SIZING THE IRAQI INSURGENCY

Here is my new estimate on the size of the Iraqi insurgency. It is available as a PDF download: How Big is the Iraqi Insurgency.pdf. I will likely convert it to a Web view at a later date.

Comments

[Joal]

This argument rests on two basic assumptions. The first is that the Iraqi insurgency is really at (or near) 163,000. The US military estimates something between 12,000 and 20,000. Robb admit he may be wrong on this point, but seems confident in his projection. The second assumption is that counterinsurgency can only be successfully conducted with overwhelming superiority in numbers. Robb takes this idea for granted. That doesn't mean he's wrong, but it's a chink in the armor that needs to be explored.

Given that a pullout now would almost certainly result in the deaths of hundreds of thousands (maybe millions) of Iraqi civilians in a brutal sectarian civil war, I think it's worth spending the money and risking our lives to stay and fight.

[Greg Burton]

Excellent reworking, John. Hopefully this will help generate some realistic discussion about what we're facing and our almost universally unpalatable options.

[Adam]

John,

Just one quick suggestion. You point out that attacks in Iraq are becoming more dangerous but don't then quantify that. Would it be an idea to put the monthly casualties that the coalition is suffering in the analysis? I think what we're seeing is the natural evolution of fewer (or at least no more) but better planned and more advanced attacks. This would imply that the insurgency is advancing. The reason I mention this is that in Lebanon the casualty ratio of Israelis to Hizbollah fell from 1:5 to 1:1 over a period of 4 years. The same may be happening here.

Joel,

"The second assumption is that counterinsurgency can only be successfully conducted with overwhelming superiority in numbers. Robb takes this idea for granted. That doesn't mean he's wrong, but it's a chink in the armor that needs to be explored."

Historically John is correct. At the minimum the counterinsurgency force needs to equal the insurgents numbers (the US currently doesn't. Iraqi forces are considered to be worthless) and then only when the intention is to allow the guerillas to exist in certain areas. Defeating the insurgents is a far harder task.

In Malaya odds of 10 regular soldiers on the ground to each insurgent were required, and in this case over 90% of the insurgents were foreigners (Chinese), living in an inhospitable jungle which they had to come out of. This is at variance with the Iraq case where few foreigners are involved and the urban areas of Bagdhad are perfectly habitable. I'm not convinced that its a good fit to the Iraq campaign, but its one of the few successful counter-guerilla campaigns we have.

In 1947 the guerillas had 4,000 men. To fight them the British deployed 45,000 police, a 50,000 man Home Guard, and 55,000 troops (including 25,000 from the UK including the newly reformed SAS and 10,000 Ghurkas), for a grand total of 150,000 troops, a ratio of 37:1. (Source; Asprey (1994)War in the Shadows 568-573). The regular 1st world forces had a ratio of almost 10:1 in themselves.

With all this force the guerilla campaign was over quickly. It ended in 1960, a mere 13 years after it began. Officially six thousand guerillas were killed, 400 more retreated to the Thai border where "after a short hiatus they resumed operations" (Asprey 573). In 2005 the leaders of the guerillas are still alive and living in Thailand by the way.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3148044.stm

The bad news was that US observers of the campaign would take the wrong lesson home, believing that conventional soldiers with technology and resources would defeat guerillas. They took no notice of the odds against the guerillas. This was the wrong lesson and would prove fatal in Vietnam.

"Given that a pullout now would almost certainly result in the deaths of hundreds of thousands (maybe millions) of Iraqi civilians in a brutal sectarian civil war, I think it's worth spending the money and risking our lives to stay and fight."

I have doubts as to whether that's true. The US gave up on Afghanistan, left North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran on the back-burner and left the "war on terror" as the punchline of a joke. Plus if Rumsfelds 12-year war is right it'll cost around $600bn. Thats a lot of money for an ugrateful, barely subservient, province. Also, since when was the US "a nation builder?" Bush was elected on exactly the opposite position.

