Quote: Hezbollah and the Inversion of Legitimacy

"Hezbollah's strength (derives from) the gross vacuum left by the state." Hezbollah is not a state within a state, but rather "a state within a nonstate." Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, a professor at the Lebanese American University.
John Kifner. "Hezbollah Leads Work to Rebuild, Gaining Stature." The New York Times. August 16, 2006.

It's clear that Hezbollah has advanced in more than the violence of 4GW, it is also demonstrating an ability to solidify its position by providing sys-admin like functionality (ala Barnett's "Blueprint for Action" and my "State Failure 101"). There is an important cycle that inverts legitimacy at work here:

• In order to fight a non-state enemy, other states hollowed out a state. Whether Hezbollah is at fault or not is a non-issue.
• The non-state enemy proves (through 4GW) it is the only force capable of defending the people.
• the non-state builds alliances with other non-states and states to gather essential support.
• The non-state provides services (political goods) at a higher level of efficiency and value than the state (sys-admin).

In short, Hezbollah gains legitimacy at the expense of the state. Expect to see this cycle again and again from 4GW groups (in contrast, networked non-states like al Qaeda operate in a different way entirely -- although many conflate the two approaches).

Comments

[Vince]

A good illustration of your post :
http://news.yahoo.com/s/csm/ohelpinghand

"We don't believe in the government, we believe only in Sheikh Hassan [Nasrallah]. He is our government."

[John Robb]

Barnett agrees:

http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/archives2/003594.html

[Azrael]

Children being reared in the hizb-e-allah social structure(healthcare,education,masjid,etc) will owe their first loyalty to the hizb-e-allah. They will of course consider joining hizb-mil more legitmate and socially acceptable then joining the armed forces of a distant and highly marginal state centered around beirut.

On a non-sequitor, I remember reading once that the long term viability of a state is dependent primarily on the means by which said polity chooses it's leaders. If the process exists for selecting competent or even semi-competent leaders fiercely loyal to the state, much as occured during the roman empire, then the polity is almost eternal. If on the other hand the selection process is disconnected from performance such as in a monarchy then the system is doomed to failure in the long run where the genetic crap shoot is bound to stumble upon a dud.
In the modern era of republics of various stripes, we can see that systems such as lebanon are doomed to collapse. It's form of government is for the most part a complicated means of sharing power between various ethno-religious sub-groups. Success for the government in beirut is achieved when it does nothing, nothing to offend it's various neo-tribal factions, whether that entails allowing hizb-e-allah to maintain it's arms, allowing the the druze warlord and his clique to get away with various abuses of the government positions they've been awarded as part of the payola of the system , or allowing various other blantant acts of corruption and nepotism a la harrari to go unpunished all for the maintance of the semblance of national unity.
Hizb-e-allh suffers from none of these ailments of modernity, rather it is a very focused organization which so far seems to have in place a mechanism for selecting competent and very commited leaders.
On a more personal note, one could also ask if the u.s. has in place a system for selecting competent leaders whose first loyalty is not just the state , but also the ideals of the state? If not, you can wager your last guider , the iranains do have a system for selecting effective and shrewd leaders. Whereas the u.s. body politic is content to allow a draft avoider into the oval office, the iranians have selected a veteren of their war as their leader , an ex-commando well aquainted with the unorthodox portfolio of warfare. Whereas the u.s. body politic is content to allow a college drop out to be president, the iranians have selected a college professor as their leader. Whereas the u.s. body politic is untroubled by having a president whose indebtiness to various corporations is hotly debated, the iranians have selected an astectic who choses to live a spartan life commited to civil duty.
I would opine , that under these circumstances, the blow suffered to u.s. interests by the israeli-hizb-e-allah war becomes not only more understandible, but even predictable. In this era of networks, leadership still counts, maybe even more so than before.

[Chris]

Great points. This is also instructive as to what approach we should have been doing in Iraq. I'm sure you've read Brian Humphreys' Op Ed in Saturday's Washington Post.

[John Robb]

The humpty dumpty principle applies to states much more than to non-state groups, since their basis for loyalty (cohesion) is typically much more tenuous (at least in the current environment).

http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2005/08/journal_the_hum.html

[Puzzack]

Sure they'll help.

But not if you are christian, Druz or even sunni.

very legitimate.

[MDE]

Azrael,

The Iranians also have a tool of the Ayatollah as their leader. That is all he is. He is a "legitimate" mouthpiece on the world stage for the religous rulers of that obsolete country. That is the only way he could be their president: he is useful and allowed to hold such office until he is no longer useful. He is religiouslyultra-conservative, he was "elected" (read that as "selected") on a hardline, populist platform in accordance with the Revolution's ideology. Do not be fooled by the Iranian "elections." He is a stooge. Iran an excellent example of a dysfuntional democracy and is what happens when you combine traditional Islamic culture with democracy without modernization.

No, I am not equating modernization with westernization, but western ideals (ie: representational government of, by and for the people) are not synchronous with traditional Arab (or Persian) culture. I'll leave it at that for the sake of stimulating conversation later.

As far as our (American) process for selecting leaders who hold to heart the ideals of our nation (e pluribus unum) and state, we have a system that assists our country in immeasurable ways: the service academies (aka the US Military Academy at West Point, US Naval Academy at Annapolis, The US Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs, the Cost Guard Academy at New London and the US Merchant Marine Academy at King's Point).
Since you obviously do not understand this system, I shall explain: the system draws from the highest percentiles of American academic, athletic and leadership achievers, provides them with educations commonly considered to be on a par with the elitest civilian schools in the western world, builds upon and refines the already-existing sense of duty, loyalty, service, sacrifice, honor, fortitude, righteousness, and above all, patriotism. And then they serve. They sacrifice. They deploy. They fight. And some die. They miss much of what we commonly refer to as "life" because of their calling to do for others that which they can not do for themselves. They allow this country, and, in turn, the world to function as an unrestricted market of ideas, opportunities and solutions. These graduates do not sit around; they do things and they lead. And they do not quit until they have died or things are made right. When an American is accused of sitting around waiting for others to hand stuff out to them or waiting to be saved from the wolves at the door, who toils to allow that person to exist and, indeed, thrive based on his or her principles or lack thereof? These graduates drive this great country to greatness; they save it in times of crisis. No other institution in the western world does this on this scale or to this standard of greatness.

(yeah, I have been drinking the kool-aid.)

[MDE]

Hizbollah's continued consolidation of its power base in southern and Eastern Lebanon will only perpetuate its own systems, indeed, it will thrive. But even that is artificial as the source of its funding is not itself and not even legitimate local taxation (a form of loyalty demonstrated by the population). Hizbollah appeals as long as it is doing something for someone. I guarantee there are disaffected people who live in that area (not just Christians and Sunnis) who are upset at Nasrallah.

We (USA) need to jump in there as soon as possible and start our own UW compaign. but, the twist needs to be that it is in support of a FID campaign in Lebanon, lest we simply create turmoil without solution. That means we need to have an Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) strategy. And that depends on Dept of State and the embassy's relationship with President Emile Lahoud. We (Americans) could get aid in there in less than a week, there is no better diguise for a knife than a helping hand (Hizbollah knows and is acting on this).

