IRAQ: ZARQAWI IS DEAD

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announced that a US air strike had killed Musab al-Zarqawi. The information that led to his death was the result of following the trail of custody on the distribution of his most recent video tape (or it could have been lucky given the number of air strikes that that have been made on reported Zarqawi positions in the past years).

This is excellent news, but it needs to be put into context (this is a brief for decision makers/analysts/thinkers and not motivation for the rank and file, so don't expect fluff -- as is often said, only the paranoid survive and every good commander I know understands this). Zarqawi is best categorized as violence capitalist, very similar to bin Laden, that supported and incubated guerrilla entrepreneurs of the new open source warfare model. In this role he was instigator of violence and not the leader of a vast hierarchical insurgency.

Zarqawi in Context

Here's how Zarqawi's role evolved:

• In the early phases of the guerrilla war in Iraq, Zarqawi was operational as the commander of a small cell. His group was able, through early large scale attacks, to set a plausible promise (an idea that many other groups could rally around) for the Iraqi insurgency. Namely, that it was possible to successfully fight the US occupation.
• During late 2004 and early 2005, his operational value diminished as the number of groups that were engaged in the war proliferated. During that time, he was focused on expanding the target set of the insurgency to include infrastructure, corporations and Iraqi military units. Later in 2005, his operational activities were focused on shifting the plausible promise of the insurgency from ousting the Americans to fighting Shiite domination (sectarian war) through attacks on Shiite civilians and symbols.
• By early 2006, Zarqawi's operational activities were all but over. He had succeeded in seeding the original insurgency and shifting the plausible promise to include sectarian warfare. During this final phase, Zarqawi moved into a role of strategic communicator, much like bin Laden's role today. In this role, he produced videos that were distributed to a global audience through the Internet and global media.

Epilogue

Unfortunately, Zarqawi proved to be rather good at his role. Here's how to rate his abilities:

• He successfully seeded the insurgency.
• Innovation and adaptability. He expanded the target set for the insurgency, changed tactics when they proved disadvantageous (ie. beheadings were stopped and he ceded Iraqis control of the jihadi effort), and expanded the plausible promise of the insurgency to include sectarian war.
• His main failure was that he didn't fully appreciate the value of systems disruption. His only attack on a systems target (the Basra terminal) was a failure. He also proved unable to give up operational roles in favor of becoming a strategic communicator (which ultimately led to his death).

ONE final note: If we put Zarqawi within a historical context, he was able to do what Che hoped to do with a foco insurgency (for more on this, read the brief on "Iraq and Foco Insurgency"). In essence, he proved that within a modern context (open source warfare and systems disruption), it is possible to seed the collapse of a state (or more precisely, keep a state in a perpetual failure).

Comments

[Duncan Kinder]

More significant is today's New York Times article, "Iraqi Ties to Iran Create New Risks for Washington," which describes how Iraqi and Iranian Shi'a, tied by religious and cultural links, are growing closer together. Similar links with other, non-Iraqi and non-Iranian Shi’a also are growing.

Such links suggest an evolution toward a new, transnational, Shi’a-based rather than state-based, social order. Given such an evolution, the Che-style foco insurgency, which resulted in chaos and failure in 1960's Latin America, would propel the transformation by softening up nation-state-based opposition to the new order. A metamorphosis, not a collapse.

What this article does not discuss; and, so far as I know, is not elsewhere being discussed, is how analogous but non-Shi’a links are evolving elsewhere in the world. For example, we should anticipate that growing Eastern Orthodox Christian links would emerge in Eastern Europe - with implications for the European Union, for NATO, for the Balkans, and similar matters.

[Duncan Kinder]

I ommitted the link to the New York Times article, "Iraqi Ties to Iran Create New Risks for Washington," which I cited above.

My apologies. It is as follows:

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/08/world/middleeast/08iran.html

[kevin]

Just a steamy turd(Haditha ect) was in mid-air and heading toward the fan, we just so happen to finally dispose Zarqawi and exploit the IO. What a coincidence!

