Global Guerrillas

PLAYING WITH WAR

The western way of war in the 21st century is a pale shadow of the warfare it waged in the 20th. The reason is simple: for western societies war is no longer existential. Instead, it's increasingly about smoothing market flows and tertiary moral concerns/threats. As a result of this diminishment of motivation, western warfare is now afflicted with the following:

• Operations of low lethality. Western militaries do not have the desire, nor the sanction, to conduct the high casualty operations typically associated with real wars. Technology has been leveraged to increase the precision of attacks to limit collateral damage and save the lives of civilians. The corollary to this is that western militaries are also fiercely protective of the lives of their soldiers. Warfare, increasingly, is supposed to be costless. What this means is that we will not see Sherman's 'March to the Sea' or Hama in the near future - and - the loss of a hundred soldiers in southern Lebanon will be enough to stop the Israeli army.
• Marginal placement within national priorities. Militaries are increasingly professional (with a trend towards the use of mercenaries) and conscription has become impossible. This drastically limits the number of soldiers that can be applied to any conflict. In addition, to retain competitive positioning on the global stage, states and their economies are operated as if war is not going on. To wit: military budgets are considered just another line item on a more complex national budget. Gone are the days of massive mobilization and economic restructuring for war.
• Muddled objectives. Given the lack of the cohesive and singular reason for war -- the survival of the state and its people through the elimination of its enemies -- the reasons for warfare will drift. This translates into a constantly shifting landscape of military objectives, where current objectives recede in favor of replacements before they can be reached. The result is confusion, mission creep, and conflict escalation.

Playing with War

The upshot of this diminishment of warfare is that wars will become increasingly difficult to win. The reasons are straightforward:

• Asymmetric motivation. In almost all instances, the opposition will approach the conflict as an existential war. This motivation both allows them to fight harder and longer than those western forces sent against it. The only aspects of warfare left in the west's favor are training and technology.
• New methods of warfare will emerge to level (flatten) the playing field Since warfare is a conflict between minds, its natural to expect that as the rest of the world gains capacity through globalization, the delta in training and technology will diminish. We have already seen this in the emergence of open source warfare (Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, and more) and 4GW light infantry (Hezbollah).
• Proliferation of opposition. As we have often seen, as western militaries apply violence, they often destroy the structures that hold together societies. This results in the proliferation of groups that adopt violence. Much, if not all, of that violence will eventually be directed at the western militaries themselves.

Learning to Live with Limits

Ultimately, western societies will need to learn to live within the limits of this new framework. It is not possible for us to reverse the clock on this trend. Any mass mobilization for war that lifts existing limitations will be severely punished by both global markets and opinion (both domestically and abroad) if it ever was attempted. Given the inevitability of the limited nature of western warfare from now and into the future, we should avoid the following traps:

• Nation-building as a global social policy. Historically, counter-insurgency against an established enemy has almost never worked (and when it has, it usually involves bloody exterminations). Any attempt to build a nation will likely, particularly in the current environment of globalization, yield an opponent that will be impossible to defeat through limited means. Further, the durations of these conflicts will exceed the capacity of the western states to maintain a cohesive set of objectives -- they will shift with opinion polls and political winds.
• Collapsing rogue states. In almost all instances, despite how easy it is to collapse a weak state with modern weapons, those wars launched to collapse rogue states will not yield positive results. The collapse will necessitate calls for revival (see item one). Unless states are willing to live with partial collapse without resolution, they should not undertake the action in the first place.
• Escalation of tension. Given an inability to resolve conflicts through nation-building and state collapse, western states should endeavor to deescalate conflicts rather than ignite them. Escalation is a false God that promises a return of the motivational clarity found in the wars of the 20th Century. It cannot deliver this.

Thanks: CSS's International Relations and Security Network

Chris Pallaris, ISN's Chief Editor:

One of the pleasures of working at the confluence of information technology and international affairs is finding a website like Global Guerillas. Built and maintained by security analyst and technologist John Robb, this blog is an excellent resource for anyone interested in fourth-generation warfare or the interplay between terrorism, political violence, networks and technology.... Highly recommended.

Mea Culpa > I should have been thanking people all along for gracious recommendations like this. Better late than never.

Quote: Hezbollah and the Inversion of Legitimacy

"Hezbollah's strength (derives from) the gross vacuum left by the state." Hezbollah is not a state within a state, but rather "a state within a nonstate." Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, a professor at the Lebanese American University.
John Kifner. "Hezbollah Leads Work to Rebuild, Gaining Stature." The New York Times. August 16, 2006.

