IT'S NOT TOO LATE FOR ISRAEL

Hezbollah's current success against the IDF was both foreseeable and avoidable. The only requirement for this insight was for the IDF to embrace fourth generation warfare. Of course, that didn't happen.

In short, if things continue on their current track: Hezbollah's rockets will remain intact as a looming ceasefire locks Israel into a horrible strategic position (which will likely lead to escalation and a wider war in the near term). Longer term, a loss by Israel here will ensure that the tactical and organizational approaches demonstrated by Hezbollah will be copied by states and non-states around the world. I clipped some relevant passages from the FMFM 1-A Fourth Generation War (unofficial) as examples of where Israel went astray:

Preserving states:
In situations where Marines and the joint or combined force of which they are a part do invade and occupy another country, they will often find it relatively easy to defeat the opposing state and its armed forces. While this is a decisive advantage in wars between states, in Fourth Generation situations it brings with it a serious danger. In a world where the state is growing weaker, our victory can easily destroy the enemy state itself, not merely bring about “regime change.” If this happens, it may prove difficult or impossible for us or for anyone to re‑create a state. The result will then be the emergence of another stateless region, which is greatly to the advantage of Fourth Generation entities. As is so easy in the Fourth Generation, we will have lost by winning. Therefore, we must learn how to preserve enemy states at the same time that we defeat them.

What to expect:
As Fourth Generation war spreads, it will be inevitable that, even if all the advice offered above is followed, Marines will find themselves fighting Fourth Generation enemies. It is important both for the preparation for war and the conduct of war that Marines know that Fourth Generation war is above all light infantry warfare. As a practical matter, the forces of most of our non-state, Fourth Generation adversaries will be all or mostly irregular light infantry. Few Fourth Generation non-state actors can afford anything else, and irregulars do enjoy some important advantages over conventional forces. They can be difficult to target, especially with air power and artillery. They can avoid stronger but more heavily equipped opponents by using concealment and dispersal (often within the civil population). They can fight an endless war of mines and ambushes. Because irregulars operate within the population and are usually drawn from it, they can solicit popular support or, if unsuccessful, compel popular submission.

How to fight 4GW opponents in battle:
Light infantry is the best counter to irregulars because it offers... First, good light infantry (unless badly outnumbered) can usually defeat almost any force of irregulars it is likely to meet. It can do this in a “man to man” fight that avoids the “Goliath” image. If the light infantry does not load itself too heavily with arms and equipment, it can enjoy the same mobility as the irregulars (enhanced, as necessary by helicopters or attached motor vehicles). Second, when it uses force, light infantry can be far more discriminating than other combat arms and better avoid collateral damage. This is critically important at both the mental and moral levels.

Israel's only chance to reverse this situation and win (which will be at most a limited victory, given previous blunders) in this war is to fully embrace the light infantry approach and fight this at close quarters. This means sending the tanks back to the sheds, slowing down the air campaign (limiting it to counter-battery fire), and reducing the infantry's dependence of tactical firepower support. Further, all efforts that destabilize the Lebanese state should be reversed. Of course, this will mean higher casualties for Israel and Hezbollah may get resupplied, but it will provide a path to more battlefield success which will mitigate some of the strategic consequences of abject failure.

One final note. Before this conflict is over, Israel should invite all the authors of the 4GW manual referenced above, as observers to this conflict. Further, they should then be engaged as consultants on the development of a new field manual for the IDF that supports fighting 4GW forces. Of course, Israel is free to ignore this advice, although I am not sure how many more failures like this it can absorb before it is in a completely untenable situation strategically.

Comments

[georgb]

the problem: this might cause a very large number of israeli casualties. and would they be able to kill enough hizballah fighters to prevent hizballah from regrouping and sending more volunteers? hizballah is supported by most shi'ites in lebanon, certainly has support from syria and iran (these states know damn well they are next on washington's hit list)and maybe even russia and china (both states know that washington hopes that the destruction of hizballah will hurt iran and make it easier to draw that country and it's oil and gas fields into the western dominion).
this battle is much bigger than what meets the eye. israel looks pretty screwed.

[name]

the problem is that israel DOES NOT HAVE "light infantry" able to engage the hezbollah.

i posted a rant here
http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2006/07/the_secrets_of_.html#comment-20487263

but i'll say it again:
after 60 or so years of playing big macho against defenseless civilians, against unarmed women and children, the IDF has become what it is: an ill-disciplined rabble of cowards who are easily rolled by anybody with an AK, some weeks of training and the motivation to do so.

and it is not me saying those thingsd either. the reports from palestine repeatedly confirm this view: shooting 8-year olds from 100m away, emptying a clip into the dead body of a schoolgirl, dropping a 1000Kg bomb on a civilian neighborhood because one guy lives there who could as well have been arrested, overt drug use and homosexual acts while on guard duty, raping old women and clerics, denigrating civilians for the heck of it, are things which an "army", as opposed to a criminal gang, does not do. and the civilian 'leadership' of that nation has similar problems: people who are confident in their motivations and ability to engage in and win a war dont go before the media calling for genocide. that is something deranged psychos do but not responsible people who have the best interest of their own at heart.

the problem of the IOF is not that they do not understand 3GW or 4GW. their problem is one of troop moral and one of morality on all levels, and it shows: after a month of (repeated) carpetbombing the whole place they are still fighting for some puny village some 100 meters inside lebanon ? they have to resort to kidnapping some namesake of the leader of hezbollah to be able to show something, anything, on TV ?

lets face the facts: after one month of hostilities the israelis have achieved squat on the military side of things. the only thing they've achieved is to destroy a whole country, to displace 1M or so civilians, and to commit war crimes on a grand scale. that is BTW exactly why milosevic and some of his buddies ended up in the hague or on the run.

as things stand, the IOF does not even deserve to win, and losing the war is the best service they can do to their country.

[Z]

Light infantry might be a solution. But I don't think Israel, or any other State, will try it. It's counter-intuitive. Why would a nation give up the main advantage (massive fire power) it seems to have over guerillas and instead fight "mano a mano?"

Also, how could it justify its higher casualties to its own population? The Israeli press is now calling for even MORE destruction, shelling and mass bombing, and usually blame their not insignificant casualties on their alledged 'reluctance' to strike civilians.

Finally, Israel hasn't the slightest interest in winning 'hearts and minds' in the Arab world. Too much bad blood for that now.

Such a strategy might have worked for the U.S. in Iraq had it been adopted 4 years ago. But even then its iffy.

[Z]

What is Israel's current strategy? As far as I can tell its two fold.

1) Punish Lebanon, either in the hope of it turning against Hizb, accept a humiliating ceasefire, or just to make an example of it.

2) Wear down Hizb in a war of attrition where Israel enjoys a far greater numerical advantage. It is able to rotate troops so some can fight while others rest. I don't think Hizb can do the same and even the very best fighters have to take a break from combat.