I envision the strategic campaign looking something like this:

Phase 1: Psychological preparation and emergency aid delivery.

Phase 2: Security force deployment and intelligence preparation.

Phase 3a: Relief operations and intelligence picture development.

Phase 3b: Relief operations and combat operations.

Phase 4: Relief operations and assessment.

Phase 5: Stability Operations and Support Operations (as in support to the Lebanese government to re-establish itself as the state in this area, all the while the previous operations continue in their cycles)

Phase 6: Transition and/or redeployment.

As regions progress through the phases the local commanders can adjust their plan. Key note: the commanders do NOT have to have simultaneous progression to the next phase, as each area may accept their presence differently and the environment may improve or degrade differently in different areas. (note: If anyone is interested, I can develop this further, but, if not, then se la vie.)

But, I'm sure that bureaucratic inertia and lack of institutional agility (and lack of dynamic presidential leadership) will win the day and we will lose this opportunity as well. Well, in the end we will be able to say we didn't even try.

[Adam]

MDE,

Um... Hizbollah collect taxes just fine and have done for around 20 years. Lebanon had a civil war going for the 1980s and 1990s and everyone had to pay for it; result taxes. Its something governments tend to do, even local governments. The Israelis gave money directly to their SLA troops, but that never really caught on with the rest of the Lebanese militias.

The only problem with your plan is that its a plan intended to benefit the Americans, and only the Americans. The Lebanese get to play the "Iraqi-victim" role in your plan. In short its a military occupation, without the actual issue of fighting the war or having any popular support on the ground. As such it relies on Americans to do it, and the Lebanese to help. And the problem with that is that the only kind of American in Southern Lebanon is either the liberal types with the NGOs or "the dead, dying, or soon to die" kind.

I hesitate to ask this but you do understand that the Israelis are US backed? That they were using US-made bombs, missiles, and planes to kill Lebanese civilians? That most of the bombing was miles away from Hizbollah sites; and a lot of it was in the Christian North?

Whilst there might be Lebanese people who today don't like the Hizbollah leadership there probably isn't a double figures number of Southern Lebanese people who now likes the US. I'm sure that one Lebanese can be found who thinks that George Bush is lovely, after all not everyone liked De Gaulle, Churchill or George Washington - they all had enemies. But its really hard to like the people who killed your kids.

Try this for a thought: The Lebanese have just suffered the rough comparison of eighty thousand US dead. Thats 80k, including 30% kids, not the namby-pamby 9/11 3k adult dead, or the 60k-odd Britain lost in the Blitz. (the reason that I point out the adult/child issue is that makes a difference - if kids die adults tend to express their irritation immediately whilst underage kids normally wait a few years if their parents die before getting revenge).

Now if the Taliban offered a few street sweepers to clean up the mess of the former world trade centre (only on the condition that the Americans convert to extreme Sunni Islam, of course) how annoyed would New Yorkers be? The Lebanese now have a lot more reasons to hate than the Americans ever did.

I'm just asking these things because your plan founders on these simple issues. A quick chat to the government isn't going to change the fact that the US's preferred client state was invading Lebanon for the second time in 25 years and it lost, also for the second time in 25 years. Specifically it lost to Hizbollah, for the second time in 25 years. That doesn't bode well for a sudden conversion of the locals to a pro-US, pro-Israeli point of view.

In reality sending US troops into Lebanon is simply asking for some dead US troops. With Iraq being a total flop does the US have the troops to waste on sideshows? The recent movement of US troops into Bagdhad required that the entire force spend an extra 3 months in Iraq. This does not mean that the US has troops to waste in Lebanon particularly as the upcoming invasion of Iran is so soon.

[Johan van Rooyen]

Great analysis, Azrael - a pleasure reading your contribution!

Adam, very altruistic of you being so patient with MDE but don't you (and you of course JR) think that, as Seymour Hersh suggests in his latest piece this Lebanese "dress rehearsal" has gone very badly wrong and the chances of an imminent US war against Iran have now been significantly reduced?

[syberberg]

Adam,

"Try this for a thought: The Lebanese have just suffered the rough comparison of eighty thousand US dead. Thats 80k, including 30% kids, not the namby-pamby 9/11 3k adult dead, or the 60k-odd Britain lost in the Blitz. (the reason that I point out the adult/child issue is that makes a difference - if kids die adults tend to express their irritation immediately whilst underage kids normally wait a few years if their parents die before getting revenge)."

Well said, it's the one thing that most Americans just don't understand never having had a full-blown air campaign targeting civilian populations happen above their heads, nor actually having suffered an invasion in living memory, particularly one that includes modern (by which I mean the technology level relevant to the time) military.

You're right, 9/11 doesn't count as it was a one off incident and nor does the Blitz because

a) the children were evacuated to the country, and
b)the Luftwaffe couldn't reach all of the UK.

And you're quite right about the view of America in the Middle East, at best it's motivations are not trusted and at worse it's a lethal hatred for. All becuase of America's actions and support of Israel at the expense of Israel's neighbours.

Otherwise I agree with you.

[Duncan Kinder]

Hypothetical: Let us suppose that I am affiliated with the Zoastrian Liberation Front (ZLF).

The goal of the ZLF is to re-establish the empire of Cyrus the Great and to impose Zoastrian values on the MidEast.

I obviously oppose Hezbollah's rebuilding efforts in Lebanon for much the same reason that the insurgents in Iraq have opposed the United States' rebuilding efforts.

Could the ZLF sabotage Hezbolla's efforts by using the same tactics now be used agaist the United States in Iraq?

If not, why not? Is there something about Hexbolla's non-state status or some other feature that would render ZLF sabotage futile?

[ptcruiser100]

Azrael> Whereas the u.s. body politic is content to allow a draft avoider into the oval office...

This is an extremely minor point in terms of the entire thrust of your argument, which I found appealing. I don't care that this particular person avoided the draft. I resisted the draft during the Vietnam era and I am not ashamed or the least bit embarrassed about it. (I would have resisted being drafted during any era.) What bothers me about the individual you refer to is that he lied about what he did and he continues to lie about it. But what can you expect from someone who said he smoked the demon weed but didn't inhale.

[Elambend]

Why is Hezbollah not state, if it can collect taxes and hold an almost monopoly on violence; especially given their very highly organized structure? Also, their actions against Israel were often at atleast platoon level if not bigger.

Ultimately, to achieve their goals, they have to take on more and more functions as a state; and when they do, they become more vulnerable to the same tactics that they used to reach that pinacle.

[Ros]

Hezbollah as a state would still practise Unrestricted War. The West cannot come to terms with the fact that the rules of "civilised war" that it has burdened itself with mean that it cannot defend itself against the likes of Hezbollah, as either a non-state actor, or as a weak paranoid state.

This edge of chaos system has many surprises in it yet. The parlous state of Syria, and the economic, and ethnic difficulties that Iran has may well mean that this war, and its cost, past and future for Iran, may well mean that Iran could implode.

