JOURNAL: Manufacturing Chaos in Iraq

TIME's Aparisim Ghosh reports that General Peter Pace belatedly has convened a group of young officers to answer the question: Why are there almost as many U.S. troops in Iraq now as there were two years ago when, in the interim, more than 300,000 Iraqi security forces have been recruited and trained?

I provided one answer to this question two years ago, when I wrote about loyalist paramilitaries (October 2004). The answer involved two elements. The first was outsourcing security, particularly in the British controlled south and Baghdad to "loyalist" paramilitaries. The second was incorporating paramilitary members into the new Iraqi security forces, particularly since they were more willing to fight than the general population. In classic US fashion (a reflection of the paucity of strategic thinking in our general staff), training to the numbers (quantity) and the early effectiveness of the unit in a fire fight (expediency) was deemed more important than loyalty of the unit to the government. The long term implications were not considered.

The result is that over the last two years the US military has actually created an environment that is conducive to a bloody and chaotic civil war. By partnering with paramilitaries, we accelerated the development of those forces that would take the war to the Sunnis.

What can we do? Nothing but leave. We can neither expect the leadership of US military to develop sound strategies for mitigating the damage done, nor can we reverse drivers of chaos that have been initiated over the last three years. This chaotic system is now running smoothly under the power of its own internal dynamics and continued intervention will only continue to worsen it. Withdrawal is the only option. The faster the better (although how to do this without tanking the global oil system is still yet to be determined).

Comments

[Duncan Kinder]

"In classic US fashion (a reflection of the paucity of strategic thinking in our general staff), training to the numbers (quantity) and the early effectiveness of the unit in a fire fight (expediency) was deemed more important than loyalty of the unit to the government. The long term implications were not considered."

This is not just a purely military problem or phenomenon. Rather it is typical of the downsizing and outsourcing motif that has characterized the American economy for the past twenty-odd years.

Consider, for example, this Asia Times Online Article, "MAN, that bus looks familiar," which discusses how Chinese manufacturers are now co-opting transferred Western intellectual property for automobiles to produce competing vehicles.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/HJ24Cb01.html

Chinese co-opting Western vehicle design hardly seems equivalent to Iraqi insurgent co-opting of Western military training - and indeed, it is not - but the point to consider is that this Chinese co-opting differs only in degree and not in essence from the Iraqi co-opting which John describes.

Moreover, this Chinese co-opting, although itself smaller in degree, does go into the kitty - and a whole lot more of this Chinese type of behavior is going on than the more dramatic Iraqi variety.

This leads to a more gradual but more profound erosion of the overall Western position much as the ordinary action of wind and tides has a more profound overall impact than does Hurricane Katrina.

It also provides a broader context for viewing the Iraqi-type behavior.

[londamium]

Ever since Rumsfeld started his happy talk routine about the numbers of Iraqi security forces in the Autumn of 2003 it's been obvious that this metric has become the updated version of Vietnam War bodycounts.

There may be a piece of paper somewhere that tells Pace that 300k Iraqis have been recruited AND trained in the past 2 years, but I suspect that the reality is somewhere between 20 and 40% of that figure, doesn't account for the massive attrition rate and fails to appreciate that most Iraqis are not interested in dying to protect American troops who are occupying their country.

[Jim S]

The citation in comments below on the 1972 Rand Study of Urban Guerrillas is striking. There have been successful rural guerrilla movements in Cuba and China but none since them; likely because the 3rd world population has moved to huge urban megatropolises. Yet other than low level violence in Columbia or Nigeria; for example, no urban based movement has overthrown a constituted government except perhaps Liberia or Somalia if they are considered to have had functional governments.

Combined Urban and Rural Guerrillas have had success in throwing out occupiers; Hezbollah in Lebanon, Taliban in Afghanistan and soon the Sunnis in Iraq. It is in human genes to resist occupation by invidious foreign invaders.

Invading Empires only have two paths to successful occupations; uplifting the inhabitants by bringing the benefits of civilization or genocide. The first step for either is the overwhelming force of arms.