[David1029]

I found this snippit about Zarqawi's probable martyrdom interesting considering Zarqawi's death later the very same day.

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htmurph/articles/20060607.aspx

[David1029]

Looks like the people over at strategypage were right. The Multi-National Force website claims they recieved intel from Iraqi senior leaders within Zarqawi's network.

http://www.mnf-iraq.com/Releases/2006-06/060608a.htm

[kevin]

"I found this snippit about Zarqawi's probable martyrdom interesting considering Zarqawi's death later the very same day."\

I noticed that too.

[totierne]

How much can we open source the current techniques used in open source warfare and counter measures, and any mistakes made in these peoples deaths, or will constant murder of senior people create a more egalitarian, effective, flatter organisation? I think there is a (UK) law against gatherining information useful to 'terrorists', a catch all if they cannot get you on anything else.

[totierne]

>a more egalitarian, effective, flatter organisation?
It would be also more resistant to bribes, like Hamas.

[Cavolonero]

I think they set him up, they wanted to get him off for some reason and tipped us off to where he was. ( You're ' foccoed ' now Martyr-man ! ) Mabye too much money was going in his direction ?

[John Robb]

Here's a total speculation (and not worth much since he had already outlived his usefulness in Iraq and analysts that attempt to explain the motivations of individuals in a hazy environment are usually on thin ground). Zarqawi was the main force behind the a major fork in the open source war: the push to sectarian conflict. He won on that but it cost him. He was also likely in motion towards seeding conflict in Jordan, which would have created a sense of betrayal among Iraqis he was fighting with. The combination put a big fat target on his head. Rather than kill him themselves, they enabled the US to martyr him (out of personal obligation and a sense that his death will serve their interests).

[adam]

Hi John,

Sadly I'm the poor monkey thats going to have to answer the "what does it all mean" question today at work. I suspect that the bosses aren't going to like my answer which is in alignment with yours: not much. I'm probably going to have to make it more comforting for executives.

Zarqawi was always the US's favourite terrorist bogeyman in Iraq. Colin Powell made him internationally famous in February 2003; on the grounds that Sadaam and Zarqawi were working together. Zarqawi was meant to be the Al Quaeda link that Sadaam just had to have. The minor fact that Sadaam had his secret police looking for Zarqawi since 2002 was at that stage besides the point. The invasion was on; Chemical Weapons and secret Al Quaeda links were the justifications.

Before Powell stood up at the UN no one had heard of Zarqawi. He'd been arrested and tortured in Jordan (US ally), arrested again in Pakistan sometime in 1999, arrived in Afghanistan in 2000 founded a training camp and left Afghanistan in 2002 (yes, thats after the US invasion). Effectively he had less than 2 years experience of leading operations before leaving (alhtough he'd had his own group in Jordan). The US claims that in that time he set up a terrorist camp (true), became a chemical weapons expert (laughable), and regularly visited his wives in Kabul and Peshawar (probably true).

The US first announced his death in 2003, during the invasion. He then died again in 2005. This time it looks like its true. Even so he managed to operate for 3 years in enemy territory before being killed. He reinvigorated the Sunni Islamic cause with the video decapitation of selected Western prisoners, a former street kid he provided a better model of resistance than Sadaam did, and he certainly had some talent and imagination. I suspect that the Iraqis that run the resistance will miss these things, but not a lot and they've got plenty of home-grown experience that has the added advantage of being loyal to them.

Guerilla campaigns are social movements and do not rely on one person. The current US excitement over his death is largely because the US insists on a "great man" theory of history, chaos in Iraq will probably continue.

Sidenote: Zarqawi was one man, the Iraqi government used the cover of this news to release six hundred accused terrorists. This will enable the Sunnis to support the new ministers of defence and interior, whilst enabling the anti-Coalition operations to continue. This would be in line with Iraqi government policy. Its rather neat actually.