Not sure how well its working. The IDF claims to kill X number of fighters each day, up to 500 now. If true, how is it that Hizb is still fighting and inflicting casualties and firing missles that close to the border? The IDF admits to taking casualties at Bint Jbail (remember from 2+ weeks ago?) today and claims to have destroyed a "rocket launcher" in Maroun al Ras...didn't they take village that 3 weeks ago?

Its sounding quite strange. Either the Israelis are exagerating their accomplishments or Hizbullah is numerous enough to absorb 500 dead without batting an eye. Or perhaps their dead return to fight as ghosts. Has to be one of those three.

[angela]

Nearly 50 years ago General Maxwell taylor said (roughly) in guerilla war the bayonet is best, the rifle second best and never ever use artilery.

However neither we nor the Israelis can take this approach. We can't.

Note how around the world we are increasingly armored and inflexible. Our embassies are fortresses, our people restrained from moving around the population. When the president travels abroad the forces protecting him are larger than General Washington's army.

We govern Iraq from behind palace walls, out troops look like the storm trooper from sci if. Even our Green Berets are far more isolated than 40 years ago and the idea that frail tubercular Ho Chi Minh was an ideal guerilla, moving among the people is alien. We insist on muscle men, not the kind of guys that still routinely wander into the furtherest reaches and emerge. We could get better guerillas off the hippie trails, but few Americans travel them anymore. It's Europeans.

Teleology is a no no in ecological theory, but paradoxically so. Once a species has locked itself into a line of evolution it does tend to specialize and develop more.

We have a very rich body of criticism on Iraq and the mistakes. The number of troops used is only one of these and from a traditional viewpoint it is the belief that more troops would have allowed us to control more so that combined with intelligent administration we would have done better. But the right reduces this to a belief that inadequete force was used. John Podhoretz says we should have killed all Sunni men of military age. Rush says the thing is you need to kill ofs of civilians.

Israel has taken this to heart. It has decided to destroy a country. It could easily enough control ships entering and not allow those from Iran or Syria but it closes ports to all. As with the Ho Chi Minh trail it can't stop back routes, it decimates roads to stop civilians. Unlike the United States it can't respond as rockets are in the air. It hits civilian areas minutes, hours or in the case of Qana days after the rocket teams fled.

Punish them. The goal is a failed state. Exterminate the brutes or rather set up the conditions wrre thet will extirminate themselves.

The philosophy is opposite yours. It is the same defacto method rthat has occured with the Palestinians. They are dysfunctional enclabves. I don't know the extent that this is concsious though in the decades of relatively peaceful occupation Israel did little to build strong institutions and there have certainly been elements (such as sharon with his visit to the Temple that helped set off the second Interfada) that have discouraged a functional society, but it could simply be that social systems mantain balances and directions with strange cybernetic forces, that they are not directed; but whatever Israel has chosen to create a system of dysfunctional socities, divided, in which at times it can play forces; perhaps based on a Machiavellian belief that they will remain minor threats and that the terrorism they engender is low key and can be used to justify the institutional status quo; perhaps as I tried to explain above because socities have strange dynamics and the things they develop are spontaneous system patterns...

But whatever the US is chosing strategies similat to Israels.

I doubt if reason ca counter this. The number of people who believe that Iraq had WMd has risen from 36% to 50%. Irrational forces drive society.

Clear failure in Lebanon will drive similar experiments in Syria and Iran who will be blamed for the failure. And more not less of the current methods will be prescribed.

[Azrael]

The israelis lost this conflict when olmert , true to expectations , over reacted and took the bait. I'm of the opinion that hizb-e-allah knew very well that the israeelis would unleash a major air campaign against all of lebanon if they grabbed a couple of idf soldiers, in fact the israelis have been threatening to do just that for over 5 years. The hizb-e-allah was facing increasing pressure from beirut and vast segments of the lebanese population to disarm, true leb-mil would have never taken any military action against hizb-for and vice-versa; neither side would want the blame for starting another lebanese civil war. But , if hizb-for provokes the idf, and the if the isralei leader was a civilian with no history of military service fearful of apperaing weak then hizb-e-allah could have it's cake and eat it too. The idf disproportionate retaliation would destabalize the beirut government, the idf attack on lebanese soil would moot all arguments for disarming hizb-for and finally the u.s., which would inevitably side with israel, makes itself a pariah in lebanon thus removing the major backer of the cedar revolution from the political landscape of lebanon.
Idf use of light infantry won't alter these facts. The u.s. is handicapped by it's current keystone cops regime, which has proven itself repeatedly incompetent to the tasks before it on the world stage. The israelis have allowed themselves to be eaisly manipulated into serving hizb-e-allahs interests. And ultimately no matter how hard the idf shakes the rubble or how many hectares of south lebanon they occupy, hizb-e-allh will survive and flourish; worst thing you can do to a resistance army is take away it's raison-d'etre and conversely the best thing you do to them is give them a cause that will energize their base and allow them a fresh harvest of recruits devoted to seeking revenge for past wrongs. Too bad western military academies don't teach Tito, otherwise this irreversible misstep may have been avoided.
The israelis have embraced a tar-baby that offers them no victories only an array of lesser forms of defeat; stay in lebanon and spend the next couple of decades sluging it out with hizb-for( last time hizb-for was able to fight for 18 years without being defeated), accept a u.s. sponsered cease-fire that will not be accepted by hizb-e-allah and results in pretty much the same conclusion as a return to occupation, accept the arab cease-fire which will return things to the staus quo, or attempt, with the aid of the u.s., a grand bargain thst would see the cheaba farms in lebanese hands and the golan in syrian hands in return for a sadat type peace with the two. All four scenarios have 2 things in common, hizb-e-allah would consider anyone of them a victory and no israeli would consider them anything other than failures of varous degrees.
When did non-state actors become smarter then the leadership of nation-states? this will be a question asked by historians sometime in the future, the answer? may be , " the year 2006, when a rag-tag guerilla army integrating many tactics and technolgies from blending with the civilian population and exploiting the resultant media windfall to deploying cruise misslies , drones and off the self commercial dual use products was able to hold back the fourth most powerful army on the planet for....".

[subadei]

A question. As far as 4GW goes: Hasn't it's success always been reliant on a state?

[subadei]

sorry. Let me clarify. Hasn't 4GW success always been reliant on support from an organized state? Hamas/Syria, Hezbollah/Iran, etc.

[Andy]

Columbia is one area where 4GW has been successful without a state.

Al-Qaeda outside of Afghanistan has been somewhat successful without a state. I'd also argue they have been successful in Pakistan where the state ignores them.

One major common bond between the two areas are the narcotics that are used for funding.

On the flip side, one can also argue that the Kosavars were a 4GW force that was propped up by the US/NATO and narcotics.