[stevelaudig]

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJ24Ak01.html

Spengler's dark view would be that this apparent "error" wasn't one at all. "We" should be careful when using the word "we" to describe what the current U.S. administration has wrought. There is no "we", there is a "they" and a "them" [the current administration] and then there are other "we's" and "us'es". [apologies to the apostrophe police]

[ramsis]

i know a big part of the population here at home just can't seem to wait to see a saigon style pullout with mehdi army and sunni extremist lopping the heads off any sane or moderate Iraqis or as some out here might call infidel collaberators but can we at least ask ourselves what will end up taking our place when we flee for wonderful lives back in the good ole usa. i'm not saying lets stay forever but just leaving isn't so simple unless of course you plan on comming back after the 2nd or 3rd 9-11 style attack, launched from camps and bases inside iraq only bigger with funding from iraqi oil revenues and iranian backing. yes this is the ultimate rock and a hard place.

[adam]

JimS,

I'd note that the Rand Study is heavily out of date. The revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua in 1979 shows that urban guerillas can be highly successful (Iran) as can combinations of rural and urban guerillas (The Ortega's 3rd Way in Nicaragua). Afghanistan (1979 onwards) also would hint that rural guerillas do just fine.

Its also next to impossble to say that the Taliban (completely rural from Northern Pakistan) or Iraqis (almost entirely urban around any number of cities in Iraq) fit the Rand Study.

In general its an artifact of its time, which wasn't as accurate as it would have liked but in 1972 it was pretty close to the mark. Other than Vietnam, but hey...

I'd also note that there is an alternative method open to Invading Empires which worked for the British. Pick a local group, work with their leaders by putting them in charge of the other locals, send their kids to good solid public schools and keep a large civil service to give them work. Nothing about bringing the benefits of civilisation (as generally the British invaded nations that had histories going back thousands of years - nations that don't usually didn't have stuff worth nicking).

Ramsis,

As neither Iran nor Iraq had nothing to do with the 9-11 attacks its a little hard to see that its a justification for either invading or staying. Iran certainly is not a supporter of either the Taliban (too nuts) or Bin Laden (too Sunni) so quite why they would finance anything like 9-11 is hard to say. Iraq, was a secular dictatorship, and hardly likely to support a group of Islamic terrorists either. Even George Bush has stopped saying that Iraq supported Al Quaeda being reduced to the naff formula of "Al Quadea-like organisations".

As for the idea that its somehow a good idea for the US to remain in Iraq to reduce terrorism, well its certainly interesting morally. If we're arguing that the deaths of whole bunches of Iraqi people (roughly 1k a month, comparable to 10k Americans) in order to make us safer (when there are still daily terrorist panics) then there are some real moral issues.

Could anyone think that an Iraqi would say that their death is a fair price to stop something "maybe kind of sort of happening someday in the US or somewhere or other in the dim and distant future if all the security programmes the US is running fail leaving thousands of bureaucrats looking silly". If anyone is that dim then, well, Fox News is there for you.

[ramsis]

well i don't recall blaming any iraqis for 911 there is this group inside the country struggling for power wich they would most likely achieve if we should leave. however if they don't win and the sadrs group gains power well you can count on an iranian influence far greater then that of hezbollah in the region. i'm not advocating any course of actionn one way or the other meerly pointing out that pullouts aren't as easy as others would like to belive.

[Barry Eisler]

John -- another great piece. I linked to it on Heart of the Matter at http://www.barryeisler.com/blog.html, where I argue that the latest ultimatums to/"collaborative effort" with Malaki is an attempt to shift blame and pave the way for a pullout before the Nov '08 elections. Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld would like the figleaf of turning over a pullout to the next administration; the Republican party as a whole is denying it to them.

-- Barry

[adam]

R|amsis,

"well i don't recall blaming any iraqis for 911"

Reread your comments. You noted that a 2nd or 3rd 9-11 attack was likely if the US left Iraq. The reasonable implication - and one that the US government did a great deal to foster in 2003 - was that Iraq was behind the first one. Otherwise its a completely irrelevant comment - on the order of the British announcing that if they left Northern Ireland then Donny Osmond would return with another version of Long Haired Lover from Liverpool.

" there is this group inside the country struggling for power wich they would most likely achieve if we should leave."

Achieve? Surely "have already achieved". You do know that Sadr (you picked out his Mahdi army as an issue earlier) is part of the elected government don't you? Currently - among the senior Shi'ite players - only Sadr is against partition, as a strong Iraqi nationalist (with a Shiite tinge). The rest want a full-up Shi'ite state in the South.

This causes a certain amount of infighting as is occuring in Maysan province - Sadr dominates the area except for the police (appointed by SCIRI during their tenure as Minister of the Interior) as a result the police are steadily being taken out and shot. The nice thing is that each side is in the same government, which the US is relying on to stop the killings!

