PARTIAL vs. COMPLETE SYSTEM DISRUPTION

The ongoing campaign of infrastructure disruption in Iraq (oil, gas, electricity, water, etc.) brings up an important question on strategy: will global guerrillas strive for a complete shut down of Iraq's infrastructure or do they achieve more through a partial shut down? Lawrence of Arabia provides some insight into this.

Lawrence's guerrilla campaign (for more on this read the fantastic book on Lawrence's strategy by Liddell Hart) against the Ottoman Turks was focused on the disruption the Turkish rail system. However, his approach did not seek the total collapse of the rail system. In Lawrence's view, it was more important to control the rate of flow on the rail system than to shut it down entirely. If he had shut down the rail system, the Turkish troops that depended on it for supplies would have been withdrawn (and would have been used to reinforce the front against the Brits in Sinai/Palestine). In contrast, by restricting its flow, the Turkish troops remained in place but didn't have the resources to do anything but remain in their garrisons. In essence, Lawrence used disruption to produce two desired effects (for more on this read the brief on effects-based operations): the paralysis of a large segment of the Turkish army and complete freedom of movement in 99% of Arabia.

A similar logic applies to the effects-based operations in motion in Iraq today. Attacks by Iraq's global guerrillas keep Iraq's infrastructure below what is needed to adequately provide for the population (see State Failure 101 for more). Additionally, there appears to be evidence that these attacks have moved into maintenance mode -- just enough disruption to maintain current levels of insufficient output although complete collapse is within their means. This makes sense if the effects desired are: an extremely weak Iraqi state and the withdrawal of a chastened US. Here's why partial disruption makes this possible (I am going to work on refining these over the next couple of days):

• Complete collapse would create total war (via a bloody civil war). A complete urban/country takedown would prompt the state to launch a total war. This is a type of warfare that global guerrillas are not prepared or able to fight (in contrast, states are well suited to this). By keeping the level of damage below what would be considered fatal to the state, total war is avoided.
• Partial disruption delegitimizes the state (and the American occupation). Partial paralysis creates a situation where the government is responsible for failures. Guerrilla attacks are lumped in with failures in system management and blamed on the state. This decrease in state legitimacy increases the need for people to depend on primary loyalties rather than the state for solutions. Fragmentation = goodness.
• Partial disruption maximizes economic attrition. Partial disruption provides the illusion that the situation is manageable. As a result, both Iraq and the US continue to fight this war on the margins of a peacetime financial agenda. However, this peacetime budget is expensive and the Iraqi state is unable to pay for these programs -- disruption has stalled growth in both export and tax revenues. Additionally, the current situation continues to spur the US to pour funds it can't afford into reconstruction (complete failure would likely halt inflows). For US projects, this disruption "tax" can be 60% of total project costs. At this level of inefficiency, nothing gets done.

Comments

[SteveL]

John,

You are on track with post. Looking forward to your refinement of this analysis, and any sources that you are willing to share.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guerrilla_Warfare
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterinsurgency
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_insurgency

[jon]

Another effect of not destroying the infrastructure is, if the guerillas are able to gain control of Iraq, it will be much easier for them to restore services to the minimum required levels than if they just blew everything up. Also, by blowing up the connections, they can disable much without having to blow too much up.

[TM Lutas]

I think that the insurgency, especially the external components are rapidly alienating Iraq on a tribe by tribe basis. A year ago you would not see the level of cooperation between certain Sunni tribes and the Coalition and Iraqi government that you do today.

The point in the original article above is correct, but simplistic. Iraq never has had a unitary loyalty structure. Even under Saddam, certain areas were kept under loose control through deals with sufficient tribal sheikhs. Saddam couldn't reliably achieve more.

Iraq's multi-layered sense of loyalty makes it incredibly difficult to balance insurgency destruction so you don't have any individual tribe (or other sub-national grouping that has armed forces attached) declaring total war even if the national government does not. The national government can and is harnessing those grievances to create a widening coalition of groups who are in total war mode even as they continue to hold out an olive branch to pull in as many insurgents as possible in from the cold.

The international coalition is providing training and heavy weapons support to both the national forces and the sub-national forces. Our side is playing this game a great deal more imaginatively than the Turks responded to Lawrence.

Today, The insurgency does not have complete freedom of movement in Iraq. In fact, it's fair to say that they have less freedom of movement than they did even a few months ago. At the same time, our side has greater freedom of movement. This is an objective measure that should tell you that something more complex is going on than a replay of Lawrence of Arabia v. the Turks.

[dan]

I'm heartened that TM Lutas is predicting the rapid approach of the day that coalition forces can finally leave their bases when off duty and head into town to put some of their cash into the local economy. I've no doubt that the MoD contingent in Maysan will be off fishing with the locals for a bit of Sunday recreation, and that the Japanese contingent will soon be able to go off base with their camcorders and buy up sounvenirs from the local bazaars.

Perhaps the IED fatality statistics for the past 5 months back up TM's assertion - the fact that this categoy of fatalities has doubled over this period is simply a temporary reflection of the fact that coalition forces are just getting out more, and will soon abate down to the more benign levels of a year ago.

Seriously, the Iraqi insurgency does not subscribe to the US way of thinking, in which it is necessary to actually destroy the village in order to save it. After all, they do intend to, de minimis, share meaningful sovereignty once the coalition has departed - and a competent reconstruction will be a central plank of their post-occupation political approach. Pipelines can be easily fixed; oil refineries, once destroyed, take years to rebuild.

[Valdis]

A few misquoto bites, instead of one big dog bite... the mosquitos remain anonymous, the dog does not.

Yet, I don't think the insurgency is minimizing damage because they hope to rule one day and have a smaller mess to clean up... IMHO they have no desire to rule themselves, just influence who does...

[nudedude]

John is right on. All news from Iraq backs up his conclusion. TM is ignoring news from Iraq and just repeating what the occupiers have said the past 3 years since the resistance began: "we are winning, there are just a handfull of fighters, etc."

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency always end the same, one side outlasts the other. I have seen no evidence that the Iraq resistance is slowing down. It appears to be at the same level of intensity as it was 6 months ago, even 16 months ago. Estimates by the pentagon on resistance killed are meaningless based on the rate of resistance attacks remaining unchanged.

This is not very different from American's fortune in the war. America is still reducing towns and cities to rubble with war planes. America is still falling victem to the roadside bomb at a steady rate. America is still unable to make good on their reconstruction goals. America's strategy appears to remain unchanged since the resistance began.

But there is one difference between the two. It is costing America more to maintain the level of involvment then it is costing the Iraqi resistance. With war popularity in America at a constant decline, it is not reasonable to believe America can maintain an occupation for as long as the Iraqi resistance can maintain the cheap low-cost harrasment of Americans and Iraqi collaberators.

I feel the deciding factor in the Iraq war will be America losing intrest in achieving the lofty goals presented to them prior to the invasion, which we see now with support for continued involvment in Iraq constantly declining in America. Iraqi resistance support does not appear to be declining or increasing based on the rate of attacks remaining unchanged since the resistance began.

If they were so unpopular and so weak, they would easily be turned over to American forces.