It isn't over yet. Now Nasrallah has to come up with the goodies, arguing that Lebanon can increase its foreign debt from 35 billion to 40 billion to do so doesn't suggest he has got the money, the promise of the money, or any ideas. And Iran has to stabilise itself, politically, socially and economically. Said that arming hezbollah has cost it 5-6 billion, and it has been withdrawing billions in gold. Plus

"2006-01-22
Swiss banking giant UBS AG said Sunday it has stopped doing business with Iran because of the company's economic and risk analysis of the situation in the country.

UBS will no longer deal with individuals, companies or state institutions such as Iran's central bank, said company spokesman Serge Steiner. A similar policy is also being implemented in the case of Syria, he said.

All existing business with customers in Iran will be canceled'

This might be the butterfly's wing flap. Israel is the state that has improved its stability, given itself a period of equilibrium, and increased its value to others.

[Azrael]

-MDE
I'm quite beyond good or evil, them or us or the concept of perfect solutions. I'm more than content with slop that works in a reasonable period of time as opposed to a perfect description of the political process of the u.s. and iran. Forgive my broad brush that glosses over the labyrinth of egalitarian instituions that litter both the u.s. and iran, but for the sake of brevity and real politik , i thought it would be prudent to stick to the meat of the issue. And keep in mind, i'm merely drawing a comparison as opposed to a judgement.
yes, the kool-aid is quite impressive

-ptcruiser100
Your observation on the president's character was what i should have said and i profusely apoligize if i implied that it somehow reflects poorly on the character of an individual if they take a principled stance against participating in a conflict. No one should be forced to bear arms and take the life of a fellow human being unless he/she is sufficiently confident that it is the correct course of action.

Duncan Kinder
I believe mao tse tung put it best when he said that humanity was like an ocean and the successful guerilla must learn how to swim this ocean like a fish. Hizb-e-allah, a shia group, has a large shia population in s.leb who are willing to be lookouts, spies , porters and continually offer forth their sons to make good hizb-mil's battlefield losses.
Likewise, the sunni insurgency in iraq has a similar, if far inferior( no major state sponsor), support base.
Now, i'll have to presume that there is a population of zorastrians in s.leb willing to render similiar support unto your proposed zlf. Personally, i don't know how large this population of zorastrians is currently, but if they gave support to some group like your proposed zlf in hizb-e-allah's mini-police-state/ultra neighborhood watch backyard, i could give you a pretty accurate number of how many zorastrians will survive.

[Marcello]

"Israel is the state that has improved its stability, given itself a period of equilibrium, and increased its value to others."

I have my reservations about things being so rosy for Israel on the economic front.
The 5-6 billions is what the Hizballah says or just a random estimate?

[confusedponderer]

Azrael,
I wouldn't belittle the Iraqi tribal and Baathist Sunnis. They have stood in direct confrontation with the US for three years now, and now increasingly with the Siites, and they still fight. The Baathists seem to have done a few things right about their discipline and OpSec. I think their conspirative and military background, and their recent combat experience help.
When they seem to lack Hezbollah's operational finesse, that's likely because they didn't have 20 years to work on it. And I hope they won't.

The Kurds seem to be closing in on Hezbollah's level. They have taxes, state services, they govern, and their miltary seem to have both cohesion and skill - in the US they even have a state sponsor whom they land their troops - and all the time they are pursuing their interest and would turn on their sponsor if neccessary. Vietnam was Cina's client and still clashed with China when the latter tried to impose it's will on them. In this sense the Sino-Vietnamese war was the tomb stone of the domino theory. The global Iranian-Syrian-Al Quaeda conspiracy dorks should note that there is a difference between unity and synergy.

I would be careful to label all this a 4th GW phenomenon. It's all along the lines of armed popular struggle as lined out by Giap. Popular or revolutionary movements and internal wars of secession aren't new. It has only become amplified by modern technology and global communications.
Instead of birth-pangs of the New Greater Middle East (tm) we see the death-throes of the old colonial order and it's artficial borders - that at least for Iraq and Ceylon. I don't think it's the death bell for the state.
The funny thing is that the probably most successful oh-so chaotic 4th GW players, the Tamil Tigers, Hezbollah and the Kurds, have been striving toward the goal of ultimately becoming a state. That should be a comfort compared to stateless chaos.

The thing the Pentagonistas who plan for intervention in 'failed states' don't tell you, is that the collapsed states will not be free of players, but free of players the US will want to do business with. Of course there is the question to which extent they can be dealt with, because they might be unwilling to deal with the US. I think, if they have something to defend, they can.

The genie of the right of self determination of the people has IMO proven the deadliest and most destabilising idea of the last century. If order through stability was what the old Westfalian System wanted to create, Wilson has spelt out the most corrosive idea possible, for what? To justify the dismembering of Imperial Germany and the Austro-Hungarian empires. Today they would probably call it 'blowback'.

[MDE]

Azrael, Adam, et al,

You are demonstrating the same thing that you did in the "It's not too late for Israel" thread. You are obviously intelligent, thoughtful and well-studied, but your sources I fear are not giving you the whole story.

Do you know how Hizbollah taxation got started? For one, it started exactly as the mafia and gangland bosses of the 1920s --- extortion -- under the guise of the Qoms/Khoms taxation system where every Shia male is required to pay a tax which eventually ends up in Najaf, Iraq or Qoms, Iran. After that, it is spent and allocated by the religious leadership (read that as IRGC) in accordance with their priorities. Iranian priority=destruction of Israel=support to Hizbollah. Other Iranian Qoms tax priorities are indoctrination of youth, enforcement of IRGC policies and training and education of religious elite. I, for one, believe that a good portion of the funding (though overall not a large percentage) for some of the Hizbollah network development into South America and, from there, North America comes from this also. Taking advantage of a BS religious "requirement" and strong-arming a population out of their money is not a legitimate form of taxation. People do it nominally now because a)it is the norm and the expectation because it was enforced for so long, and b) they don't dare stop due to dire consequences. Contrary to what some apologists would have you believe, the majority of funding and support comes from Iran, Syria and outside Lebanon. Now, as Hizbollah solidifies its support base, people won't question it anymore.

As for the leadership comparison, yeah, I would tend to agree with you. We are a reflection of our society and what we let our government get away with. Forgive my presumption about the other stuff about that topic.

Yes, I readily acknowldge that Israel is US-backed, seen as such by the Arabs and also that they grossly mispercieve that just about everything that Israel does is a puppet-movement directed by the Americans. To what extent that is or is not true is irrelevent.

As far as your assessment of my plan, I'll give you this: aid benefits everyone it goes to, to include the enemy, and the entire endstate of the operation would be to enable Lebanon to stand on its own three left feet (since that is what its government seems like) and we do as much as we can insofar as military and civil-military assistance. It would have to have more than just the Lebanese face on it, it has to be something to counter the Hizbollah influence. That is a very long-term arrangement. And the real (perceived) impact must be that significant. The rest is not up to people like me, rather, the American people as a whole.