"however if they don't win and the sadrs group gains power well you can count on an iranian influence far greater then that of hezbollah in the region."

Sadr is partly backed by Iran true. Sadr gains his credibility from religious appointments from Qum. On the other hand SCIRI and Dawa are also backed by Iran (also part of the current government). You'll notice however that they don't actually agree on everything - especially on the big things like partition - so there is no "plan from Iran". You'll note that even US talk-show hosts and evangelical religious leaders aren't saying this in any coherent way.

As a side note Sadr gained his currently unique position by defeating US military forces; Hizbollah gained theirs by defeating Israeli troops. Failing to defeat the leader of the resistance when they're openly fighting you is a little embarrassing for a regular military force.

"i'm not advocating any course of actionn one way or the other meerly pointing out that pullouts aren't as easy as others would like to belive."

Actually I think that pullouts are hard, messy, bloody, expensive, embarrassing and ultimately set the scene for the next war. On the other hand the next war is going to happen anyway and frankly we're at least three quarters of the problem right now. Still as the guy halfway down having jumped from the Golden Gate Bridge says: we are where we are.

[Duncan Kinder]

Reed Hunt, on TPM Cafe, has proposed the following 10 "Iraq Rules," which I present to commentators on this list for their information, criticism, and comment.

http://www.tpmcafe.com/blog/coffeehouse/2006/oct/23/iraq_rules#comment

quote:

These are also the rules derived from numerous other conflict-ridden, negotiated states in the last 100 years.

1. When the central government cannot control the countryside, it will eventually lose control in the cities as well.

2. A foreign army cannot provide security in the case of civil war.

3. It is uneconomic to use military force to obtain access to natural resources.

4. Democracy cannot be imposed on a people by a foreign military force.

5. Economic development must precede democracy.

6. A great power should not directly fight guerrilla wars: it cannot use its great power in those situations and will suffer loss to its great power by embroiling itself in such conflicts. If it must engage in such conflicts, it must use surrogates.

7. Airwar cannot provide security; it can be used to preclude the formation of large massings of soldiers, materiel, or other airforces.

8. Police have to speak the language of those policed.

9. The United States has more important national security issues than those presented in the Middle East, as important as those may be.

10. The White House really should let the generals run wars.

:end_of_quote

[ramsis]

the group in wich i refered to that has yet to gain power (thanks to our soldiers) is al-qaida in iraq. an off shoot of the group that DID commit 9-11 and shares the same global philosophy of jihad. i find it unfortunate that decisions by officials in the administration allowed sadr to reach this level of relevence. as i recall our soldiers had him surrounded in najaf and could have leveled and buried him at any time but chose instead to allow him into the political process. his forces could never defeat ours it is meerly about what price our we willing to pay to get the job done. as it looks right now we are holding the hoover dam together with duct tape and you are suggesting that we remove the duct tape before something better is built. i don't know if things will get better for them if we leave but honestly no one else can say either.

[Jim S]

Adam,
You are correct that Iran is an example of a successful take over of a constituted government by indigenous guerrilla force. But, the Mullahs successful identified the Shah as a CIA puppet government; adding it to the list along with Algeria of successful movements to kick out the invidious foreigners. One could also add East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Eastern Europe, except their foreign occupier, the Soviet Union, collapsed without much of a fight. This list is just an indication of how terribly hard an invasion and successful occupation really is. The British just a few generations later completely and totally forgot all the hard lessons learned over their centuries of Empire building. The American with UK's help went on a binge of neo-colonialism after swearing off it a while back. The horrid results are bloody obvious.

The questions is how to quickly get out of the Middle East without too much chaos, build secure borders and isolate radical Islam, a natural human response to invasion and occupation by foreign overlords.

[londamium]

Ramsis:

Regarding Sadr, you're displaying the same level of utter cluelessness as Wolfowitz, when he thought that Iraq would be better for US forces than Saudi Arabia as there were no important religious sites there, or Bremer, who thought he could get another fatwa from a different mullah when Sistani decreed that there had to be proper elections.

Sadr is not some little upstart - he is the scion of one of the most important clerical families in Shia islam; he certainly does not owe his relevance to the US's inexplicable refusal to JDAM him to death in the Kufa mosque.