[jamie]

"Before this conflict is over, Israel should invite all the authors of the 4GW manual referenced above, as observers to this conflict."

John, since we're doing thought experiments, what advice would you offer to hezbollah?

[Vince]

John,
The point you make may be right on the physical level. As you know in 4GW the physical level is much less powerful than the mental and moral levels.
On the moral level Israël can hardly have the high ground: it is a foreign occupation army and it is the official, US sponsored, bully of the palestinians. On the mental one Israel is a western society accustomed to comfort with much to lose in a lasting conflict (think economic depression, mass emigration).

In my sense the only viable grand strategy for Israel is to leave the occupied territories, accept the existence of a viable palestinian state and to begin developping fruitful and peaceful relationships with its neighbours, while fiercely protecting its legitimate piece of land (I must admit I'm day dreaming).

Besides that, I think the IDF (and Israel with it) has been utterly Pantagonized, and sure as the US army will stay the course of its totally failed strategy (can we still speak of strategy, ideology may be more appropriate), Israel will stay the course of its failure, because it's their nature.

[John Robb]

Jamie. Delay. Dig in. Delay. Concentrate on vehicles. Delay. Keep firing rockets. Delay. Cease fire arrives and locks in the win.

Vince, it could indeed be bureaucratic inertia.

Subadai, I agree with Andy. Independent sources of funding are proliferating (that's a trend).

Angela, fracturing states is a failed strategy, particularly in the current environment. A loss would potentially widen the conflict to include Syria and Iran (in an attempt to go after the "sources.")

Name, agree.

Z and georgeb, agree that it might not be possible. If so, they will lose this badly.

[P-]

"Of course, Israel is free to ignore this advice,... "

They will. It'll be interesting to see what element will change a deeply entrenched mentality(Israel) Defeat? A regional apocalyptic type destruction? I'm just surprised that Hez. has got an arsenal of even though crude and lack thereof guidance but non the less effective missiles. Whose to say that victory maybe determined not on the tables of diplomacy but in the warfield!? Homer would have loved this one!! Substitute the Greeks w/ Israel/U.S. meanwhile the fictitous heroes have yet to be determined nor written in...

[Bob Hope]

"Columbia is one area where 4GW has been successful without a state."

Some would disagree with this fact.

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1859842585/sr=8-1/qid=1155093854/ref=sr_1_1/104-5047723-8590354?ie=UTF8

The majority of 4GW guerrillas are funded by sovereign states with a distinct and objective goal, primarily for resources, or political gain.

Speaking of Columbia, the "war on drugs" since Regan has seen the exponetial growth of the american military complex at the cost of the american tax payers.

http://www.drugwarfacts.org/economi.htm

[thasymachos]

Part of the IDF problem is that they already fought and lost a guerilla war on this ground and against these opponents. Hizb does not meet the FMFM-1A description of irregulars that can be easily beaten by regular light infantry. Hizb is (by all accounts) experienced, professional, and confident and has won exactly this type of fight against the IDF before. This time they have the advantage of six years to prepare the battlefield.

IMO, Hizb is going to prolong the fight. I don't see why they would grant a ceasefire on Israeli terms when they can just keep on fighting knowing that eventually, Israel will cave and give them everything they want.

[Skeptic]

Disagree with Azrael's speculation on Hizb's motive for the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers. Hizb behavior is not controlled by the government in Beirut or the sectarian conflict in Lebanon. Even Iran or Syria do not fully control Hizb though they supply much of the arms and finance. Much of what I have read suggest's Ehud Olmert was prodded into overreacting by Israeli generals who had become very disturbed by the threat posed by Hizb rockets to nearby parts of Israel. Israeli generals are clearly the extremists behind the "show no mercy" tactics pursued in the current conflict. Israel is unlikely to succeed completely in their strategy but yet they are likely to prevail over their Arab enemies in the short and medium term due to their superior airpower and armored forces overwhelming advantage backed by the US political strength of the Israeli lobby. Compared to the Israeli position, the US position in Iraq is increasingly fragile as the occupation is unable to reverse the plunge into sectarian violence and civil war. This is generally acknowleged by analysts though it will take a while longer before the remaining Democratic politico holdouts acknowledge what is inevitable. Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld may never publicly admit their disastrous mistake but the generals are already facing reality as the recent Senate hearings testimonials of Abizaid and Pace demonstrate.

[Grimgrin]

angela : John Paul Vann said something simmilar about Vietnam. "This is a political war and it calls for discrimination in killing. The best weapon for killing would be a knife, but I'm afraid we can't do it that way. The worst is an airplane. The next worst is artillery. Barring a knife, the best is a rifle - you know who you're killing."

Unfortunately you get one or the other, force protection or discrimination in killing.

As for wether it's politically possible to impliment the reccomendations of this field manual, ask yorself this question "How many leaders would take steps that could lead to victory in warfare, if they knew it could cost them the next election?"

Implimenting this field manual gaurantees more casualties for western armies who try it, and that gaurantees an opponent who'se going to be waving the bloody shirt of "Soldiers who died because we held back our most powerfull weapons".

War is still politics by other means, and as long as our political systems continue to rot from the inside out, our militaries will be ineffectual on the battlefield.

[Z]

Lest we forget, Israel does have ane ace up its sleeve, namely ethnic cleansing.

They are already doing what Milosovich was alleged to have done in Kosovo (without the rapes) and on a large scale. Telling people to leave...but don't drive.

I don't have enough faith that the international community will protest strongly enough to stop it, even if modern media make what is happening crystal clear. No one has to look.

They've done the same thing in the past, most recently in 1996 , and it failed. But the U.S. is even more in lock step than in the past and will give all the needed cover.

[Mike]

Jamie, I'll offer up some ideas of what Hizbollah might want to do.

1. Infiltrate teams into Israel to destroy airfields and aircraft if possible. The point being to take away the clear advantage that Israel has - close support for their ground troops. Katyushas and sabotage.

If Hizbollah has Sa-6, Sa-7, or Stimgers I can't undertand why they have not used them or taken down any Israeli aircaft. Which leads to 2. Secure portable antiaircaft weaponry for use in Lebanon. Use it. They apparently have good antitank weaponry.

3. Use the media machine they have to being to promulgate the position taken recently by Hamid Gul - that Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are all targets of the US/Isareli regime change crowd. This could also be used to shame Egypt into some level of support - say logistics to support # 1.

4. Pray that Turkey stops making noise about crossing the border into Iraq to attack the PKK and actually does it.. (unless, that would be part of a plan to deny iran overland supply routes to Lebanon.. in that case don't pray for it... I suppose they would have to rely on Iranian intelligence for that information) The point here being to destabilize Iraq futher to split the US-Israeli and Israeli-Turkish alliances

5. (Unlikely) Appeal directly to Russia and China for arms, Sigint. Humint. Play up the Hamid Guls position of "they have a list and are checking it off" and for China spin it in terms of "you will be affected because you won't have access to energy sources to keep growing" and for Russia spin it in terms of "you will be denied a role on te world stage again if they suceed"

That's my gaming it out. Curious to see what you think.