As far as what I mean, I recommend you Google and read the Atlantic Monthly article "Imperial Grunts" by Robert Kaplan. That will also help you understand an important part of the Philippines discussion we were having. I wish he would have written a string of articles of that on-the-ground nature -- it was a very good start. There are probably six other countries about which he could have written something similar -- success stories all or at least success stories in the making.

And, yes, everything we must do must benefit Americans first. That is the nature of a government, diplomacy and the military. Does it matter to Joe Schmo more that a Lebanese kid is allowed to self-actualize or that Southern Lebanon is no longer a safe haven or training ground for Hezbollah who is trying to kill you and me? Since we can't "fix" Lebanon -- only the Lebanese can do that -- we must choose our priorities in accordance with our bare minumum desires for the reagion. I used to believe that we (America) have infinite resources. I still do, but we while our resources away by our internal politics.

No, I disagree that Iraq is a total flop -- yes, it has been grossly mis-handled by the politicians, Paul Bremer, and the general officers over there and in the Pentagon. There are serious eduation issues with the policy-makers when it comes to IDAD, FID and COIN, but the only solution I see is for the current generation of senior officers to retire, get out of the way and let the two generations of officers who have been growing up since the mid-nineties get in charge. Now, the caveat to my statement: any insurgency/COIN fight will be long and ugly. That is the nature of insurgency, and there is no avoiding it. Democracies do not fare well in this kind of fight because of the arduous political process and common ignorance -- which eventually turns into mere mis-understanding. So, I patently agree and disagree with your assessment, though that is the extremely popular one.

The last thought for now is that these kinds of encounters and opportunities(Lebanon, Philippines, and others) are going to be the norm for the next 30 years. The GWOT (I hate that name) is going to be inconvenient because it is not going to be on our schedule. It must flow and morph to reflect the changing tides within the various theaters of operations. If an opportunity arises that gives a reason -- any reason -- to positively influnce populations, then we need to jump on it. That being said, we do need to dump the Iraq thing sooner than later, but not before Iraq can do it on its own. Iraq is the single best oportunity for major democratic change in the entire region, and we mustn't pull their legs out fom under them. The Iraqi work ethic and self-determining attitude already provide the best circumstances we could ask for from a root-cultural standpoint.

I'll post some definitions I live by later today. (they aren't mine, they are definitions the government -- military -- uses to describe many of these terms we are using). Maybe we can resolve some of our differences that way.

[jon]

A couple of things, first to ptcruiser, I would argue that both our current and most recent President were draft dodgers. I don't have any objection, I would have certainly done the same thing about Vietnam. I only object, because Clinton basically ignored the issue, and Bush anytime any one tries to challenge his service in the National Guard, not whether he completed it or anything like that, but just saying he avoided the war by joining the guard, he accuses the person of questioning the patriotism and sacrifice of this generation of guard members. The guard that he served in is a totally different organization than the one that exists now. His unit was filled with members of the Dallas Cowboys, and many of the sons of important Texas politicians, including Gov. Connelly's son.
For those who were wealthy, well connected, or smart and well educated, if you didn't serve active duty during Vietnam, you didn't want to go, as a general rule. You certainly didn't sign up with the guard as a way to go to war. That is what made me so angry about many of the attacks on John Kerry during his campaign. He volunteered for active, hazardous duty. If he had so desired I'm sure he could have gotten into the Masachusetts National Guard. I believe the only people that have a right to criticize someone for their lack of service during Vietnam are those who actually served over there, other than that these arguements should be left in the dust bin of history.

As for Hizb attaining semi-state status, I think this could be the best thing that could happen for everyone, excepting hizb in the long run. If they really become the state, they will be the ones everyone points to when things go wrong, the people of Lebanon will also demand services from them, rather than just enjoying them and being happy about getting what their government and the international community could not or would not provide for them. It could also make Hizb more vulnerable to Western and Israeli actions against them in the future. They will have something to lose. As of now, when they fight someone, they are so dangerous in part because they have nothing to lose, and everything to gain.

[Chris]

We're openning our own Counterinsurgency Construction Company, the Los Angeles Times.

Article: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-usmideast17aug17,1,7685307.story?coll=la-headlines-world

It is all fine and good to copy the enemy's successful tactics, but our strategic footing is awful. This plan is poorly conceived. Based on our experience with this administration, I imagine the execution of this plan shall match the conception.

[tim302]

MDE,

Hate to break it to you, but a significant portion of the GOP (the libertarian wing) believes that taxation is theft since it is a government taking by force.

In fact, I doubt that many Americans would pay taxes were it not for the long arm of the IRS. Al Capone and all that.

[P-]

Now they've "won" the "war," can they win the peace?

Some opinions i've been getting that this cease-fire is at best tenuous. Some even venture to say it'll last just a month...

I'm a bit optimistic however especially when both sides(Bush on behalf of one) has claimed victory but it would take much concrete fundamental changes to attain
that everlasting peace that even at times of promise has eluded past administrations. Including this one remains to be seen.
Breaking this proverbial cycle of violence has been especially difficult to do if not seemingly elusive and impossible.

P.

[MDE]

Chris,
Excellent timing for the article. It seems that the powers that be are not content to watch this opportunity to slide by. No, I am not expecting a real good effect, but, no one will be able to provide as well as the US. Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries can pledge all they want, but if the pattern the brother Arab countries have established over the years holds consistent, none of the funds for reconstruction will come from Arabs (see promised vs. real contributions for Iraq and the Palestinaian territories).
I agree with some of your emphasis in your comments, though. The administration is hoping for trickle-down second- and third-order effects from the reconstruction, and this will be very limited unless you have an intelligence role in there, buried somewhere, to help you target the right places to build and the right people to aid for maximum effect.

Tim302,
That is a nice idea for the Libertarians, but it is a complete self-licking ice cream cone (aka sounds good but a useless idea). That is as silly an idea as ever, and also why they will never get anyone serious elected.

jon,
I like the ideas in your last paragraph. But that is exactly why I do not think they would ever seek statehood. They may have it as a stated goal now or in the future, but that is only to lay claim to Israeli land or areas of influence as pretext for further acts. They know (for all the reasons you stated) that they have it pretty good politically right now. They will seek to expland their formal influence via the political processes in Lebanon and their informal influence via reconstitution, development and expansion of their networks throughout the region and across the continents and oceans.

The more Nasrallah promises, the greater the burden to live up to (like paying rent for people up to one year, rebuilding the infrastructure, etc.). This also takes expertise: building a bridge is no joke (a real bridge not some Arab POS construction). It will be interesting to see where Hizbollah gets the tools, equipment, materials, and experts to do all this, or if they will simply co-opt what others are doing and put a Hizbollah label on it, or act as if they granted "permission" or "authorization" for others to do the work. Or an even better info ops campaign would be to claim that they "brought together" the many contributors and construction assets to assist the good people of S. Lebanon and show how powerful Hizbollah really is. Or, what I fear may actually happen, is that Hizbollah will restrict who does what and where and when and then the S. Lebanese population quality of life will further deteriorate, which can also be an IO coup for Hizbollah as they use the conditions to demonstrate that no one but Hizbollah cares for the people.