[ramsis]

interesting, exactly how relevant is a dead man, how many elections can a dead man win. sure he was a popular guy before we got there but i find it hard to belive that at this stage in the game it would not have been better to make that mosque his grave and then throw our entire support behind the badr brigade, maybe thats a little hindsighted history but i would doubt its clueless.

[bobw]

John, this is a great comment. wish it could be run as an op-ed on the front page of every major US newspaper.

Duncan -- is that quote your own? It's also prime wisdom.

[Duncan Kinder]

"Duncan -- is that quote your own? It's also prime wisdom."

It's Reed Hunt's, which he posted on TPM Cafe.

http://www.tpmcafe.com/blog/coffeehouse/2006/oct/23/iraq_rules#comment

[londamium]

Well, for starters, Ramsis, killing Sadr in 2004 would have resulted in an open-ended and no-holds barred Shia insurgency to add to the fun of the existing Sunni one. One of the likely side-effects would have been Shia clerical permission for the employment of martyrdom tactics against coalition forces; this hasn't happened yet, and it would be a very good idea to stay within the red lines to ensure that it doesn't. US commanders on the ground have some understanding of this: a UK documentary crew got an on-camera admission from a US officer based in Baghdad that there are explicit standing instructions to not touch Sadr.

Bear in mind that the Sadrist uprising that was in motion at that time was ended via a deal with Sistani, Dawa and SCIRI. Generally it's a bad idea to kill important and influential religious leaders - you need credible figures who can deliver political outcomes to negotiate with unless you're prepared to indulge in industrial scale mass killing.

In case you hadn't noticed, the Sunni insurgency destruction of the Samarra shrine has tipped the sectarian war in Iraq over the edge; bombing a major clerical figure and destroying a major-league significant religious site in the process would have had a similar effect - with the added bonus that it would be US and other coalition troops turning up in fields with drill holes in their dead bodies.

[ramsis]

is it possible that a side affect of killing him would have been an increase in martyrdom ops? yes but we killed scores of mehdi army followers in the two major engagements with them and i find it hard to belive that he was holding back anything. i don't think a full scale open ended shia insurgency would have been as likey as you think. al-sadr has been a thorn in the side of sistani as well and i cant help but wonder if deep down he wanted him to get killed. recently the washington post ran a story claiming sadr followers had killed several police men belonging to sistani, as well as attacked badr offices in Amarah and in response badr members beheaded al-sadrs nephew, not exactly best freinds. i know wars are usually decided between bad decisions and worse ones and you have every right to point out the possible results of those decisions but we must also look at the results of the decisions that we HAVE made and say to ourselves what could we have done different. as for having noticed what happened after the shrine in samarra was bombed i did. i noticed the inflamation of the whole incident being brought on by sadr. the call for revenge and resoration of honor through blood all called for by Al-sadr. It was sistani that called for calm and to resist the urge for revenge not al-sadr.

[adam]

Ramsis,

I suspect that you're getting key players confused.

"is it possible that a side affect of killing him would have been an increase in martyrdom ops? yes but we killed scores of mehdi army followers in the two major engagements with them and i find it hard to belive that he was holding back anything."

You might do, but he was. Najaf was not the centre of Sadrs power; its just where he was based at the time that the US came for him. The centre of Sadrs power was the renamed Sadr City part of Bagdhad where more than a million people live.

Its significant that when the Spanish were asked to deal with the Sadrists they turned down the operation on the grounds that it would lead to massive instability.

"i don't think a full scale open ended shia insurgency would have been as likey as you think. al-sadr has been a thorn in the side of sistani as well and i cant help but wonder if deep down he wanted him to get killed."

Probably not. Sistani and Sadr agree on many things. One of these is that Iraq should not be partitioned. They also agree on Sunnis and Shi'ites working more closely together. Earlier this month Sadr and Sistani provided support for a fatwa arguing for everyone to work together in Iraq (or at least stop killing each other).

" recently the washington post ran a story claiming sadr followers had killed several police men belonging to sistani, as well as attacked badr offices in Amarah and in response badr members beheaded al-sadrs nephew, not exactly best freinds."

Errrm. Yeah. I had already mentioned Maysan which is the exact same province under discussion. The Badr people aren't Sistanis - they're SCIRI. Not quite the same thing, as for the rest in the wrong order - head lopping first and then afterwards the shootings. The dead man - Husain al-Bahadili - was the brother of a Mahdi Army commander. He's also, by all accounts, a Marsh Arab which creates an ethnic issue of inter-tribal conflict too.

