THE CONTROLLED CHAOS EXIT FROM IRAQ

The United States is losing the moral conflict with Iraq's guerrillas. The US President's support among Americans has dropped to the lowest levels since Richard Nixon and opposition groups are becoming more strident and popular. Opposition calls for a rapid withdrawal from Iraq are now supported by a near majority of Americans. The development of these non-cooperative centers of gravity is due to the propagation of the following factors of moral conflict:

• Uncertainty. Can we leave in five years or next year? Is the Iraqi government worth fighting for? Will Iraqi troops ever be good enough to fight on their own? Is the insurgency growing or collapsing?
• Menace. Will US troops continue to die at the current high rate? Will the conflict devolve into a civil war with US troops caught in the middle? Will the conflict spread?
• Mistrust. Did Bush lie about the reasons for going to war? Are the Democrats playing politics with the war? Is the opposition treasonous?

Isolation Drives Vulnerability to Moral Conflict
The decline in US moral cohesion is a natural consequence of the isolation of US decision makers from the external reference environment. Instead of making connections, we severed them (for a complete analysis of why this occurred, read my earlier brief on "Boyd on al Qaeda's Grand Strategy"). This isolation (across mental, physical, and moral vectors) drove:

• Bad decision making. The willingness to accept flawed intelligence on Iraq's WMD capabilities. The failure to stop the looting after the invasion. The decision to disband the Iraqi military. The failure to send enough troops.
• Ad hoc planning and strategy development. The lack of a plan to win the peace in the Iraq. The plethora of different military plans since then: build Sunni militias (Fallujah), stability for elections and a political solutions, aggressive counter-insurgent sweeps, clear-and-hold (oil-spots), etc.
• False or corrupt internal dialogues. An internal: Are you with us or against us? Democracy throughout the Middle East was the real goal of the US invasion. This is another Vietnam.

The Controlled Chaos Exit
The end result of this break-down in moral cohesion will be the following:

• A withdrawal within the next three years. The inevitable result of a collapse in US moral cohesion is a quick withdrawal. The pressure to leave will only increase.
• A reliance on "loyalist" paramilitaries. Despite the claims that Iraqi troops are capable of independent action, they aren't. While some few may be able to lead an engagement, they don't have any of the support systems necessary to sustain an army in the field (from medical to supply to air power). This support capability won't emerge before we leave since it takes many years to develop. This means that we will rely on Shiite and Kurdish paramilitaries to enforce the peace (we got a taste of what that means when the US raided the Badr Brigade's/Interior Ministry's torture chambers in November).
• The collapse of the Iraqi state and the spread of the conflict. The withdrawal of US forces will cause the Iraqi state to split. The Kurds will be the first to leave. An independent Kurdish state will inflame regional tensions through the activation of guerrilla groups in Turkey, Iran, and Syria. A slow burning war between Shiites and Sunnis will draw in regional powers and cause substantial instability in the Gulf Monarchies with large Shia populations. Finally, as Iraq's global guerrillas return home from the Iraqi training grounds, they will bring disruption with them.

Comments

[Hakim Hazim]

This is a provocative assessment of what is currently taking place and what is likely to take place in the near future. I am assuming you see that some of the tenets of the Wienberger doctrine have been ignored. What I would like to see is other people’s take on the Wienberger doctrine and its relevance to the Iraq Invasion and future wars.

Here are the 6 tenets:

1. The United States should not commit forces to combat unless the vital national interests of the United States or its allies are involved.
2. U.S. troops should only be committed wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. Otherwise, troops should not be committed.
3. U.S. combat troops should be committed only with clearly defined political and military objectives and with the capacity to accomplish those objectives.
4. The relationship between the objectives and the size and composition of the forces committed should be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.
5. U.S. troops should not be committed to battle without a "reasonable assurance" of the support of U.S. public opinion and Congress.
6. The commitment of U.S. troops should be considered only as a last resort

I’ve said all along that democratic idealism or democratic peace theory was the ideological impetus behind the invasion. WMD arguments certainly aroused fear and created a green light for the invasion, but sagacity and the Wienberger doctrine were missing. The fruit of the invasion is starting to show and Pandora's box is open.

[Adam]

John,

3 years before a full US pullout is looking a little optimistic. That would take us to 2008. The UK is talking about pulling out in 2006 (other coalition members are leaving as we speak with Bulgaria's 400 troops are currently packing up for December). Without the South being covered by the British, the North, especially Bagdhad, becomes untenable whenever the Shi'ites decide.

