JOURNAL: Primary Loyalties in Basra

There are two working assumptions for the global fragmentation we are seeing. One is that we are involved in a clash of civilizations (Huntington) and the other is that disconnectedness is driving discontent (Barnett). Neither survives a review of the facts.

Iraq provides a good test case. While Iraq's initial plunge into civil war appeared to center around a clash of civilizations (Sunni vs. Shiite) it is rapidly devolving past that to smaller groups with more cohesive primary loyalties (gang, mosque, tribe, family, etc.). The rise of intense inter-tribal warfare in Basra between Shiite militias/tribes/families is an example of the granular nature of the level of fragmentation we are seeing. With nearly hourly assassinations, no-go zones for police, the proliferation of antagonistic militias, and ongoing attacks on British troops (including the Mogadishu like event that occurred when a British helicopter was shot down) Basra is likely the most unsafe place in Iraq today despite the lack of any meaningful Sunni insurgency.

The other assumption, that a lack of connectivity is the source of problems, fails to account for the rapid proliferation of crime due to improved inter-state connectivity between Iraq and its neighbors. This transnational crime, from drugs to oil bunkering, is fueling the growth of militias and guerrillas throughout Iraq. This would be impossible without improved connectivity. Further, the radical growth in automobile ownership and telephone usage due to Iraq's rapid globalization has enabled high levels of maneuver and coordination among anti-state groups, making them much more effective. It has also provided a mechanism by which the most effective weapon in Iraq was built and rapidly improved upon: the IED and the VBIED. Finally, this new connectivity also allows funding to flow into Iraq from a vast number of sources. We are now in a world where even a small group of individuals can act like nation-states to underwrite the activities of guerrilla groups that represent their interests.

Take what you want from this example, but it's clear that rapid connectivity is a source of the problem, due to the high degree of leverage provided by the global platform. Further, this platform makes it possible, nay probable, that small groups will use it to advance their own interests (well below the civilization level).

UPDATE: It should be clarified that connectivity is neutral. Improved connectivity doesn't diminish danger (as improved connectivity on the US southern border is proving daily). It can be an enabler of both good and bad. The problem is that it doesn't take sides.

Comments

[Ned]

It would seem that a combination of your ideas on connectivity and Mansfield and Synder's idea on democratization might win the day. Specifically, Mansfield and Synder focused on how the rapid transition to democracy breeds instability. In this instance a rapid transition to connectivity proves to be unstable especially when there are no solid institutions or civil society (press, judiciary, political parties, etc) to anchor society. Its possible that the lack of these institutions and a civil society creates a vaccuum that is filled by (dis)organized criminal elements and other malicious actors that are well suited to take advantage of the chaos.

[Siev]

Sure your not talking about the new NSA military computer platform and the integration of the CIA analyst - access by operaions officers and politics?

[John Robb]

Ned, you are exactly right. Democracy isn't merely an election. It requires much, much more.

[Man's Field]

Global fragmentatioon may have alot to do with declining baby births and that dreaming became a disease for humans early on?

[Cliff Nickerson]

Mr. Robb,
In cases such as Basra, is it feasable to cut their cellphones and internet access? The signals have to come from somewhere nearby. These transmitters cost money, so someone has to build them. Can we track the money back to someone "sinister" (an extra-national player with personal motivations, be they profit, ascension, or what have you) or is it just the work of big phone companies (or other big companies).
If these technologies are not working for the general benefit, why allow them to continue to operate in a critical area like Basra?
Man, I'm starting to sound like a Luddite. I believe that these technologies are good in general, but here in Brazil it is the cell phones in prisons that have allowed the PCC to achieve what it has in recent years. Turning off those phones might very well kill the PCC where it stood, or at least set it back seriously, since the most influencial members are behind bars. If we cut off wireless communications in a critical city like Basra, will it help or hurt? (Sorry to jump threads here, but this is all so closely related.)

[Marcello]

"Turning off those phones might very well kill the PCC where it stood, or at least set it back seriously, since the most influencial members are behind bars."

Don't count on it.The Mafia does rather well with scraps of paper...

"In cases such as Basra, is it feasable to cut their cellphones and internet access?"

Physically it would be rather easy.
The civilian communication network of a country is not exactly some sort hidden apparatus planted in the middle of the night by a scheming conspirator.
The problem is that you cannot have a modern society without modern communications.So you are going to slow down the guerrillas but at the price of giving up the whole reason of being there.