[TM Lutas]

dan - Misstating what I wrote does your credibility no favors. The movement referred to in the original article and in my comment is military movement. The US patrols, moves units, and conducts operations without any significant restrictions militarily imposed by the Iraqi insurgency and terrorists.

On the other hand, I don't know how often soldiers do get out of the gate during their time off. You might benefit from reading Michael Yon sometimes. There's a very good recent report he did on the role that one commander used sheep as rewards for aggressive Iraqi commanders. They were acquired in the traditional manner, haggled over at the local market.

nudedude - If you think that all news from Iraq backs up John's conclusions, you've got to start reading wider sources. Maybe including the NY Times would be in order, or at least some milbloggers. The NY Times has covered the growing frequency of Red on Red (insurgency infighting) battles as well as the rise of Sunni tribes who are militarily cooperating with the US. They might bury it on page A16 but it's there.

The milbloggers are putting such cooperation stories front and center in their own narratives of Iraq. But of course *their* credibility is suspect. All they are is military professionals who are either currently serving or who have recently served in Iraq.

It's more accurate to say that there are competing narratives in the coverage of Iraq. It would be prudent for the objective analyst to look for real world signs to determine which narrative is correct. I think that the major media peddling the "quagmire" narrative are going to find themselves in deep trouble over the next five years and it's going to show up in their circulation figures (if they can be bothered to report those accurately).

[johnny]

Michael Yon's reporting is no longer even suspect. He's admitted to taking up arms to support the US side. Why would you believe what he writes is anything but propaganda?

[John Robb]

Jon and Dan: I think it is better to view this in terms of coercion rather than an attempt to replace the state.

Validis: very cool analogy. I like that alot. The parable of the mosquito and the dog.

Nudedude: the numbers are against the US:

http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/07/journal_the_new.html

[Countergang]

This is my first visit -- great blog. I'm inclined to think that partial destruction is one of the fundamental tenets of guerrilla warfare. An insurgent leader knows that he cannot possibly wage a war of annihilation, so he wages a war of attrition. In other words, insurgent leaders lack the capacity (intended very broadly) to wage war on a conventional basis, so they adopt the widely available model of the guerrilla war.

Guerrilla leaders have known for years that a few well-placed bombs can do a great deal of damage to a government. I'm thinking, for example, of how loyalist paramilitaries bombed city services (electricity perhaps?) in the late 1960s in Northern Ireland. They knew they did not have the capacity to destroy any of their enemies. They did not want to alienate their potential allies in the Protestant population. But they were able, by means of a few bombs (and later, a general strike), to bring down a government that they believed was giving in to the demands of Nationalist/Republican organizations. The point of the bombing, of course, was to make the government appear inept.

[StrategyUnit]

Excellent post and comments all around.

John, any comments regarding the new strategy to "clear and hold" rather than "search and destory" that Operation Steel Curtain is supposedly doing?

I just mentioned it in my blog, but havent really dived into any analysis:
http://tinyurl.com/9r5r5

I seem to think its much ado about nothing.

[John Robb]

Clear and hold is the classic oil spot strategy (and the way it is being rolled out indicates that it is merely the strategy of the month rather than a fundamental shift). Historically, this strategy has been relatively effective. There are more than a few problems with it in the current situation. First, it is manpower intensive. We just don't have the manpower ot pull it off. Second, it is built for a immobile/rural society that relies on local resources for basic necessities. In a situation like Iraq, there is too much system dependence and mobility for this strategy to work cleanly. There are more, but this is not the space to deliniate them all. In conclusion, this is a misapplication of history (knowing the verse but not the rhyme).

[TM Lutas]

johnny - You can't be serious. Please tell me that you're joking about Michael Yon's report on acquiring gift sheep from the market is discredited by his grabbing a gun and firing off a clip when in fear for his life in the middle of an ambush when there were no functional soldiers available (1 severely wounded, one presumed dead, two newbies frozen). That's just absurd.

John Robb - You're right that we don't currently have the manpower to do it. We had fewer effective fighters to do it last month than this and we'll have more effective fighters next month and so on until there are enough. I still think that you are wildly wrong about the effective forces opposing the current government but the trend of increasing forces will make clear and hold more effective over time. Combine that with the reality that the other side simply cannot mass in large formations without being pounded to pieces by artillery and air power means that this insurgency effort is ultimately doomed.

I strongly suspect that the current government will not be reelected. I strongly suspect that Sunnis will have some ministerial positions in the next government. I'm absolutely convinced that if this comes about, a great deal of Sunni opposition to the current constitutional system will melt away as they see that they can peacefully have a place at the table.

Time will tell.

[Marcello]

Lutas, do you mean we should start to trust the mainstream media (speaking in general, I am not referring to the NYT in particular) which gave us the WMD bullshit? Or maybe we should trust those who said the the capture of Saddam,the death of his sons,the siege of Fallujah or the various elections which have happened were the decisive turning points and the insurgents were on the verge of being wiped out?
I do read military blogs when I have the chance (those written by armor officers are one of my favorite reading).Neverthless one should not forget that they are written by uniformed personnel in a war situation, with all which that entails, included the possibility of a very unpleasant talk with one's direct superiors.I hope you get the point.
I do not doubt that red on red and the various others accidents decribed have or may have happened.But rivalries between the various factions are not exactly unknown in guerrilla wars, as well some locals siding with the foreign power.Unless it becomes a general trend capable of disrupting the enemy I would not read too much into it.

"but the trend of increasing forces will make clear and hold more effective over time."

Just because the Pentagon says that we have more NIA troops that does not mean that we have more troops which are:
1)loyal and not filled with enemy spies;
2)willing to fight;
3)sufficiently trained and equipped to do so.

"Combine that with the reality that the other side simply cannot mass in large formations without being pounded to pieces by artillery and air power means that this insurgency effort is ultimately doomed."

Guerrilla warfare 101:they cannot win decisive battles against the superior military might of the foreign power.
And they do not need to do so.
All they need to do is to break the US national will with the current attrition campaign and force the americans to get out.
And that is working as the public opinion polls show.

I would say that the various Lind, Robb etc although lacking crystal balls have a better track record than those announcing "Mission accomplished".
If you believe otherwise,you are free to do so.But chances are that you might wake up one day finding that the "light at the end of the tunnel" is coming from an high speed train headed in your direction.Do not tell that you were not warned then.

[Marcello]

Further on the local troops, I have tried to keep up for wargaming purposes with the developments in that area.I have seen a stream of security organizations, from the FPS to the ING being created, hailed as a great progress and then disbanded in the space of few months, with the number of troops theoretically available varying wildly in a short timeframe.I have also seen battalions collapsing in battle.
Those usually are not good signs.There seem to have been some improvements in these areas but frankly I would wait before celebrating.
And do not get me started on equipment shortages.

[Adam]

"I strongly suspect that the current government will not be reelected. I strongly suspect that Sunnis will have some ministerial positions in the next government. I'm absolutely convinced that if this comes about, a great deal of Sunni opposition to the current constitutional system will melt away as they see that they can peacefully have a place at the table."

TM - why on earth do you believe these things? Can you link to evidence so that we can evaluate these statements. I may personally think that the moon is made from green cheese but I'm pretty sure that other people may prove this might be wrong. I wondered just now if you have read Alice where the Queen believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast?

