WHAT'S NEXT IN IRAQ

US forces are now in a precarious and untenable position in Iraq. The window of opportunity for an easy exit has passed. Three years of fighting an open source insurgency has destroyed Iraq's economy (through systemsdisruption starting in 2004), worn down US commitment/curtailed operational flexibility (the IED marketplace during 2004/05/06), and forced a country-wide descent into primary loyalties (through a combination of social systems disruption that reached a crescendo in 2006 and an early reliance on loyalist paramilitaries as a force multiplier back in 2004). Iraq is now in full failure and as a result, the assumption that the US will be able to continue with its partial efforts at urban pacification has become dangerously wrong.

The reasons should be obvious. US forces are now surrounded by a sea of militias and insurgents. Within Baghdad itself, where the current pacification effort is focused, US troops are badly outnumbered in extremely difficult urban terrain. Worse yet, the opposition is growing in numbers, sophistication, and aggressiveness at a rate more rapid than the static number of US troops can build up the Iraqi military. It is now only a matter of time before either a misstep or a calculated event pushes the countryside into full scale warfare.

In this near term conflict, we are likely to see a repeat of the lightly manned defensive hedgehog used successfully by Hezbollah against Israel. That lesson was not lost on this war's open source participants, particularly Sadr's Mahdi Army, which uses Hezbollah as a model (which implies they might try to replicate Hezbollah by translating success on the battlefield into the critical currency of "legitimacy"). If placed along critical US military supply routes or immediately outside US mega-bases, and augmented by informational superiority (a combination of better local intelligence and advanced signals intercepts), these defensive tactics would extract a heavy toll on US troops (even as the US wins a tactical victory). Further, if repeatably successful, these efforts will force the US to forgo all efforts at offensive pacification operations in favor of basic force protection (not only for US troops, but the tens of thousands of civilians on these bases). From that point on, the timer will be on until a US forward base is overrun (when it finally goes off, we will be cooked).

Of course, the above outcome grows increasingly likely as the rhetoric for a war with Iran heats up, given that Iran can easily supply the weaponry necessary for these tactics. Since the current US administration's timeline for this new war isn't Iran's nuclear development cycle, but rather the US '08 election cycle (because they don't trust the next administration to make the tough decisions on the issue), this may come into being soon.

Comments

[Azrael]

It's time to revaluate our alliances in the the region. The only thing i can see that will bring stability is resuming the u.s-iranian alliance. Iran is the rising power in the region, not as large as china nor india, but far more militant. They have a built in shia-sunni hatred of al-qaeda, they provide a market of 70 million and they have the most capable military in the region. In fact they have a light infantry focused military that complements our own force structure. Their assistance in iraq and afghanistan could turn strategic defeat into decisive victory. They could once again be our gendarmies of the gulf.
By allowing them to play the bad cop to our good cop role, we can keep the entire region in line. But of course there is a price to be paid for this alliance, fortunately the u.s. doesn't have to pay it.

[Chris]

This war is in a state of strategic decay. Maybe we will address this sometime soon? Not likely.

[Duncan Kinder]

Here is a very interesting diary in DailyKos to the effect that pipeline politics is driving Pakistan's, Iran's, and India's foreign policy right now. It is to the effect that these countries are developing Central Asian gas pipeline projects that cut the United States out.

http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2006/9/19/11487/7024

I've not had time to wade through all the particulars, but based on my overall reading and sense of things, none of it really surprises me - except for the discussion of Baluchistan, a topic that puzzles me.

I hate to be cynical; but it really, really, really would be interesting to get hold of Cheney's secret energy task force deliberations and see how they compare and contrast to the sort of pipeline politics outlined in this DailyKos diary.

[sammy small]

"Since the current US administration's timeline for this new war isn't Iran's nuclear development cycle, but rather the US election cycle (because they don't trust the next administration to make the tough decisions on the issue), this may come into being soon."

How did you find this out? Can you share some of the details of this timeline. Since France just caved, are we going to go it alone again? What is the initial plan, bomb the known development sites or something more drastic? Are we going to invade soon? What will be the nation re-building and exit stratagies? Is it time to buy more oil and defense stocks?

[fester]

John --- are you sure it is on the election cycle, for if the TIME magazine report of movement readiness orders for the minesweepers are for movement on Oct. 1, it is extremely unlikely that they make it to the theatre by Nov. 10, which is after the election... or are you looking at a slightly longer time frame (action before the '08 primary season really heats up)

[John Robb]

Fester, I should have been more clear. The '08 election cycle.

[Mark Pontin]

What next? Now that Scenario 1 -- call it "Democracy and Flowers" -- is tanking, the US can move towards Scenario 2, which we’ll call "the Coming Tanker War Between Iran and Saudi Arabia." This represents an escalation beyond sanctions and runs like this ---

In coming months, media reports will increasingly feature unnamed CIA analysts and the like lamenting that the Bush administration's policy of 'Iraqi democratization' isn't just failing in the face of the Sunni-Shia sectarian conflict, but also the fear now is that the destabilizing forces already unloosed are escalating into a situation in which Iran will try to obstruct the passage of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz (where the Persian Gulf narrows to only 34 miles and through which 90 percent of Persian Gulf oil exports pass). In other words, as Iraq breaks up into three partitioned regions --Kurdistan in the north, an oil-less "Sunnistan" in the middle, and a Shia-dominated region with oil in the south--Saudi Arabia, already the Sunni insurgency's biggest supporter, is going to see its fellow Sunnis deprived of the oil wealth that has historically been theirs and will increase its aid to the Sunni insurgency. Iran will respond with increased support for Iraqi Shias. Thence, the struggle can intensify into a conflict resembling the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq "Tanker War," when both countries attacked oil tankers and merchant ships--including those of neutral nations--to deprive their opponent of trade.

http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/9005lessonsiraniraqii-chap14.pdf

In short, it's a scenario of "let's you and him fight." And as in the 1980s, U.S. naval forces would be drawn into such a conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Note that in such a “tanker war” scenario, Iran, Europe and China all have more to lose than the US. In Iran’s case, despite the threats they’ve made, oil is ALL that’s keeping their economy and the mullahs’ regime going. As for Europe and China, they draw more of their oil from the Gulf than America does, and furthermore last time I looked the US has six months of strategic reserves. Under these circumstances, much of the world might be grudgingly compelled to support deployment of the global hegemon’s military and naval forces against Iranian attacks on shipping in the Gulf.