[mark]

John,

Great post. Thought provoking as always.

[dan]

Mike

RE the Manpad conundrum. In the first few days of the conflict the IDF managed to lose either 4 or 5 aircraft( at least 3 helicopters and possibly 1 or 2 fixed wing aircraft ) - officially to "accidents". It's notable that the IDF is not using its attack helicopters in this operation - at least during daylight hours - and is flying its fixed wing aircraft at high altitudes. This suggests that there is a threat that they are mindful of.

I can't see any particular reason why Hizbullah would have access to good quality anti-tank kit, but would have neglected to source SAMS, which they could easily get from Syria or Iran. So, in all probability they have them - and the IDF is having to fight this without attack helicopters ( which they use extensively in Gaza, for example, because there's no threat to them, and where they don't lose clusters of them to mysterious accidents during offensive operations.)

FWIW, the Israeli-Turkish alliance is in poor shape these days - and there is a de facto Turko-Iranian tactical alliance against the PKK, which has seen both sides co-ordinating their activities against bases in Iraq.

[dan]

Mike

RE the Manpad conundrum. In the first few days of the conflict the IDF managed to lose either 4 or 5 aircraft( at least 3 helicopters and possibly 1 or 2 fixed wing aircraft ) - officially to "accidents". It's notable that the IDF is not using its attack helicopters in this operation - at least during daylight hours - and is flying its fixed wing aircraft at high altitudes. This suggests that there is a threat that they are mindful of.

I can't see any particular reason why Hizbullah would have access to good quality anti-tank kit, but would have neglected to source SAMS, which they could easily get from Syria or Iran. So, in all probability they have them - and the IDF is having to fight this without attack helicopters ( which they use extensively in Gaza, for example, because there's no threat to them, and where they don't lose clusters of them to mysterious accidents during offensive operations.)

FWIW, the Israeli-Turkish alliance is in poor shape these days - and there is a de facto Turko-Iranian tactical alliance against the PKK, which has seen both sides co-ordinating their activities against bases in Iraq.

[angela]

Grimgrin:

The contrary argument to force protection is that if you have the right people in the right places you need less of it.

Before Field Marshall Limbaugh ordered George Bush to make the first assault on Fallujah the Marines wanted to scatter small units among the population. Like widely dispersed beat cops they would see and hopefully get local information from the neighborhoods they controlled.

To some extent this did work in Vietnam, given the power of Shiite gangs and the many murders I'm not sure it worked in British controlled Basra.

In the ideal world you don't even need your troops to impose order just individuals who can work with the culture, make deals and offer resources. A lot of the British empire was made this way and held. Imperfect, but maybe better.

Our current society does not allow this kind of thing. Indeed the Bush administration felt no need for anything besides kids recruited at the Heritage Foundation allocating Iraqi oil money to US corporations. According to the "Assasins Gate" book they gave something like 28 million out of 20 billion *Iraqi* dollars to field commanders to finance local work concils and rebuilding.

This was big boast like Exxon spending a milion on pollution control.

So let this develop and you do need more force protection.

And because you are dealing with the place in increasingly isolated ways with most of your contact throgh sycophants who tell you how perfect you are it all escalates in a positive feedback loop.

Then the odds for disintegration increase especially because you decide the reason for failure is that you were too politically correct and as Limpbowel says need to kill more civilians or as John Podhoretz says to survive you need to be willing to kill every Sunni male (rather biblical.)

I think this tends to encourage disintegration and I suspect that's not good. Desperate Palestinians on a "diet" have little to do but kill, warlords can offer territory and now there are places for potential terrorist to wander it to and can trained, great powers tend to get entwined in one feud or another and be bled and results like we seem to be seeing in Iraq and Pakistan and possibly Afghanistan tend to support the natiest conspiracy theories about us.

Facts speak louder than declared intentions especialy when you have lots of rightists mouthing that "exterminate the brutes" should be our intention.

I don't think what we are hoping for now is a briliant redesign of strategy and tactics, byt that the old soggy moderates regain control with the compromises and cold wars and aversion to "creative destruction" and "births."

The thing is that these seem a lot easier when you have lots of force protection, you don't seem to pay. But I think the consequences of this strategy is that you may pay a lot more over time.

[Z]

Dan,

It could be that they are very mindfull of pilots being taken prisoner. It would be quite a PR faux pas to have a couple of apache pilots end up on Al-Manar TV. It may be the Israelis don't want that risk.

A separte question (to anyone interested)
1) what are the chances Israel is grossly elevating its estimate of Hizb casualties?
2) what are the chances they are less than candid about their own? The latter seems unlikely in an open society, but they do keep mum about their tank losses.

[jon]

I don't know whether the Israelis are lying about casualties caused amongst Hizb, but I am sure they are inflating the results. Probably like the body counts in Vietnam were always inflated. They are probably counting every man, I use the term rather loosely(every male over the age of 12), that they kill with a gun as Hizb. Whether they just had the gun in their house as self-defense, or are actually part of Hizb.

The other thing to consider with the body counts Israel releases is whether they are just counting who they think are Hizb fighters, or just anyone that is a member, whether they are part of the political groupings, or the relief part of Hizb. It would be like the British counting dead Sinn Fein members, and members of the relief agencies that were associated with the IRA and Sinn Fein as dead provos.

As for their own casualties, I think it would be impossible for them to lie. It is a very small country and just about everyone serves or served in the military so everyone has contacts that can tell them what really happened to their kid or the neighbor across the street. Plus they are an open country(certainly for that part of the world) and a democracy.
The actual number of tanks destroyed seriuosly damaged I wouldn't be suprised if those numbers were false, if only for operational reasons, ie they don't want to let Hizb and other opponents know just how effective or not their tatics and weapons are.

[Z]

Thanx Jon,

Another topic is how will Hizbollah's resistance, assuming it continues successfully affect their image in the Western world. People have talked a lot about Arabs and Muslims rallying behind Hizb. But how would Europe, and even the U.S., view things if after another month or so Israel is unable to point to any great accomplishment? People like underdogs, especialy when they "win." I remember a CNN.com headline after the clash at Bint Jbail that read "Hizbollah Fights Back." I found that very surprising.

So the question; What chances would anyone here give Hizb of actually winning some real respect from traditionally pro Israel media outlets? That would be a very big win if they do.

[angela]

Billmon does a piece on reported casualties in the ground fighting. It doesn't look good for Israel.

http://billmon.org/archives/002655.html

I suspect that this ground fighting is the only way to get at the rockets. Israel seems to use airpower to blow up civilian areas minutes, hours or even days after the rocket crews have fled.