So lets take these impossible things. The Sunnis will never be elected to more than 60 seats out of 275 (currently they have 17). Thats just reality. They will never form a government - 138 seats are needed. They cannot form a government with the Kurds either, together they're about 10 seats short.

As for the Iraqi military, after 2 years of full time training they've 1 battalion of useful troops, out of a hundred (60 Shi'ite, 40 'Sunni and others'). The 99% remaining need US support (defined as the US do the fighting and the Iraqis don't). In the last weeks the Iraqi government offered to take back Sunni officers, which tells two things a) the current Iraqi military junior officers are useless and b) the insurgents have lots of competant former junior officers on their side. I wonder what the current Iraqi junior officers think when their government offers their jobs to the people they're meant to be fighting? I wonder if they know that coups were a popular Iraqi pastime in the 1940-60's?

You dream that United Iraqi Alliance will collapse after all they only took 60%+ of the vote last time. The UIA is made up from Dawa, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the Sadrists (Muqtada al-Sadr branch), and the Islamic Action Organization. They have a huge amount of actual credibility. Sistani might want to get people to vote against them, but can you give a reason why? What other choice is there?.

The Sunnis have some ministerial seats so thats a fair point. One of the sticking points in April was that the Shi'ites wanted only non-Baathist Sunni ministers (as if you'll find a Sunni who can count his fingers who wasn't in the Baath party. It was a deliberate blocking tactic). Disturbingly you don't seem to know that this is the case. As they already have some ministerial positions why would that end the insurgency now?

[TM Lutas]

Marcello - I specifically do not say that you should trust the MSM. I think their defeatist narrative is far off the mark. They bury the good news in paragraph twelve after headlining less strategically significant bad news. They do, however, include available facts that don't fit their preferred negative narrative because they'd like to maintain some credibility in the event of our side winning.

You raise the possibility that the milbloggers are not being honest. They're not paid to do this. In fact, there are some clear examples of milbloggers running afoul of exactly those unpleasant sort of chats that you refer to. Given all the potential flak they can run into, why do you think that they do it? If they're required to hold to a particular line, why would they write at all? I can't think of a convincing motivation for these volunteer journalists that is consistent with your implication of them being captive to an imposed USG narrative.

You are correct that rivalry inside such movements is not unheard of. What is more significant is tribal cooperation with US forces where they are helping us spot targets and fight alongside our troops. When groups that weren't doing that in 2004 are doing that in late 2005, that's a marker for real progress.

You say that troop strength statements put out by the Pentagon do not equal actual troop strength. You're right about that. There were several early missteps where we were overoptimistic about how many of those troops would stand and fight. It's just not realistic to take those missteps and just throw all USG statements on troop strength out the window. They should have confirmatory data.

When was the last time you heard about a large scale Iraqi formation breaking? When was the last time you heard about mass desertions? When was the last time you heard about Iraqi police stations being overrun? All three of these phenomena tailed off and disappeared by my count. That says to me that we had problems in training regime and in leadership, problems have been addressed and things are much better now.

Route Irish (the road between Baghdad and its international airport) has had a precipitous drop in casualties. What fixed things after 2.5 years of failure? Iraqi troops who connected with the neighborhoods around the road and largely run that security job with a handful of US advisors giving advanced pointers where needed. This is just one example of a common trend.

I agree with you that the important problem is US will to fight. That problem is made worse by over-pessimistic analysis that magnifies the problems and minimizes or denies the real progress that is being made. The US public is quite patient if they feel that there is progress to a real end to a conflict. We have the will to see this through. Unfortunately, too much of our elite has bought into the defeatist narrative irrespective of actual military and political conditions in Iraq.

[Adam]

TM,

Just to point out that the Bagdhad airport route, all 6 or 7 miles of it, is largely no longer used. Generally helicopters carry valuable people whilst expendables travel by car or truck.

http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0426/p01s03-woiq.html

I know that in October and November last year the US had an entire battalion assigned to the area - all seven miles of it. I assume that they've been reinforced since then. Thats a lot of troops for one short road. As the US has sent Air Force and Navy people (I hesitate to use the word troops for these poor suckers) to escort convoys it seems that infantry have become too valuable to waste.

http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2005/04/26/unready_for_combat?mode=PF

As for the last Iraqi police station being overrun. It happened in the Summer. In Basra. On 19th September. The British had to overrun the place because the insurgents already own it.

http://newswww.bbc.net.uk/1/hi/uk/4332136.stm

[TM Lutas]

Adam - I didn't see your first article prior to posting so I'll address it here. Sistani allowed his name to be used in support of various Iraqi parties. He has most emphatically dissociated himself from any party in the next election. This should fragment the Shiite vote as Sistani is a major influence in all areas of life for the Shiites including politics. If you thought Sistani wanted UIA before and you hear that he doesn't want to associate with them now, this is going to make it much less likely that UIA gets your vote.

What I think is likely to happen is that mixed ethnicity party lists who group via ideology, not religion or ethnicity will gain in strength. This would be a very good thing.

I think you've completely misunderstood the US rating system if you think that only category 1 battalions are useful. In our own ranks, I would suspect that a great number of our own battalions have slipped from the highest rating level. In fact, I recall a unit coming off of Iraq deployment going all the way down to 4. A large part of that downrating was the shape of their support tail. A lot of the Iraqi 2 and 3 division problems are due to logistics problems. It would be absurd to think that Iraqi troops who can fight and are willing to fight are useless because they depend on US bullets and beans and trucks.

As for Sunni ministerial positions, the Sunnis that are in the current government are not there based on their electoral strength but rather on Shia charity. The next government's Sunni ministers will be. In a pride/shame culture, I'd think that the difference would be obvious.

Now to your 2nd message:

Try looking at stats on Route Irish for the past few months. It's significantly changed since the Iraqis took over security. Your article is prior to that takeover.

You're right about the stretch on manpower, it's there. I expect the situation to get better as we both improve combat training for support units and as Iraqi units come on line, allowing infantry to move back to convoy escort duty.

Your commentary on Basra is... less inspired and distinctly off point. The attacks that are under discussion are largely absent in Shiite dominated areas. Damaging the infrastructure in order to hold down coalition forces is simply not going on in any large scale in Basra and environs. What's going on in Basra *is* troubling, but it doesn't fit into the original article narrative.

Argued separately from the thread topic, I think that the UK is making its own, different mistakes in Iraq. I don't think those mistakes will be fatal but they are there and they will need to be corrected.

[Deimos]

Lutas: yeah Basra is doing great! Please make it your next vacation destination.

extrajudicial killings of Sunni's: http://www.upi.com/SecurityTerrorism/view.php?StoryID=20051104-010735-5775r

bombing:
http://customwire.ap.org/dynamic/stories/I/IRAQ_CAR_BOMB?SITE=MABOC&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2005-10-31-14-07-44

second bombing:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4394412.stm

Brain Drain:
http://www.nwherald.com/MainSection/local/26584790058200.php

"The stunning transformation of Basra from a secure rear area for U.S. and British troops into a center of anti-occupation agitation reveals the utter weakness of the Shiite political base on which the United States must now rely to sustain its occupation of the country." - http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=15&ItemID=8978

"The most powerful and feared institution here in southern Iraq's largest city is a shadowy force of 200 to 300 police officers, known collectively as the Jameat, who dominate the local police and who are said to murder and torture at will. They answer to the leaders of Basra's sectarian militias." - http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/10/09/news/basra.php

links thanks to Today in Iraq

[Adam]

TM,

So many comments. So little time. I have to dash. Can we take this to email?