It's clear that Hezbollah has advanced in more than the violence of 4GW, it is also demonstrating an ability to solidify its position by providing sys-admin like functionality (ala Barnett's "Blueprint for Action" and my "State Failure 101"). There is an important cycle that inverts legitimacy at work here:

• In order to fight a non-state enemy, other states hollowed out a state. Whether Hezbollah is at fault or not is a non-issue.
• The non-state enemy proves (through 4GW) it is the only force capable of defending the people.
• the non-state builds alliances with other non-states and states to gather essential support.
• The non-state provides services (political goods) at a higher level of efficiency and value than the state (sys-admin).

In short, Hezbollah gains legitimacy at the expense of the state. Expect to see this cycle again and again from 4GW groups (in contrast, networked non-states like al Qaeda operate in a different way entirely -- although many conflate the two approaches).

QUOTE: Legitimacy for global guerrillas

"If there was just one Nasrallah in every Arab country -- one person with his dedication, intelligence, courage, strength and commitment -- Arabs would not have had to suffer stolen land and defeat at the hands of Israel for 50 years,"said an Arab celebrity, Kuwaiti actor Daoud Hussein on Al-Jazeera. (Faiza Saleh Ambah, Arab World Riveted by Coverage of the 'Sixth War." Washington Post. August 14, 2006.)

This quote reflects an increasingly common desire: that global guerrillas (non-state forces that use 4GW tactics) are the only way to provide protection against external foes (and potentially against the depredations of their own internationally impotent but domestically repressive governments). Hezbollah's victory (locked in by the ceasefire that will, despite its language, allow the group to retain both its tactical and strategic capabilities) has engineered a sea change in perception.

AL QAEDA'S ACHILLES HEEL: RESIDUAL HIERARCHY

Early analysis of a rapidly unfolding operation, like the arrest/unravelling of the UK airplane liquid bomb plot, can easily be distorted by hype and erroneous information. Despite this potential minefield, here's my initial take on the event.

Here's the bad news. From all indications, it appears that the operation showed significant signs of open source warfare in both substance and structure. For example, the operation was characterized by: a self-organizing UK cell energized by al Qaeda's plausible promise, gathering of expertise/funding from al Qaeda in Pakistan, and innovative applications of technique/technology. Also, it appears that the operation wasn't directed at purely symbolic targets (using planes as guided missiles) but against the transportation infrastructure itself (like the successful attack on Madrid and last years attack on London). This slow shift reflects a growing realization, echoed by an increasing number of sources, that system disruption is more valuable in this war than the destruction of symbols.

Here's the good news. Al Qaeda's leadership provided too much centralized command and control of this operation after it connected with the UK cell. A great example of this, in microcosm, is a report that the suspects received a coded message from Pakistan that said, "attack now" just before the arrests. Operational control at this level is likely the cause of the factors that led to its failure. Here's why:

• it increased the plans exposure due to extensive traffic/communication to/from/with cells in Pakistan (particularly coded traffic). This needlessly exposed the operation to state monitoring of cross border traffic and Pakistan's ISI (which has proven to be much better at counter-terrorism than western agencies).
• it increased the size of the operation to ensure that it approached the scale of 9/11 (to counter the diminishing returns of terrorism). The result is that the greater the scale of the plot and the longer the length of the time line necessary to plan it, the greater potential of the plot's exposure.
• it likely dictated the method and the target of the operation. The operation was focused on body counts, airplanes, and simultaneous detonation. It's very likely that a indigenous UK cell could have produced more innovation in method and target selection. In effect, any similarity to previous attacks increases the potential of detection.

Final thoughts. Al Qaeda's failures to decentralized command and control of this operation ultimately led to its failure. Despite this, the plot appears to have been close to fruition since there are signs that a significant amount of planning and intelligence gathering was accomplished before detection (which indicates that our ability to interdict these threats is still not much better than it was before 9/11, the only major difference between then and now is that we are aware that they can occur).

Unfortunately, given the strong trend lines towards further escalation of this epochal conflict, we can expect al Qaeda to recover from this failure quite quickly. The motivations necessary to activate groups are still running high and the tools/methods of this type of warfare are still readily available and applicable. However, as long as al Qaeda continues to exercise even a small modicum of centralized command and control: the spacing of attacks will be long, the targets will be within known groups, and the size of the plots will be large. The result is they will be relatively easier to detect than more sophisticated, innovative, and decentralized operations. Our problem really starts when they evolve to the next level and fully embrace open source warfare's decentralized approach (much as the problem we now face with Hezbollah, although their evolution reflects the different contextual requirements of their position on the spectrum of open source warfare).