Israel is risking increased militance among the Arabs. It wouldn't surprise me if oil production starts to slow perhaps for "mantainence," perhaps in open support.

It is possible that Egypt and Syria will start digging fortifications and placing tens of thousands of missles and rockets on the border in a multi year project.

The thing about the new right which Israel is imitating is that it never believes the rest of the world has any power. It finds it unfair if that power is used.

Nor does it understand most of the nature of power. I feel one area were the new right is losing so much is in the doers, the cops, the military, the diplomats who are all flawed and all in agencies in need of reform, but who make action possible. The Scowcroft rebellion is one of many warnings.

In the CIA and elsewhere we see this admiistration doing sixties Maoism, "better red than expert" but without the experts your capacity becomes crippled and there are these little muddles you didn't expect. While you've done your best to make sure even your strongest allies have resentments and concerns that will lead to much less cooperation.

And you are so wide open for so many things. Right now Gulf states buy lots of our government debt and they can stop, dramatically raising our costs. There are literally thousands of little gears in this world, but in the world according to Rush they're too complicated and so didn't exist. These people literally believe we have ground troops to invade Syria and Iran and police the border and they have no problem with the fact congress isn't coming anywhere near funding the replacement of equipment.

They live in faith based reality, which is another name for magical thinking which means that because we are a superpower chosen by God we can do anything and the test is purity of heart.

[Veteran]

All Israel has to do is to purchase plenty of products from the South Lebanese Shia-run farms and Hizbollah's support there will shrivel.

[haydar]

Whoops. 15 dead IDF, 38 wounded in one day. I don't think that a light infantry approach is going to work. Hizbullah is good enough to beat them on that level. Hizbullah also claims to have killed 13 tanks, to which the IDF says no comment. With these numbers Israel has to keep escalating to try and reach the Hizbullah breaking point, in order to claim a "win". I think they've got a long way to go. It has been stated that Hizbullah only has a few thousand fighters, but with their operational security so tight, who really knows? I am suspecting they have more depth than that, and are probably signing a lot more people up, now that this has become a patriotic war.

[Jim S]

Israel and the USA are intent on killing radical Muslims and bombing the rest into moderation. It won't happen.

To counter 4th generation warfare you need the draft to put enough rifles on the ground to kill insurgents or ethnic cleansing to decimate the local population. It is a war that can't be fought on the cheap as Israel just found out. No state can allow rockets landing on their cities. As much as they didn't plan it, Israel and its Patron are going to be drawn into ethnic cleansing which will ultimately fail because it has radicalized a billion Muslims.

[Konaman]

John
Struck by a few things:

1. That field manual was written by a bunch of western trained, likely military, personel. To wit, culturally biased ( & acceptable) solutions but out of touch with reality. Islam has already set out the doctrine for its hearts, minds and souls: it is called jihad.

2. Without redefining the notion of Mao's "sea", we have no chance. An airplane, tank, or ak are useless without knowing who the enemy is and a willingness to fully engage. In this instance, it is not some insurgency force seeking to repel colonialists (much as the theme has been beaten into us over Iraq). This is not some benevelent lot that just wants to be left in peace. If 200 Hez die tomorrow in hand to hand combat with the IDF (as suggested), do you think Iran puts its tail between its legs and shuffles off? Hell no they don't. They re-arm more foot soldiers, train them and send them off to war. The problem is far more intractable than eating soup with a knife.

3. If we hold states harboring terrorists to be culpable, why do we not hold individuals on the ground to the same standard? Got to love all those civilian casualties in Lebanon. Last I heard, harboring fugitives or aiding and abetting are crimes (in war punishable by death).
Look at the press reports surrounding the latest "terrorist" attempt.
"...bunch of asian males."

It should give every westerner pause to think that the same culture that is producing this reporting/analysis (?) is the one generating "4GW" manuals? Smart bombs(?)

4. The US isn't intent on bombing anyone into moderation (for Jim S: if they need to be bombed into moderation does that mean they are already radicalized(?)). Perhaps we should send a bunch of NY shrinks over there and work through it? Jihadist invented the suicide tactics and their culture has allowed (encouraged) it to fester and grow. Our problem isn't identifying the radicals it is dealing with supply lines (inclusive).

5. Angela - "Israel is risking increased militance among the Arabs." Mere existence did that long ago (and failed societies). I don't think the US abhors others with power, just think the US is best equipped to maintain the balance. I'll take a culturally arrogant westerner over a similiar islamicist every day of the week.

Desperate Palestinians on a "diet" have little to do but kill - good thing we have done such a good job of quelling all those desperate africans?

and on. on. on..when do we get past the anti bush tripes?

[Grimgrin]

"If we hold states harboring terrorists to be culpable, why do we not hold individuals on the ground to the same standard? Got to love all those civilian casualties in Lebanon. Last I heard, harboring fugitives or aiding and abetting are crimes (in war punishable by death)."

That logic cuts both ways. Should the people who supported Lt. Calley been fair game for reprisals from Vietnamese?

Konaman : How about the people who defended the Marine's actions in Haditha? Should we ship Alberto Gonzales off for aiding and abetting torture?

What about everyone who'se signed off on American actions in South America? Do you want to ship the survivng members of the Regan administation off to live out their lives in a Nicaraguan prison?

If you think that the goal of defeating Hezbollah and the tactics to achive that goal requres and justifies the murder of civilians, say so. But don't piss down my back and tell me it's raining.

[P-]

"Israel has taken this to heart. It has decided to destroy a country"

I'm getting an impression that Israel is confusing between actions taken based on need and that of purpose. If it even makes sense.

Hey, John got this on your other site

>>Unfortunately, Tom's voice/your's/and mine, will mean little. This war is going to be launched on the cheap or through mistake and will escalate quickly to regional scale from that point on. Think counter-insurgency from the Med to the Hindu Kush.<<

Israel did freely ignore the advice didn't they.

[steve laudig]

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HH11Ak03.html

reports that Hezboullah's "lack of structure" is it's strength.

in summary then IDF can only prevail if it does militarily [take casualties] something it cannot do politically [take casualties]. Funny they don't look Greek.

[Adam]

Well, here we are... Almost a month into the war. On one side a powerful well backed force armed with state of the art weapons. The other side is a group of bumbling amateurs with no idea of what they're doing. Its more than slighly odd that the first is Hizbollah, and the other is the Israelis; but such is history, as Condaleeza would say.

Anyway, one month into the war and Israeli military sources now say that 400 out of 1200 Hizbullah have been killed. That Hizbollah is known to have a million or so supporters, plus 20k reservists, plus everyone in South Lebanon is considered to be Hizbollah, plus whoever else the Israelis have upset in their carpet bombing campaign, is besides the point: Israel has set their numbers are 1200 and when 1200 are killed the Israelis can declare victory. If 1201 were killed that would be a disaster as it would imply that there were more than 1200 Hizbollah.