"Sistani allowed his name to be used in support of various Iraqi parties. He has most emphatically dissociated himself from any party in the next election."

No he didn't. He actively supported the UIA in September. He's not saying anything right now, which might mean he doesn't like the UIA, or it might not. Theres no emphatically there at all. He may well be waiting for the right price. After all he got the Islamic Law article into the constitution.

"This should fragment the Shiite vote as Sistani is a major influence in all areas of life for the Shiites including politics. If you thought Sistani wanted UIA before and you hear that he doesn't want to associate with them now, this is going to make it much less likely that UIA gets your vote."

What Sistani wants and what else there is available are two different horses. He wants an effective efficient government that does what he wants. Thats not in the stable. He can choose the UIA or the American puppets. Its not going to be the Americans.

"What I think is likely to happen is that mixed ethnicity party lists who group via ideology, not religion or ethnicity will gain in strength. This would be a very good thing."

You're dreaming. Lets look at the party lists in December. These are now fixed by the way (unless the rules change, and in Iraq thats quite possible). Its the UIA the Kurdish alliance and whatever scraping the Sunnis put up. Thats a straight ethnic split.

"I think you've completely misunderstood the US rating system if you think that only category 1 battalions are useful."

Hm. Ability to operate on their own. Seems a basic condition in a nation the size of France. Iraqi units simply don't take casualties when the US is attacking a town. Never wondered why? This month Iraqi military casualties were 25% of the US total. They're worse trained, and led, and equipped. So the casualties should be higher, right? Except they're not.

"In our own ranks, I would suspect that a great number of our own battalions have slipped from the highest rating level. In fact, I recall a unit coming off of Iraq deployment going all the way down to 4. A large part of that downrating was the shape of their support tail."

Shrug. You're confusing building an army up (Iraqi) and one being taken apart (US). The Iraqi statistics should be improving. In early 2005 the Iraqis had 3 Category 1 battalions, in September its one.

"A lot of the Iraqi 2 and 3 division problems are due to logistics problems. It would be absurd to think that Iraqi troops who can fight and are willing to fight are useless because they depend on US bullets and beans and trucks."

No I think that they're useless because they're poorly led, unwilling to fight, generally haphazard, at best flaky in their loyalty to the government and largely indifferent to US objectives.

"As for Sunni ministerial positions, the Sunnis that are in the current government are not there based on their electoral strength but rather on Shia charity. The next government's Sunni ministers will be. In a pride/shame culture, I'd think that the difference would be obvious. "

Well you mentioned the Sunnis not being in government. In the Iraqi constitution the Sunnis will always be reliant on charity (Shi'ite, Kurdish). Always. Thats just plain numbers. You can choose to deal with reality or ignore it but it'll still be there.

As for the rest of your comments. You specifically raised the point of police stations not being overrun, not me. I merely pointed out that the Insurgents don't have to overrun things that they already own.

As for the insurgency slowing: http://icasualties.org/oif_a/CasualtyTrends.htm
http://icasualties.org/oif/IED.aspx

October set a new record for US IED deaths (59). Mind you this month we're on 14 already. In October 2004 it was 13 in the entire month. The Iraqi government reported casualties in October as:

93 US GI's killed (no wounded was given but apparently its about 500)
400 Iraqis killed
83 Ministry of Interior paramilitary police killed, 103 wounded
25 Iraqi soldiers killed, 32 wounded (Sorry, just to check. Valiant Iraqi troops taking barely a quarter of US casualties and far fewer wounded? Could it be that they aren't fighting at all? Looks possible...)
282 "insurgents" killed
493 "insurgents" captured

You can believe the last 2 figures as you will. The US also released around 500 "insurgents" they had captured earlier. If you believe that this lot are insurgents then the last lot now being release were too. Bodycount maths is always high (2 blood trails and a discarded AK-47 = 32 KIAs was the old Vietnam gag). Good news is that if the figures are right then the US can win the campaign in 11 years, with only 40,000 US dead. Strangely this is roughly Rumsfelds prediction for how long the campaign will last. What are the odds on that? Still, Victory is in sight!

Again: here are the numbers and these are the reality. Deal with them or not as you choose.

[Marcello]

"You raise the possibility that the milbloggers are not being honest."

I am not saying that Armor Geddon and the others are lying puppets in the hands of CENTCOM.I believe that they are honestly giving their personal perspective.They believe in what they are doing.
But if one has major critics about the war effort, emphasis on major,then shouting them from a blog from the front would not be very smart for a variety of reasons.
So there is the possibility of self censorship at work here.

"When groups that weren't doing that in 2004 are doing that in late 2005, that's a marker for real progress."

Provided of course that groups that were not shooting at us in 2004 have not started to shoot at us in 2005 and those who are shooting with us in 2005 will not shoot us in the back in 2006.These sort of alliances can be quite fluid.

"It's just not realistic to take those missteps and just throw all USG statements on troop strength out the window."

Indeed but when one hand has attempted to feed me bullshit once, I am very careful before swallowing what is giving me after that.

"All three of these phenomena tailed off and disappeared by my count."

My personal opinion is that ther NIA has seen some improvements.That being said if those battalions are used just for some cleanup in the wake of american units, then it is a given that will not collapse as it happened when they were put in high stress situations like Fallujah.

[Adam]

I apologise for the double post - a thought occured to me on the way home relating to the use of Iraqi soldiers. US National Guard troops cannot do tours abroad less than 24 months apart. I also recall that half of US forces are National Guard, and that most National Guard units and individuals have been tapped.

This means that the US hits a critical resource crunch about now, for a period of roughly a year. This would explain far better why the Iraqi military is being used by the US (assuming that it is, which I doubt, I haven't seen any numbers yet). Its not the Iraqis, its the fact that the US have nothing left.

Prediction: If this is the case then, right after the December election, the US pulls back into a number of extremely heavily fortified encampments in Iraq whilst publically arguing that they are letting the Iraqis do the fighting. (I can just hear John whispering: "controlled chaos exit solution").

[TM Lutas]

Deimos - Read what I wrote, not what the voices are telling you I wrote. To recap:

The attacks that are under discussion are largely absent in Shiite dominated areas. Damaging the infrastructure in order to hold down coalition forces is simply not going on in any large scale in Basra and environs. What's going on in Basra *is* troubling, but it doesn't fit into the original article narrative.

This isn't a statement that what's going on in Basra is peachy. It's a statement that what's going on in Basra is off-topic to the thread. The brits have made a hash in Basra but it's a different set of errors than the US has made.

Adam - I'm sorry, I'll argue for an audience but I'm already up to my quota of e-mail correspondents that are committed advocates.