What could the US gain from this? Quite a bit potentially. Tactically, in whatever way a US-Iran conflict gets started, the US Navy unfortunately doesn't have much in the way of minesweeping capability and is going to need European naval assets along those lines. And militarily, of course, Iran is immensely more difficult than Iraq. For instance, the whole north coast of the Gulf is effectively a base for at least 300 Exocet antiship missile systems and an undisclosed number of Russian Moskit supersonic antiship cruise missiles. For the rookies here, those Moskits are a real concern.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/moskit.htm

These ramjet-equipped missiles, flying two and a half to three times the speed of sound and as low as five feet above the water, were specifically designed by the Russians to overcome the Aegis defense systems -
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/systems/aegis.htm
- and the SM-2 and SM-3 missiles protecting American aircraft-carrier groups. The maximum theoretical response time to a Moskit launch is about 25 to 30 seconds, leaving little time for jamming and countermeasures. Modern American warships, like the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers that are primary components in a U.S. carrier group, generally have steel superstructures. Nevertheless, al Qaeda's attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000 likely shows the miinmum that a Moskit can do. The Cole, an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer with steel armor, was docked in Aden harbor when a small craft with some 600 pounds of explosive detonated against its port side, putting a 40-by-40-foot gash in the Cole's flank.
http://www.pianoladynancy.com/recovery_usscole.htm
The Cole's vulnerability strongly suggests that any of Iran's Russian-made Moskit missiles, with their 750-pound warheads, are potential ship-killers when they hit a ship at close on Mach 3.

In other words, the US will need to rely on its air dominance to support minesweepers and whatever other sea vessels are needed to keep tankers going through the Gulf. Moreover, it'll have to stand off its carrier groups beyond the horizon - in fact, outside the Gulf - if they're to be of any use at all. For that matter, the US Fifth Fleet HQ is in Bahrain and could be targeted, since the whole north shore of the Persian Gulf unfortunately belongs to Iran and is potentially a platform for their cruise missiles. However, for practical purposes the Iranians must aim their missiles -- which are radar guided -- only at whatever targets are within visible range or, alternatively, they must turn on their radars so their missiles can acquire over-the-horizon targets or else they musy use sea-based platforms to launch from. In any of these cases, one chance would be probably all the Iranians would get before their ground or sea-based platforms were destroyed from the air, whether they target US ships or Bahrain itself.

So it’s bloody, but doable if the Bush administration as a whole had enough on the ball (probably a futile hope, though I wouldn’t put it beyond Andy Marshall’s crowd, which includes Rumsfeld). There is one great deal-breaker here. What if the Iranians could launch swarms of hundreds of missiles simultaneously? Afterr all, the rising profits on the oil they’ve sold since we very kindly invaded Iraq has given them a lot more money to buy munitions from the Russians. In such a case, the Iranians could conceivably damage or even devastate a large American force. Do the Iranians possess enough missiles to do something like that? Probably not in reality. Nevertheless, as that congressional report released on Thursday, August 24th concluded, the U.S. intelligence community currently seems to have remarkably little idea about exactly what capabilities Iran does possess.

http://intelligence.house.gov/Media/PDFS/IranReport082206v2.pdf

Altogether, this "Tanker War" scenario is ugly (e.g. it depends on ethnic cleansing in Iraq) and tricky for the US, requiring much tactical agility. However, firstly, something like it may now be hard to avoid, given how the "Democracy and Flowers" scenario is failing. Secondly, it does accomplish screwing both Saudi Arabia and Tehran, allowing the US to surgically attack certain sites in the latter country and perhaps altogether destabilize the regime there. And thirdly it's preferable to Scenario 3, which really is ugly and which Cheney ordered to be drawn up last year after the 7-11 London attacks. In Scenario 3, we basically just attack Iran with everything, including tactical nukes.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/14/AR2005051400071.html
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=CHO20060810&articleId=2942
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-strikes.htm

Oh, by the way: a Washington source who claims to have seen actual operational plans by the US Marines for ground action in Iran – which, if they exist, may only amount to the Marines’ bid to prove they’re still relevant – reckons on 2007, so there’ll be enough time passed before the 2008 U.S. elections.

[dan]

Mark

Interesting points, but you ignore some rather salient facts. Sadly, this is a problem of trying to get other people to act in accordance with your tactical or strategic exigencies, especially when they have plans, tactics and strategies of their own that have proven quite successful.

Firstly, Iran and Saudi Arabia have fairly substantive political, diplomatic and commercial relations these days, and their respective policies tend to be triangulated to avoid the direct conflict that you envisage; their 2003 security cooperation agreement is emblematic of this.

Whilst the Saudis have an ambiguous policy towards the Sunni insurgency, in that they're a source of funds and fighters, the more radical elements of that insurgency are also enemies of the Saudi state, as well as the US military and the Shia in general. There's a tight balance of forces in play here and the Saudis are not going to start something that is going to cause them pain and will entrain serious domestic repercussions - the Saudis run a similarly oil-dependent economy and the Royal Family are in a permanent domestic legitimacy crisis; the Iranians have a little more breathing space regarding popular legitimacy. Considering that the Saudis have never done that much for anyone other than themselves in the past 60 years, beyond giving cash, the idea that they will go to war with Iran in solidarity with Iraqi Sunni is perplexing and would require some evidence that there has been a massive shift in posture within the Saudi royal family.

Secondly, considering that Iran never attempted to close the Straits of Hormuz during the Iran-Iraq war, in spite of universal Gulf Arab backing of Iraq, the bar for such a move is set extraordinarily high ( ie a direct US attack on Iran is the tripwire - and the US moving its naval assets out of the Gulf would be telegraphing the intent, thereby enabling the Iranians to make blocking manouevres, both on the ground in Iraq and in the Straits ). The tanker war, which involved Iran and Iraq attacking third-party shipping, only started in 1987 and was initiated by Iraq.

Thirdly, the Saudis are not overt strategic/tactical actors - they are not going to attack Iranian shipping under any circumstances bar a direct declaration of war from Iran, which is likewise not going to happen; if such a thing did happen, the Saudis would be asking the US to do the fighting for them.....again.

There are a number of published war-game scenarious ( you can find them at Global security ) dealing with a US MEF to counter Iranian moves to block the Straits - all of them call for at least 30,000 boots on the ground and the time-frames are in months. It's doubtful that the US can muster such a force these days, and will be even harder-pressed to do so in the next 1-2 years.

[dan]

Following on from the Daily Telegraph's reporting earlier this year of comments made by the Director of Planning for the JCS, Lt. Gen Victor Renuart, studiously ignored by the US media, today they're citing Abizaid on the Iran war scenario.