At the same time its notable that most US National Guard units have been used to their contractual limits, and recruitment in the US military overall has collapsed. This creates a critical resource crunch in the US infantry which has been filled - to an extent - by pulling Air Force and Navy personnel into infantry roles, but using technical specialists as cannon fodder is incredibly expensive. The fact that its happening at all is a sign of desperation, on the order of the arming of the clerks at Chosin Resevoir. In short the US cannot cover the loss of the UK troops, neither can they find more, so they are out of options.

This leaves the US an awkward choice and the most likely option is to pull out as much as possible now (by the US elections in 2006 ideally) and leave a "fire brigade" of professionals in Kuwait to support whoever the US wants to win the civil war. The problem is that this solution means that it appears that Kuwait, Jordan and Saudi Arabia are "in play", probably from mid-2006 onwards.

[TM Lutas]

I can understand the post but it's an incredibly inapt first sentence that made me struggle with the rest of the article. The idea that anybody worth taking seriously thinks this bunch of war criminals comprising the Iraqi insurgency has any moral standing is a joke.

[John Robb]

TM, moral conflict is about who gains the moral high ground first (although that can help). It is about maintaining moral cohesion in the face of uncertainty, menace, and mistrust.

[brainfart]

> The idea that anybody worth taking seriously
> thinks this bunch of war criminals comprising
> the Iraqi insurgency has any moral standing is a joke.

The idea that anybody with an IQ above room temperature thought that the locals would welcome an invasion force with flowers and confetti after they killed half a million of their cildren is a sick joke. It's equally a joke when people talk about "THE insurgency", totally disregarding the thousands of reasons that causes normal average Iraqi people to take up arms against the invaders. I'd rather call them 'la résistance' since their fight, for a large part, is justified and was to be expected.

[dan]

The moral high ground is the cheapest real estate in the world.

I think that JR is largely correct in this analysis, but there is one vital aspect missing.

The Bush administration invaded Iraq with the intention of establishing a permanent military presence, with a permissive Iraqi government in place, that would enable it to continue the base-line strategy of reshaping the Middle East into conformity with US imperatives. I have yet to see any conclusive repudiation of this goal from the Bush administration; and I am dubious of the ability of the US Congress to force the hand on this point, even after a presumptive Democratic advance in the 2006 elections.

So the stay-the-course rhetoric will continue to dominate the discourse. We have seen drawdowns in US military forces take place already: in early 2004 the complement reduced to about 105,000; today it is between 150,000 and 170,000. This is the entropy of occupation that dictates that the US must commit ever more manpower, resources and firepower to simply stand still. If the Iraqi forces could function as a balancing item in the equation then it would be possible for the US forces to reduce - the fact that after 30 months, and endless delusional pronouncements from Rumsfeld and Co that there are hundreds of thousands of Iraqi forces coming on line, there has been no discernible decrease in the violence suggests that the insurgency is liable to achieve its goal of asserting de facto sovereignty over Anbar, Salah-ad-Din & Ninawah provinces if US force levels decline. Now I don't know how much longer the US can maintain its current force levels in Iraq - the logic of exhaustion suggests that it will have to reduce to some extent in 2006, but this will come at the price of a loss of control on the ground somewhere.

As regards the possibility of a UK pullout - there is a great deal of smoke and mirrors regarding this. The MoD has been leaking pullout scenarios like crazy for most of this year - the net result has actually been an increase in UK troops from its low point of 8,000.

FWIW, the pace of deployments in Iraq, UK committments elsewhere and the upcoming operations in Afghanistan, coupled with our own recruitment and retention crisis ( we don't have a stop-loss system to paper over the holes ) are causing serious strains. However, UK forces, whilst not actively engaged on the ground in the same way as US forces, fulfill an absolutely vital strategic function as the gatekeeper for the US logistics chain from Kuwait. I have always assumed that UK forces would be amongst the last to leave.

[jclavijo]

Paradoxicalally, the USA has turned Irak in a failed state. If the justification is that "we must be" to fight the terrorism, the recontruction of a state in Irak is a deceit. This scene has not eliminated the violence.

If United States troops won't leave Irak after the celebration of the legislative elections, everything will be a double deceit.

It is logical to think the construction of a state in Irak is going to serve to fight insurgency by himself.

[user]

The poster dan raises some very interesting points which complement the initial views well; I too agree with John's analysis.

[Ryan]

I remember the Kurdish leadership declaring that stability in Baghdad is in the best interests of Southern Kurdistan, the OP also seems to neglect the fact that millions of Kurds live in Baghdad alone, and that the Kurds leaving the Iraqi state is quite laughable in the foreseeable future.