As for the civil war, its happening now anyway. Not a single day goes by without one group killing members of another. The sooner the US picks a winner (Who, who cares?) and supports them, allowing them to neutralise (read: slaughter in their thousands) their political opponents the sooner it'll all be over. And that takes us right back to the original British position of "the next man with a moustache" but personally I think that option went when the Iraqi army was disbanded.

[Marcello]

"The second assumption is that counterinsurgency can only be successfully conducted with overwhelming superiority in numbers. Robb takes this idea for granted. That doesn't mean he's wrong, but it's a chink in the armor that needs to be explored."

Historically is a reasonable assumption.
In this case then the overwhelming majority of the soldiers we have know very little about local language, customs and culture.
So I do not see why it should be different.
The only thing we have in abundance is firepower,relatively accurate and available on short notice in huge quantities.That should spare us embarassing defeats à la Dien Bien Phu but it will not protect the Coalition Ground Forces or the infrastructure against the daily war of attrition which, absent favorable developments,is going to break us.

[Joal]

I know that Robb is historically correct. I'm just saying that it is my belief that history never repeats itself -- it just echoes. What may have been true in Malaya in the mid-20th century doesn't necessarily dictate what happens in the 21st century. I think the history should be used as a guide, but we should also look for ways around the 10:1 "rule," given that it is outside the realm of our capability.

As for the civil war -- if we wanted to prevent a Turkish invasion, we would have to suppress the Kurds (or allow them to be suppressed). I doubt the Shiites are up to the task. That means we have to rely on the Sunnis. Which means we have to allow them to suppress the Shiites also. Do you think Iran won't get involved? After we leave, the Iraqis are not going to have a strong military capable of preventing an Iranian annexation of southern Iraq. So where does that leave us?

Best case scenario: moral bankruptcy. We show the world and ourselves that America doesn't really stand for much after all. We show the world that our ideals and our values are lies.

Maybe it's just me (although I don't think it is), but I'm willing to fight *indefinitely* to prevent that from coming about, in the hope that a better solution might emerge at some point in the future. In fact I'll soon get the chance to -- in May I'm going to be commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant in the United States Marine Corps.

[Adam]

"As for the civil war -- if we wanted to prevent a Turkish invasion, we would have to suppress the Kurds (or allow them to be suppressed). I doubt the Shiites are up to the task. That means we have to rely on the Sunnis. Which means we have to allow them to suppress the Shiites also."

To the other readers: this is a bit long. I assume that some of you know this stuff. Just move along.

Joal,

You won't get told this in the USMC but Iraqi history did not start in 1991 or 2003. The ability of the 3rd populous power in a nation to keep control if given outside support was the reason that Sadaam was picked in the first place. In the early 1980's Sadaam switched from Russian to US backing as he needed advanced US weapons against the Iranians (who purchased their weapons on the open market, mainly from North Korea and China).

So why have a strong man in the first place? The recent history of Iraq is littered with civil wars. A Kurdish insurgency was annihilated in 1931-2. Northern Iraq was invaded (for want of a better term) by a joint Turkish-Iraqi force in 1935 to further put down the Kurds. During WW2 the Kurds tried another (failed) rebellion.

In between 1958 and 68 Iraq "enjoyed" the delights of three coups, and five national governments.

The 1958 government is most important because it at least recognised that the Kurds existed. But in 1961 the next government along launched (another) invasion of Nothern Iraq, this time using 3 of the 5 Iraqi army divisions to do so. Fighting continued until 1966 when a peace treaty was thrashed out.

The Baathist party came to power in a military coup in 1968 (the military quickly giving power to the civilians, of which Sadaam was one). Ironically the Baathists actually began to follow the peace treaty (including Kurds in civil government and allowing the use of Kurdish language in official documents). But in 1969 the Kurds rebelled again - breaking the peace treaty by attacking the oil refinery at Kirkuk.

The fighting lasted another year with the arrival of another peace treaty (and a new constitution givng the Kurds even more). Naturally this peace treaty lasted no better than the previous ones.