On the other hand it does mean that the Israelis are admitting that a mere 1200 people have been knocking the shit out of thousands of Israelis soldiers. If that's not embarrassing I don't know what is, because I'm pretty sure that the last time this happened was at Thermopylae. At the same time as this remarkable non-success is being celebrated by the Israelis hundreds of thousands of Israeli citizens are still under rocket fire. (Never mind the Lebanese, this is the Israeli propaganda we're looking at).

So where did it all go wrong? I think John is a little unfair when he blames it on a lack of Israeli light infantry. I think the issue is a lot deeper than that. Its about power in Israel, who has it and who uses it. In short I think its about the Israeli general staff.

The current internal fighting in the Israeli military over who is the incompetant one (I'd question the 'one'... but someone's going to have to take the rap). Anyway, the Israeli commander Halutz, has found his culprit (i.e. anyone other than him) and the finger is pointing at Udi Adam, the boss of Northern Command. The alternative would be for Halutz to admit that its his massive Douhet and Goering inspired aerial bombardment plans have gone pear shaped, and what would be the point of that? Job security is far more important than honesty.

Of course a cynic like me would say that the Israeli generals have to have a war with someone. Their skills are useless in any normal peacetime society, and they know it. Without an external threat they would lose their political standing in Israeli society. And that would never do. As a result the Israeli generals have to have a war somewhere on their borders. Lebanon now looks like it'll be good for a generation or so.

The second front of this far more important battle is the one that has now opened between the Israeli military and the Israeli goverment (at this level the attitude is: 'f==k Hizbollah, they're only going to whack some conscripts. We could lose our careers if we lose the battle and thats far more important. Look at Sharon, personally responsible for the 1982 disaster, caused Sabra, the 2nd Intifada and still got elected. Now there's a role model for a general and a politician').

Udi Adam has announced that the government tied his hands (quite how, he doesn't explain...) Olmert on the other hand says that the Israeli army had no plans for widening the campaign (basically the line is you didn't ask for nothing! Quite what plans the army actually has Olmert doesn't explain either). Biff whack pow; hand to hand fighting over whos to blame and far more vicious than anything in Lebanon currently. Truly it is said that victory has a thousand fathers, defeat is an bastard orphan, unless you can shift the blame onto someone else. In which case its his bastard child...

Anyway Olmert yesterday said that classic line of the hopeless governor: "From the first day of the war, the government has not refused the army a single request!" In other words the current position of the Israeli leader is: 'its not me running the country guv any more, its them incompetant bastards in the brass. They set the policy and objectives... not me. I'm just an observer, a disinterested viewer you might say'.

At that line Churchill would have raised an eyebrow, Lloyd George would have raised a cynical laugh. Olmert raises a rubber stamp with 'Approved' on it. Frankly the position is that the Israeli military don't even need the stamp any more, but it keeps Olmert happy. Personally I'm wondering if there's anything on the paper that he's stamping or do the military fill it in later, saving time all round.

Anyway it now appears that the Israeli army has been planning for this war for three years. This is quite reasonable as its a basic military thing to plan for wars. I'm willing to bet that somewhere in the Pentagon there's a plan for invading Canada in full South Park style. More seriously the Israeli military ran exercises to prepare for the war and I'm willing to bet the US does not do exercises called Canadian Invasion. The last Israeli exercise was a month before the war started.

Like most military plans this one didn't survive contact with reality. The concept that Hizbollah might shoot back hadn't appeared in the plans despite Hizbollah saying that they had thousands of rockets. Evidently the plans were provided by the Marx Brothers. The upshot (sorry, bad pun) was that there was no plan for dealing with the fact that right behind the Israeli military invasion were thousands of Israeli civilians. The other side of the un-planning was the economic impact of having a third the population move south. Quite a number of Israelis needed help moving, using government funded "holidays". Sooner or later the holiday fund will dry up. At that point the war had better be over or there'll be hell to pay.

So with all of that politicing going on who has time for worrying about light infantry or conscript soldiers?

[Z]

Many good comments.

It appears Israel is puting its faith in more high-tech and are asking the U.S. for M-26 cluster bombs. These, it appears toss thousands of grenade like bomblets and its hard for any one to survive in a large area. The U.S. is resisting, allegedly concerned about civilian casualties (lol) but I'm sure it will be approved.

It was leaked to the NYT so not sure if its just a psych-prop tool.

Is anyone familiar with the M-26 and could that turn the tide in Israel's favor?

[Adam]

Z,

I'm genuinely surprised that Israel is asking for cluster bombs from the US as they make their own.

http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/07/24/isrlpa13798.htm

I think that the M26 designation refers to the US made Multiple Launch Rocket System (right at the bottom of the report above) Its intended to destroy an area of a few acres with more than 8,000 small explosives, many of these fail to detonate so they create huge problems for children in the attacked area for quite some time afterwards. At this stage this is, in Israeli terms, a good thing. Anything they can do to put pressure on the Lebanese is valuable.

Quite what else the Israelis are planning to do with it in an area occupied by civilians I leave it to you to imagine. Historically it was artillery fire that destroyed the backbone of the Warsaw rising.

This is the catalogue for the launcher:
http://www.missilesandfirecontrol.com/our_products/firesupport/MLRS-M270/product-MLRS-M270.html

This is the military page for the M-26:
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/mlrs/

Its a partly British invention. We may all be very proud now...

[Z]

Thanx Adam,
That's rather disheartening. If these weapons prove effective, we will spend years hearing about those plucky israelis who wouldn't give in to 'terror.' The Polish Home Army also lost, but had better press agents than Hizb.

Still, it was probably leaked for a reason. If it were extremely effective, I think they would have employed it without warning as I'm sure they would like to kill as many Hizb fighters as possibe. Since they don't mind bombing Beirut, where there are still cameras, I doubt they worry about south lebanon where no one will even notice.

[JBHA]

John, -israeli light infantry being the solution?-

no. you have spotted the trends but have drawn half the solution. The light infantry would also have to be 'non-trinitarian' and would have to be peoples miltias, poltical commisars- kibutzers all in one. This begs the question- can 4gw only work effectivly as a defensive/deterrent tactic? In WW1 technology favoured defence, do the moral forces at work now favour defence? has warfare levelled power hierarcies so effectively as to render it useless offensively? What are the deeper philosophical ramifications? All this talk of decentralisation reminds me of many anarchist doctrines (devolve responsibility and power blah blah). remember, in the long run the societal and military environments enjoy a symbiotic, reciprocal relationship.

This Orwell link has been posted before, but it is eternally relevant.

http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/comments/c467.htm

Regards,

Keep up the good work you all

j

Remember flamethrowers from WWII?
Very effective by ground forces against bunkers. Extremly demorilizing to those receiving the flames.

