JOURNAL: Sadr: Losing control

Sadr has lost control of up to 1/3 of the Mahdi Army, reports Sabrina Tavernise ("Cleric Said to Lose Reins of Parts of Iraqi Militia," NYTimes, Sept. 28, 2006):

But as Mr. Sadr has taken a more active role in the government, as many as a third of his militiamen have grown frustrated with the constraints of compromise and have broken off, often selling their services to the highest bidders..

...six major leaders here no longer answer to Mr. Sadr’s organization, according to the intelligence official. Most describe themselves as Mahdi Army members, the official said, and even get money from Mr. Sadr’s organization, but “are effectively beyond his control.”

Sadr has modeled his organization on Hezbollah. However, he may have misunderstood the raison d'etre of Hezbollah, which is its ability to win 4G wars against encroaching nation-states. This ability provides it with the legitimacy they need to persist and prosper. Its relief efforts and good works are secondary to military power, and help to balance the organization's image. Political power, at the state level, comes in a poor third (and only serves to provide cover to the organization, despite its non-state status) -- for good reason, political power in a fractured state is of little meaningful value (unless you enjoy failure and frustration).

Frankly, if Sadr has inverted this equation and placed political power in the first position, he will quickly find himself without much of a militia left. This is particularly true if Sadr's militia isn't really cohesive like Hezbollah -- most signs point to this -- and it tends towards open source. In that case, the lack of a plausible promise (like: "kick the Americans out") will fork the movement. How could he reverse the slide? Given that 4GW military power is the only source of meaningful legitimacy he can tap, the way to gain power (not official control, but defacto) would be to set himself against the US military. The US is an enemy all can agree on, and any military action against US forces would be likely inflate Iraqi nationalism (a secondary loyalty) across the spectrum. I detailed one way to do that: by blocking its supply lines using a defensive grid (as demonstrated by Hezbollah against Israel) last week. I wonder when (or if) he will figure this out?

Comments

[Z]

I wonder if this will encourage him to try more aggressive actions to regain his stature and influence. I guess if he doesn't someone else will.

But he has been very restrained against U.S. forces in the past 2 years. This could be fear of heavy losses against U.S. firepower or a calculation the the Sunni insurgency will be enough to get rid of the Americans and so no need to bloody the Sadr movement.

Or could it be a restraining influence by Iran? After all, Iran's best card against the U.S. is the potential of a massive Shiite uprising. Once the uprising happens, they will have one less card to play.

[stevelaudig]

"New explosive devices are now used in Afghanistan within a month of their first appearing in Iraq," said the report. "And while the Taliban have not been found fighting outside Afghanistan/Pakistan, there have been reports of them training in both Iraq and Somalia." From yesterday's United Nations report.

[Chris]

He's young and he is no Nasrallah.

Also, I think his militia and followers are 1.) larger in number than Shiite Lebanese and 2.) more dispersed geographically and demographically. He does have a clear center of gravity in Shiite Baghdad, but it is an urban center and not something like the Beka valley. Those are my impressions, and I am no expert. So, if I am out to lunch please call me on it.

Given my suppositions, though, it is not a surprise that his movement has fractured. Also, his positions have been targeted by Sunni militants to provoke and retaliate in the sectarian conflict. He has engaged the United States, and he may have been hoping for political capital to survive Najaf.

I think a split in his movement could lead to a few things... Sadr may return to first principles and actually benefit. He may be usurped as the sectarian/civil war spirals onward. He may be reinforced by rivals of America -- though he is very pro-Arab and therefore anti-Persian.

Just another complex wrinkle in the Iraqi facade.

[Andy]

Not a surprise at all. Michael Vlahos notes this trend in one of his books on Arab terrorism. A group splinters because the core and leader move onto a larger stage, and make a few compromises to gain power. The more radical elements split off because they are "more" Shia, Sunni, etc...than these guys will ever be.

it's like when an indie band has a mainstream hit. The small core of fans get pissed when they are on the radio, and they accuse the band of selling out.

Same thing here, but obviously with much greater implications for additional chaos in Iraq. The state has shattered and ain't no horses and ain't no men coming to put Humpty Ali back together again.

[Z]

Chris,
I'm also no expert but I'd add the following regarding Hizbullah in Iraq Vs the Real McCoy;

The original Hizb did not materialize overnight, but rather developed over 25 years. They first split off from the more moderate Amal Militia during the early 80's (so whatever breaks away from Sadr may be more analogous) They learned to survive under a very heavy handed Israeli occupier, who had learned how to do it over 20 years in Gaza and the west bank. Hizb learned to keep secrets from some of the best intel services around. They learned to survive against overwhelming air and firepower. They had time to make mistakes and learn from them.

Hizb also had the benefit of watch how the PLO would loose...and learned to do the opposite of whatever they did.

In short, a first rate movement like that is forged slowly in a hot furnace and pounded into a sharp weapon. It can't simply be willed into existance.

In fairness to Sadr, remember that just 2 and a half years ago he seemed like a dead man walking. Now he is THE powerbroker in Iraq. I wouldn't count him out yet.

[Arnold Evans]

I agree that Sadr is THE powerbroker in Iraq, after Khalizad - and Khalizad is short- rather than long-term like Sadr.