Four years later the situation was dire for Iraq. The Kurds, with the active assistance now of the Shah of Iran (and by implication his puppet masters, the US),had pinned down some 100,000 Iraqi soldiers and 650 of Iraqs 1390 tanks in a guerilla war. Around 25,000 square miles and 1.5 million Kurds were "liberated" at this stage. The Shah provided air and artillery support, and in 1975 actually deployed 2 regiments of regular Iranian soldiers into "Kurdistan". Ironically this caused Iranian Kurds to start demanding liberation, and the Shah had to move troops and SAVAK into their areas to put their rebellion down in 1975.

A peace treaty was agreed in Algiers in 1975, giving Iran a huge number of concessions and leaving Iraq humiliated. The Kurdish guerillas had damaged Iraq to the point that her army could not have fought the Iranians. Clearly a new method was needed, and poison gas had worked (for the British) in the 1920's. So as early as 1975 the Iraqi military had decided that poison gas would be used to destroy any further Kurdish insurgency as it was cheaper and quicker, whilst denying the Iranians any opportunity to take advantage of the crisis.

Sadaam Hussain was Vice President in 1977 (leading repression of the then restive leaders of the Shia majority, with a combination of executions of the leaders and bribes for the followers. It worked. In 1980-88 it was the Shias who fought hardest for him). Sadaam became Chairman of the Baathist party (and president of Iraq) on 16th July 1979 on the resignation of the previous holder on health grounds (like most 3rd world successions the health grounds were "resign or die". That's pretty healthy).

The bottom line of all this history is that in the 20th Century alone there are more years of guerilla warfare in Iraq than not. Today its in the cities, rather than the mountains. Bagdhad alone is 2,000 square miles, 8 times larger than 1945 Berlin. In addition key strategic decisions had been made for Sadaam well before he became President simply because of the reality of having huge land borders and a large disloyal Northern population that won't keep treaties. The US now has that problem and that this has happened is no surprise to anyone who knows some history.

"Do you think Iran won't get involved? After we leave, the Iraqis are not going to have a strong military capable of preventing an Iranian annexation of southern Iraq. So where does that leave us?"

Iran is involved now, and always has been. Its like claiming the US won't be involved in a political collapse in Mexico, its right next door, they cannot ignore it. Iran has also functionally annexed Southern Iraq already because voting finished in the constitution.

Lets look at the Iraqi constitution (which changed 3 days before the voting, but no-one really knows how, so this is what we think is the case. The current constitution says that it will be changed by the next government. The last government, elected in a landslide, is pro-Iranian and Islamic. That looks like a win for Iran in future). So on with the big stuff:

Article (115): Right to establish a region
Article (116): The writes a constitution
Article (4): Any region can take a local language as an additional official language
Article (117): The regional administers the region including security forces

The constitution will pass, as the voting rules means that it cannot fail. The regions will form as part of the prelude to the Iraqi civil war, just like the Confederacy. The regions will be independant nations (constitution, government language, military. There's also foreign representation in the constitution but I missed it at 6-30 this morning. I'll have another look tonight) and the Shi'ite one is dominated by Iranian-backed religious politicians. Effectively Iran now has a land border with Saudi and Kuwait. Useful fact: the Saudi area on the Iraqi border has the most oil, and the most Shi'ites. Its been in rebellion for years. With support just across the border the rebellion will step up a gear.

I wonder if the Iranians will send the US a thank you note? Its not every day that someone gives you half the worlds oil supply.

"Best case scenario: moral bankruptcy. We show the world and ourselves that America doesn't really stand for much after all. We show the world that our ideals and our values are lies."

Got it in one. That's the big problem with illegal invasions. Its also the basis of Bin Ladens argument against the US - the US doesn't believe in its supposed fundamental values - truth, human rights, free speech, equality before the law. Sadly with the current government that'd be my position too.

The US is morally bankrupt due to some utterly stupid decisions made early on - the invasion being one of them and the dismal post invasion handling being another.