[wtofd]

Ned, well argued. Do you have a link for Snyder and Mansfield? Are referencing,
Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War? Cheers.

[Veteran]

Primary loyalties rule when Maslow's Hierarchy is stunted.

[AoT]

While I agree with most of this I must take issue with the idea of Sunni vs Shi'a as a Clash of Civilizations. Despite the horrendous job that Huntington did in defining a civilization (if I had turned in that essay in a political science or international relations class I would have gotten a big fat F) Sunnis and Shi'as clearly do not fall into said definition. The are both arab and muslims which catagorically excludes them from being different civilizations.

In this case I'd say it is clear that the reversion to primary loyalties is taking place; but, it took quite some time, nearly three years, of living in a failed state for this to happen. It was never a forgone conclusion.

[Cardenio]

' Primary Loyalties ' is a good name for an album. { I already decided my band is going to be ' The Arab League ' }

[AoT]

I was thinking "The Global Guerillas" and the first album would be "System Punkt."

[Andy]

Ned, liked your comment and agreed with what you had to say - do you have a link or further reference to the mansfield and snyder? I have read both Huntingotn and Barnett and while both are good books, they are overly simplistic - one of the reasons I read this blog. National disconnectedness forces sub-state groups to provide services that a state normally would (good article in the new Foregin Affairs about the topic). What we are seeing in Basra is sub-state groups filling the vacuum that is not being filled in the south (or pretty much anywhere) by the national government. The issue is to empower these groups or outlaw them, both have dire consequences. Empowering them would favor the issue of state autonomy that Shia and Kurd are pushing for, but we do not want a Sadr led state (know from experience). To tear them down would extend, broaden, and change the scope of the insurgency. The key would be to legitimize national government through renewed acces to infrastructure and key development locations and a visible security presence to wean power away from these groups. What does this mean for global guerillas? New targets. As state power expands, their logistical tail will grow, and new means to create system failure. An improved infrastructure grid is a large new target for deliberate execution.

[Arherring]

I disagree that the problem in Basra is a failure of Barnett's connectedness. Just because a place has cell phones, Internet, and the like does not mean it is connected. What Basra lacks is a societal connectedness.

[Ned]

Unfortunately the Mansfield and Snyder piece I referenced, "Democratization and the Danger of War", is not publically available on-line. For those with access to a subscription to MIT Press's International Security you can find the article in Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38.

Many of the arguments in this article are also repeated in "Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War".

[Adam]

"What Basra lacks is a societal connectedness."

Alternatively the population of Basra is quite cheerfully connected at a social level, without the use of technology. Its just that this doesn't work in a pro-US way. The problem (for the coalition) in Basra is that the locals are connected, its just that one of the aims of their connection is getting the occupying troops out.

The coalition has been really dismal at joining in all this Iraqi connectivity - mainly from its love of technology and complete lack of language skills. One of my all time favourite moments in the Iraq invasion comedy was a US Colonel with the wonderful name of Drinkwine (No comedian could set it up better; Drinkwine in a Muslim country). He thought that it'd be an idea to set up an internet site so that Iraqis could meet each other and go for rebuilding contracts (this was during the Fallujah operation). Apparently this would be useful in a country that invented the bazaar. I suppose it has the plus side that he didn't then have to speak to the locals who smell and probably speak their own language. Sadly no one had explained to him that social connections some two thousand years older than the US operated in Iraq. I'm told that most US military officers have degrees in engineering or "military science" rather than useful colonial subjects such as politics or history but, my word, it shows.

But thats just business interconnectedness. Throw in tribes, religion and politics and well, things look really awkward.

Earlier this month Marsh Arab tribesmen killed 11 Basran policemen and burned down two headquarters of the SCIRI political party; probably in revenge for the assassination of one of their clan chiefs (Shaikh Hasan Jarih al-Karamishi) by Iraqi special police commandos. The special police commandos are normally the SCIRI Badr corps in neat uniforms. Did SCIRI do this to encourage chaos? Was it business as usual? Who knows?

