VAN CREVELD'S PREDICTION

Iraq’s insurgency is made up of dozens of different groups, each with their own motivation for fighting. Under this big tent, no one group is dominant. Even the foreign Jihadis under Zarqawi are but a single digit percentage of the total insurgency. Despite this fragmentation, the insurgency appears to act as a single entity: it probes for weakness, improves its methods, and mounts campaigns. The major reason for this is that Iraq, unlike most of the places we have fought insurgencies, is a relatively modern urbanized environment. It has a cell phone grid, a modern highway system, and Internet connectivity. People have the ability to both communicate and travel quickly throughout the entire country. This high level of connectivity makes possible for the insurgency to combine and recombine into new organizational networks that are similar to what we only see in advanced western settings.

This infrastructure has allowed the insurgents to leapfrog to a new organizational form that is more survivable, inclusive, and innovative than traditional hierarchies (I call this open source insurgency). It appears that the US military has finally taken actions to mitigate this advantage. It announced yesterday that it had bombed (with precision strikes) eight bridges across the Euphrates River inside western Iraq to stop insurgents from using them. As the US army spokesman said:

"One of the vulnerabilities of this insurgency is freedom of movement. We took out portions of these bridges to deny terrorists, foreign fighters and insurgents the capability to cross north to south or south to north across the Euphrates River."

This is the first major attempt to slow down the insurgency's rapid decision making loops and as a localized tactic, it may even enjoy some success. However, strategically, it is political and moral kryptonite. It is also a sign that the coalition has become in the words of Martin van Creveld (who provides fantastic insight into the decline of the state in his book, The Transformation of War) as weak as the insurgents (it needs to destroy Iraq in order to save it).

In other words, he who fights against the weak - and the rag-tag Iraqi militias are very weak indeed - and loses, loses. He who fights against the weak and wins also loses. To kill an opponent who is much weaker than yourself is unnecessary and therefore cruel; to let that opponent kill you is unnecessary and therefore foolish. As Vietnam and countless other cases prove, no armed force, however rich, however powerful, however advanced, however well motivated is immune to this dilemma. The end result is always disintegration and defeat...That is why the present adventure will almost certainly end as the previous one (Vietnam) did. Namely, with the last U.S. troops fleeing the country while hanging on to their helicopters' skids.

NOTE: The response of Valdis Krebs to this event is worth highlighting: " Smart to focus on key bridges in the bad guys' network. Not real smart to destroy them... two reasons.

1) They are also key in the good guys network.
2) They are rich sources of data! Want to unravel the insurgency? Need to understand their internal dynamics... which they give away every day through their activity... watch, listen, pay attention, and soon you will understand... more, but not all.

Once you understand, various disruption tactics can be reviewed from a position of wisdom. It takes network thinking to fight a network!"

Comments

[Adam]

I'd agree that bombing the bridges (what, no engineers any more?) is pretty much a sign that its over. Any idea of the US holding onto a technically operational nation called Iraq has now gone.

Who remembers when it was the insurgents blowing up the infrastructure so that the US didn't get to use it? Now its the US blowing the infrastructure because they cannot stop the insurgents from using it.

Even so the Iraqis will soon adapt. Pressure will increase on the remaining bridges, first from trade, and people travelling then from bombings. If the US has pulled back from 12 bridges, leaving just 4, it will be far less traumatic to reduce the number to 1. Then 0.

Am I the only one having a flashback on the Vietnam moment of "we had to destroy the village to save it"?

[Marcello]

"what, no engineers any more?"

That is interesting actually.Personally I would want to use people on the ground to do that job to reduce the possibility of civilian casualties due to a bomb going astray and such.I suspect that the area is so infested by guerillas that sending engineers there would have been too much trouble.
Are there different takes on the matter?

[CK]

Doesn't destroying the Euphrates river bridges also impede the mobility of the most expensive military in the world? Or will they supply the bases north of Baghdad by chopper or c-130 low altitude drops?