He makes four points: they can interdict the straits, their missile forces will hit the US and their allies in the region, their army is sharpening its knives and he's worried about their capacity to use asymmetric tactics, and they have force projection capacities that can take the conflict outside the immediate region ( terrorists or, depending on how you view it and their target set, special forces ).

This is now the second senior serving uniformed military figure telling us that the military option is the mother of all mistakes.

[Z]

It does seem that the diplomatic train, rolling so steady just 6 weeks ago is comming off the tracks. As mentioned before, even France and Germany are having second thoughts. China and Russia were playing a double game to begin with. Not sure what changed everybodies mind. But I'm guessing it may be the undesirable outcome (from the West's POV) of the Hizbullah war. Afghanistan is now blowing up and England and Canada arrived just in time to catch the shock wave. Nobody believes anymore that the U.S. can do Iran quickly and cleanly.

In other words nobody is on board with sanctions, which means EVERYBODY (outside of the neocons and Israel) is against war.

Which narrows U.S. options two exactly two; 1) Welcome to the Nuclear club!
2) Start a war that doesn't even have the pretense of legitimacy.

I was allways very convinced thatthe U.S. would find a way to choose 2. But now I'm begining to think wiser heads have prevailed.

But you never can tell.
Z

[Jim S]

We can do war games all day but there is one huge wild card, the President really wants to do Iran. All portents signal the start of the bombing campaign.

Yet, recent events have blown these predictions of an air war into smithereens:

1) Hezabollah defeated Israel’s invasion. Shock and awe belly flopped in Lebanon.
2) NATO and Canada suddenly find themselves in a hot nasty Guerilla War in Afghanistan.
3) Gasoline prices have fallen because speculators have decided that Iranian supplies won’t be blockaded. We’re talking about real money. The oil traders must have gotten the news from some very good sources.
4) Corporate Media drumbeat is out of synch. Even Time Magazine's report indicates that the US Army is tied down in Afghanistan and Iraq and only a bombing campaign is possible. The article and all experts report that speculation a bombing campaign will overthrow the Iranian Mullahs is a neo-con opium pipedream.

In the next year we will find out, if reality has returned to the White House or if we are witnessing the 21st century version of "Waiting for Barbarossa".

[Duncan Kinder]

Some time ago, during the Israeli-Hezbolla conflict as I recall, I posted a comment on this blog to the effect that, if Israel were to secure serious long-term prospects in the Middle East, then it should abandon its reliance upon conventional supremacy and, instead, form some sort of understanding with at least some indigeneous Middle East gropus and develop counter-guerilla guerilla networks of its own. I then proposed the Sufis as prospects for such a role.

According to the BBC, it looks as if Israel may be doing precisely such a thing with the Kurds.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/5363116.stm

The article states:

quote:

When the former Israeli special forces soldiers were sent to Iraq in 2004 they were told they would be disowned if they were discovered.

Their role there was to train two groups of Kurdish troops.

One would act as a security force for the new Hawler International Airport (near Erbil) and the other, of more than 100 peshmerga or Kurdish fighters, would be trained for "special assignments", according to one of Newsnight's interviewees.

....

"We were training them in all kinds of anti-terror lessons, anti-terror, security airport, training them with long rifles, pistols; telling them, teaching them tactics like shooting behind doors, behind barricades, shooting from the left, shooting from the right, shooting from windows, how to shoot first, how to identify a terrorist in a crowd.

:end of quote

I undertand that the Kurds tend to be heavily Sufic; so perhaps my suggestion that the Israelis ally with the Sufis was not that far off the mark.

[Azrael]

ad d.kinder
The kurds are overwhelmingly sunni, most are Shafii with a small following of hard core wahabis. According to a turkish friend there are some hanafi kurds in turkey but that seems beyond the theater of operations. The few kurds who are sufi are not in iraq but rather in iran , where there are several sufi madraseys in iran's kurdish zones. But sufism is generally a anti-ethnic movement and these schools tend to be ethnically mixed mostly populated with urban iranians escaping psychological melt downs in the snowy mountains.

The israleis are overplaying their hands in iraqi kurdistan. The turks, with their large population, developing economy and the largest military in nato(troop count), are a far better ally than the peshmerga, but by aiding the kurds they are alienating not just turkish public opinion( which they never really had) but also the turkish leadership, which is paranoid about any terroritoral concessions that may be forced from them by "western powers". The kurds desreve a homeland, the jews desrve a homeland, the palestinians desreve a homeland, the native americans deserve a homeland but that doesn't mean any of them will get it , hold on to it, and ever no a day of peace if they achieve it; reality can bite sometimes.

[g510]

RE. "Nevertheless, as that congressional report released on Thursday, August 24th concluded, the U.S. intelligence community currently seems to have remarkably little idea about exactly what capabilities Iran does possess."

Let's not forget a) someone in the Admin leaked to one of Chalabi's guys that the US broke top-level Iranian military & diplomatic crypto, causing Iran to upgrade and putting us squarely in the dark, and to date no one has been prosecuted for this, and b) Valerie Plame, outed for nothing more than pure spite and politics, and also to date no one has been prosecuted for the actual leak.

The incompetence of ideologues knows no bounds.

---

Re. Hezbollah running a SIGINT op against Israel: This is not terribly surprising, and not the first time we've seen something like this.

In Vietnam, the VC were able to conduct physical wiretaps on US field telephone lines and collect an amazing amount of tactical intel. In Nicaragua, Sandinista sympathizers working at the public telephone exchanges tapped Somosa and his Guardistas, discovering among other things, that they were fueled by large quantities of meth ordered from Florida.

I can see how Hez could set up a decent collection system with perhaps two layers of analysis to process the raw stuff into actionable intel.

However, if Hez successfully "cracked the code" as the newspaper article title suggests, that would be a whole 'nother level of sophistication. Though, this gets very interesting: the probability of Hez having the kind of specialized talent required for cryptanalysis ("cipher brains"), much less the computer resources required, is very small indeed.

If there was any cryptanalysis going on, it was most likely going on somewhere else. Somewhere large. Somewhere with a history of world-class math nerdism going back decades. Somewhere like Russia, perhaps. But: Russian government? or Russian outlaw subculture with access to cipher brains & supercomputers...?

Is it possible we could be seeing collaboration among diverse subnational groups in different countries, or could Hez have members in Russia so it's all one group with a franchise?