One theory is that it was to cause chaos to get rid of Governor al-Wa'ili as the group Revenge of God (another branch of the Badr Corps) staged demonstrations against the chaos. al-Waili is currently trying to get rid of the current Basran chief of police (Major-General Swadi) because the police have not undertaken a single investigation of the hundreds of recent assassinations (Basra averages 24 assassinations a day. A higher murder rate than Bagdhad - to get the same in New York would require some 300 murders a day, for a total of 90k a year).

It gets religious as well as al-Wa'ili also charges Grand Ayatollah Sistani is involved, but this was probably an attempt to get the US to justfy assassinating Sistani - al-Wa'ili's is a supporter of a rival faction - and it would seem a good deal for a small lie.

Of course if the police and religious angles aren't enough there is a separate political battle between al-Waili and the commander of the local Iraqi division, Major-General Taaban. He also could have a motive for getting rid of al-Waili.

Then we have a national angle - al-Wa'ili is a player in the Fadilah (Virtue) Party, a splinter group of al-Sadrs main party. Virtue is also a radical Shi'ite group who run torture chambers for Sunnis unlucky enough to be caught. Virtue also stands for defending Iraq against "civilizational assaults... in accordance with correct Islamic thought". Nice.

This month they pulled out of the Iraqi government when they failed to keep the looting opportunity of the petroleum ministry. It is one of the groups demanding that the US ambassador be sent home. Without Virtue support the new government will be crippled and have to rely on the Kurds. So there is a good reason for the US to see chaos in the streets of Basra too (and if a few Brits die, who cares?). Theres also good reason for the national government to see Virtue come a cropper.

Don't worry, the British aren't blameless either. al-Wa'ili has a long running dispute (over 6 months, whereas every before is this month alone!) with the British over arresting whole bunches of people. Including the head of the electrity board, which caused the workers to strike. The British claimed that they were supporters of al-Sadr, which may be true, but if so its hellishly awkward as he's a major player in the new government.

Interconnectedness? Is there anyone who isn't a player here? Probably Iceland, maybe. I don't think we have seen manouvering like this since the 30 Years War. In such a war everyone has a motive.

What is clear is that Basra is at boiling point - literally - with summer highs of 41C. It gets no electricity for most of the day, meaning that there is no refridgeration, no air conditioning (and no internet). There are demonstrations every evening against the government because of this (another social connection not needing modern equipment), in 2004 there were fuel riots so at least that is working.

How bad is the situation in Basra? Try this: last week the national government ordered the locals to turn over their security files to the army. They are assuming that the local government offices will be overrun. No one wants a repeat of the overrun of the Stasi offices at the fall of East Germany.

[RyanLuke]

Mr. Robb,

This is not on topic, but I wonder if you have any comments on this (from the Chicago Sun-Times via Antiwar.com):

"The Gangster Disciples, Latin Kings, and Vice Lords were born decades ago in Chicago's most violent neighborhoods. Now, their gang graffiti is showing up 6,400 miles away in one of the world's most dangerous neighborhoods – Iraq.

"Armored vehicles, concrete barricades, and bathroom walls all have served as canvasses for their spray-painted gang art. At Camp Cedar II, about 185 miles southeast of Baghdad, a guard shack was recently defaced with 'GDN' for Gangster Disciple Nation, along with the gang's six-pointed star and the word 'Chitown,' a soldier who photographed it said. The graffiti, captured on film by an Army Reservist and provided to the Chicago Sun-Times, highlights increasing gang activity in the Army in the United States and overseas, some experts say."

[arash sotoodeh]

Really sad news on Iraq. Seems a real underground society is there, that prevents all attempts to democracy. The question is allowed , who is actually ruling that country and what is there going on. It seems like Iraq will be a longterm battlefield , with many innocent people to be victims including the US-British forces, who to my view have just to gave their lifes away for nothing, really sad and disturbing, thanks arash.

[Cliff Nickerson]

I read just this weekend on Armed Forces Journal that the US forces sometimes ignore Iraqi civilian attempts at providing intel. It seemed like the language barrier was the problem. The US soldiers don't speak Arabic and only one or two from each group can even communicate with the locals. When one of these locals tries to talk to an American soldier, he gets shooed to the back of the line to talk to the translator. Meaning, stay here in plain view of your neighbors, waiting to talk to someone who might just ignore you anyway.
This is preventing connectedness in a big way. it's preventing the US from connecting to the Iraqi people. What can be done? Is better language training an option?