[Jeff Vail]

I think that this is truly a fascinating post and development. I agree with the assertion that this is best characterized as "open source insurgency", but I think that it is important to understand that it is heavily influence--even trending towards--the pattern of rhizome: a decentralized, non-hierarchal, networked pattern of organization found in nature among bamboo, aspen, etc. The interesting part about rhizome is that it doesn't work like hierarchy. It is an EMERGENT phenomenon. Hierarchy processes information mechanically, it is machine intelligence, much like a computer. Rhizome, however, is emergent intelligence, much like the human brain. There is no (or little) conscious coordination between the various nodes in the insurgency, just like there are no controlling neurons in our brain, and yet the human brain and the iraq insurgency is capable of information processing feats that are beyond the abilities of the most capable computer.

Using that analogy: if you open up the human brain and kill 8 critical neurons, it will have no substantial impact on the ability of the brain to produce emergent information processing. Conversely, if you open up a computer, and destroy 8 critical transistors in your Pentium 4, the computer will be severely damaged, possible rendered non-functional. The fact that the US decided to destroy some of the very links that it depends on is evidence that they neither understand their enemy or themselves. Sun Tzu had some critical words for that...

John: can you provide a link to the announcement of the destruction of the 8 bridges? Thanks...

[John Robb]

http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/ALI657489.htm

One of many links.

[Steve L]

End game for the Iraqi adventure? Au contraire, the ball is very much still in play. The corporation, nation-state, and tribe all need energy to survive. The Middle East holds significant amounts of energy and the rest of the world, in particular the US, China, and Europe, will do whatever it takes to ensure its uninterrupted flow to the critical nodes in their societies.

Let’s do a quick fact-finding fly-by of some of the current issues in this adventure….

American 2006 Senate Elections. http://www.cookpolitical.com/races/report_pdfs/2006_sen_ratings_sep15.pdf

Iraqi Elections
http://www.economist.com/countries/Iraq/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-Forecast

Standing up the Iraqi security apparatus:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/10/mil-051005-dod01.htm

US Economics & Energy
http://www.economist.com/countries/USA/profile.cfm?story_id=4454404
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/usa.html

Iraqi Economics & Energy
http://www.economist.com/countries/Iraq/profile.cfm?folder=Profile%2DEconomic%20Structure
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iraq.html

Disabling eight bridges, which link Syria and Jordan to Iraq, is not an endgame. Tactical maneuvers such as these are ongoing, but they do not always hit the press. The bridge on the road from Mosul to Irbil is another real-time example of these same tactics. Reviewing American tactical history, we controlled the bridges on the way into Baghdad and WWII’s Operation Market Garden is a grand example of bridge control http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Market_Garden

[Marcello]

"Tactical maneuvers such as these are ongoing, but they do not always hit the press."

It may well be a tactical maneuver but its implications are not pretty for the coalition.It points towards a defensive stance and surrendering ground control to the enemy, that is if ground control existed in first place.The way it was carried out, bombs instead of demolition crews weighs further towards this conclusion.
When you are attacking you want to capture bridges intact.In some cases you might blow them to cut off enemy escape routes.When you
blow bridges to prevent enemies from pouring in it usually means that the shit is hitting the fan.

[Steve L]

Marcello,

True. Massive military formations, strongpoints, large battles, etc are costly to all concerned and no guarantee of success.

A magician misdirects our attention whilst setting up the trick.

On a map Iraq does not look to be that large, on the ground however it's big, the borders are porous and you don't need a passport or anybodys permission to travel if you are a guerrilla or a bootlegger.

My guess is the intent of this operation is more directed at influencing economics and popular opinion, as well as channeling the bridge crowd towards the limited number of iraqi border patrol folks than stopping the determined guerrilla who will get through anyway.

[John Robb]

This isn't the border Steve, this is inside Iraq.

[Steve L]

John,

Do you have a link for which bridges are open and which have been closed?

I have enclosed a link for a map that might help in our discussion:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/images/oif_mil-comm-routes-map_may04.jpg

The voting begins on 15 October.

Lets key in on highways 1, 10, & 12.

Notice Ramadi and Fallujah...Sunni's can be directly impacted by their ability/inability to cross the Euphrates:
http://www.cidi.org/humanitarian/hsr/iraq/03a/ixl128.html
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/11/mil-041120-usmc01.htm

The Iraqi, Jordanian, and Syrian economies as well as the opinions of their public are dependent upon being able to cross the Euphrates.

