LAST STOP FOR BAGHDAD: Connectivity and counter-insurgency

The insecurity of Baghdad's Dora neighborhood was demonstrated yet again in early October by three blasts that killed 17. What makes this interesting -- different and apart from the ongoing violence in the rest of the country -- is that this mixed neighborhood was "cleansed" by the US military in August.

The August operation was meant to make Dora an example, carefully chosen due to the presence of critical infrastructure, of how the US was going to apply classic counter-insurgency strategy (aka oil spots) first to Baghdad and outwards from there. The oil spot strategy -- the detailed playbook for this new attempt at it was written by DoD thinker Andrew Krepinevich, and was published in Foreign Affairs (September/October 2005) if you are interested -- is the latest and potentially the last (given the upsurge in domestic discontent with the war) US strategy for fixing Iraq.

A simple rendition of the oil spot process is:

• isolate (cordon off) an area,
• cleanse it of insurgents, and
• provide it with political goods (the process is then repeated in a new area while maintaining a cordon around the first and so on until the country was pacified).

Connectivity

Put into perspective, the bombing in Dora is likely another indicator that even this classic strategy isn't working to dampen the insurgency (the recent upsurge in all of the negative indictors, from US deaths to number of attacks per day, provides it with a supportive backdrop). However, the problem with it isn't that the US military is incompetent (although it's pretty telling that the best strategic thinking in this war isn't coming from the general staff), it is that modern connectivity invalidates it. Iraqis, and Baghdadis in particular, are much more connected and mobile than the rural farmers of global backwaters in the last century that this strategy was built to pacify. They travel and communicate at levels and ranges that nullify attempts to isolate them for pacification. Here are some examples of this connectivity:

• Telephone subscribers. Prewar: 833,000 August 2006: 8,100,000 (nearly an order of magnitude increase)
• Car owners. Prewar: 1,500,000 October 2005: 3,100,000 (usage/traffic is 5x more than prewar)
• Internet subscribers. Prewar: 4,500 August: 197,310 (44x prewar)

What it means

The paradox is that in order to pacify Iraqis under the current US strategy, they need to be isolated from the surrounding community. However, they cannot be isolated, because the very political goods that the government needs to deliver to gain their loyalty are inextricably tied to this connectivity. In short, while this connectivity brings progress, it will also deliver mayhem. There's no easy way around it.

Comments

[subadei]

Somehow the terms pacify and American forces don't seem synonomous these days. Furthermore, a strategy that seems to include "one step forward, one step back" seems more akin to metophorically eating soup with chop sticks than it does realizing any degree of success in Baghdad or in regard to the two tribal factions that will eventually decide the rule of Iraq.
Cleansing a geograpgical location of physical resistance (insurgents) is one thing. Purging the ideology behind the insurgence is quite another.
LoL. Guess I'm not really effectively touching on what you've said here John. Forgive my rant, if you would.

[bobw]

Connecitivity certainly seems like a factor, and you dont need cell-phones to have it. Given that we dont speak Arabic, insurgents can simply shout across the street at each other.
Subadei makes a good point about ideology (or culture). That's a form of connectivity too.

[ramsis]

an attack in a previously "cleansed" area in Iraq is nothing unique. nor is it fair to say it is a failure of the current strategy. fighting an insurgency the scope of this one with the current level of troop strength in Iraq is bound to have some thin areas in the "oil spot".victories and defeats should never be measured in the ability of one side to to kill or create havoc, but in stratigic ground gained. last i checked U.S troops are still on the ground, the elected Iraqi government is still in place and the Iraqi army is still on joint patrols with coilition forces. as proven in Vietnam and by current administration critics body count victories are hardley victories at all, for us or for our enemies.

[sammy small]

I don't think that the strategy is wrong, just how its implemented. Connectivity can work to your advantage if you use it in your implementation.

The strategy can only be effective if the oil spot area is truely cordoned off and locked down, and treated like a neighborhood watch. All traffic into and out of the area must be controlled and tightly monitored on a continuous basis.

This takes a lot of manpower that can be trusted. Trust of each individual is a key element missing from the area. Without it, any plan will be weakened and may fall apart. And we have all read just how trustworthy most of the Iraqis are. Planted insurgents are everywhere.

All we can do is to help set them up, give them the tools and training, and tell them its up to them. If it degenerates into civil war, then we depart and watch from the sidelines.

[Azr@el]

The only effective strategy for counterinsurgency is population control, everything else is the fantasy of children. The fact that the u.s. military is implementing these 'flights of fantasy' speaks volumes to the poor quality of the current officer corp. The military leadership has been so corrupted by the politicians and the defense contractors that they can no longer perceive reality. When the rot is in the head what does it matter how tactically proficient the rank and file are?

[anna missed]

Curious that all three of the connectivity issues you mention are part and parcel of the occupation, that they were/are indeed promoted and encouraged by the occupation. As Joe Lieberman recently quiped that the many cellphones seen in Iraq, are a sign of our progress -- so that we must be winning.

[bobw]

Retired Marine Col. Thomas X Hammes describes the three part process as "clear, hold and build", and says the fact that we are not providing equipment to Iraqi security to hold, or money to build, means we have given up on the process and are just looking for a way out.