[Azrael]

confusedponderer
I've never been comfortable with the term 4gw, it implies an evolutionary path from 1st generation to second generation, etc... In reality , 4gw , anthropologically, predates the 1st,2nd and 3rd generation warfare. It's probably better to view Lind's generations of war as a wheel that complete a cycle, the 4th generation , being the point at which the power and influence of the nation-state has ebbed to it's lowest point, as hizb-e-allah starts the slow path back up towards nation-state(if it so chooses) then it's military will similiarly change.
This, doesn't strike me as being a completely satisfying answer, but it is my best understanding of Lind's 4gw. I do believe there is a need a need for a better , more encompasing ,theory of this evolution in warfare we are currently experiencing. This theory should take into account the societal evolution a globalizing planet is undergoing and the ressurection of tribes, both the kin-based structures you allude to in iraq and these other more virtual tribes , driven by religion, ideology , etc that are arising and being nurtured online.

MDE
Again, i make no value judgements about the "goodness" or "wickedness" of any group, whether it is hizb-e-allah or farc, i'm merely curious about how they are evolving and their structural significance in our increasingly networked planet. Just as studying google bussiness model will give some insight about the future of internet commerce, so too, will studying hizb-e-allah give an equally illuminating insight about the future of warfare. I'm not advocating the formation of a carbon copy version of google, nor am i advocating the formation of a carbon copy of hizb-e-allah.
As far as the rest of your post, i'm of the belief that the current leadership in both washington and tel aviv, are incompetent. They are driven by views of the world that are no longer valid. And , ideologically , they are unable to step back from these flawed views and re-evaluate their socio-economic and political-military constructs in light of the reality that is facing them everyday. Bush , has seriously underminned u.s. interests in southern eurasia with his "freedom initiative", he has squandered his 2nd/3rd gen military in a pancho-villa style hunt for al-queada. And when faced with the successes achieved by others who treat terrorism as a police matter, he is unable to recognize this and change course, rather he seems to prefer to muddle thru, driven by his own internal narrative of events. The two incidents that pop right out are the scene on the deck of the flat top, when he proclaimed that major military ops in iraq had ended and again when he had proclaimed israel the victor of the current round of fighting( he did this a few hours before the israelis opened a commision of inquiry to find out why they lost).
Olmert seems , at least in the early phase of the conflict with hib-e-allah, to have drank from g.w.'s cup of kool-aid.

[tim302]

MDE,

Just for the record, I don't enjoy paying taxes but I recognize they are the price we pay for a functioning government.

I must take exception however to your characterization that "strong arming a population" out of their money is not something legitimate. My point about the GOP was this-- many, many people in the USA don't like taxes at all and only pay because if they don't the IRS will make their lives hell. Therefore, the US government is (quite rightly) strong arming them out of their money.

[MDE]

Azrael,

I can not agree with you more than in the first paragraphs of your response to confusedponderer and myself.
4GW is exactly as you stated: the oldest of the types of warfare. I would also say that it is the real way that most lesser-developed countries actually (naturally, culturally) wage war. In fact, I am researching right now as to whether this is the big or a big reason that they (Arab and Persian militaries) have faired so poorly against each other (Iraq vs. Iran) and against non-arab-minded armies (ie: Israel, US, British, etc) in the maneuver warfare model and done so well in the insurgent model. I do not think this is a "progression" per se of warfare. The manuever armies and navies and air forces still exist and will, in my opinion, do major battle again some day, but only between similarly-matched adversaries. I see this insurgent model expansion as a natural attempt to balance against the overwhelming power of the electron and high explosive. This warfare is people-centric, which is the only relatively unlimited resource that lesser militaries have at their disposal and it happens to be one of our vulnerabilities since we don't believe in or conduct ourselves with a genocidal-style approach to warfare. We seek to preserve life whenever possible, which, on the modern insurgent/unconventional battlefield, that human is the primary weapon. Would we discriminately kill selected enemy tanks while seeking to preserve others? Nope, but we would and do go through a decision process (called ROE) before we kill a person. Therefore, the enemy has achieved one ultimately important thing we seek to do in a battle: insert himself into the enemy's decision cycle.

[Azrael]

MDE
I'm of the belief that globalization, has lowered the barriers of entry to power-projection. Allowing groups like al-quaeda to launch attacks at any sufficiently networked spot on the planet(al-queda has the ability to hit new york which is a nexus of transportaion and communication hubs, but is probably incapable of striking a target on the alta-plano which is on the fringes of the modern telecomm/transportation grid and also distant from the traditional muslim trade and cultural exchange networks). In context of these lower barriers of entries, non-state actors and lesser military powers are able to play decisive military roles on the world stage. Those who master the art of insurgency and it's twin counter-insurgency seem poised to have a chair at the table when the terms of the new world order are being hammered out. You're argument is that iranian and arab cultures have some sort of inherent advantage on this new playing field. I find this to be a stretch, since any power , minor or major , who is able to get a grasp of the changes coming down the pipeline should be able to be equally succesful, ceteris peribus, in this new era.
Personally, i think GWOT has less to do with the simplistic good and evil being spouted by world leaders and more to do with unraveling of the post-patriotic war world system. We've seen that the u.n. is incapable of keeping the peace and now various alternatives are being put forward to complement and or supercede the u.n. goals of world order and stability; Pax-americana, a new sunni caliphate, a chinese co-prosperity zone masquerading as a trade and border dispute agency, a hungry shia bloc strethcing from the mediterrian to the indus, various populist movemnets in south america, the e.u. itself ; these are all on the rise because of the percieved weakness of the current world system. Will any of them come to pass, yes and no, but if your claims of iranian-arab predispositon to superiority in the field of insurgency is accurate, then expect the iranians to be at the table when we finally stop spilling blood and start to spill ink on treaties.

[tim302]

Azreal,
Yes, I think the barriers to entry are much lower. But I'd also say that it's not the unravelling of consensus. Rather, the consensus was previously enforced by the sword, backed by the might of high modernist industrialization. As both you and MDE point out, that model is shifting.

That's my biggest argument with the rhetoric (in the sense of the structure of the persuasive argument, not in a pejorative sense) of 4GW-- it assumes that there was a past time when there was a unified moral consensus not backed by violent force.