[Adam]

Flamethrowers are useful, but the poor squaddies carrying them are dead men walking. Generally militaries look for people a little bit dim to carry these things. They're highly visible, they can explode, and they can really hurt the defender. Unsurprisingly every defender in sight looks to shoot the flamethrower guy, or better yet the backpack. Making the flamethrower guy burn to death is a really good way of discouraging them. Effectively flamethrower guys are bait, in the time it takes them to fry other soldiers can move a little more effectively.

And in latebreaking news a followup to an earlier story:

http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2006/07/quote_systems_d.html#comment-20449236

Khiam, 2 miles from the Israeli border has now fallen (the Israelis were on the outskirts last night). That means it took a month to move 2 miles to the old IDF prison torture / facility - now the Lebenese Museum of National Remembrance.

Even so the advance is hardly impressive. Now lets look at garden snails. Don't worry its relevant...

http://hypertextbook.com/facts/AngieYee.shtml

Taking the top figure. At 0.013 m per second garden snails go 0.78m a minute, 46.8m in an hour, 1123.2m a day. If we assume 2 miles is 3km then the Israeli army, in one month, has travelled the same distance as a snail in 3 days.

The new IDF - ten times slower than a snail.

At the same time Israeli bombing has still not been effective. Its killed cartloads of civilians but the Hizbollah television station (al-Manar) is still on air. In the last 2 days Israeli has been blasting anything with a history of telecommunications (operational or not) in order to locate the broadcast centre. This target list has included a lighthouse and the old 1930s French mandate radio station transmitter. Both are in Beirut and far outside Hizbollahs area. The radio transmitter got hit by two advanced missiles.

The fact that a) Hizbollah TV is still there and b) the Israelis have no means of stopping it is disturbingly interesting to say the least. We're talking about Israel not being much cop against 4GW, and that's true. But I have my doubts about their abilities at modern 3GW too.

[Marcello]

Some comments

"That's rather disheartening. If these weapons prove effective, we will spend years hearing about those plucky israelis who wouldn't give in to 'terror.' The Polish Home Army also lost, but had better press agents than Hizb."

MRLS equipped with DPCM rounds are devastating weapons against targets caught in the open.The submunitions have small shaped charges that can pierce the top armor of conventionally designed tanks while at the same time generating enough shrapnel to kill advancing infantry.That's what they are designed for and that's what they do best.They have at the same time many drawbacks among which low accuracy, low rate of fire and the inability to deal efficiently with several types of covers and field fortifications, to name a few.
They are devastatingly effective tools for certain tasks, wonder weapons they are not.

On antiaircraft weapons.
Antitank and antiaircraft weapons are two very different animals.The tank is an heavily armored target wandering on the ground at relatively low speed, the plane is a thin skinned object traveling in the air at hundreds of km per hour.This requires very different approaches regarding warheads, guidance, size and so on.Suffice to say that an effective antitank weapon will be much,much cheaper and simpler than an effective antiaircraft weapon.A RPG-29 or a Krizantema (the state of the art in terms of AT weapons) are within the scope of guerrilla operations.Decent air defense systems are
not.The short range IR SAMs that non state force can deploy are only marginally effective against planes,as the laws of physics and technological limitations are set against them,generally forcing a strafing plane to break off the from attack run and execute evasive manouvres is all you can generally hope for.Occasionally you may actually shoot down a plane but you are better not betting on that.

[Marcello]

Some comments

"That's rather disheartening. If these weapons prove effective, we will spend years hearing about those plucky israelis who wouldn't give in to 'terror.' The Polish Home Army also lost, but had better press agents than Hizb."

MRLS equipped with DPCM rounds are devastating weapons against targets caught in the open.The submunitions have small shaped charges that can pierce the top armor of conventionally designed tanks while at the same time generating enough shrapnel to kill advancing infantry.That's what they are designed for and that's what they do best.They have at the same time many drawbacks among which low accuracy, low rate of fire and the inability to deal efficiently with several types of covers and field fortifications, to name a few.
They are devastatingly effective tools for certain tasks, wonder weapons they are not.

On antiaircraft weapons.
Antitank and antiaircraft weapons are two very different animals.The tank is an heavily armored target wandering on the ground at relatively low speed, the plane is a thin skinned object traveling in the air at hundreds of km per hour.This requires very different approaches regarding warheads, guidance, size and so on.Suffice to say that an effective antitank weapon will be much,much cheaper and simpler than an effective antiaircraft weapon.A RPG-29 or a Krizantema (the state of the art in terms of AT weapons) are within the scope of guerrilla operations.Decent air defense systems are
not.The short range IR SAMs that non state force can deploy are only marginally effective against planes,as the laws of physics and technological limitations are set against them,generally forcing a strafing plane to break off the from attack run and execute evasive manouvres is all you can generally hope for.Occasionally you may actually shoot down a plane but you are better not betting on that.

[Z]

Well,

It appears there is no ceasefire as Israel expands it offensive to 4 divisions and plans to stay untill 'international forces arrive.' That could be a while. They aren't waiting for MRLS.

They have also shut off electricity to Tyre and Sidon. I guess the plan, as I thought erlier is to starve Lebanon into submission. Seems all that talk of ceasefire was smoke and mirrors.

Now it will be a classic guerrilla war.

[Chris]

"Therefore, we must learn how to preserve enemy states at the same time that we defeat them." - 4GW

"Thus one who excels at employing the military subjugates other people's armies without engaging in battle, captures other people's fortified cities without attacking them, and destroys other people's states without prolonged fighting. He must fight under Heaven with the paramount aim of 'preservation'. Thus his weapons will not become dull, and the gains can be preserved. This is the strategy for planning offensives." - Sun Tzu

[Dimitar Vesselinov]

There are two successful ways to fight against terrorists and insurgents:

- the British way (N. Ireland)
patience, law, police force

- the Syrian way (Hama)
violence, terror, army

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Northern_Ireland
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_IRAs
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hama_Massacre

[Z]

"There are two successful ways to fight against terrorists and insurgents:

- the British way (N. Ireland)
patience, law, police force

- the Syrian way (Hama)
violence, terror, army"

Which of these two methods did the Russians employ in Afghanistan and Chechnya? Can you evaluate their success?

[ian]

so there is a dichotomy with declining power of the state and the rise of non state actors engaging in 4gw, while the suggested answer seems to be the light infantry approach.
well, that light infantry either consists of drafted troops or a professional army. the drawback of the drafted troops is that there's a declining element, identification with the nation's war aims. Because the concept of the nationstate seems to be dissipating. So on the one hand we have non state actors with an identity and ideology, on the other hand.... not much.
it seems that a rethinking of the nation state and what it stands for is a necessary element/precondition of succesfully fighting 4gw.

[MDE]

Chris: Nice re-orienting remarks with the quotations.