We're in disagreement on what Sistani did (I don't think his support was as formal as you characterize it for UIA in the last round and he *has* issued a statement that his name was attached too closely to certain parties, that this round he insists that no party claim his endorsement, and that he just wants a heavy turnout for the election for whatever party) and what he's doing. This is a factual error on one of our parts that'll come out in the wash. If I'm wrong, my analysis drawn from those facts is all wet. Are you willing to concede that if I have the facts right, that my analysis is reasonable?

This RFE/RL analysis of the lists (http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/11/45dd3b31-ade2-4567-a0b3-07c62735eb75.html) seems to indicate that UIA has fragmented/morphed. But what do they know?

As for operating on their own being the sine qua non of military usefulness, that's just a nonstarter. If you don't have your own kitchens, you can't operate on your own. Armies still travel on their stomach. If you pair up with a US unit's kitchens and they feed both units, you can still guard, patrol, run intelligence operations like recruiting and running informer networks (better than the US by all accounts) and do other tasks. The lack of kitchens is a pain, but it does not render you militarily useless.

The US is taking the point because we've got the experience, the training and the full complement of equipment. The Iraqis start off doing basic soldiering, grow into support operations, and start taking alternate leads in military operations as they grow in maturity and experience as units. This is not rocket science (well maybe for the artillery battalions, it might be) but basic training methodology in any apprenticeship style program, military or civilian.

Like US battalions that arrive at status 1 and leave at status 2,3, or even 4, Iraqi battalions that are at status 1 are going to occasionally be downgraded because they use up equipment, their people will get tired and burned out just like US soldiers.

The major difference seems to be that we're throwing in a lot of 2s and rotating them out when they hit 3 or 4 for rest and refit and throw them back in when they hit 2. We do the same thing in the US but we rest and refit up to 1 because we can. We've got a sophisticated military tail that specializes in doing just that and most of it is in the continental US. The Iraqis haven't gotten to that level of logistical sophistication. That doesn't make their military useless.

The quality of leadership in Iraqi units, as far as I can tell, is governed by the iron law that it takes a lot longer to make a good general than it takes to make a good captain. We're apparently turning out lots of good junior and even some mid-grade officers through intensive training and mentoring. There's just not been enough time for those officers to mature into good senior officers. I'm not particularly unhappy that nobody's invented a time machine. I'm somewhat peeved that so many think that the lack of its invention is a failure (this may or may not include you as your comments were too general to figure out whether you are in this category).

As for Sunni presence in government being always charity based as far as the eye can see. That's something like saying that Green or FDP presence in FRG governments is charity based, pure nonsense. It's understandable if Shia bloc voting happens but that's really unlikely. The Shia have too many ambitious leaders and too few positions of power to satisfy them all in a monolithic bloc. They will fragment just like every other bloc like them has fragmented in parliamentary politics.

Since we are taking point in the majority of situations, it's understandable that we're going to take heavier fire. From what I understand, out of ~120 battalions, maybe 40 are good for serious combat operations right now with the rest being used lightly and trained up for more serious duty (guarding relatively secure areas is still useful as it frees up more capable forces). The wounded % discrepancy is probably due to less body armor resulting in more deaths to wounds among Iraqi forces.

As for Iraqi military casualties being so light because they won't fight, that seems to contradict (http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/johnrobb/2005/10/estimating_iraq.html) John Robb who was making the point, not too long ago, that the Iraqi military was taking large numbers of casualties. I'll let you argue it out with him further. In short, I think your figures are wrong.

Again, on Basra, you're mixing apples and oranges. The discussion, lest you forget, is about partially destroying infrastructure. In areas where the scenario doesn't play out, your observations are just not germane to the topic.

Marcello - I'm not aware of any such losses on the Iraqi government side. Who wasn't shooting in 2004 that is shooting now against the government and the Coalition?

[Adam]

TM.

"We're in disagreement on what Sistani did (I don't think his support was as formal as you characterize it for UIA in the last round and he *has* issued a statement that his name was attached too closely to certain parties, that this round he insists that no party claim his endorsement, and that he just wants a heavy turnout for the election for whatever party) and what he's doing. This is a factual error on one of our parts that'll come out in the wash. If I'm wrong, my analysis drawn from those facts is all wet. Are you willing to concede that if I have the facts right, that my analysis is reasonable?"

Fair enough. Some facts for you.

a) On December 23rd 2004 Sistani co-signed the UIA platform
b) Sistanis aides have said that they aren't supporting anyone other than the UIA (Friday 28th October 2005)
c) The defections are in the micro parties around the UIA leaving the big boys - Dawa, SCIRI, Virtue and the Sadrists. Thats enough right there for a 138 seat government by the way. Theres another 13 parties in the alliance.

The non-UIA Shi'ites represent a pro-Western businessmans side and frankly have no chance whatsoever. Chalabis INC are included in that bunch, which is why he's looking for funds and support in the US because without it he's out of power.

"This RFE/RL analysis of the lists (http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/11/45dd3b31-ade2-4567-a0b3-07c62735eb75.html) seems to indicate that UIA has fragmented/morphed. But what do they know?"

The short answer appears to be nothing. They are a propaganda arm of the US government and are reporting what the US would like to see - its all sweetness and light. I note that they don't mention that the UIA are certain to win the election and don't need the secularists, thats why they didn't offer them any sweeties this time.

"The US is taking the point because we've got the experience, the training and the full complement of equipment. The Iraqis start off doing basic soldiering, grow into support operations, and start taking alternate leads in military operations as they grow in maturity and experience as units."

Vietnamisation part 2. At the moment and for the forseeable future (forever) the US will run the operations and do the dying and the Iraqis won't. The casualty lists simply are there. I note that you haven't engaged with them at all beyond vague its "all in the happy place" kind of commentary.

"As for Sunni presence in government being always charity based as far as the eye can see. That's something like saying that Green or FDP presence in FRG governments is charity based, pure nonsense."

Except that in Germany theres not a majority ethnic bloc thats pretty much guaranteed a win in any election. Geramny's split roughly 50-50 which means that small parties are worthwhile. Iraq isn't, so the smaller parties are nothing.

"It's understandable if Shia bloc voting happens but that's really unlikely."

Except of course it has.

"The Shia have too many ambitious leaders and too few positions of power to satisfy them all in a monolithic bloc. They will fragment just like every other bloc like them has fragmented in parliamentary politics."

For right now they understand that if they win all the elections they get all the power. Maybe it'll fragment in a few years, maybe it won't. I'm predicting fragmentation , a nice solid civil war, or dictatorship by then so it won't matter.

"The wounded % discrepancy is probably due to less body armor resulting in more deaths to wounds among Iraqi forces."

How is the death to wound ratio relevant compared to the base number? Iraqis 25 deaths. US 93. Obvious statement: The US fought a lot more than Iraqis. Agree/Disagree? If you're arguing body armour then the US casualties should be a lot less for similar work, right?

"As for Iraqi military casualties being so light because they won't fight, that seems to contradict (http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/johnrobb/2005/10/estimating_iraq.html) John Robb who was making the point, not too long ago, that the Iraqi military was taking large numbers of casualties."