[Duncan Kinder]

Azrael:

My source for stating that the Kurds are Sufic is the following from Juan Cole:

"Two bombings in Kirkuk underlined the collapse of security in that city. Al-Zaman says that the violence in Kirkuk every day during the past 3 days is unprecedented in its severity. Kurdish Peshmerga control the city, and the governing council is being boycotted by its own Arab and Turkoman members. A bombing of the takyah or Sufi center left 9 dead and 53 wounded. The Sufi center belonged to the family of Jalal Talabani, the president of Iraq. (I presume that this center is for the Naqshbandi Sufi order, which predominates among Kurds.) In a separate incident, the offices of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan were attacked. Al-Zaman is speaking of the "collapse" of security "in Kirkuk.""
http://www.juancole.com/2006_08_01_juanricole_archive.html

Cole could have meant, when stating that "the Naqshbandi Sufi order, which predominates among Kurds" meant that the Naqshbandis predominate amongst those Kurds who are Sufic and not that they predominate amongst all Kurds.

However, my Google for "Kurds sufi" gets this:

"An overwhelming majority of Muslim and non-Muslim Kurds are followers of one of many mystic Sufi orders (or tariqa). The bonds of the Muslim Kurds, for example, to different Sufi orders have traditionally been stronger than to orthodox Muslim practices. Sufi rituals in Kurdistan, led by Sufi masters, or shaykhs, contain so many clearly non-Islamic rites and practices that an objective observer would not consider them Islamic in the orthodox sense."

http://www.kurdistanica.com/english/religion/sufism/sufism.html

A number of other blurbs from the Google search results suggest that there is indeed sume substantial Kurdish / Sufic interface.

I am no expert on Kurdish religious beliefs and may ultimately stand corrected, but I am not presently prepared to retract my statement that Kurds tend to be Sufic.

[Adam]

John,

The worst news is that the US is totally surrounded in a sea of insurgency and is now having to scramble to try and hold onto the capital.

Around a year ago you wrote that the insurgency had around 130k people involved. Today with 75% support among the Sunnis the insurgency effectively has 1 million male supporters.

http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=2470183&page=1

Lets do the numbers on that. Traditionally the 10:1 ratio means that ten soldiers are needed to supress one insurgent. That means the US army needs to increase to over 10 million strong. The US army in March 1945 was 11 million strong.

In other words the US needs to effectively equal the mobilisation of WW2 to hold onto Iraq. Of course that ignores the fact that in 1945 most of the troops were Poor Bloody Infantry and today there are relatively few frontline troops (I've seen numbers suggesting that in 1945 around 50% of army troops were troops, and its 10% today - no idea if that is accurate).

However in Bagdhad where the US forces are concentrated the civil war hasn't slowed down at all. Around 3,000 people are killed a month now. That is, in US terms, roughly equal to a 9/11 roughly every 3 days - significantly up from a 9/11 every ten days earlier this year.

In fact the situation is so bad that the US has had to flee Salahuddin Province including Samarra completely, leaving it in the hands of an Iraqi division.

[Mark Pontin]

Dan wrote: 'Interesting points, but you ignore some rather salient facts.'

Yeah, I was mostly attempting to be provocative along the lines of 'given that we've got lemon' -- e.g. Iraq is almost certainly disintegrating into some kind of tripartite state -- 'let's figure out how to make lemonade.'

'Considering the Saudis have never done much for anyone other than themselves... beyond giving cash, the idea that they will go to war with Iran in solidarity with Iraqi Sunni is perplexing.'

Frankly, I agree.

'There are a number of published war-game scenarious (you can find them at Global security) dealing with a US MEF to counter Iranian moves to block the Straits - all of them call for at least 30,000 boots on the ground and the time-frames are in months.'

And yet, funnily enough, John Pike at Global Security.Org was exactly who I first got the 'tanker war scenario' from.

Two general points I'd stand by:

[1] Even with something like 5000 bodies in the Baghdad morgue in just the month of July (as I recall), the Bush administration isn't defining what's going on in Iraq as a civil war. What would it take for them to define the situation as civil war? It'd require wholescale ethnic cleansing carried out at the same speeds as in Bosnia or Rwanda (as opposed to the slow dribble we're seeing now). The thing is, if events do tip over into such a scenario -- if somebody tips them over -- it can happen rapidly e.g. in a time-frame of two weeks. Most analysis I've seen scants just how the rest of the region outside Iraq could be drawn through "the gates of hell" -- as we were warned by the local regimes -- by our destroying the status quo within Iraq .

[2] All that said, it's hard to communicate to people outside the US (I'm not American, but I live there) how little use the US now feels it has for propping up the disintegrating status quo in the Middle East, given that its most salient feature is that the US would serve as prime target for the Muslim world while the rest of the world benefits. The US is quite prepared to keep on throwing over the table till we get a game we like. Specifically, whenever I talk to someone in Washington, all the signs are indeed that, as Jim S. wrote, "the President really wants to do Iran."

Personally, I think we're somewhat deluded even about the extent of our military supremacy over Iran. In case we didn't get the message from Hezbollah's excellent performance in Lebanon, note that the Iranians developed their first indigenous 32-bit microprocessor a couple of months back: they can build their own cruise missiles etcetera now. If we were strategically smart, I think we'd be investigating whether we could -- as Azrael suggested -- construct an anti-Wahhabi alliance in the region with the regional superpower, Iran. After all, Nixon went to China and Roosevelt did business with Stalin. Unfortunately, as g510 writes, "the incompetence of ideologues knows no bounds.'

[AoT]

"I am no expert on Kurdish religious beliefs and may ultimately stand corrected, but I am not presently prepared to retract my statement that Kurds tend to be Sufic."

The confusion might come from the fact that Sufism and Sunnism are not necessarily mutually exclusive. You can be a Sufi and still be considered Sunni, Sufism is the more mystic, esoteric aspect of Sunnism.

[Duncan Kinder]

"The confusion might come from the fact that Sufism and Sunnism are not necessarily mutually exclusive."

Most Sufi's are Sunnis; the reverse is not so. There are some non-Sunni Sufis and even some non-Muslim Sufis. See eg:

"Mainstream Sufism is seen by its scholars and supporters as a part of traditional Islam. However, there is a major line of non-Islamic or offshoot-Islamic Sufi thought that sees Sufism as predating Islam and being a universal philosophy, that is independent of the Qur'an and the teachings of Prophet Muhammad. This view of Sufism has been popular in the Western world, and the terms yogi and sufi are used interchangeably. Universal Sufism tends to be opposed by traditional Sufis, who argue that Sufism has always been practiced from within an Islamic framework and can never be separated from it. Inayat Khan founded Universal Sufism, and Idries Shah advocated similar concepts."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sufi#Universal_Sufism

[Chris]

AQ and 4GW

http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370137

[TM Lutas]

The goal was to get a freely adopted constitution passed (check), have a freely elected Iraqi government (check), and then hand over security to that government's functioning army drawing down troops along the way (bzzzt).