I also agree that Iran has likely asked Sadr and the Shiites to hold back on their push to evict the Americans until after the nuclear file either is resolved or reaches an impass - or until Iran feels it can reliably shut down Saudi oil facilities or the gulf.

Until one of the splinters becomes a force on its own, at least eclipsing the other splinters, none will be a challenge to the central Mahdi army.

There is a good chance that after the Americans leave, the center of power will still be the Parliament in which case Sadr will have made the right decision to build his power in Parliament.

The militias are a bigger problem for the Americans than they are for the Iraqis. They are more loyal to Iraq than either the US army of the Iraqi army that so far has been built to follow the commands of the US army.

Both Sunnis and Shiites have blamed the death squads on the Americans.

Sadr is doing just fine. Americans tend to see the militias more negatively than is warranted and get hysterical about this idea that Sadr as lost control of some of his army.

There are probably more people under Sadr's control than there were last year. And he has more than enough troops to really punish the US when he decides to. Sadr also has money to pay salaries - so he can replace disloyal militia leaders if he is bothered by them, which he may not be too deeply.

[dan]

A couple of points:

Firstly, according to an interview conducted by Peter Oborne for the Channel 4 investigative strand Dispatches in January of this year with a US officer stationed in Baghdad, the US military has explicit orders to not interfere, arrest or touch Sadr - the guy is effectively "made". This has been the situation since the Najaf standoff ended in August 2004; and I have seen nothing to indicate that there has been any substantive change in policy. There have been endless pronouncements about going after the Shia militias for the past 18 months, but little ever comes of it.

Secondly, the developmental trajectories of Hizbullah and the Sadrists are inverted - Hizbullah started as an armed resistance movement and developed into a full service social-political organisation, whilst Muqtada al Sadr inherited a social-political organisation ( covert and repressed to a degree by Saddam ) from his father and brothers - the Jaish al-Mahdi only comes into existence in late 2003 and only starts military activities against the US military in April 2004.

Thirdly, having used the Mahdi army to "buy" his seat at the political table in 2004, Moqtada is now clearly "with the programme" as outlined by Sistani-SCIRI-Dawa-Iran that will first consolidate Shia majoritarian control over Iraq and then remove the US occupation by primarily political means, at a time of their choosing. Whilst there are local turf wars and political fights between the various elements of the "grand coalition" these are still manageable within the context of the larger strategic objective which all the parties agree on.

Fourthly, there is a huge element that has been missing from Shia militant and militia activities in Iraq thus far: the use of martyrdom operations against either occupying coalition forces or against their internal Sunni enemies. This is not because Iraqi Shia are inherently less inclined to martyrdom operations than their Lebanese cousins in Hizbullah during the Israeli occupation - it is because the clerical authorities whose permission must be gained for the adoption of this tactic have yet to give such permission. At this stage the occupation has clearly stayed within the red lines for this - whether they know where the red lines are drawn is another matter.

IF the Mahdi army goes into a full-scale revolt against the US ( highly unlikely at present ) then the tactical profile will not be the Hizbullah 2006 approach, but the Hizbullah 1983 approach. The "blocking" element to this is, of course, Iran - Sadr's object of emulation resides in Qom, not Najaf, and it will require his authorisation for this ball to roll.

[ramsis]

I would like to start by asking the question where is the badr corps in all this. Sistani has in effect been relitivly silent while his counter part Al-sadr has gained strength. The U.S. has missed many opportunities in the past to pit these groups against each other and if the story by the New York slimes is correct then this might be one of those chances.With recent secretarian violence in bagdad I would like to see the U.S. employ some of these groups for operations against sunni extremeists (acting on U.S intel) and maybe giving the Badr Corp some military and political victories they can build on.

[Chris]

Z, thanks for saying it better than I could. Do you blog?

I think Sadr is a player. I don't envy anyone's footing in that country now, though... It's very, oh, Mesopotamian isn't it?

That's right... Someone reading ancient history would have a better background for predicting events than the POTUS.

[Dan tdaxp]

The article also mentions Sadr's cooperation with the US military (not objecting when the US takes out free-agents within Sadr's organization).

To me, the article implied a coming together of Sadr and the US, as the US wants to set-up a post-Multinational Iraq, and Sadr wants to be part of that set-up.

[anna missed]

I wonder about this splinter issue, and how this becomes news. The fighting in Diwaniya, supposedly started by a splinter group of the medhi army, was quickly put to rest by a phone call from Sadr himself. Could it be that these splinter groups are givin tacit approval from Sadr to engage in activities that could be denied should they go awry? And couldnt it also be a sort of insurance policy, that waiting in the wings is a successor(s) (to Sadr himself) more militant -- so be careful what you wish for? That the movement itself cannot be decapitated.

[E Stepp]

John, I wonder if this is an eventuality for non-state warfare players such as Sadr? One of their benefits of these groups is the ability to be outside of the state control, which 1) insulates the state, and 2) provides for more flexibility in the tactics employed.

But, without a state-sanctioned cause, these types of guerrilla groups are left with ideologies as their cohesiveness. Once the leader (and it usually is only an individual leader) starts straying from the original ideology, then we see fractioning within the group. We saw that with the PIRA and Sein Fenn, Fatah and Hamas, now Sadr and his own corp.

Back in March, I wondered similar things about Musharef and his Pakistani militias fighting in India... http://www.projectlucidity.com/content/view/423/2/