As for the Shia, they have a sizeable bloc within their own ranks which opposes the splitting up of the Iraqi state, which is coincided with the Sunnis who also detest the break up of Iraq.

As for the Iraqi Army being a joke and being made up of a ragtag milita, you are clearly mistaken. No one joins a militia at the rate of 1000 per week. This is frankly rubbish.

[John Robb]

Dan, that is why I gave it three years. The President may gut this out at great expense to his party and national cohesion. It won't survive his presidency.

Ryan. Millions of Kurds do not live in Baghdad. There is almost unanimity within Kurdistan that it should be independent. The most vociferous advocates of an intact Iraq in the Shia bloc is Sadr. Not much to rest US hopes on. Recruitment rates have nothing to do with the quality of the force. The Iraqi army doesn't has zero in regards to support infrastructure necessary for a true army. As a result, it is by definition a militia.

[Adam]

John,

Today's comments from the Iraqi Interior minister imply that US troops will be leaving sooner than 2008, and pushed out by non-Americans at that.

'U.S.-led forces should able to leave Iraq by the end of next year, saying the one-year extension of the mandate for multinational force in Iraq by the U.N. Security Council earlier this month could be the last. "By mid next year we will be 75 percent done in building our forces and by the end of next year it will be fully ready," he told the Arab satellite station Al-Jazeera.'

http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/1107AP_Egypt_Iraq_Conference.html

Removal of the US troops from Iraq was a major part of the Shi'ite platform in the last elections, and will be again in December. After that its a just quick hop to the civil war with the Shi'ites certain that they can win as they have 60 battalions of troops at least, yet ignoring the fact that the Saudis have every reason not to want them to win.

[Boghie]

John,

It is my opinion that the Middle East is where our military should be. Where else, PTA meetings in Kansas, Oktoberfest in Germany, visiting Shinto temples in Japan, or drinking beer in England and Australia… Iraq is the key to bisecting the crescent of militant Islam – not Guam.

In Iraq, we are now in a clear and hold strategy – differing from the hit and strike strategy of earlier this year. Iraqis and Americans are holding choke points along the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. There is no ‘Islamic Republic of Qaim’. That Republic didn’t even last as long as the French Second Republic… I think it is now obvious that the al Qaeda stronghold will, shall we say, have to move around a bit.

So we will be able to draw down as the Iraqi military stands up. I think I could place quotes around that – seems I have heard it somewhere (even before Mawkish Murtha presented the Democratic plan of retreating to another continent, looking quite scary, and promising to attack again if someone yells ‘Danger, Will Robinson’)… Right now the Iraqi military has about 220,000 troops in the field – with about 80,000 trained to Level II and I. That number is growing every month. Level III units are developing into Level II. Level IV units are developing into Level III. Soon, Iraq will reach its end state goal of 270,000 troops. Thus, even with a draw down of 70,000 American soldiers and Marines we are talking about 350,000 American trained troops stationed in Iraq. As the mid-level NCOs and Officers gain experience, and further their training, the situation will become even more bleak to the hold outs, terrorists, and state sponsors of terrorism in the region.

I think that will be the end state. With that many American trained forces, we could actually blockade Iran under UN sanction. Syria is currently marginalized and will be more so. We could offer Realpolitik Europe and Asia a viable alternative to purchasing Iranian oil. We could force Iran and Syria to defend their borders (North, East, West, and South) and thus drain resources from their nuke, WMD, and terror funds.

Iraq is the key to bisecting the crescent of militant Islam – not Okinawa. We will not, or should not, leave unless Iraq tells us to do so – as the Philippines did a decade ago. Based on the 403 to 3 vote against Mawkish Murtha’s proposal I think it is clear where the American public is – regardless of opinion polls.

Note: Adam, are you stating that 60 'battalions' of Shi'ite is in any way comperable to trained military forces?

[Adam]

Boghie

No. Those 60 battalions (According to Peter Galbraith, actual strength, who knows?) As of September 2005 the actual strength was around 700, but even so imagining them advancing under fire from anything more dangerous than a sharpened pineapple would need a neo-con level of dreaminess. Its the US administration, not the Pentagon that has issued these latest numbers. Which I think you'll agree is an interesting situation. There is, to date, no sign that the Iraqi military are taking casualties (and plenty that the Iraqi police are). To date in November 78 US troops died, 36 Iraqi soldiers died (and I'm including an Intelligence official and 3 colonels separately assasinated - arguably it could be less). Iraqi police are roughly half the number of Iraqi military yet take 3 times the casualties. Over a hundred Iraqi police were killed. US troops are half the number of Iraqi military and take twice the casualties. Why? There is only one possible conclusion, isn't there? The US is fighting and the Iraqis aren't. Last month there was no sign that the Iraqi military were fighting either. Nor is there this month.

http://icasualties.org/oif/IraqiDeaths.aspx

Global Security have some interesting numbers showing the massive shortfall in numbers (never mind the quality):

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/iraq-corps3.htm

In short the Iraqi military are worthless against any people with guns and there aren't enough of them.