But let's look at facts as they stand today. Iraq's now got its navy and air force under its own control as well as two army divisions and they just had their 2nd province handed over to their control. These forces are likely to increase.

So long as that step by step handing over keeps going, there should be a reasonable exit available to the coalition troops including US forces. Iraq may not meet its self-declared goal of handing the whole of the country back over by the end of next year but it is very likely that the province count will be very much better than 2 of 18 by that point.

[Duncan Kinder]

Following the jamestown.org link cited above, I came across the following article, which further develops the Sufi / Global Guerilla interface:

quote:

Iraqi Sufis Join the Fight Against Coalition Forces

By Lydia Khalil

Of all the Islamic trends, Sufism, a mystical branch of Islam, is reputed to be the least prone to violence and more tolerant of other currents within Islam as well as other faiths. This is why the recent announcement by a group of Qadiri Sufis that they have formed the Battalions of Sheikh 'Abd al-Qadir al-Gilani to fight against coalition forces and the Shiite-led government of Iraq is surprising to many.

Although Sufism is a minority trend within Islam, it is not uncommon in Iraq. There are different branches of Sufi Islam in Iraq, with the Qadiriyah, of which this group is comprised, being the largest. The Qadiris follow the teachings of a famous Sufi mystic, 'Abd al-Qadir al-Gilani (1077-1166), who moved from his native Caspian village to Baghdad when he was 18. In 1127, he began to preach and his order steadily expanded in Iraq. Al-Gilani's teachings stayed close to orthodox interpretations of Islam but featured some mystical interpretations of the Quran. He attacked materialism and instead stressed charity and humanitarianism.

:close_quote

http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370133

Whatever this means, it does indicate that the Sufis are getting involved in Global Guerilla activity. This is also happening in Chechnya.

Note that Sufis are mystics. That means they are in the business of confounding whatever conceptual framework you might have about them. Their conduct can be quite surprising. Albanian Bektashi Sufis masqueraded as Communist cells. And they are not necessarily peaceful. The Mahdi, who killed Chinese Gordon at Khartoum, was a Sufi.

[Azrael]

Okay let's lay this to rest.

First sufis are not inherently pacifist. In fact all of the major military orders of medieval islam were sufi orders; the yeni-sari(janissary), the mamlukes, saqāliba , etc.... Sufism was one of the first movemnets in islam to circumvent the the prohibition against infighting amongst muslims.
Second, i hate to quote wiki, but in light of time constraints here goes:
"Today the majority of Kurds are officially Muslim, belonging to the Shafi school, and to a much lesser degree, the Hanafi school, both of Sunni Islam. There is also a significant minority of Kurds that are Shia Muslims, primarily living in the Ilam and Kermanshah provinces of Iran and Central Iraq ("Al-Fayliah" Kurds). The Alevis are another religious minority among the Kurds, mainly found in Turkey."

Checked on the Naksibendi, they are a sufi order whose heartland is eastern turkey w/ strong followings in the u.s. and germany. They are ottoman revivalist and have been linked with some turkish nationalist outfits, doesn't exactly strike me a club for kurds, but who knows. I fired off an email to a friend who speaks arabic, if she has some time she'll check the iraqi sites for any mention of sufi orders in northern iraq.

[Duncan Kinder]

The Naqshbandi were founded by Baha'uddin Naqshband of Bokhara, in present day Uzbekistan.

The Bektashis, whom I previously mentioned, were linked to the Jannisaries; so they were literally the fellows who were "at the gates of Vienna." Nevertheless, they also eat pork, drink alcohol, practise celibacy, and grant high status to women. Bektashi jokes are common in Turkey.

[Empires Fall]

It's very interesting how many elements of the strategy they've been using are luring Western nations into taking off the gloves. Use of torture, bombardment of civilian areas using antipersonnel weapons, even just the occupation in force, which produces friction against an otherwise neutral populace.

The media minimizes the Israeli loss in Lebanon. The fact that a few thousand guys armed with substandard weapons were able to stand off the regular army of the best armed nation in the world, with a massive numerical advantage, is extremely foreboding.

I heard the other day that a political science professor of mine from years ago said in a recent lecture that we're witnessing the fall of the West. This is how empires collapse. The old strategies don't work anymore, and the homefront population ceases to buy into the lies.

A nuclear Taliban is, at the very least, regional endgame. I have a strong suspicion that their sleeper network in the US is still functional. I base that on the severe beating it's taken in the Middle East-- an extreme, total-war pounding-- without an appreciable reduction in ability to inflict casualties.

Quite the opposite: US forces have been isolating themselves in armed camps from which they launch periodic strikes. But if they're unable to prevent large mobile groups from abducting and murdering 60 people every few weeks within a stone's throw of the Green Zone, that doesn't bode well by any metric.

Expect the appearance of technicals. Expect the use of repurposed off-the-shelf commercial air drones by the Iraqi resistance. Expect an escalation of high-technology anti-armor and anti-air armaments provided by Iran and Syria. Expect WMD attacks on the Green Zone.

All this is just IMHO. I feel kind of guilty about contradicting the party line that the Bush Administration has been spouting, because the situation is starting to look so bad for the guys in white cowboy hats. But I just don't see how blindly parroting the propaganda department helps. The whole war is a hearts-and-minds war, and to recognize that is the only hope of pulling out of there with any kind of dignity. Of course, that'll never happen.

I agree with John that we're going to see a US forward base overrun within the next six months. I'd expect a combination of a WMD supply bomb and a conventional attack with fast maneuver groups. Everybody knows Saddam's toxins are still out there in the desert somewhere in nice safe canisters.

All in all, it's starting to smell a lot like Tet.

[Empires Fall]

'nother thing: CENTCOM in the US was penetrated by two joyriding teens in a stolen car.

What's that say? At the very least, it's got to be kind of embarrassing.

[Azrael]

Nothing is eternal. Parents die, children die, even empires die. I can take the fall of the u.s. as a superpower/empire; never in history were a people(i'm excluding southerners here:)) so ill-suited for oppression thrust into a postion where it's so manifestly a part of the core skill set. That and all it entails i can take with a sigh of relief, but god help me i can't stomach the fact that the PRC will fill the power vacuum. Damn i thought i could get thru this life without ever having to say ni hao mao with a serious face. Jeez, g.w. sure is sum dum phoc.

