that it is so distracting. The remainder of the brief is much more interesting to me.

[vox]

John,
I probably shouldn't have jumped in on the biology either, since for some reason it induced a rash of spelling mistakes-- doubtless a form of PTSS from my prior interactions with my Biology 375 TA :-/

After reading the PDF, I too, am charmed by the idea that power law exponents of lethality are predicted by changes in the attackers' unit integrity, that is in turn predicted by plugging values into Dirac's function. LOL!

So, since the historical data correspond to historical events of a finite duration, this begs the question of whether:

(a)the 2.5 value of the non-G7 exponent is a stable equilibrium that supports/sustains a guerrilla, or...

(b)it's just a way station for conflicts where the insurgents either follow the Maoist paradigm towards conventional warfare capacity, or, they get mopped up, or...

(c) since 2.5 describes the curve at the end
state of the historical conflicts, it's a harbinger of peace, once it's exactly this bad, it's not profitable for either side to escalate.

Tactically, this paper suggests that it's wise to bait one's 4G opponent into an unwise concentration of their forces and then kick the crap out of them.

[John Robb]

I think, given our experience in Colombia, that it is likely option a. It is relatively stable as in option c, but not a functional state.

The Alexandrian strategy I outlined earlier in a modern context is to let them form conventional forces and attempt to "win." Once they form conventional units they can be defeated in detail like Afghanistan (they will also alienate the populace in the interim). If pressure is applied to early and paramlitaries form, we end up with a 2.5 solution, and that is extremely difficult to recover from paticularly if the guerrillas can self-finance.

[Adam]

Bit confused here John. You're saying that a defence/solution to modern Guerilla warfare is hope that they emulate the Greek Communists? The Greek example is a fairly unique one (and it relies on the national military actually winning).

In other words you're asking governments to bet everything on a win, not play for a draw?

I have doubts if govenments would aim for a win by waiting until an enemy army is operational in the country as a long-term draw seems a better bet for the government as opposed to military defeat or internal coup (due to the governments inactivity). After all they lose nothing significant in reacting early.

[Intesar Abdelrhman Gadf]

Please I need of many examples of Global as the the new idea in every field of life.