[Azrael]

tim302
Everything is a trade off; is it better to settle for 90%, 80% 70% of what your goal was and avert a costly and potentionally unpredictable war? This is the choice facing most nation-states. This is the reason why the u.s. would rather haggle in u.n. then take a roll of the dice by marching on iran. This is why the israelis have agreed to a cease-fire that shatters their image of invincibility.
During the post-war era, where the u.n.s.c. was the dominant power on earth , yes there was coercion, but there was also the promise that the sacrifices made by various polities would be minor and that everyone would get a share of the wealth that came from a post-colonial global trade system. And this was acceptable to the vast majority of polities and peoples on the planet.
As the u.n.s.c. became ineffectual with the demise of the bad cop, the soviet union, The u.s. became the head of a unipolar world. But as we've seen in africa, the balkans and afghanistan, on the periphery of the world sytem, even though the preponderance of military might resides in the hands of the sole remaining superpower, no one , except maybe the israelis , considers the use of that power to be legitimate.
You can only force people to do so much by shoving the barrel of a gun in their face. At some point the u.s. will have to figure out how to move beyond coercion and give rising powers like china, iran and brazil a greater stake in the world system.
And, as the barriers fall, it might be prudent to start giving non-state actors a stake in the sytem as well. There are ideologues in the u.s. who dream of ushering in the so-called "american century" by strangling china in it's crib, using atomics to curb iran's growth, locking up south america to contain brazil, but these individuals are not the ones who are going to pay the bill, in blood and treasure, in doomed attempts to accomplish these delusions.
Coercion had a role to play in the old world order, and coercion will have a role to play in the new world order. But , inversely to degreee which the new world system relies upon coercion speaks to the stability and resultant longevity of said world system.

[MDE]

Azrael,

I agree with your assessment of gloablization lowering barriers to power projection. There is a significant ability via the internet and the air transportation routes to conduct business as never before. The part I will disagree with you about, however, is the global insurgents being "probably incapable of striking a target on the alta-plano which is on the fringes of the modern telecomm/transportation grid and also distant from the traditional muslim trade and cultural exchange networks."

I see the global guerrillas as using those remote locations as sanctuary and safe haven for development of capabilities to reach into those locales more "sufficiently networked" in the decentralized manner that they have been pursuing against us since the early 2000s. It lends itself to their purposes specifically because they are lesser connected and more remote, therefore less-populated which provides for privacy from public and governmental discovery, investigation and revelation. Our country's inherent civil liberties and the vastness of our country (in the physical terrain and human terrain) provides plenty of excellent cover and concealment for every nefarious purpose under the sun.

Contrary to you, I draw a very pronounced distinction between the good and the evil. That is mostly because humans behave in certain ways when they know they are doing good and the body, the ultimate guage of righteousness, agrees with the brain. Humans behave differently when their being knows they are doing evil. Their brains may have justfied it to the point that their belief in the righteousness is indeed genuine, but they will do what they do with an air of secrecy, because they seek to insulate their hearts from what it knows is wrong. I learned these differences in the things I've seen: an American grabbing a kid off the street under fire to protect her versus the Sunni insurgent using a 12-year-old boy as a shield to attack a US Marine checkpoint. The American was embarrassed when confronted by the chain of command to reward him because he did want the attention out of humility and he cried because of the emotion of that act, while the Sunni insurgent in Fallujah was embarrassed during interrogation because he was ashamed of what he had made the boy do. He cried for shame that he had been brought to task and to answer for his monstrous actions. Humans are wired a certain way, and our reaction to our environment can indeed put a shell around our innermost selves, but inside we are still human and the humanity still comes out. That display is truth. That being said, the ones who deny their humanity to extinction and fire rockets into cities with the express intent of killing as many non-combatants as possible are the ones who should die in the most expeditious manner possible, for they show no shame and, therefore, demonstrate that they have dispensed with their humanity. A soldier without humanity is the scariest creature on the planet and without limit as to the destruction and terror -- misery -- he/she can cause.

[MDE]

To bring this back around to the thread topic -- Hizbollah has found themselves a wonderful nest in one of the least networked areas in the Middle East -- the Bekaa Valley. There is no government presence their at all, and almost no wider-world visibility into what goes on there. The Iraqi version is the immensity of the al Anbar province in western Iraq. Al Qaida had -- had -- that in Afghanistan and now in Waziristan (Pakistan). The Ciudad del Este area in the Brazil-Paraguay-Argentina tri-border region is another key location for a projected branch of Hizbollah. The FARC has the whole eastern third of Colombia -- the rural-without-a-single-paved-road-or-powerline region. The common characteristic? These areas are the least networked locations in these regions and yet provide reach into operational areas -- areas of higher network complexity.

[Azrael]

MDE
very touching prose, you should've taken a position with psyops, your talents are being wasted on souless fellows such as myself. If i did have a soul, i imagine i would have to drag up all the various incidents of depraved conduct in the current iraqi operation by individuals wearing the stars and stripes patch on their uniforms. I imagine i could bring up the israleli strategy of targetting civilian infrastructure in the forlorn hopes of pressuring hizb-e-allah to quit the fight. But, again, without the concept of good or evil , my sole interest is in what works and not so much moral externalities.
Non-state actors can create safe havens in non-networked regions, but their ability to strike non-networked regions far from their safe havens is just about nil. They require the network, as a means of logistics; transportation, supply, etc, and they need the network to enhance the impact of their attacks. Thus , when al-qeada spinoffs target several buses in london, a very networked locale, the shockwaves are far more intense than when they target the transportation hub in mumbai, a less networked locale.
Thus, al-qaeda wannabes, would find it several orders of magnitude more expensive to destroy the transportaion grid in some city on the alta-plano than in say new york. And because the alta-plano is almost disconnected from the grid, the socio-economic shockwaves from such an attack probably wouldn't displace some celebrity scandal from the front page of most world newspapers.

[tim302]

Azrael,
I agree with you actually. I was not advocating escalating the coercion as a method to fight 4GW. On the contrary, I think it is a positive development that naked coercion is no longer effective at generating a false consensus.

Without deviating too far from the topic of the blog, I think the solution lies in developing a common shared culture that maximizes the number of people and sub-cultures who can get along without shooting each other.

[Adam]

MDE,

"Do you know how Hizbollah taxation got started? For one, it started exactly as the mafia and gangland bosses of the 1920s --- extortion -- "

As the quote says: 'Taxation is just a sophisticated way of demanding money with menaces'. (Terry Pratchett, without a doubt the UK's top satirical novelist). You pay taxes to people who tell you to. One of the more fun things in a civil war is multiple tax departments.

"under the guise of the Qoms/Khoms taxation system where every Shia male is required to pay a tax which eventually ends up in Najaf, Iraq or Qoms, Iran."

I suspect that you're referring to the Islamic tradition / duty of tithing 10% of the worshippers income. I note that you later call it BS, but in reality its one of the 5 pillars of Islam - a relgious duty from God, no messing. Its US interference in this thats cause no end of issues in recent years as it is a direct attempt to put man-made laws (bad) in the way of the divine laws (good). This kind of thing does not play well in the Middle East. Do Islamic groups try to stop Catholics shifting money around the world? Hardly. In short its a major part of the Islamic tradition and a good reason why fairly poor areas can afford such fantastic religious institutions. The idea is that the money goes to the poor or cultural pursuits, and I cheefully admit that this can mean making films. The recent Iranian film renaissance is partly funded this way.

"After that, it is spent and allocated by the religious leadership (read that as IRGC) in accordance with their priorities."

You may read it that way. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps might differ. As might the people who actually get the money. The money doesn't go to the IRGC and the people who get it aren't connected to the IRGC.

"Iranian priority=destruction of Israel=support to Hizbollah."