On the other hand the troops the US are training will make fine rapists, murderers, and thieves against civilians and political organisations that the new government wishes to destroy. This level of military competence will suit the new government adequately. You'll note that the iraqi military has been slow to build up mechanised forces (Sudan gets tanks delivered faster - and they're under UN embargo - 60 T-64s (?) from Iran along with Chinese helicopters and Belgian light infantry weapons over the last year). This is fascinating because a) mechanised forces have historically been the only useful ones in Iraq and b) they're the ones most likely to take over. In short the Iraqi government doesn't want a useful military. The current Iraqi military are only intended as an instrument of social control, ethnic cleansing, and social engineering. Bluntly you can get scrapings from anywhere in the world and do the same.

My original point is that these units are tempting to politicians (who count rifles). Politicians have a long habit of overreaching themselves and that there are a lot of players in the game at this stage, of which Saudi and Iran are the main players. And if this sounds like complete chaos beckons, you'd be right.

http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200512/iraq-army

It becoming increasingly clear that the current US plan is to declare the Iraqi's trained and then run for the door. Not since Paul Bremer treated Iraqi sovereignty like a live hand grenade has a handover run in quote the same way. This would be the basis of the Controlled Chaos Exit Solution (CCES). Or as I prefer to call it the 30 years war bloodbath solution. But then I'm not as gifted at management speak as John is. In the name that he's developed CCES has that combination of banality and inhumanity that just screams "Pentagon Powerpoint Slide".

As for the rest of your point not since Vietnam have so many Americans poured so much emotional energy into the maps and flowcharts to so little avail. I thought that the days of declaring hamlets "cleared" had ended. Guess not.

[Boghie]

Adam,

Your GlobalSecurity post dates from October 2004, and dovetails nicely to my more current sources. I have them noted in the reference section of a post I made in mid October:

http://boghieonyoursix.blogspot.com/2005/10/oh-bla-di-oh-bla-da.html

or, if you don't want to review it from there:

http://billroggio.com/archives/2005/10/training_the_ir_1.php

http://63.247.134.60/~pobbs/archives/001865iraqi_troop_strength.html

Note, that the chart referenced in the SecurityWatchTower post had the same count you mentioned for October 2004 - the date used in your GlobalSecurity link. SecurityWatchTower provided a more recent chart illustrating the numbers I stated.

However, an awful lot can happen in a year. For example:

The River War: http://belmontclub.blogspot.com/2004/11/river-war-fallujah-battle-which-is.html

http://belmontclub.blogspot.com/2004/11/river-war-2-at-least-one-set-of-people.html

or, if you prefer, the Anbar Campaign:
http://multimedia.threatswatch.org/2005/11/anbar-campaign-october-2005

more generally:

http://www.billroggio.com
http://www.fallbackbelmontclub.blogspot.com
http://www.securitywatchtower.com

have a number of posts regarding what some called 'The River Wars' in November 2004 and others now call 'The Anbar Campaign'

Finally, in a clear and hold campaign it is the police forces that hold. Regardless, reading later articles in the GlobalSecurity website makes it clear that there is very little distinction in Iraq between military and police forces. That is why the Iraq Casualty site combines them. This was discussed in detail at 'The Belmont Club', 'The Fourth Rail', and 'SecurityWatchTower'. Early discussion on this topic are more than a year old...

More link love would be confusing. There has been an enormous amount of discussion on the readiness and activity of the Iraqi forces over the past 18 months on those sites - and not all of it pleasant.

BTW Adam, thank you for the link to Iraqi casualties. I have used the site as a source, but did not delve into the whole thing...

But, I want to infuriate everybody here so:
http://boghieonyoursix.blogspot.com/2005/11/winning-war-on-terror.html

I very much enjoy this site, and the author and commenters are top rate... Anyone who reads this long winded response deserves a beer on me...

[Ben Love]

From today's New York Times: "The administration must realize it needs a real exit strategy, because it's advertising for one. The U.S. Agency for International Development is offering more than $1 billion for anyone - anyone at all - who can come up with a plan to pacify and rebuild 10 Iraqi cities seen as vital in the war."