Konaman: You have some pretty good comments there. The "4GW" crap really needs to stop. There are very successful tried and true concepts for Counter-insurgency (COIN), Guerrilla Warfare (GW) and Counter-Geurrilla Operations (CGO), Unconventional Warfare (UW), Foreign Internal Defense (FID)/ Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) strategies and campaigns. They were all written (by western authors) prior to 1963. The Asians had their library pretty much compete by WW2 (started 1500 years ago)by Mao Tse Tung, Ho Chi Minh, and other lesser names. The British had theirs written by TE Lawrence, though they they conventionally rejected the precepts from his articles, journals and his "Seven Pillars of Wisdom" until the 1950s and later when they were confronted by major problems in the colonies (a great example is Malaya). Even Saddam Hussein had his COIN and UW/GW manuals.

Most notably for the Americans is the USMC Small Wars Manual of 1940, as well as the other side of the coin (no punintended) as the conduct of UW/Insurgency/COIN was all-encompassingly recorded in the various 31-series manuals by US Special Forces from 1951 through 1963. It was a direct out-growth of the CIA and USSF split from the dissolution of the OSS after WW2. And that institutional knowledge came from the multi-cultural application of those theories by the British SOE and America's OSS in France with the Maquis resistiance, the SOE in Yugoslavia and by Detachment 101 in Burma.

The current UW manual (though classified) accounts for these various concepts without re-writing the doctrine for each (don't bother reading the old one -- it was a political document that was forced on the SF community by a 1990's politically-correct distaste for all things unconvetional and, therefore, dirty). Now, that being said, all the realistic and useful concepts from "4GW" are already accounted for by the publications. COL Hammes' publications are nothing more than re-discovery by the conventional military and political leadership of things already taught by a few in the military school houses and neglected by most in practice.

I am reminded of a quotation:
"There is nothing new under the sun, but lots of old things we don't know" -Ambrose Bierce, in "The Devil's Dictionary"

This is not the first time we have re-created the wheel with this. In the late 1960s and 1970s California Gov. Ronald Reagan commissioned Raymond Momboisse to research and write a paper to instruct and familiarize state officials in the seeds of social discontent and the actions, conditions and other indicators of disenfranchisement shifting toward discontent toward unrest and, eventually, upheaval and rebellion. This was in response to the explosive growth of the various California university system-based student revolutionary movements such as Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) (which later split in 1973-74 into the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Weather Underground (aka the Weathermen) -- remember Patty Hearst?). The result of Momboisse's work was the seminal "Blueprint of Revolution." This is (in my opinion) a landmark book and seems to be a big secret. It is also hard to get a hold of, unfortunately. Read this book to understand the social dynamic of unconventional or asymetrical warfare (lately known as 4GW). As far as what to do about it from the all perspectives of national power (military, political, economic and information) our current (dated but still relevant) IDAD doctrine covers it.

Another big problem is the continued lack of emphasis in the conventional military concerning these topics. The institutional ignorance is what allows for things like "4GW" to take hold without realizing that we already "knew" this stuff. The US Army Infantry is the proponent agency for COIN doctrine development and enforcement. Yet, they do not teach it anywhere. SOF teaches it, specifically, SF teaches it. I can not speak for the Marines, but the Army infantry does not teach it to their officers. The infantry seems to enjoy keeping their officers educated at the FM 7-8, 7-7J, 7-10 and -20 levels (infantry light and mechanized tactics at the squad, platoon, company and battalion). The next level of schooling is at ILE (formerly known as Command and Gen Staff College or CGSC), and they barely even mention that UW, COIN or anything besides division-level operations exist.

I, also, would like to see the Bush-bashing, and other specific derisive comments about or toward political leadership, foreign and domestic, stop. Please. That is a waste of time considering the brainpower engaged in this forum.

Adam: Don't get caught up in quantitive metrics. You can influence, secure or control a town or area without seizing it. Contrary to what the techno-wizards think, the world does not boil down to math. Humans do not work that way. Human-designed systems may operate more or less according to an algorithm, but that completely disregards the qualitative nature of the human brain and its perceptions. That mentality -- in the poitical and military realms -- is a big part of the reason why we are having problems in Iraq. We started off the war with the wrong measuring stick.

John and Sudabai: External sponsorship is an absolute necessity for an unconventional warfare campaign to succeed and thrive. State or non-state status is not a discriminator. Situation dictates what is needed (money, sanctuary/safe haven, training, etc.) and the movement that thrives, finds it. In this ever more connected world, geography is less and less important as compared to connectivity. John, you did a decent job describing this in your "bazaar" and "stygmerigic learning" concepts. The Hawalla system, for example, is part of this that covers the economic aspect of power. That is also part of the battleground that we are engaged in (vis a vis the NSA's and DoJ's monitoring of the world's financial transactions).

The apparent lack of "external" sponsorship (Colombia and Afghanistan) is an interesting twist, though not entirely accurate. The Taliban had the Pakistani Intelligence to back them up, indeed, they created them from scraps, more or less. The FARC and the cartels mooched off anyone they could find until they met each other and fell in love. Now, though, they have Hugo Chavez and all of the land and security resources of Venezuela at their disposal in another marriage of convenience since they both seek to balance their power against the USA. That is why Brother Hugo kicked the DEA out last year, among other things.

Now, one of the biggest problems we have in this forum is that we are analyzing with the assumption we have all the facts. The first assumption we must make is that we do not and will not ever be privy to even a predominance of facts, let alone a majoity or all of them. All we know about Israeli goals and objectives are what we see in the media. These are not their real goals and objectives. Those are most assuredly classified and what we get is a version of selected pieces of information that is designed and marketed for an effect: it is an Information Operations campaign. Ehud Olmert and his military and political advisors and planners know full and well that they can not "destroy" Hezbollah, yet he stated this as one of the aims of this campaign. Why would he do that? Simple: he wants to create and effect, to give and impression. In another way, he wanted to state an ideal. We are not on the ground in the Shebaa Farms area or on the north bank of the Litani River. If anyone knows of a blog or a site that has first-hand info, that would help us out a lot. I'll post one as soon as I find it.

[Marcello]

"Which of these two methods did the Russians employ in Afghanistan and Chechnya? Can you evaluate their success?"

The situations are not really comparable.
The Hama affair was for example an internal insurrection by islamists against the "secular" government. Algeria found itself in a vaguely similar situation back in the 90's.In both cases the residual legitimacy of the state enabled it to fight and win.The soviet-afghan war was a foreign intervention and in that case different dynamics kick in.As far as I have understood while the soviets were quite ruthless at the tactical level, with a very liberal use of mine warfare, artillery etc at the strategic level after the initial intervention and mission creep phase they adopted a defensive stance.They tried to keep the committment to a minimum and radical war winning solutions, like mass deportations, were rejected.