Since when were these the IRGC's objectives? They may be the Israeli version of the objectives but the actual one is to guard the 1979 Islamic Revolution itself (the army guards Iran) from foreign enemies. Its probably a chicken and egg situation. Israel wants Iran (and the Revolution) to burn, preferably at the hands of the Americans. Iran doesn't want to burn so needs the IRGC to defend itself. This means that the IRGC wants to stop Israel, meaning that they are bad people to the Americans.

"Other Iranian Qoms tax priorities are indoctrination of youth, enforcement of IRGC policies and training and education of religious elite."

I could of course say almost exactly the same for the US military; you yourself have written Paeans to the wonders of military education and the benefits to the US of it. The Iranians actually feel the same way. Personally I think you're both wrong, but the reality is that any organisation (government or otherwise) in any nation would do this. About 2 years ago I recall the NSA was running a "Junior Codebreakers" section. I personally loved the Orwellian name... Its now called Cryptokids which is a crying shame

http://www.nsa.gov/kids/

"Yes, I readily acknowldge that Israel is US-backed, seen as such by the Arabs and also that they grossly mispercieve that just about everything that Israel does is a puppet-movement directed by the Americans. To what extent that is or is not true is irrelevent."

The Lebanese might disagree on how relevant that is given that unexploded weapons with US military codes and made in Seattle are all over the place right now. Actually the general perception these days is that its the US that is a puppet of the Israelis (specifically Israelis from the far-right Likud party). "Who is the master?" is the way its normally phrased. The neo-cons in charge in the US have very close links with the Likud party.

"that Southern Lebanon is no longer a safe haven or training ground for Hezbollah who is trying to kill you and me? "

Errrm. Hizbollah has never run a specifically anti-UK operation and probably never will. It ran a specifically anti-US operation during a US-supported invasion of their country, within their countries borders. Actual Hizbollah operations outside of Lebanon are almost zero. They're really centred on Lebanon. Personally I worry more about the next earthquake in London than Hizbollah.

"If an opportunity arises that gives a reason -- any reason -- to positively influnce populations, then we need to jump on it."

Hardly the US position right now. We want subserviance, not popularity. Its the only sane attitude to take however. One of our best ways of improving the situation is stop thinking that if we kill enough people they'll like us.

"That being said, we do need to dump the Iraq thing sooner than later, but not before Iraq can do it on its own. Iraq is the single best oportunity for major democratic change in the entire region, and we mustn't pull their legs out fom under them."

Errm. You do know that the Israelis just bombed the crap out of the only two genuine representative democracies in the region (Lebanon and the Palastinians). You'll note that the US did nothing to help them in their time of need. Strangely the US does support a number of dictatorships in the area (Egypt, Saudi and Jordan)... In short any hope that Iraq might somehow create democracy (the successor of the neo-con fantasy of the road to Jerusalam leads through Bagdhad) died in the last month. The Israelis made even this vague idea of democracy via slaughter (as you yourself admit is now needed) completely worthless. You'll also note that democracies mean that the popular people get elected. In the Middle East this is not going to mean people that like the US or Israel. You cannot have it both ways. Currently the US chooses pro-Us dictatorships, that will not change.

At current rates it'll be "peace with honour " by next month.

[Adam]

Interesting note on economic tactics that Hizbollah are using:

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2006/08/18/2003323671

[haydar]

Adam,
The word for this type of tithing is Khums, and there is nothing particularly sinister about it, though it does support a non-secular world view. The vast majority of Shia' around the world observe it, and it does support the hierarchy that produces the likes of Khomeini and Sistani. The Sunnis don't consider khums mandatory, and thus have no clerical structure based on it. The Sunnis emphasize Zakat, which is 2.5% of one's yearly income. Khums is 20% of yearly income in excess of ones needs.

Hizbullah's focus on reconstruction indicates to me that this war really is over for the time being. They are very disciplined and the fig leaf of international peacekeepers is absolutely unnecessary. I think that Israel and Hizbullah have established a mutual deterrence balance, though if the Israelis make good on their threat to assassinate Hassan Nasrullah all bets are off.

As Hizbullah's position as the defacto state in Southern Lebanon has actually been strengthened by this war, a formal confederation model for Lebanon might be workable. What's the difference between Hizbullahstan and Kurdistan?

[Adam]

haydar,

"As Hizbullah's position as the defacto state in Southern Lebanon has actually been strengthened by this war, a formal confederation model for Lebanon might be workable. What's the difference between Hizbullahstan and Kurdistan?"

Functionally none, except that the Kurds are - nominally - US allies; whilst Hizbollah are at the moment US enemies. I'd also note that the 1990s Kurdish civil war left them with two equally inept governments unlike Hizbollah which currently reigns supreme in Southern Lebanon and appears to be pretty competant.

It now appears that the Kurds have run their US-support horse into the ground. The US has ordered that they disarm (certainly the PKK are now expected to) whilst Turkey and Iran are reprising their combined 1930s invasion of Kurdistan. Turkey and Iran have historically been in agreement on the Kurdish question (the question is "what'll we do to the Kurds?", the answer is "shoot them"). You may wonder what the US is doing in all this and the answer is that the US dropping supposed allies (like the Lebanese government) is something of a theme this month.

As of yesterday the Kurds were trying to put together a military force to meet the quarter of a million strong Turkish force poised around Hakur. Turkey is said to have conducted at least 53 special operations into Iraqi Kurdish territory since March. The current betting is that Turkey will invade (if the Kurds don't disarm, or maybe if they do...) with Iran acting as a blocking force sending the Kurish refugees fleeing into the Iraq civil war.

The problem that the Kurds have with this is that in order to have their own military they would have to suceed from Iraq formally; and if they do that they will rely on military supplies coming from the South and that's not going to happen. It also means that the US loses their only actual supporters in Iraq. It'd be far better for the Iraqis to see Turkey and Iran shoot the hell out of the Kurds and then move back to the Kirkuk area to retake the oilwells.

This is so much like the 1930s its spooky. A failed colonial adventure, popular resistance, Kurdish adventurism, invasions....

[Marcello]

I am a bit clueless on this one.What is the US going to do when turkish troops enter in Iraq en masse,with large amounts of infantry and presumably conspicous hardware such as tanks and such, as you seem to imply they are going to do? Shut their eyes and ears and beginning to sing la-la-la-la?
What's their game?

[Duncan Kinder]

Re: Potential Turkish / Iranian action against the Kurds.

Presumably the Kurds are as aware of the tactics Hezbullah has used against the Israelis in Lebanon and is now planning to utilize the same against the Turks.

The Turks, meanwhile, doubtlessly also have been studying the recent conflict and have determined to avoid the Israelis' mistakes.

Any Turkish action against the Kurds, therefore, should therefore help clarify whether the Israelis lost or whether Hezbullah won the recent Lebanon War.

In any event, Lebanon suggests that the Turks should think twice before they conclude that their having a mechanized army would give them an advantage against the Kurds guerrilla forces.

