CLEAR AND HOLD?

The current US approach in Iraq is to clear areas of insurgent activity and hold them to prevent their return. This is a redux of a 20th Century counter-insurgency method called oil spots (a variant is strategic hamlets). The idea is to tightly control select areas and return them to a vestige of normal life (under the assumption that this is what the people the vast majority of people in those areas want). As a method for achieving the articulated strategy for Iraq, it is markedly flawed. Some flaws in this approach can be seen in the recent history of Ramadi and Fallujah, both of which are currently being 'held' by US forces:

• Attacks against Americans continue. 34 US troops have died in Ramadi since September. There are ongoing battles for control of the central roads (which are essential US supply routes). 11 Marines recently died from an IED blast on the outskirts of Fallujah.
• An open source insurgency exists in both cities with multiple Iraqi groups operating in concert. In Ramadi, al Qaeda has moved to a support, training, and financing role.
• The city has a robust and competitive market for violence. Both cities have 50% + unemployment. The current market price for violence are only $200 for the death of an American and $50 to emplace an IED.

The flaws with 'clear and hold'

As we see in Ramadi and Fallujah, even areas 'held' by US troops are still being contested. This points to problems with 'clear and hold' -- it was originally designed to fight rural insurgencies of the 20th Century, which means it will be difficult to apply to the current environment of ethnic/religious fragmentation, urban environments, and global guerrilla methods. Additionally, the current plan is complex because it is being combined with a draw down in the US presence (to reduce opposition to the war in both Iraq and the US). The result is an extremely difficult judo move that uses US forces clear towns for relatively unprepared Iraqi units to hold, while at the same time consolidating bases to reduce its presence in preparation for a pull-out. Here's a critique:

• Open connections. Iraq's insurgency is relatively urban. Urbanites cannot be "locked down" like subsistence level farmers. They need access to connections: transportation, utilities, communications, and trade to function economically. These "holes" provide opportunities for exploitation. Additionally, the economic revival of an urban environment (in contrast to farming) requires more than a freedom from violence. It requires extensive reconstruction which in turn creates more avenues for coercion and disruption. For example, due to this potential for disruption, progress in Fallujah since its reduction has been meager. See "State Failure 101" for more.
• Insufficient manpower. The US doesn't have a sufficient number of troops in theater for this manpower intensive strategy -- to clear areas, train Iraqi troops, and support them once in place. This will not be reversed due to insurmountable structural factors. This situation will only get worse as the US starts to bring troops home.
• Expanding insurgency. The use of use of "trusted" uniformed Iraqi militias to hold cleared towns, would only heighten violence due to sectarian tensions. We can expect extremely harsh tactics by Iraqi units in Sunni towns as they take control (similar with the torture chamber that was recently found in the Iraqi Interior Ministry). This will only serve to activate a larger percentage of the population to take up arms. Note, if we use Sunni units we will find them quickly co-opted by insurgents.

What this means

The likely outcome will be that the US will have little real value (a decrease in violence) to show for its efforts over the next year. If we do it flawlessly (which is going to be very difficult given a thinking enemy), the controlled chaos may hold long enough for the US to get most of its troops out. Here's what it means:

• Moral collapse. There will be intense pressure from US voters to exit Iraq prior to the US elections next year. This is the last plan that the US public will allow without serious repercussions for the American political leadership. It's a one way ticket.
• Melt down. As the plan bogs down and the body bags of Iraqi troops flow home in increasing numbers (due to insufficient armor, training and increased fighting), there will be a backlash against the US. Expect increased pressure by Shiite militias on our rear 'safe' areas after full independence. Since this pressure will threaten our lines of supply as well as our exit path, it will put the US military in a difficult position. The key is to get as much as we can out of Iraq before it occurs.
• Unexpected events. A rapidly evolving plan like this creates the potential that unexpected events may cause serious disruption. For example: the expansion of the conflict to a new area (the US?) and/or a major overrun (we almost saw this in the attacks on the Baghdad hotels in October/November) where a large group of Americans are killed and taken hostage. Either event could cause a radical policy collapse.

Comments

[g510]

For a while I've been persuaded that the best option for Iraq is a combination of clear & hold and a kind of Marshall plan, the latter with participation from as many allies as we can muster at this point. The goal being to rebuild critical infrastructure & turn over ownership to Iraqis, who in turn would be more willing to fight to protect what's theirs.

You've just said that clear & hold isn't going to work.

What do you think about something like a Marshall plan?

And at this point, what do you think is the best strategy to pursue, and what can we expect as an outcome?

[spacenookie]

I have been remarking to friends this week that US strategy in Iraq now resembles the failed Soviet strategy in Afghanistan. The soviets also made a fetish of western-style political process, building schools and hospitals, and rights for women. The afghani army, built up during the ten year occupation, crumbled in a matter of 2-3 years after the Soviets withdrew.