Sigh. OK. Basic reality 101. Robbs talking about the military and the police. I'm talking about the military. Police stay in places and don't run around with US soldiers. Military people attack places with US soldiers (well, supposedly). If you're looking for people to work with the US military you're looking at soldiers, not plods. I separated out the military/police casualties because of that fact. The police took a hundred dead this month - and the police take heavier casualties every month. They're easier to find, non-mobile, and don't live in US-defended barracks. Even so it still means that in October the Iraqi military took 25% of the police casualties, as well as 25% of the US military casualties.

" I'll let you argue it out with him further. In short, I think your figures are wrong."

Well the Iraqi government disagree. The figures were in Al-Hayat http://english.daralhayat.com/

I notice that you don't provide any alternative figures. In fact I note that you don't provide any links to your Pollyannish worldview. I repeat, its the numbers.

"Again, on Basra, you're mixing apples and oranges. The discussion, lest you forget, is about partially destroying infrastructure. In areas where the scenario doesn't play out, your observations are just not germane to the topic."

Your original point was that the insurgents weren't overruning police stations. My point is that they don't need to. I note that you're not engaging with that at all.

[Marcello]

"Marcello - I'm not aware of any such losses on the Iraqi government side. Who wasn't shooting in 2004 that is shooting now against the government and the Coalition?"

It was a general statement.I do not have a giant board with all the iraqi tribes names written on it and a with us/against us/neutral status indicator on the side.
And I bet neither the NYT.
But I will note that Al Sadr went from a non issue to the biggest headache of the month and then back to a non issue (for now at least).Such things are to be expected.
Then there are some little facts like the non decreasing coalition casualties or the very warm welcome which british troops got in Basra some time ago and many others little things.Taken collectively, they make you wonder if the enemies are actually defecting en masse to our side.

[Marcello]

"Like US battalions that arrive at status 1 and leave at status 2,3, or even 4, Iraqi battalions that are at status 1 are going to occasionally be downgraded because they use up equipment, their people will get tired and burned out just like US soldiers."

Which is all well and good but when are they going to be ready then if their readiness continues to be downgraded? By 2050?
"Ask me anything but time" someone said.
Besides are you sure that the issue is strictly logistical? They are light infantry battalions after all, not advancing tank armies.They should not need immense amount of supplies.If we cannot even replace in a timely manner or issue in first place stuff like some trucks, field kitchens,the basic medical equipment etc then I would say we have a problem.Unless of course the real issues are trust,units leadership (not generals),motivation,training and so on.Then the problem is a bigger one.
The NIA is better than what was available previously.However that does not equate good enough to accomplish the mission.Either they get a lot better soon or they will not need to get better at all.

[TM Lutas]

Adam - Sistani's being neutral does not conflict with Sistani not supporting parties other than UIA. I think that this is going to lower the UIA vote totals and perhaps enlarge some of the departing UIA party vote totals. We'll see come election time.

You're right that I didn't offer alternative figures. I was googling for some and found the contradictory claim that the Iraqis were dropping like flies (and thus were losing) played so well against your claim that the Iraqis aren't dying enough (and thus were losing) to be too delicious to pass up. All theories welcome, I guess, as long as they erode the western will to fight on.

Finally, on Basra, I'm not engaging because it's not on point to the discussion. Basra isn't subject to the types of attacks in the original thread, therefore, whatever charlie foxtrots are going on there are irrelevant to the question at hand; is the phenomenon described in the original post accurately describing what's going on in Iraq?

Marcello - Please don't put words in my mouth. I'm claiming that there's progress and you turn it into an much harder to defend claim of mass defections to our side. If I were to look at the question of pacing, I'd say it's slow, steady progress with conversion occuring at least as much by jihadi attempts at imposing Wahabbi/Taliban style sharia than by US diplomacy. What cannot be underestimated is how loathesome the ideology of the other side is even to a great many of their putative co-religionists.

As for the ratings, I'm sure that logistics isn't the only reason that battalions are downgraded. If they're driving out in thin-skinned pickup trucks in the morning, a '1' rated squad, may be a '2' by evening when their pickup comes staggering back in barely under its own power after a vigorous day's combat patrol complete with bullets flying.

I've seen pictures of some of the Iraqi rides. They move but they're obviously not as durable as US military grade.

I disagree that we're in the end-game here. The Iraqi forces need merely improve enough so that US draw downs in troop strength do not reverse progress. They're going to have to hold the line for awhile as we get our own forces back up and hopefully get some Potomac spine implantation going.

[Marcello]

"Please don't put words in my mouth. I'm claiming that there's progress and you turn it into an much harder to defend claim of mass defections to our side."

Admittedly I was a bit sarcastic.The point essentially was that if such progress actually exists it has yet to manifest itself in practice.When we will see coalition casualties decrease due to a steady reduction in the number of attacks, infrastructure restored in a meaningful way and so on then we will be able to speak about real progress.Trends are what matters.
Even in a losing war there will still be succesful counterattacks and local victories.That however does not change the strategic picture.A guerrilla war may be further misleading if one attempts to measure it with the same parameters of a conventional conflict.

"The Iraqi forces need merely improve enough so that US draw downs in troop strength do not reverse progress."

Well they obviously they aren't.We are unable to equip them adequately,among the others things,exactly like we are unable to repair the infrastructure of the country in an effective manner.

"They're going to have to hold the line for awhile as we get our own forces back up and hopefully get some Potomac spine implantation going."

Politics 101, supporting a war that the public opinion does not may endanger you political career.Now one may whine and moan about backstabbing politicians and the evil media as long as he wishes but as long as the USA remains a democracy of sort the public opinion will have some say on the matter.And the support for the war among the public opinion is overall declining.Check the polls.In order to change that your spine implantantion program will have to increase considerably in scope.
The nature of the political process gives us some strict deadlines,ensuring that we do not have ten years and not even five.

[Marcello]

To elaborate further,the final deadline is the next presidential election.Some time before that the public opinion will have to be convinced that we are winning the war.
Tribe x switched to our side or two additional category 1 NIA battalions will not do the trick.A steady, substantial reduction in american casualties for a prolonged period of time would be the minimum.If we can start to patch Iraq in a serious manner that would be a very strong plus.Short of that we will be out because that is the direction the american political situation is pointing towards.

" If they're driving out in thin-skinned pickup trucks in the morning, a '1' rated squad, may be a '2' by evening when their pickup comes staggering back in barely under its own power after a vigorous day's combat patrol complete with bullets flying.

I've seen pictures of some of the Iraqi rides. They move but they're obviously not as durable as US military grade."

Obviously they should not be driving in those deathtraps in first place.But they are because armored cars are in such high demand and only a pathetically small number can be spared for them.The same goes for the armor plates for bullet proof vests.Since the US forces do most of the fighting that is an unfortunate necessity.

[TM Lutas]

Marcello - The progress manifests itself just fine. The reporting of that progress could use a lot of work.

This difference in perception (or reality) of progress is foundational. If the progress is there, unreported, US draw downs (we both agree that they're coming) will slow the expansion of secured areas but the insurgency will continue to have fewer and fewer places to hide. If, however, the police force really is rotten and controlled from within by the insurgency, the insurgents will simply go to ground and repeatedly pop up in the "held" areas (as in clear and hold) to make new mischief and provoke repeated "clearing" operations that don't actually reliably clear the area. I haven't seen that happen recently (there are some earlier examples of it happening) so i strongly suspect that the Iraqi police aren't as infiltrated as some commentors here make them out to be, at least not in 2005.