I don't fear global insurgents united by a more or less common religion yet lacking strong economic fundamentals; they're just raiders taking bites out periphery of the empire/hegemony. The real challenge has been and will be the chinese, they have the industrial might to supplant the u.s. While washington pissess away the military strength of the nation in garrison duty trying in vain to pacify the muslim world, all the time asking the prc to underwrite our military folies by purchasing our debt( the chicoms make a little extra on the side arming the global insurgency for good measure), the chinese slowly build up their conventional armed forces. The day will come , a generation from now when we'll be to the chinese what england is to us now, a sychophant unable to conceive of an independent course of action. When that day comes, i think i'll join the global insurgency.

[dan]

Nice to know that the baked bean theory of Iraqi WMD still has some adherents.

[g510]

Good to see some discussion of the Sufis here.

Techincally, the term "mysticism" refers to the branch of any religious denomination that is primarily concerned with the direct individual experience of (or contact with) God or equivalent principle (e.g. "ground of being"). By "direct" is meant "unmediated," which also includes "unmediated by scripture or religious hierarchy." Mystics tend to be intellectually capable, and tend to regard established power of any kind as transitory and self-deluding. Politically they tend toward a kind of libertarianism based on belief in individual autonomy, combined with some mildly socialistic ideas based on beliefs about the role of compassion in human affairs.

Mysticism tends to be the polar opposite of fundamentalism, which it views as being encumbered by scriptural orthodoxies. For example, mystics in the Christian tradition tend to believe that American fundamentalists are engaged in "bibliolatry," i.e. idolatry with the Bible as its object. Mystics living under authoritarian regimes tend to be among the first people to embrace dissident views. Mystics also tend to be strongly pluralistic in their views about society-at-large. Authoritarian regimes of all kinds are deeply suspicious of mystics and tend to persecute them immediately and mercilessly.

The mystical view of reason and logic tends to be more expansive or inclusive than that found in orthodox Western scientific and philosophical thought, and yet mystics tend to respect and even embrace science and its findings readily.

RE. Sufis specifically, "we can work with these people." This is not the same thing as the naive belief that Sufis are ready to accept Western cultural values and political structures, but it is a basis for practical alliance.

---

Re. Azreal's items above: Good to see what appears to be a traditional oldschool conservative critique of the present Administration's strategy and tactics. I also agree that the Chicoms (Chinese Communists for anyone who doesn't know the abbreviation) are taking the long view and will probably emerge as the dominant world power after all of this is over.

[John Robb]

Yesterday:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/21/AR2006092101723.html?nav=rss_print/asection

"U.S. and Iraqi forces arrested top aides to anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr in pre-dawn raids Thursday, according to Sadr officials who called the move a provocation designed to trigger a full-blown battle between the groups."

[ramsis]

interesting but i have a few issues with your assesment. first as i understand it the violence in Iraq is mostly secretarian at this point, and although full civil war is a strong possibilty it does not mean end game (or full failure) for the united states. I'm curious wich side is going to be able to battle its secretarian rivals,the Iraqi security forces and still have time to set up katushyas outside american bases unmolested by american airpower or raids by joint ops. a full civil war might actually allow our enemies and the enemies of Iraq to expose themselves. i think an attempt to overrun an american base in iraq would be slaughter for attacking insurgents and play right into the hands of our forces. I think it is absurd to cite the recent war in lebonon as a succsess for islamic facists everywhere. the truth is Israel could have ended that war in a week under better leadership and from the souds of it thats underway right now (netenyahu). As for iminent war with Iran, I would wait a little before i'd make that assumption, the recent drop in gas prices and the fact that ahmadinjad decided to not partake in chavez's recent personal attacks on President Bush have the whiff of appeasment in the air. perhaps a blind eye and low gas prices will win out even if it means prolonging one conflict(Iran) to shorten another(Iraq).

[AoT]

There seems to be a lot of misconception about Sufis here. They are not some sort of Islam-lite sect, nor do they abandon the Qu'ran. The Sufi mystics, the real ones not the western new-age folks, are strict adherents to Shari'a and they are not "more accepting" of other religions as a group than are sunnis or shi'a.

[Barry]

Robb: "...but rather the US '08 election cycle (because they don't trust the next administration to make the tough decisions on the issue), this may come into being soon."

Since Bush's by-now obvious Iraq plan is to hand off the defeat to the next president, no matter what the cost, perhaps you should reconsider.

[stevelaudig]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/23/AR2006092301130.html?nav=rss_nation/special

Washington post article that needs no summary from me.

[Marcello]

"In this near term conflict, we are likely to see a repeat of the lightly manned defensive hedgehog used successfully by Hezbollah against Israel"

Hizbollah had first rate training,sizable numbers of adequate antitank weapons and were well entrenched.The iraqi guerrillas have none of the above.
Without these things american armor and artillery/bombers will make short work of any attempt to hold ground.Likewise small numbers of tanks will be able to keep the roads open for supply columns.
Iran migh supply something but ATGMs don't exactly grow on trees.The Saghegh tandem warhead round design seems pretty minimalist either, especially if pitted against the TUSK upgrade for the Abrams.

[Duncan Kinder]

Marcello: "Likewise small numbers of tanks will be able to keep the roads open for supply columns."

Col. Patrick Lang disagrees.

http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0721/p09s01-coop.htm

His article is as follows:

quote:

The vulnerable line of supply to US troops in Iraq
By Patrick Lang
ALEXANDRIA, VA.

American forces in Iraq are in danger of having their line of supply cut by guerrillas. Napoleon once said that "an army travels on its stomach." By that he meant that the problem of keeping an army supplied is the prerequisite for the very existence of the force.

A 21st-century military force "burns up" a tremendous volume of expendable supplies and continuously needs repairs to equipment as well as medical treatment. Without a plentiful and dependable source of fuel, food, and ammunition, a military force falters. First it stops moving, then it begins to starve, and eventually it becomes unable to resist the enemy.

In 1915, for example, this happened to British forces that had invaded Mesopotamia. A British-Indian force traveled up the line of the Tigris River, advancing to Kut, southeast of Baghdad. They became besieged there after their line of supply was cut along the river to the south. Some 11,000 troops ultimately surrendered, after the allies suffered another 23,000 casualties trying to rescue them.