I don't know how we win this one. Our strategy over there is largely determined by our political process at home (troop increases are unpopular, complete withdrawal is unpopular, compromises on an agenda of complete westernization are unpopular, US casualties are unpopular, human rights violations are unpopular, etc), it seems like our hands are tied by perception management on the homefront.

[nykrindc]

I've been mulling this one for a while. I agree that the clear and hold strategy is not likely to work. I'm not too optimistic about the often proposed El Salvador solution, mainly because for that to work it would need to place sunni supporters of the government against sunni insurgents. So far, the manner in which it has been argued for "shiite and kurdish "civil defense" forces against sunni insurgents is just a recipe for an all out ethnic "civil" war. Maybe I'm wrong on that score, but that is my view for now.

This weekend I was watching a program on CNN about how other countries have fought terrorism and insurgency. One of the things that stood out was the role of a good police force. According to the report, corroborated by both IRA and the Irish police tasked with fighting them, police work not military operations were largely responsible for their defeat. So far in Iraq we have focused on building a military force to go after the insurgency and have allowed the police units to become the bastions of the various religious militias and hence not a viable force that can be seen by the population as fair and objective.

[jon]

Another thing that the British did in Northern Ireland for the most part, was accepting casualties in their military occupation forces. For the most part they were willing to bear isolated attacks that didn't do much damage, rather than respond massively to every assault that happened. This meant that they probably lost more men then they had to, but they kept a much larger percentage of the Catholic population out of the fight than if they had responded with force to every rock thrower.

[ali]

The US strategy in Iraq so far has paid a lot of attention to Clearing and a deficient amount to Holding. Can we expect this to change? This has not been a traditional COIN war so far and it's probably way to late to fix that. Reading the recent strategy paper it mentions a lower profile US but aggressive presence and while driving around at 40mph in armor cannot be said to be holding this suggests to me the Iraqis will be left to it with US air support. That's a force protection measure not a COIN strategy.

In Ireland PIRA weren't defeated they just failed to win. Their will to violence was eroded by a combination of political engagement, infiltration, diligent police work and carefully calibrated military attrition. In the end, rather like Hezbollah, they chose to quietly abandon their unrealistic goals and rely principly on the ballot box rather than the Armalite. Crucially it took 30 years. The US has maybe 3 more years in Iraq tops.

While Policing is obviously key to dealing with the violent chaos in Iraq I don't think there's any hope of a similar solution in Iraq currently. Heavy handed tactics have incautiously escalated the level of violence beyond levels were policing can work. Iraq is nowhere near to being an institutionally functional democracy like N.Ireland was in 1960. The rebellion is politically incoherent.

[nykrindc]

Just came accross this from the CounterTerrorism Blog and talks about this very point. It is an interesting read.

Here's the link:
http://counterterror.typepad.com/the_counterterrorism_blog/2005/12/police_not_armi.html

[tim fong]

Nykrindc,
Sure, Japan is a good example of using police forces for counterterrorism. But the comparison is, I think, not a good one.

Iraq is made up of disparate confessional and ethnic groups. By and large, Japan of the immediate post-war era was a homogenous society. Yes I know about the Ainu and the Okinawans but both groups were pushed to the margins. Furthermore, Okinawa was separated from Japan by water.

More importantly, the Occupation forces shrewdly made use of the established Japanese military and paramilitary forces. MacArthur established a national constabulary that eventually became the JSDF. Many of the members of the JSDF and police forces were members of the previous incarnations under the Empire.

The Japanese police also had help from the old-time martial arts people as well, and it is not by accident that judo and kendo became the basis for police physical training, as well as indoctrination. So there was support from non-governmental elements.

Iraq does not have that, we voided that option with Bremer's deBaathification process.

[nykrindc]

Granted, and I also thought the comparison with Japan was a bad one. The only thing I was referring to was the idea that we should be focusing more on training and developing Iraq's police force, to fight terrorism within each region (in the manner in which the IRA was fought).
Now, the argument I am making here is one I drew out of a recent CNN report on terrorism, in which IRA and British elements argued that having the british military fight the IRA actually made it stronger(the IRA), whereas having the local police force fight them had the opposite effect, mainly disruption of terrorist cells and eventually the defeat of the organization. Also, the report noted that part of the strategy defeating the IRA was to coopt the people and address their grievances. In Iraq we can do so with the local insurgency because it has limited aims.

In case the link above does not fo through, here's the link again:
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0512/03/cp.01.html

[dan]

NYK

There's just one small flaw with your prescription for dealing with the local insurgency's limited aims. If the grievance is US military occupation, and if this is a stance shared with the wider Iraqi public, then ipso facto, the insurgency cannot end until the US military departs.

All the polling data suggest that the overwhelming majority of Iraqis want the US to leave the country; the only favourable segment of the population are the Kurds - who are happy for the US military to occupy other parts of Iraq and let them get on with things their way.