Syria and Jordan receive a significant amount of bootleg oil/petroleum products via truck. Cutting bridges that cross the Euphrates channels this traffic. If a strategic message needs to be sent to these regimes the remaining crossing points can be closed. Perhaps they will increase their assistance in controlling the border...
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2004/isg-final-report/isg-final-report_vol1_rfp-08.htm

[SteveL]

For all of us who gravitate towards quantitative data, thorough analysis, and solutions that work, enclosed is a sweet piece of work:

http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2005/RAND_CT250-1.pdf

More Iraqi border guard info:

http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=39498

http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/print.php?story_id_key=8029

[Ken]

Another reason why the guerrillas are so decentralised may be that the country is NOT as modern as you seem to be suggesting. Mobile 'phones arrived with the Americans and the internet was in the hand of only a few prior to the war - as Salam Pax noted.

What may have happened is that the only national structure, the Baath Party, was destroyed by the war. Waiting in the wings were the original structures that governed people's lives, namely their clan and tribe. It is these bodies that are leading the fight and that is why their is no central body.

If I am correct then bombing bridges makes no sense because the guerrillas don't use them. They are local men fighting a local war.

I suppose that it may impede the activities of any foreign fighters, but nobody believes that they are anything other than a minority.

[befuddled]

A bit off topic, but I wonder about the role of this kind of hallucination, err prediction. This is the 4th or 5th time this year alone that this guy has announced total victory and he and a handful of similar "strategists" guide the perception of many.

http://fallbackbelmont.blogspot.com/2005/10/letter-to-zarqawi_07.html

Just trying to get some ideas about bigger context.

[John Robb]

Ken, the guerrillas are using cell phones to coordinate attacks and outsourcers in the IED business even advertise their services on the Internet. Even whithout knowing that, one look at Zarqawi's media output should lead you to think otherwise.

[John Robb]

Befuddled, he is clearly confusing partisan ideology with strategy. This quote: "Implicit within Zawarhiri's message is an admission that the insurgency is headed for defeat unless it changes it's policies and thereby its fortunes," is clearly not supported by the article he cites. My read of the article is that the US withdrawal seems to be an expected outcome since they are already planning for what comes after.

[TM Lutas]

If the cell phone infrastructure came with the americans (it did) it's quite likely that the US can take it out (it can). So why doesn't it? It doesn't because the US is aided by cell phone tips more than the insurgency.

Search and destroy sweeps are being replaced over the last few months by clear and hold operations with Iraqis doing the holding. So far, the Iraqis seem to be holding just fine. If that trend continues, this insurgency is toast. The insurgency is adapting. So are we. I think we're adapting faster.

[Adam]

Just to point out that the cell phone infrastructure did not come with the US. Its just that the US offically put in a GSM network.

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/07/23/those_ghostly_iraqi_mobile_networks/
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/10/01/love_me_tender_bidding/
(and countless other stories at the same location. Its a UK based technical e-magazine)

So the US can "take out" the infrastructure, that they put in at the cost of billions. But a chunk of it is based in Jordan and Kuwait and they might not want their modern economies destroyed simply to be nice to the Americans. And then the insurgents will have to use satellite phones which are pretty easy to pick up these days.

[Adam]

TM,

"The insurgency is adapting. So are we. I think we're adapting faster."

I don't believe it. Lets take the example of deciding whether we're winning or not. A fairly basic, important question I think we'd all agree. 2 years after September the 11th, in October 2003 Rumsfeld wondered:

"Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror. Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us."

A sound question. It took 2 years to ask, but a sound question nevertheless. So whats happened since? Well in September 2005 2 years after asking that question, and 4 years after September 11th the US government has asked some people to look at it.

http://blogs.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2005/10/the_terrorist_b.html

If 4 years delay to order some software to be written to determine if you're winning is a sign that is the US being adaptable then the insurgents have no reason to worry.

[Marcello]

"It doesn't because the US is aided by cell phone tips more than the insurgency."

Has it occurred to you that maybe, just maybe, there might be good reasons to not shut down the communication network of a country which are not related to that?
Like say the impact it would have on the economy, reconstruction efforts and what not.

[Marcello]

"So far, the Iraqis seem to be holding just fine. If that trend continues, this insurgency is toast. The insurgency is adapting. So are we. I think we're adapting faster."