"Maybe it's just me (although I don't think it is), but I'm willing to fight *indefinitely* to prevent that from coming about, in the hope that a better solution might emerge at some point in the future. In fact I'll soon get the chance to -- in May I'm going to be commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant in the United States Marine Corps."

Well good luck to you. My advice would be to keep your head down, wait for the general pull out, and don't die (or worse, get the poor squaddies you'll be put in charge of, killed) to prevent moral bankruptcy. Back in Vietnam it was "peace with honour".

[James Acres]

This is interesting. But I think we need some qualitative measure of an insurgent as well as quantitative.

All those "disgruntled" Sunnis are far less dangerous and committed than the former Baathists. Also, one wonders if they are so much AGAINST the government as they are just FOR their tribal or regional affiliation.

And so I wonder if 1) the "disgruntled Sunni" is less dangerous and 2) if he's not ammenable to being split off from the insurgency should his tribe so command.

Another wonderment -- can we compare the disgruntled Sunni to the disgruntled urban American gang member? Are they of greater or lesser ability to cause mayham than the urban American gang-banger? Do urban American police outnumber the gang-bangers?

[Adam]

"Another wonderment -- can we compare the disgruntled Sunni to the disgruntled urban American gang member? Are they of greater or lesser ability to cause mayham than the urban American gang-banger? Do urban American police outnumber the gang-bangers?"

Good question: In Iraq military service for 3 years is compulsory and includes training in all the standard Iraqi military weapons including assault rifles, rocket launchers, machineguns and mortars. In addition they get training in tactics, which has included - according to the manuals anyway - urban warfare.

Their fathers will have combat experience in a real war (1980-88, the longest land war in the 20th Century), creating a pool of advice and knowledge that can be drawn upon. The exceptionally bad news is that Basra hints that the resistance and the police are not on different sides.

The good news is that the disaffected urban youth in the US aren't as well trained and they're more interested in making money rather than active resistance.

Personally I'd say that the Iraqis are, on a man for man basis, far more dangerous.

[Marcello]

"I think the history should be used as a guide, but we should also look for ways around the 10:1 "rule," given that it is outside the realm of our capability."

Frankly I do not see what can be done about that.The tendency in western armies has been reducing manpower and increasing technology.That makes sense because manpower for us westerners is expensive in many ways
(monetary,political etc) and replacing it with technology is therefore a good deal. Unfortunately in this sort of situations there is not much that can replace lots and lots of infantrymen with brains.Maybe in the future we will be able to find technology based solutions (robotics etc) but until then that is what we are stuck with.

[Tim]

What is the maximum percentage of losses an insurgency can sustain and still increase the quality and quantity of their attacks? Is there historical data to support a figure? What minimum insurgency size would that render?

[DE Teodoru]

I should like to plead with all list members to read
the following
article
"Insurgency and Counterinsurgency" in Iraq by Stephen
Metz. He is a
leading figure on this issue at the US War College and
teaches many of
the
officers now facing and in the future to be facing the

counterinsurgency
task in many lands.

http://www.twq.com/04winter/docs/04winter_metz.pdf

There is now much of an historic record for what was
done in our
counterinsurgency response to the Iraq insurgency and
how it worked
out.
Mr. Metz's article is important because it was written
early in the
insurgency and offered solutions to ongoing problems,
many of which
were
put into practice. Thus, this article is invaluable,
not only for what
it
admits to be the misjudgments of the Pentagon but also
for its
assumptions as to what the insurgency and Iraq are all
about. To my
mind,
this article is a radical departure from the Vietnam
experience. So I
particularly look forward to the opinions of those who
may have
experienced Vietnam insurgency and counterinsurgency.
Personally, I
fear
that, unless this article was neutralized by others--
and I think not--
it
represents a pathological gold mine to understanding
where we went
wrong and
where we thought wrong, being culture blind and
language deaf. Worst of
all,
it seems to me, the Pentagon operated on a series of
ideological assumptions, as this article indicates,
that support my
opinion
that we went in truly intelligence blind.