American troops all over central and northern Iraq are supplied with fuel, food, and ammunition by truck convoy from a supply base hundreds of miles away in Kuwait. All but a small amount of our soldiers' supplies come into the country over roads that pass through the Shiite-dominated south of Iraq.

Until now the Shiite Arabs of Iraq have been told by their leaders to leave American forces alone. But an escalation of tensions between Iran and the US could change that overnight. Moreover, the ever-increasing violence of the civil war in Iraq can change the alignment of forces there unexpectedly.

Southern Iraq is thoroughly infiltrated by Iranian special operations forces working with Shiite militias, such as Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigades. Hostilities between Iran and the United States or a change in attitude toward US forces on the part of the Baghdad government could quickly turn the supply roads into a "shooting gallery" 400 to 800 miles long.

At present, the convoys of trucks supplying our forces in Iraq are driven by civilians - either South Asians or Turks. If the route is indeed turned into a shooting gallery, these civilian truck drivers would not persist or would require a heavier escort by the US military.

It might then be necessary to "fight" the trucks through ambushes on the roads. This is a daunting possibility. Trucks loaded with supplies are defenseless against many armaments, such as rocket-propelled grenades, small arms, and improvised explosive devices. A long, linear target such as a convoy of trucks is very hard to defend against irregulars operating in and around their own towns.

The volume of "throughput" would probably be seriously lessened in such a situation. A reduction in supplies would inevitably affect operational capability. This might lead to a downward spiral of potential against the insurgents and the militias. This would be very dangerous for our forces.

Are there alternatives to the present line of supply leading to Kuwait? There may be, but they are not immediately apparent.

A line of supply consists of the route and the facilities at both ends. Our present line of supply now originates in Kuwait with its ports, stevedores, warehouses, etc.

A new line of supply leading from Turkey or Jordan would require similar facilities. Turkey has not been very cooperative in this war, and a supply line leading from Jordan would have to pass through Anbar Province, the very heart of the Sunni Arab insurgencies. Creating new facilities in these countries would be possible but politically difficult, and it would take time.

Few of the permanent requirements for uninterrupted resupply can be satisfied out of the local economy. Iraq lacks reserves of these supplies, and there would not be anything like enough "left over" for our forces to subsist on.

What about air resupply? It appears that only 5 to 10 percent of day-to-day military deliveries into Iraq are currently transferred by air. Inside Iraq, local deliveries by air probably amount to more. In a difficult situation, the tonnages delivered could be increased, but given the bulk in weight and volume of the needed supplies, it seems unlikely that air resupply could exceed 25 percent of daily requirements. This would not be enough to sustain the force.

Compounding the looming menace of the Kuwait-based line of supply is the route followed by the cargo ships en route to Kuwait. Geography dictates that the ships all pass through the Strait of Hormuz and then proceed to the ports at the other end of the Gulf. Those who are familiar with the record of Iran's efforts against Kuwaiti shipping in the Iran-Iraq War will be concerned about this maritime vulnerability.

Potential adversaries along the line of supply include many combat-experienced and well-schooled officers and former officers. We can be sure that they are acutely aware of this weakness in our situation.

The precarious nature of our supply line is well-known to our military leadership. Unfortunately, this is one of the many problems in Iraq that has not been adequately addressed because of a shortage of troops. We should start building ourselves another line of supply as a backup, and we should do it soon.

• Patrick Lang is former head of human intelligence collection and Middle East intelligence at the Defense Intelligence Agency.

:close_quote

[dan]

Duncan:

Col. Lang's article is interesting, but you need to look at a map and calculate the distance from Aqaba to Baghdad for example to understand that from a logistical point of view, the route is a nightmare; it doesn't help that Aqaba is a small port, unlike Kuwait, that probably lacks the capacity to cope with the additional logistics traffic that US military supplies entail. Likewise, similar considerations apply to Turkey, with the added problem that the roads ain't great, there is already a high volume of truck traffic, and some of the terrain is mountainous and can be impassable in winter. Needless to say, both these alternate routes pass through the main areas of Sunni insurgent activity. Kuwait is the only realistic option, and this requires that the US respects certain red lines.

Marcello:

The Sadrist uprising of the Summer of 2004 put significant pressure on the US logistics chain. Since then they have increased their numbers, improved their organisation and upgraded their weaponry and training; they also have a significant presence in most of the key southern cities along the supply chain, whilst there is a coalition forces vacuum developing in this area - when the Italians and the Romanians leave Nasiriyah in the next few weeks, the US will be reliant on a contingent of 450 Australian troops and Iraqi security forces to keep the road between Diwaniyah and Nasariyah open.

At present there are very few IED incidents in the region between Basra and Najaf, and the adoption of this tactic would be a very effective means of slowing down the supply chain. Realistically, the US lacks the resources in theatre to fight another insurgency, and the adoption of swarm tactics would likely overwhelm US capacities somewhere along the line.

[Marcello]

"Col. Patrick Lang disagrees."

Duncan, the devil is in the details.If the shiite really hits the fan I can easily see the US Army being forced to do little apart
from figting for its supply lines.That, yes.
But I do not buy a complete cutoff of the supply lines scenario.
The first reason is that simply the US will not allow the loss of tens of thousands of its soldiers.If that means firebombing every iraqi city along the supply lines, you bet they will do it.I hope you remeber what was the rationale for the use of nukes in WW2.
Secondarily a supply convoy escorted by a tank platoon, a few Bradleys/armored cars/guntrucks, with helicopter gunships and air/arty support on demand isn't such a soft target.If you cannot deal with the heavy elements of the escorts,and without ATGMs/high end RPGs you can't,you will be limited to some harrassment, except in some bottlenecks with no manouvre space.

[Z]

"Secondarily a supply convoy escorted by a tank platoon, a few Bradleys/armored cars/guntrucks, with helicopter gunships and air/arty support on demand isn't such a soft target."

I'm no logistician but that sounds like a dog chasing its tail. If that's what you need to protect your supply lines, then you need more troops (dificult enough) and for them ofcourse more food and ammo. For the tanks and helis plenty more fuel and spare parts. All this will greatly increase the demand on the supply train. And all of it useless against preplanted IEDs which don't need to be used against heavy armor, but merely the light trucks.

I certainly don't envision any Bataan style death march in Iraq. But if the Shiite south develops an insurgency like in the Sunni center but proportional to their population, the U.S. will have little choice but to withdraw. Firebombing cities really wont be that helpful.