I have been hearing statements like that for more than two years.In the meantime things have been going so well that we are down to sending the the air forces to blow up infrastructure.Until I see actual developments you will excuse me if I put it under "there is light at the end of the tunnel" folder.

[befuddled]

The nature of my question was the larger informational and media context.

The issue is demonstrated here. We may be having successes, but these are always presented as a way to avoid analysis of problems.

I think whether or not we are successful we would have been far more successful if from the begining we had heeded warnings from our experts and from observers. Instead we have a "pro war" cadre who have dismissed all such concerns.

This seems to have occured in the president's speech where the enemy is defined as outsiders, and problems of corruption, Shia militias, crimnality, religious conflict, flatteing economy, inadequete infrastructure, demoralization...
don't exist even though a handful of these have been enough to crash 2rd world hopes elsewhere.

Instead we have a narrowly defined enemy who we are killing thus defeating. The rightwingers claim one or anothr event is proof of total victory 3 to 5 times a year, in the last year they've qualified these things with cautions about problems in mopping up, but the victories are relentless as in 1984.

And in this faith based reality we don't even see parts of the problem. So what is this inability to see not only the compplexities of other cultures, but unpleasant facts in the context of a global guerilla war?

It is obviously a potential tool for the enemy.

[Cardenio]

There's no way at all that ' we're leaving '.

That's Uncle Sam's Private Reserve now.

Scaling everything back, and then sitting on it until the clock runs out for then next say, 10 years, okay. The trick is going to be not pissing ourselves broke doing it.

[Marcello]

Since 1984 has been brought up I thought it might be of interest.

"In the past, also, war was one of the main instruments by which human societies were kept in touch with physical reality. All rulers in all ages have tried to impose a false view of the world upon their followers, but they could not afford to encourage any illusion that tended to impair military efficiency. So long as defeat meant the loss of independence, or some other result generally held to be undesirable, the precautions against defeat had to be serious. Physical facts could not be ignored. In philosophy, or religion, or ethics, or politics, two and two might make five, but when one was designing a gun or an aeroplane they had to make four. Inefficient nations were always conquered sooner or later, and the struggle for efficiency was inimical to illusions. Moreover, to be efficient it was necessary to be able to learn from the past, which meant having a fairly accurate idea of what had happened in the past. Newspapers and history books were, of course, always coloured and biased, but falsification of the kind that is practised today would have been impossible. War was a sure safeguard of sanity, and so far as the ruling classes were concerned it was probably the most important of all safeguards. While wars could be won or lost, no ruling class could be completely irresponsible.But when war becomes literally continuous, it also ceases to be dangerous..."

The problem is that the mentality necessary to start this war is probably the least adapt to run it rationally once it has started.
A clash between two armored divisions is primarily a technical issue.Politics can (and should) stay out of it.
A counterinsurgency campaign on the other hand cannot detach itself from politics.
In Washington a Party intellectual can speak about "moral clarity",
"islamofascism", "exporting democracy" and so on.Connection to reality comes almost only under the form of elections by an electorate which is connected to the reality of place like Iraq almost only via TV.
On the ground, in order to win it may be necessary to cut morally dubious deals,paying respect to the "towel heads" and not forcing things on a society if it is not ready to support them.
Disconnection from reality means a bullet in your head.
Thus the two levels are at odds with each other.Waging the war rationally may lead to question the political assumptions on which was started.This of course is unacceptable. The solution to the dilemma? Detach further yourself from reality,"victory is at hand",and throw more steel on targets even if it does not work.
Small wonder we are where we are.

[TONY]

Don't you all think that focusing on the bridges and the cellphone networks and other logistics is a bit academic? Maybe you are all academics but the salient facts are not the logistics but the obvious subversion by the US of credible processes: democratic system, law and order (even the military kind), press reporting and the rest. In other words the very things they purport to be promoting in Iraq. The stupid 'tactics' follow inevitably. You are right, John. This is the most doomed to failure crusade since, probably, the First Crusade.

[Marcello]

"Don't you all think that focusing on the bridges and the cellphone networks and other logistics is a bit academic?"

Logistcs is not some sort abstract academic subject.It is one of the more important aspect of a war.
Actions like these are also among the few "metrics", to quote Rumsfeld,available to gauge how things are going.