[nykrindc]

That is true Dan. However, that is the exact topic that American forces have been discussing with Iraqi sunnis, (i.e. the steps that sunnis need to take for the US to begin withdrawing from Iraq).

A WAPO story from November 30th indicated this was going on in Iraq. The relevant parts are posted below:

>>>>

That's part of what I was referring to, a small step? yes. A long way to go? definitely. Is there animosity between US forces and the tribal sunni groups? yes. But they are talking, even when they are still fighting, and that shows that they are different from the hard core, it also makes them the target of the hardcore baathist and al Qaeda terrorists because these guys, although willing to fight to the death to get us out, will also talk to find a faster way out. Additionally Dan, if we allow for the creation of a viable local police force that rebuilds some of the basic structures in place then American forces will no longer need to be there, hence both sides get what they want.

[nykrindc]

Sorry. Here's the link to the WAPO story.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/29/AR2005112901850.html?sub=AR

[seydlitz89]

Greetings John Robb

My first comment on your blog.

Interesting take from an industrial warfare perspective. Disagree. We should be considering how to de-escalate, not "clear", let alone "hold". We could end any potential civil war by negociating with all interested parties our own withdrawal. . . and at the same time achieveing the military goal of extracting our army from Iraq intact.

Not that either of our plans have a snowball's chance in hell. . .

[mark safranski]

John,

What would be a good " Market-State" strategy for Iraq ?

[enigma_foundry]

If the USA leaves, Iraq will not long last as a state, and the fragmented remains of that state is where we should start our planning process. That that state is inevitable is now clear--the challenge is to get there with as little further damage as possible.

The fragmented state I would anticipate would be a Kurdistan in the north, really angering Turkey. The Shia dominated remainder, will probably disintegrate into a civil war. Iran will want to step in, if the Shia are in any risk of losing.

What will Syria do? Will Trukey step in to supress the Kurds? Many questions, few answers--is there any possibility of setting up some kind of frame work in the UN to create a forum to resolve these issues? Very doubtful.

[dan]

NYK

I vaguely remember this strategy being applied in Falluja in April 2004.

[dan]

NYK

Come to think of it, I vaguely remember this story being told in both February and June of this year already. What's changed this time?

[Barry]

g510: "the latter with participation from as many allies as we can muster at this point. The goal being to rebuild critical infrastructure & turn over ownership to Iraqis, who in turn would be more willing to fight to protect what's theirs. "

The two problems I see are that (1) we've persuaded most of the world that we're not to be trusted, both on honesty and competance; (2) that, given a raging guerrilla war, rebuilding critical infrastructure faster than it's destroyed is very hard.

[John Robb]

Mark,

There isn't a market-state strategy for Iraq, because it wouldn't have invaded.

John

[Nykrindc]

Thanks to the reduced support for the war, the administration now has the maximum incentive to negotiate with the Sunnis to get them back into the political process and divide them from the hard core elements (both baathists and Islamists).

Even SST is singing the tune and he's been on of the harshest critics of the administration.

http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2005/12/the_right_idea_.html

There are also reports coming from Juan Cole that the US intends to make a big push to reintegrate the Sunnis into the new government after the elections.

http://www.juancole.com/2005/11/iraqi-guerrillas-made-key-demands-of.html

This is a trend that I've seen mounting over the last month or so.

[mark safranski]

" There isn't a market-state strategy for Iraq, because it wouldn't have invaded"

LOL ! Touche' John.

[TM Lutas]

John Robb - A usefully honest analysis would examine risks and rewards both on the insurgency side and on the government side. By only looking at the problems from our side of the table, you leave the impression that there are few to no problems on the other side. I think that is quite unlikely to be true. If all you say is true but the insurgency collapses faster than the US, we still walk away with a win.

spacenookie - One major difference between Iraq and Soviet held Afghanistan is that the mujahadeen fought the Soviets to the point where the no-go areas of the country grew larger and larger and much of the countryside was liberated long before the USSR pulled out. In Iraq, low troop levels left the insurgents large areas where they had freedom of movement and could operate at will. Those areas are currently getting squeezed.

While John Robb is correct that Ramadi is still being contested, many areas that have been cleared and are being held are not. This says to me that oil spot is working but that the enemy gets a vote and will pick a spot (or more if they have the military capability) to contest to the limit of their available forces in order to try to get us to abandon the strategy. Ramadi seems to be that point for right now. From what I can tell, it's going relatively well.

nykrinde - In short, there's a large police force that's being deployed across Iraq and there's an indigenous police training capability that's being built up. In fact, President Bush explicitly mentioned both current doctrine and how it had been improved from earlier failures in his recent plan for victory speech.

ali - Iraqis have successfully held areas (such as route Irish in Baghdad) that the US has failed to do. That road to BIAP is now one of the safer ones in the city. They may not be trained as well but they have other advantages and those advantages should not be discounted.