[adam]

Thats it. The Zarqawi hype has gone completely out of control.

http://www.economist.com/index.html

He's got his own historical era now. After Sadaam, sure. After Bush, maybe. After Bin Laden, probably. But Zarqawi?

[David1029]

Adam,

Where did you find the bit about the six hundred accused terrorists released?

[David1029]

never mind. Found it at http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=2048102

[salsabob]

al Queda dropped the nickel on Zar; the question as to why can be easily deduced from the video he put out a few weeks ago. While nearly everyone was getting their har-hars from Zar's machine gun comedy routine, one guy was blowing a fuse over what Zar was actually saying -- and no sane person in the region who wants to see a few tomorrows seriously messes with that guy, including OBL. Scroll down to the Zar's 4/29 transcript here --

http://www.centcom.mil/sites/uscentcom1/Shared%20Documents/Extremist%20Page/What%20Extremists%20Say.aspx?PageView=Shared

Hint, it ain't the Jordanins or any other "first thing," its about Zar's "second thing." OBL was given a choice, drop the dime or els.. But being such a nice guy, OBL made sure Zar's spiritual leader would be there to help guide him through the pearly gates and onto the promised virgins.

[TM Lutas]

The removal of a major capitalist mover and shaker is a very big deal for an ideological movement. You can compare the eulogies among conservatives for the John M Olin foundation and map that onto what's likely to happen to Al Queda in Iraq as well as the broader Iraqi insurgency.

It hurts when a major cash and inspiration source bites the dust. Don't kid yourselves, it's a major win for our side. The nature of the win is just being misunderstood.

Ref:
http://www.nationalreview.com/miller/miller200504060758.asp

[arash sotoodeh]

I think the motto of this side is : you can only fight an enemy you know. I hope we are not kidding ourselves, but trying to figure out this enemy... What make me very doubtful is the point, that Zarqawi had been maybe betrayed by own people. thanks Arash

[John Robb]

It is a big moral victory for the western public. No doubt. Much of the conflcit was personified in him, and he is now dead. However, within the context of the warfare, below the moral level, I think the point is that we killed the man whose operational days were over. His new role was as a strategic leader -- where his value becomes more motivational and persuasive.

In regards to the moral impact on Jihadi audiences, I'd be more interesting to find out what Hakim Hazim would say in regards to his value as a matyr in this context.

[pm2075]

I don't know if any of you have heard this but there is some speculation circling the circumstances in which Zarqawi was found and when he died. It revolves around the possibility that he was "assassinated." He might have been outed by inner circles associated with Bin Ladin. Question remains how his body remained intact in the destructive effects of 2 500lb bombs. Did a search on 'Zarqawi' and found the following...

'Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was accompanied by women who wore skimpy night clothing, and read magazines on current affairs and militant propaganda, an inspection of the house he was killed in showed on Saturday.'

'Also beside the slabs of concrete was a woman's leopard skin nightgown and other skimpy women's clothes.'

-Reuters

Military **revises** al-Zarqawi account

'An Iraqi man who was one of the first people on the scene of the U.S. airstrike targeting Abu Musab al-Zarqawi said he saw American troops beating a man who had a beard like the al-Qaeda leader.'

USA Today

Nothing like loosening up the guard of a leader with a $25 million bounty on his head with a few scantily & provocatively clad women.

Life is truely stranger than fiction!!

P.

[shloky]

The skimpy clothing bit sounds like propaganda from our side targeted at undermining his radical islamist image.

[adam]

John,

Not sure I agree that its "It is a big moral victory for the western public... Much of the conflcit was personified in him, and he is now dead."

This personification was a Western invention, for Western purposes and Western audiences. Specifically it was needed for US TV audiences, to give the Iraqi resistance a non-Iraqi face, and to argue that Iraq was linked in some way to September 11th 2001. Basically it was a feel-good lie. The only reason that Iraq could be described as the Central Front on the War on Terror was that there was a group called "Al Quaeda in Mesopotamia" run by Zarqawi. If he hadn't existed we'd have needed to invent him; which arguably we did. It was Colin Powell who insisted on his importance, and the Americans who always argued that everything that happened in Iraq was at his instigation.