Daniel E. Teodoru

************************************************

A very interesting story made yet another scandal
for
the White House:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/01/AR2006050100854_pf.html
At the end of a basic training ceremony, Iraqi Army
recruits in Anbar province tore off their uniforms and
refused to serve. According to the Wash. Post:

The protest was triggered by an announcement that the
new soldiers, all residents of Anbar province --
widely considered the heartland of Iraq's Sunni Arab
insurgent movement -- would be required to serve
outside their home towns and outside the province as
well.

To me, having posted Mr. Metz's 2003 article on the
Iraq insurgency, I am encouraged that someone finally,
in effect, said: Rumsfeld goes or we go!

To understand this view, one must first recall the
imperial McNamara solution to the Vietnam War: a large
central army. I was in Danang Airport waiting for my
plane to Saigon when I met and ARVN soldier on
emergency leave to go back home to his Mekong Delta
village. He was stationed in a unit near Danang and
the local Viet Cong Committee of his village tried to
talk him into deserting, using the well known
nice-->mean "binh van" tactics scripted way back by
Lenin. First he was sent requests to return to protect
his family; then he was sent a death warrant if he did
not desert; then he was sent a threat to his family;
finally, he received a package with a small child's
hand in it. Thinking it was his young son's, he asked
leave to return home. There was no other way to
confirm that. I have no idea what happened. But the
story came to mind when I read the above story about
the Anbar training camp. In fact, we succeeded in
Vietnam only after the Tet Offensive, when we
concentrated our assets and efforts into training
local forces-- RFs and PFs-- to resist the VC from the
villages. That spelled the end of the Viet Cong and
the war became against Hanoi's regular troops sent
south.

Let us remember that Rumsfeld ordered our "liberator"
troops to not interfere with looting, violence and
murder after Saddam fell on grounds that "freedom is
messy." Thus, the insurgency began as a crime spree.
As a result, we could not disarm people; they needed
their AK-47s to protect their homes. It was only when
our troops came under constant attack that all Iraqis
were deemed suspect of trying to kill our troops until
proven innocents.

The more we preempted, barging into homes in the
middle of the night, the more we turned the Iraqis
into outraged resistors. Soon they went from avenging
insults to their Iraqi dignity to avenging dead
relatives. Apparently none of Gen. Sanchez's
commanders read Lora Blumenfeld's book REVENGE, as
seen by Mediterranean peoples. We kept, as Metz wrote,
assuming that we were dealing with Jihadists from
abroad. And so, as in Vietnam, when we realized that
we couldn't stay, we concentrated on building up an
Iraqi army to replace ours.

To make a long story short, we turned an unleashing of
criminals into a foreign Jihadist insurrection from
abroad (for Rumsfeld ideology substituting for
intelligence). And so we focused on creating a Shi'ite
Army to protect against Sunni insurgents and then a
Sunni Army to protect against Shi'ia Death Squads (not
to speak of the Kurd Peshmerga we fully armed). When
we tried to put it all together into a national army
that we control, we only repeated the ARVN catastrophe
of mass desertions.

But now the lowest soldiers have made it clear that
this is a LOCAL war, to protect their neighborhoods
and villages. Perhaps now Mr. Bush will go the next
step and fire Rumsfeld and replace our military
trainers with able Arab speaking advisers who can
train local police forces to protect their own
families.

At the same time, withdrawing our troops on a fixed
schedule and asking the UN to replace us with police
advisers will refocus this war into the many local
wars that it really is. The Central Government can be
helped by us with reconstruction funds that are
performance standards based (their corruption could
never be as bad as that of our contractors).

In the end we may not get credit for Iraq's police
suppression of a bandit insurgency fought and won at
the local level, the UN police advises will, but them
we also will be remote from any final failure if it
occurs. Yet I really think that our ability to
persuade Iraq at the central and local levels will
only manifest once we remove our ham-bone military and
empower Iraqis one local sector at a time.

Daniel E. Teodoru