I think that most of the Congress realizes that Congress, with their precipitous aid cutoff, doomed South Vietnam. I don't think that they want to repeat that sad chapter in our history. We certainly paid for that bad planning in lives, influence, and treasure in the decade after. The nature of our involvement in Iraq will change over the next ten years. I suspect that we'll still be holding mentoring classes and joint training sessions a decade from now unless we really decide to hold a charlie foxtrot.

[Marcello]

"I suspect that we'll still be holding mentoring classes and joint training sessions a decade from now"

If there will still be a pro westwern iraqi government, no doubts about that.That's a huge if however.

"If the progress is there, unreported, US draw downs (we both agree that they're coming) will slow the expansion of secured areas but the insurgency will continue to have fewer and fewer places to hide. If, however, the police force really is rotten and controlled from within by the insurgency, the insurgents will simply go to ground and repeatedly pop up in the "held" areas (as in clear and hold) to make new mischief and provoke repeated "clearing" operations that don't actually reliably clear the area. I haven't seen that happen recently (there are some earlier examples of it happening) so i strongly suspect that the Iraqi police aren't as infiltrated as some commentors here make them out to be, at least not in 2005."

I am not sure if I am following you but I will make some considerations.Would you say that Paradise square was "cleared and held"?
That has not stopped the troublemakers from attempting a big coup.It depends on what those words means on the ground.
An area that we have nominally cleared (and left to local corrupt forces closing both eyes) may be a perfect base for operations
carried out elsewhere while the area itself remains without trouble.Von Dach, among the others, prescribed this strategy for guerrillas.I am not saying that this must absolutely be case but this is an alternative possible exaplanation that popped in my mind.
If I saw the american casualties etc going down I would of course tend to agree more with your hypothesis.

[TM Lutas]

Marcello - Somebody will be holding mentoring classes because the officers and soldiers know that they suck at the high level stuff. They've seen what can be done and won't be satisfied with a return of the status quo ante of being a professional joke in the world rankings. They'll have the money to get trainers in from somewhere. They're likely to be american, or american model trainers because they know the US model works.

Help me out about the coup thing, which is used both in its general sense and as a term of art with a specific meaning. What coup?

Here's a useful letter from a combatant come home:
http://www.claytoncramer.com/weblog/2005_11_06_archive.html#113167945203007713

--start quote--
Who are the bad guys?:

Most of the carnage is caused by the Zarqawi Al Qaeda group. They operate mostly in Anbar province (Fallujah and Ramadi). These are mostly "foreigners", non-Iraqi Sunni Arab Jihadists from all over the Muslim world (and Europe). Most enter Iraq through Syria (with, of course, the knowledge and complicity of the Syrian govt.) , and then travel down the "rat line" which is the trail of towns along the Euphrates River that we've been hitting hard for the last few months. Some are virtually untrained young Jihadists that often end up as suicide bombers or in "sacrifice squads". Most, however, are hard core terrorists from all the usual suspects (Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas etc.) These are the guys running around murdering civilians en masse and cutting heads off. The Chechens (many of whom are Caucasian), are supposedly the most ruthless and the best fighters. (they have been fighting the Russians for years). In the Baghdad area and south, most of the insurgents are Iranian inspired (and led) Iraqi Shiites. The Iranian Shiia have been very adept at infiltrating the Iraqi local govt.'s, the police forces and the Army. The have had a massive spy and agitator network there since the Iran-Iraq war in the early 80's. Most of the Saddam loyalists were killed, captured or gave up long ago.
--end quote--
This is an interesting quote that lends support to multiple posters on this thread. the Iranian Shia networks are confirmed and the infiltrations are really happening. I maintain that where the Iranians are active, the network destruction isn't happening. So while this is important from a geopolitical sense, it's not so important in a thread sense.

--start quote--
The Iraqis are a mixed bag. Some fight well, others aren't worth a []. Most do okay with American support. Finding leaders is hard, but they are getting better. It is widely viewed that Zarqawi's use of suicide bombers, en masse, against the civilian population was a serious tactical mistake. Many Iraqis were galvanized and the caliber of recruits in the Army and the police forces went up, along with their motivation. It also led to an exponential increase in good intel because the Iraqis are sick of the insurgent attacks against civilians. The Kurds are solidly pro-American and fearless fighters.
--end quote--

Again, food for thought all around. There's some Iraqis who apparently are worthless as fighters. According to the guy on the ground, they're a minority. There are really competent Iraqis who have their act very much together, another minority. The majority is in the middle but improving. This means that the longer we delay draw down, the better the odds that the majority middle group will get their act together.

final quote
--start quote--
Fun fact: The enemy death toll is supposedly between 45-50 thousand. That is why we're seeing less and less infantry attacks and more IED, suicide bomber [].
The new strategy is simple: attrition.
--end quote--
Being honest, I hadn't thought we killed that many. Did any of you?

[Ada,]

TM,

The coup thing is mine. Its a matter of historical fact that, in Iraq, from 1936 to 1941 seven military coups occured. A short period of stability (jumping over little things like military occupation in WW2, the 1948 war against Israel, the 1954 dissolution of all political parties...) ended in 1958. The 1958 coup saw the Royal Family eliminated and a rejection of the League of Nations settlement (a decision which would cause Kuwait some issues later). Interestingly its also the first Islamic coup, beating the Iranian Revolution by 21 years.

In the ten years between 1958 and 1968 Iraq enjoyed the delights of three coups, and five national governments. Thats roughly a new government every 2 years.

The Baathist party came to power in a military coup in 1968 (the military quickly giving power to the civilians, of which Sadaam was one). This was the last coup because the military worked closely with the civilians, to the point of voluntarily handing power over to them. This isn't to say that coups stopped being attempted, they merely stopped succeeding, with an example being the Communist coup of 1973, or the anti-Sadaam coup of 1979.

I think we can agree that coups are rather more common in Iraq than elections. We can also agree that the military officers of Iraq know some history. It must occur to them that there is advantage to them personally in a coup, provided that they can ride the tiger. Plus they would be far more useful rulers to the US than the next elected one. Therefore the probability is that a coup will be attempted in the lifetime of the next government. Whether it succeeds or not depends on the religious groups, the US and Iran.

[Marcello]

"Help me out about the coup thing, which is used both in its general sense and as a term of art with a specific meaning. What coup?"

I used the term coup referring to the attack on the Palestine Hotel as described in in Robb's post.I was not referring to a coup d'état.

"Being honest, I hadn't thought we killed that many. Did any of you?"

Given the firepower available I would not be surprised to see that we have killed 10-20 or so of "them" for each of us.You can compare the number of Vietnamese killed to that of american soldiers and do the math.
How many of those "them" were insurgents rather than military age men in the wrong place at the wrong time is far trickier question.
I can believe that we have killed that many people, less sure how many of them were the right ones.

"The new strategy is simple: attrition."

That is a very dangerous mindset to enter in a guerrilla war with.
The vietnamese lost many more people that the USA.And yet they won.
To my understanding the french had largely neutralized the opposition in Algeria.But they had to give up.I could go on for quite a while.