In reality it doesn't make much difference in Iraq. There is an argument that Zarqawis ultra-violent methods may have caused factional infighting in the Iraqi Sunni resistance. This is probably true, if there's one thing resistance workers agree on is that they are the one true resistance organisation and all the others are splitters. Things like the Pact of Caracas are the exception, not the rule. Even so, Zarqawi had only one group out of many - I recall that there were 50 or so resistance groups operating in Iraq a couple of years back, and the number hasn't gone down.

One theory being kicked around is that now Zarqawi is dead a joint Sunni-Shi'ite anti-US resistance movement might form. I doubt it, but they are agreeing on a lot of things that are against US policy in parliament, and sooner or later the Iraqi government and the US are going to butt heads. Probably over the Kurds and Kirkuk. Having the joint operations already agreed would be a big step in stopping US forces from arguing the point. Even so its a move that would rely on the two sides trusting each other. It would also mean that the US divide and rule operation running since 2004 would have collapsed and harm the current Iranian method of running the government.

Yesterday in Iraq there was street-fighting in Ramadi requiring US helicopter gunships to be used in the city centre (earlier in the week the resistance had been sighted using the train station to move munitions into Ramadi - when the guerillas are running their own armaments trains there is a real problem). In Bagdhad cars were not allowed to be used (too much risk of car bombs). In the oil refining town of Baiji, three engineers at the refinery were killed. These are just the headlines in my intray; there's also governor-level assassinations, abductions of ministers, corpses of those killed by strangulation and by drill (one of the most popular methods for a torturing someone to death in the new Iraq is a 'driller killer' through the back of the head. I'm vaguely reminded of line which said movies don't create psychopaths, movies make psychopaths more creative.

For Iraq, thats business as usual. But business as usual is defined as a thousand or so dead each month. Back in the old days of the 1980s that number would be enough to be called a civil war. We avoid that phrase these days. For a comparison Iraq, on the international September the 11th scale, suffers a September the 11th every week to 10 days (on the basis that 300 Iraqis = 3000 Americans in population proportion).

But that is the reality of Iraq. An honest question: does anyone really believe that the death of one person is going to fix this?

[Hakim Hazim]

Here are some of my thoughts and points on Zarqawi's influence as a martyr:

The most important thing perverse religious movements and cults produce in people's minds is the sense that they are truly special and others are not. Zarqawi convinced himself and his followers of this. This belief is a common thread that runs through all cults. The motivational psychology behind Al Zarqawi and those eagerly following his ideology is not that they live a significant life by worldly standards, but that they die a significant death. He achieved this, and now others of a similar mindset will follow this course.

Seven things to watch for:

1. He will now live beyond the grave and many idealistic jihadists will seek to emulate him.

2. Unfortunately for Al Qaeda, their zeal will not be matched by his knowledge or charisma, and many will lack the discipline necessary to be effective jihadists.

3. Unfortunately for the US, the movements will become more and more fragmented and disorganized, producing more violence on low level targets.

4. The fragmentation will produce rivalries between jihadists that are using violence as a way of seeking attention from the media and potential recruits. They will seek parity with highly devoted and previously successful zealots.

5. In the meantime, old school zealots will be appalled at these new "upstarts" and their self-seeking jihad.

6. Look for a conglomeration of a new generation of terrorists in Iraq and elsewhere that include pragmatic jihadists, idealist jihadists, gangsta jihadists and the like to emerge and began to clash with one another more frequently.

7. At the end of the day these special people, will have to make their selection by God provable, and in an empirical way. The only way they know how to do this is through violence and body counts that the media will undoubtedly show and focus on. This is what we can expect to follow Zarqawi's death.

[kevin]

"Life is truely stranger than fiction!!"

Shacking him up with women in leopard lingerie, botched assassination despite half a ton of bombs, only to beat him to death..... A perfect story to round off the "Hot Shots" trilogy!