[Marcello]

"I'm no logistician but that sounds like a dog chasing its tail. If that's what you need to protect your supply lines, then you need more troops (dificult enough) and for them ofcourse more food and ammo. For the tanks and helis plenty more fuel and spare parts."

Z, there will not be more troops, simply because there are no more troops to spare.What it will mean is that most of the existing assets (troops tanks etc.) will be used to protect some bases and the resupply effort necessary to mantain them.I will have to check but if I remeber correctly the 50% of the soviet forces deployed in Afghanistan was used to defend the main supply route.You get the picture.
If the shiite hits the fan the only rational answer is withdrawal.However it should be possible, if completely pointless, to hang on for a while regardless and execute something resembling an ordered withdrawal when finally some sanity prevails.

"And all of it useless against preplanted IEDs which don't need to be used against heavy armor, but merely the light trucks."

IEDs are harrasment, basically.They cannot stop a determined resupply effort.

[Adam]

Z,

I agree completely with your comments on the dog chasing its own tail.

Lets take the example of M1A1s travelling from the Kuwaiti border to Bagdhad, a distance of some 300 miles. Each M1 needs to refuel at least once, delaying every convoy whilst refuelling takes place. On this journey each M1 will use some 300 gallons of fuel, whilst each Bradley will need 150 galllons to travel that distance. Of course they'll need the same again to go back the next morning. Therefore each escort vehicle in this convoy will need a fuel tanker just for it. I'm not sure what an IED will do to a fuel tanker but I do recall that a tank without fuel is a statistic waiting to happen.

In addition each vehicle will almost certainly have to change tracks and have regular technical breakdowns. Each one represents more delay, more wasted fuel.

Currently the US uses 2,000 trucks a day to transport logistics to transport nearly 2 million US gallons of fuel a day (fuel represents nearly 60% of the current US logistics requirement). Additional delays in the process will cost more fuel, require more trucks, which will need more tanks. Its a very vicious circle.

[Marcello]

In principle the same tank platoon and escort element does not have to be attached to the same convoy for the entire lenght of the travel.They could be changed at some intermediate base.In theory this would enable a better knowledge of the local area of operation.

"Therefore each escort vehicle in this convoy will need a fuel tanker just for it."

It depends on what fuel tanker you are speaking about.The M900 series has a 5000 gallons capacity, which according to your own fuel consumption figures would be sufficient for a round trip for both an Abrams platoon,a few Bradley and still something left to spare.

"Additional delays in the process will cost more fuel, require more trucks, which will need more tanks. Its a very vicious circle."

I do not get a strong relationship between delays and increased fuel consumption.A fuel truck waiting in some base for the tank escort being refueled or something is wasting time but it is not burning fuel.

[SteveL]

The US has been supporting a force of ~150,000 troops some 6,000 plus miles from home every day since 2003. If the insurgents had to desire & ability to cut our lines they have had ample time to do so. Obviously they don't want to or can't.

This conflict is not just a one-way military training session for Anti-American forces. There is no military force in the world which can push the US out of Iraq. The Russians would not take us directly on during the cold war for good reason and I know of no other country which has had its astronauts bring back rocks from the moon.

The question on the table is can the American political, diplomatic, and economic cadre succesfully synchronize their efforts with that of our military to accomplish the publicly stated objectives?

[syberberg]

"There is no military force in the world which can push the US out of Iraq."

Wasn't the same thing said about Vietnam?

[tim302]

Bringing rocks back from the moon has nothing to do with fighting the Iraqi insurgency. Nothing.

[Marcello]

"The US has been supporting a force of ~150,000 troops some 6,000 plus miles from home every day since 2003."

Which has not been contested for nearly all its lenght.That might change in the next future.Maybe they cannot cut them but they can still make the position untenable for any practical purpose.

"There is no military force in the world which can push the US out of Iraq."

In the narrowest sense of the expression, yes.
Guerrillas make you bleed until the cost of staying is simply not worth anymore.

"I know of no other country which has had its astronauts bring back rocks from the moon"

The touting of this supposed "proof" of US invincibility is something I generally find rather amusing.I remember a country which put the first man in space.It doesn't even exist anymore.They are gone, finished.
By the way, the Buran and the Mir did exactly shit for them in Afghanistan.

"The question on the table is can the American political, diplomatic, and economic cadre succesfully synchronize their efforts with that of our military to accomplish the publicly stated objectives?"

The question is more along the lines if they can develop enough sense not to jump in the abyss.The US economy is floating on red ink.

[SteveL]

If you’re innovative enough to go to the moon and back you can probably figure out other issues as well…

US 2005 GDP: 12.3 Trillion USD
US 2005 Deficit: 318 Billion

http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/74xx/doc7492/08-17-BudgetUpdate.pdf

Italian 2005 GDP: 1.8 Trillion USD
Italian Deficit: 4 % of GDP ?

Russian 2005 GDP: 766.2 Billion USD
Saudi Arabian 2005 GDP: 307.8 Billion USD
Iranian 2005 GDP: 196.4 Billion USD

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)
http://www.eubusiness.com/Finance/060710172409.t64d70ek

[SteveL]

During my time in Iraq I used to head up into Kurdistan from time to time to gather ideas on how UNDP had used almost 1 billion USD from the Oil for Food program to provide 24 hour per day electricity to the Kurds (they limited the number of amps each house could draw). From the presence of electricity flowed many things (security, drinking water, regular trash service, independent businesses, etc) that we see in developed countries.

Security and Electricity can be provided for the rest of Iraq at a price as well (about a million dollars a megawatt)….it may require approaching things from a Sunni-stan and Shia-stan angle, and employing mainly Iraqis rather than the multinationals, but “you always miss 100% of the shots that you don’t take.” It is not Africa yet…

[Marcello]

"If you’re innovative enough to go to the moon and back you can probably figure out other issues as well…

US 2005 GDP: 12.3 Trillion USD
US 2005 Deficit: 318 Billion"

The fiscal deficit per se isn't scary, although saying that one's deficit is better than Italy is like saying that one's human right records isn't as bad as Saddam's.The issue is the fiscal deficit AND the trade deficit, plus a myriad of others factors.

[SteveL]

"The fiscal deficit per se isn't scary, although saying that one's deficit is better than Italy is like saying that one's human right records isn't as bad as Saddam's."

Certo. But I thought it might provide an interesting data point that some of friends in Europe could relate to.

These gentlemen cover some of the points you have raised much more eloquently than I can, and it is an interesting look at what's behind the on-ground tactics that are often discussed on global guerrillas...

http://www.cfr.org/publication/10071/american_grand_strategy.html