A guerrilla war cannot be reduced to a big match where if we score more than the enemy, our team wins.There are a variety of others factors to consider.

"That is why we're seeing less and less infantry attacks and more IED, suicide bomber"

Why would you use infantry attacks why the IEDs, which have got better (with the introduction of shaped charges etc), are more cost effective?
They may be running out of people.Or they may be allocating their resources more effectively.If I saw a steady decline in the number attacks against the coalition and their effectiviness, as well a decline in sabotages etc then I would lean towards the former.

In my book the NIA has got better.And in my book the insurgency has got better too, based on a series of parameters (sophistication, casualties inflicted etc).

[marcello]

To recapitulate.
The NIA is an improvement on what came before (ING etc).They are more professional, they desert less and so on.
They are probably getting better but, as far as I see it, in a: one step forward, two steps back and then maybe after a while two steps forward fashion.
The enemy is ruthless and sophisticated.They have made several mistakes but, I would argue, fewer than us.
The american political situation makes mantaining substantial amount of american soldiers in Iraq past 2008, absent strong positive development, difficult at the best.
If the things stay as they are now, even that may be in doubt.
That means that the NIA has to get a lot better.Can they do that? I do not believe so.
Can I be wrong? Well It has already happened before.

[Adam]

"Given the firepower available I would not be surprised to see that we have killed 10-20 or so of "them" for each of us"

Marcello,

Just to point out that on casualty ratios I'd hesitate to say 20 to one, or even 10 to one. Van Creveld notes (2002, 360) that in Lebanon the ratio of casualties in 1995 was 1 Israeli to 5 anti-Israeli insurgents (that is to say actual gunmen, not civilians). This dropped in between 1995 and 2000 to just over 1:1. This is a distubing trend as it appears to have spread into Palastine. In a 2-week long gun battle in Jenin on the West Bank in April 2002 an Israeli assault against an unknown number of guerillas lost 22 soldiers to 30 guerillas (and 22 civilians) dead.

If the Israelis didn't get a high kill ratio in an area they had occupied for years, with all the attendant advantages that brings, there's no reason to assume that the Americans in Iraq did or will. Neither is it safe to assume that the ratio in Iraq won't go down.

[Marcello]

"(that is to say actual gunmen, not civilians)."

That is why I said:

"How many of those "them" were insurgents rather than military age men in the wrong place at the wrong time is far trickier question"

Nervous soldiers at a roadblock + one unlucky iraqi in his car who makes a small mistake = one more dead insurgent for the Pentagon

When you start to use artillery and bombers on urban areas people will die.That is the nature of things.Maybe I am wrong but I get the impression that the israelis do not rely on indirect fire as the americans do.
Therefore I can believe that we have killed that many people as the Pentagon says.The number of actual insurgents might indeed be far lower.

[Adam]

Marcello,

I do apologise, I simply misunderstood.

You are quite correct - body counts are notoriously difficult, particularly when "attrition" is the objective. I'd also agree that this comes from pressure on a unit to perform which makes the definition of an enemy more flexible to the point that being Vietnamese (or Iraqi) becomes sufficient to count the corpse as a terrorist.

I noted earlier that the October 2005 casualty lists had: 93 US, 83 Ministry of Interior paramilitary police and 25 Iraqi soldiers killed for a total of 201 dead, against 282 "insurgents" killed. Even if we assume that all the "insurgents" were actually insurgents thats frighteningly near 1:1 (or a still bad - but perhaps more acceptable - 3:1 if only US troops are counted). And, as you noted, it doesn't take much to make an insurgent in US definitions.

[Marcello]

I remember an accident that it had happened in the sunni triangle, where an armored convoy had been ambushed.The military announced proudly that quite a lot of the enemies had been killed in action.
Unfortunately the enemy must have managed to accomplish the non trivial feat of dragging away tens of corpses while under autocannon fire because no remains of such bloodbath were found.
Then somewhere else a 155mm round falls on a house where a familiy is hiding from the a battle.
So in the end the math might find some balance, sort of.

[TM Lutas]

Regarding coups, one of the useful aspects of our intervention in Iraq may very well be that we will infect some of the Iraqi military with our disdain for coups. I was aware that Iraq had a large number of coups in its past but nothing recent (ie, post Saddam). May that new trend continue.

I agree that pure attrition is a bad attitude to have in an insurgency. I posted the quotes not because it was entirely to my liking but because it was authentic and seemed to expose how detached the mainstream media accounts are from what the soldiers on the ground are seeing.

I think that it's undeniable that somebody's being lied to and this is a large source of our differing analysis over what's going on and what's going to happen in future.

I do believe that you're losing track of your own argument if you don't see how destructive IED and suicide bomber attacks are for the insurgency. It was impossible to deny in Jordan with the hotel bombings but the same anger, the same outrage are pretty evident to me in Iraq. The insurgency can't fight infantry style and they are destroying their own chance for winning by using suicide bombers and IEDs.

[Marcello]

"The insurgency can't fight infantry style and they are destroying their own chance for winning by using suicide bombers and IEDs."

I think you are making a mistake here, in the sense that you are confounding weapons and their targets.An IED and a suicide bomber are weapons, which can be used against variety of targets, raging from military convoys to civilian crowds.
In themselves they are not more prone to generate collateral casualties than many weapons the coalition is using, like medium artillery or bombers.Furthermore being around an infantry firefight is not healthy for a civilian either.A RPG or a coalition antitank grenade which have missed their intended targets are not going to ask permission before blowing up the side of an house.The same for bullets and shrapnel before entering bodies and so on.
So I would argue that the issue is targets.
An IED aimed against a coalition convoy may kill some civilians, as it has happened many times.So one of our artillery barrages.Why should we expect that locals should forget the latter? Just because we write them off as a collateral damage?
Civilians IMHO are more likely to excuse these things if done by locals rather than by foreigners.
Then there is the issue of attacks specifically aimed against the civilian population.Here I believe you would have a very strong case IF we had played our cards smartly.In that case the insurgency would indeed have very strong chances of alienating the population.Unfortunately we have not played well our cards.The outrage for a terrorist attack against civilians might get lost between being humiliated at at checkpoint and a picute of Linnie England.
Furthermore just because there is no all out civil war now that does not mean that there will not be one.

[Marcello]

The anger caused by the attacks against crowds and such works for us as long as it is directed against the insurgency as a whole and it translates into support for the government and the Coalition.
If the people think "it's the government fault because it cannot keep security", or "it's only the fault of the foreign fighters, not our guys" or finally "let's go out to hunt some sunnis" then it will not work for us.

[davod]

There was a time when people kept things to themselves or within government. Now, everyone has a great desire to tell the ignorant ones among us how to win a war or in the case of the above article - how the enemy can win.

I don't care if you think the enemy has already caught on to your thesis. Some of them might not have.

Lawrence did not write a treatise on how win a gurrila war then publish it for all to read. He waited until the war was over. All of WWI, not just his part of the war.

[Davod]

PS: How many of your avid readers and commentators ask questions so they can fill in the blanks and act upon your work.

[aidendmam]

Hello.
I do not discern what to say not far from this ...

P.S. I need to say that - globalguerrillas.typepad.com perfect ridiculous Web resource!