JOURNAL: The PCC's currency

Brazil. The PCC is keeping up the pressure on Sao Paolo through attacks on government facilities/personnel and economic infrastructure (transportation and finance). One of the mechanisms by which they are maintaining the pressure, looks like an innovation in open source warfare. Here's an interesting note on the micro-market currency used in the recruitment of attackers (Guardian): According to Mr Amorim, one of the PCC's key strengths is its capacity to recruit "freelance" members to carry out specific actions. Many see involvement as a means of self-protection. "It is a kind of seguro-cadeia [jail insurance]," Mr Amorim said. "You know you will be arrested one day, so it is better to arrive in prison as a friend or at least someone who is known [to the PCC]."

IT'S NOT TOO LATE FOR ISRAEL

Hezbollah's current success against the IDF was both foreseeable and avoidable. The only requirement for this insight was for the IDF to embrace fourth generation warfare. Of course, that didn't happen.

In short, if things continue on their current track: Hezbollah's rockets will remain intact as a looming ceasefire locks Israel into a horrible strategic position (which will likely lead to escalation and a wider war in the near term). Longer term, a loss by Israel here will ensure that the tactical and organizational approaches demonstrated by Hezbollah will be copied by states and non-states around the world. I clipped some relevant passages from the FMFM 1-A Fourth Generation War (unofficial) as examples of where Israel went astray:

Preserving states:
In situations where Marines and the joint or combined force of which they are a part do invade and occupy another country, they will often find it relatively easy to defeat the opposing state and its armed forces. While this is a decisive advantage in wars between states, in Fourth Generation situations it brings with it a serious danger. In a world where the state is growing weaker, our victory can easily destroy the enemy state itself, not merely bring about “regime change.” If this happens, it may prove difficult or impossible for us or for anyone to re‑create a state. The result will then be the emergence of another stateless region, which is greatly to the advantage of Fourth Generation entities. As is so easy in the Fourth Generation, we will have lost by winning. Therefore, we must learn how to preserve enemy states at the same time that we defeat them.

What to expect:
As Fourth Generation war spreads, it will be inevitable that, even if all the advice offered above is followed, Marines will find themselves fighting Fourth Generation enemies. It is important both for the preparation for war and the conduct of war that Marines know that Fourth Generation war is above all light infantry warfare. As a practical matter, the forces of most of our non-state, Fourth Generation adversaries will be all or mostly irregular light infantry. Few Fourth Generation non-state actors can afford anything else, and irregulars do enjoy some important advantages over conventional forces. They can be difficult to target, especially with air power and artillery. They can avoid stronger but more heavily equipped opponents by using concealment and dispersal (often within the civil population). They can fight an endless war of mines and ambushes. Because irregulars operate within the population and are usually drawn from it, they can solicit popular support or, if unsuccessful, compel popular submission.

How to fight 4GW opponents in battle:
Light infantry is the best counter to irregulars because it offers... First, good light infantry (unless badly outnumbered) can usually defeat almost any force of irregulars it is likely to meet. It can do this in a “man to man” fight that avoids the “Goliath” image. If the light infantry does not load itself too heavily with arms and equipment, it can enjoy the same mobility as the irregulars (enhanced, as necessary by helicopters or attached motor vehicles). Second, when it uses force, light infantry can be far more discriminating than other combat arms and better avoid collateral damage. This is critically important at both the mental and moral levels.

Israel's only chance to reverse this situation and win (which will be at most a limited victory, given previous blunders) in this war is to fully embrace the light infantry approach and fight this at close quarters. This means sending the tanks back to the sheds, slowing down the air campaign (limiting it to counter-battery fire), and reducing the infantry's dependence of tactical firepower support. Further, all efforts that destabilize the Lebanese state should be reversed. Of course, this will mean higher casualties for Israel and Hezbollah may get resupplied, but it will provide a path to more battlefield success which will mitigate some of the strategic consequences of abject failure.

One final note. Before this conflict is over, Israel should invite all the authors of the 4GW manual referenced above, as observers to this conflict. Further, they should then be engaged as consultants on the development of a new field manual for the IDF that supports fighting 4GW forces. Of course, Israel is free to ignore this advice, although I am not sure how many more failures like this it can absorb before it is in a completely untenable situation strategically.

QUOTE: Moving beyond mere moral conflict in Lebanon

"I think that there is, perhaps for the first time, a very real possibility that the fourth-generation non-state force will win at the tactical and physical levels..."

Bill Lind to Matthew Stannard of the SF Chronicle.

JOURNAL: James Fallows on the War on Terror

The Atlantic. Worth the subscription to read it.

The United States can declare victory by saying that what is controllable has been controlled: Al-Qaeda Central has been broken up. Then the country can move to its real work. It will happen on three levels: domestic protection, worldwide harassment and pursuit of al-Qaeda, and an all-fronts diplomatic campaign.