[dan]

Duncan

What Turkey and Iran are doing is more of a feint which has two principal objectives:

(1) Pressurise the Iraqi Kurdish factions into putting a lid on the PKK and PJAK. Neither Turkey nor Iran are going to invade - but they can make life difficult by ramping up the pressure. I doubt that Turkey or Iran are going to go the whole Israeli hog and bomb power stations or anything like that.....yet.

(2) Force the redeployment of Peshmerga units from Kirkuk and Mosul and equalise or tip the balance of forces there.

Obviously, the redeployment of US forces from Mosul to Baghdad is coincidental, and neither Turkey nor Iran would dream of taking advantage of this to ramp up the pressure.

[Marcello]

Assuming this is going to happen in the short term there is no time to analyze in depth the lebanese conflict, much less to actually implement "lessons learned" in a significant way, beyond emphasizing some tactical recommendations which for the most part should already be well known anyway.
The Hizballah have fanatical determination, strong discipline accompanied by tactical initiative and decent training and equipment, as well the advantage of fighting from well prepared positions.
These things are not improvisated and the Kurds will not have the time.
The turkish army on the other hand is poorer than the IDF.
To me it seems more like the traditional mechanized army vs mountain guerrillas match which has already been played several times.Afghanistan in the 80's comes to mind.
Yet the situation here could play out along different lines, as Turkey has more at stake here than the SSSR had there.And I have yet to hear what the US is going to do.

[Marcello]

"Neither Turkey nor Iran are going to invade - but they can make life difficult by ramping up the pressure."

It sounds like the most logical explanation.

[Duncan Kinder]

It would be interesting to find out how easily and rapidly transferable Hezbollah's skills are.

Turkey would be constrained from the more severe ethnic cleansing type operations, not only because of United States' opposition, but also because this would impair its desire to join the European Union.

Just to throw more fat on the fire, Turkey is heavily involved in the BTC Oil Pipeline, about which John Robb has blogged:

http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2005/11/journal_the_fat.html

As John states:

"The newly expanded Caucasian front and a resurgent PKK (Kurdish guerrillas in Turkey) are within easy striking distance of this pipeline (as well as smaller groups)."

So the pipeline's vulnerability would further complicate things.

[Marcello]

"It would be interesting to find out how easily and rapidly transferable Hezbollah's skills are."

Not as easily as dowloading the schemes for the latest improved IED from the web.
Training and discipline are not improvised.
And in addition to that there is physical hardware (bunkers and ATGMs) which takes time and money.

"Turkey would be constrained from the more severe ethnic cleansing type operations, not only because of United States' opposition"

What are they going to say when turkish tanks roll into northern Iraq?
Furthermore,while Israel interests automatically ovverride arab ones what exactly did the US get from Turkey for selling out his only friends east of Israel?
It makes absolutely no sense to me.

[Duncan Kinder]

For a detailed discussion of the Turkish application to the European Union, go here:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Turkey_to_the_European_Union

The Turks' treatment of the Kurds already is an active issue:

"Turkey's treatment of the Kurdish people and other indigenous populations is also of concern. Some decry the recent recognition of the Kurdish language by Turkish authorities as a cosmetic operation. Kurdish education is provided through only a few private local courses, while television in Kurdish is only for half an hour a week and under the monopoly of the state broadcasting corporation TRT."

"Many have continuing doubts on the commitment of the Turkish state to democracy and human rights, and its ability to reach European standards in these issues as gender equality, political freedom and minority rights (especially as regards the Kurdish population, non-Muslims, and gays and lesbians). Freedom of political speech is another area in which some concerns have arisen (e.g. "Regular Report on Turkey's progress towards accession", p. 36, recent internal EU reports discussed in Financial Times, 5 June 2006, EU Observer 6 June 2006, City Journal, 4 June 2006)."

[enigma_foundry]

The methods that have been used thus far to fight 4GW non-state entities are wholly unconvincing.

I am convinced that the method not yet tried is a combination of law enforcement, not necessarily using the military, and a media campaign.

As well as using financial resources selectively, to buy those things wanted, but not achievable by a state entity.

I feel that for a small fraction of the money spent on Iraq, we could have achieved the goals in our war by now.

Of course, the goals I would have would be very different.

[enigma_foundry]

"Neither Turkey nor Iran are going to invade..."

Turkey, no, except for a rare cross border raid to keep PKK in their toes.

Iran is already has a strong presence in Iraq. What would they need to invade for?

[Adam]

Whats been fascinating the last few weeks since the ceasefire is the speed that Hizbaollah is acting.

http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article14672.htm

Hours after the ceasefire began young Hizbollah men armed with Ak-clipboards and RPG-mobile phones swarmed across Southern Lebanon. In fact so fast did Hizbollah act that by the time the NGO aid teams arrived there wasn't much need for them. Food had already been sorted. Then the money arrived. Hizbollah representatives turned up to each house in Southern Lebanon with $12,000 - certainly from Iran. I should say that's $12k per dwelling - if you owned a block of 4 flats that's $48k cash in hand. The money is US dollars, they're crisp, clean and still in the packets. The total estimated spend is $180m. There are no restrictions on what you can spend the money on. If you want some more furniture go right ahead. Hizbollah are treating the people of Southern Lebanon like big boys and girls.

In other words Hizbollah just gave people somewhere in the region of 2 years wages. In cash. In the US it would have to be about $100k. Now if George Bush dropped by New Orleans the day after with $100k in his back pocket and just gave the cash out wouldn't the situation be a lot better ?

There's also a nice piece of political judo here. The oil price went up as part of the US/Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which gave Iran more cash to send to Hizbollah.

The US is claiming it will send Lebanon some $200m in reconstruction monies (or more accurately reparations). In reality this is likely to be a smaller amount of non-cash items, late, not what people needed, heavily looted in the US and Lebanon, sent by US manufacturers who needed to get rid of shoddy stock, and which will never be seen in Southern Lebanon anyway. Even if it is Hizbollah will get the credit.

The following things can be drawn from this:
a) Hezbollah remains an organised and disciplined force with military capabilities. In effect they have control of Southern Lebanon.
b) It can give money away. How many US politicians were actually willing to stump up? How many Lebanese ones were for that matter...
c) Hezbollah won the war. As an organisation it said what it would do and achieved these aims. Now its aiming to win the peace.
d) Emphatically Hizbollah is saying that there will be another war as Israel will attack them again within the year. They are not advising people to start rebuilding yet, but people can if they wish. You're big boys and girls is the message.
e) (Bitchy point, but it needs saying) At no point did the Hizbollah leader announced that "Brownie was doing a Heckuva Job". He didn't need to.

At the same time as we'll recall in the US after Katrina survivors received a minimal payoff (less than 1 months wages), got told off for failing to die properly, and then were sent away. In the US people's fates were firmly in the hands of the US bureaucracies, whilst in Lebanon its "here's the cash go spend it".

So which government looked legitimate to the people that needed them? In New Orleans the government stood around, shuffled their feet, and did nothing. In Lebanon they were there almost the morning after the shooting stopped with bright smiles and hard cash, maybe they stopped for lunch, but no more.

[tim302]

Adam,
What are the chances that a good chunk of those bills are counterfeit "superbills?"