[nykrindc]

nykrindc - In short, there's a large police force that's being deployed across Iraq and there's an indigenous police training capability that's being built up. In fact, President Bush explicitly mentioned both current doctrine and how it had been improved from earlier failures in his recent plan for victory speech.

I understand that. However, I am uncomfortable with the President's plan mainly because what he failed to say is what is being reported throughout in the press and elsewhere. The police forces have to a large extent been infiltrated by militias loyal to different tribal, political or religious groups and hence cannot be counted upon to become the upholders of the newly emerging regime. That is a big problem because the police has a great deal to do in terms of stemming the growth of the insurgency (they know who belongs, who doesn't and when things just don't seem right), something our forces lack. If they are not seen as impartial then their role is likely to be detrimental rather than helpful. This is particularly true as we send more Shiite and Kurdish police forces into the Sunni triangle. What I would like to know, is how much trust does the population have in the police force, do they fear them? How much are the police forces able to protect the citizenry as opposed to just protecting themselves? One final question is how well trained are these forces, and whether they are fighting on behalf of the government or specific factions or tribal groups?

Many questions remained unanswered, and too much is at stake.

[haydar]

As has been brought up on this site many times before, the "insurgency" is not a unified, hiarchical group, and factions within it have been at each other's throats on a numerous occasions. It doesn't seem to do the U.S. military much good, however. For that matter, the "Iraqi government" is not a unified body, and factions within it have been at each others throat as well. It needs to be noted that during the Lebanese civil war there was a nasty intra-Shia'conflict as well between Hizbullah and Amal. Lebanon as a model may present a best case scenario in Iraq, if all sides finally settle down to an uneasy coexistence with each other and at least an acceptable piece of the resource pie. The alternatives would certainly be worse.

[jim p]

We discuss when and how to draw down/exit Iraq as if we are in charge. I think the discussion is skewed by the unspoken mythological belief: "Military Might Is Always Determinative."

My bet is--and we'll know soon--is that once Sistani and his colleagues have obtained a Shia-dominated government recognized by the world as legitimate, and at the moment when we've damaged the Sunni enough (at our expense) to meet Shia needs, it'll be "Goodbye Great Satan, Hello Brother Iran." They won't need US tanks/planes anymore, Iran will lend them whatever they require.

Juan Cole had an item, of which there's been no follow-up on by anyone, that an associate of Sistani said that the elections will be followed by a fatwah to expel the foreigners, non-violently. You sit 15 million Iraqis on the few roads and say "You can go out, but you can't come in" and our mighty military quickly runs out of food and ammo. So unless you're willing to kill everyone on the roads--and Bush wouldn't do that because that would drive down his ratings--you're going to leave.

I don't see how this doesn't happen if we are still there in a few months. All our our plans here--2 years, when the iraqis can stand up, etc--are really just fantasies. We can stay in Iraq as long as the Shia find it convenient, and not a week longer.

[nykrindc]

You bring up a very good point. Ultimately, as occupiers, we can stay only so long as the mass of the population allows us to. With regard to Sistani's coming fatwa, I think people more inclined to see Iran as controlling Baghdad from now on see it as a self-fulfilling prophecy. If the fatwa is issued asking foreign troops to begin leaving Iraq, I think it reflects more than anything else, Sistani's guidance on how to quell the insurgency (who's key demand is that the US provide a timetable for withdrawal). Sistani, has established a pattern for moving things forward at his own pace, he also has been a voice for moderation and for dialogue with the Sunnis. Remember, when the constitution was first being ratified, he issued a statement telling Shiites in Iraq that they should not forget, and indeed should stand with their Sunni brothers. Nasr, at the Council on Foreign Relations has argued recently that Sistani is crafting a third way for Iraq's Shia, neither theocracy, nor secular democracy, but something in between. Unlike Khomeini and Khameini, Sistani does not believe that Ayatollahs should rule over the population. His view of Shiism and its role within the state is more moderate (for lack of a better word) than the Shiism in Iran under the mullahs. His religious school has actually argued against a system like Iran's. Further, he knows that by establishing a system in Iraq that respects its minority Sunni and Kurdish population, other states are more likely to respect, or at least improve the lot of their own Shiia populations (i.e. Saudi Arabia). The Ayatollah's in Iran to a certain extent fear Sistani's influence because Qaim and Najaf have always been two distinct poles of Shiia power and both provide different visions of the Shiia state. As such, the monopoly over interpretation that Iran's mullahs had when Hussein had Sistani behind his own Iron Curtain is over, and now they have to engage in a battle of ideas with his school of Shiism.

That said, will Iran have more influence in the region and Iraq? Yes. But it might not be as bad and pessimistic as Cole makes it out to be.