" i know wars are usually decided between bad decisions and worse ones "

I recall reading in Keegan that the great Generals worked very hard to put their opponents in that particular position.

"and you have every right to point out the possible results of those decisions but we must also look at the results of the decisions that we HAVE made and say to ourselves what could we have done different. "

Well the problem with jumping off a building is that suddenly you have no other options than landing. If its a high enough building the lesson learnt is that you're dead. Sometimes I think that business courses have a lot to answer for; lessons learnt logs are for projects in companies, not politics. The lessons learnt log for politics is called history. "History teaches everything including the future."

More seriously there is a line in Dr Who that sums it up far better than I can: 'Every great decision creates ripples--like a huge boulder dropped in a lake. The ripples merge, rebound off the banks in unforseeable ways. The heavier the decision, the larger the waves, the more uncertain the consequences.'

"as for having noticed what happened after the shrine in samarra was bombed i did. i noticed the inflamation of the whole incident being brought on by sadr."

Sadr certainly accused the US and Iraqi governments of failing to protect the shrine. Which is, lets face it, the bleeding obvious. He also called for his people to go to the shrine for Friday prayers which he then called off as soon as he realised that it would be a really bad thing to do. He then sent his soldiers to protect the shrines. Is that inflamatory compared to the destruction of a major shrine? Not in a civil war its not.

" the call for revenge and resoration of honor through blood all called for by Al-sadr."

Except he didn't. Sadr was in either Lebanon or Jordan at the time of the bombing and rushed back to call for less violence. I think that you might be confusing Sadr with Hakim from SCIRI. The worst that Sadr can be accused of is foolishly asking for volunteers to rebuld the shrine (its in what is now a heavily Sunni dominated area so its inflammatory).

" It was sistani that called for calm and to resist the urge for revenge not al-sadr"

Phooey. Sistani went on national TV and demanded the formation of a Shi'ite militia. Like the formation of another bunch of heavily armed religiously aligned squaddies would make Iraq a happier place.

[ramsis]

adam after some thought and some fact checking its pretty clear i mixed up some of the players and their roles in the many shia organazations within Iraq,i'd also like to thank you for the education in that regard. That being said i still have a couple of thoughts and concern that seem to remain unanswered. in regards to weather the U.S troops felt the full sting of sadrs army in 04 i would have to maintain that we did a very good job in isolating his forces in najaf. if you recall and as reported in time magazine in 04 that us forces were engaging mehdi militia in sadr city at the same time as the battle in najaf. i've got to belive that when Al-sadr calls on his followers to quote "TERRORIZE THE AMERICANS" he did so with belief that people will martyr themselves next in reference to "sistani and sadr agree on many things" i would have to say that their biggest agreement is that they are rivals. I have found numerous articles of clashes between sadrs men and those loyal to sistani. in time magazine alone there are many that refer to it (new thugs on the block and no easy options) are just two of them. clashes between sadr and other shiite groups can only lead me to belive that there have been in my opinion EXPLOITABLE divisions between them and that the administration had been unable or unwilling to take advantage of. i will say that i enjoyed your comparison to to our current situation and that of a man who has jumped out of a window and i guess i would have to answer that to some of us as we fall we might have a pretty good idea about what will happen to us when we hit the ground but i still cant justify shooting myself before i do, even if i am going to die i cant help but flap my arms on the off chance that just maybe.....

[Luke Lea]

Dear John Robb:

Is there a case for "pulling back" as opposed to "getting out?"

Suppose Iraq fragments into a number of competing tribal mini-states led by warlords, each pumping oil in the area it controls.

Might there be an advantage in such a situation (I am thinking of the south) as opposed to a large consolidated Shia state supported by Iran?

I don't claim to know. But it seems like the small Emirates on the Persian Gulf coast are more loyal allies than large states like Saudi Arabia and Iran, maybe because the smaller ones look to the United States for protection against an organized invasion by one of their larger neighbors.

A U.S. force in the area might serve a useful function in that capacity, assuming they could create an effective security perimeter. Is that feasible?

Just a thought. I would love to hear your views on the matter.

[Amy Zalman]

Equally worth considering is how poorly the new police and army forces have been trained. The training task was outsourced to both American and regional subcontractors in 2003-04. Some of the training wasn't particularly effective, some unto corrupt. The nascent Iraqi army was poorly served in both cases.

Amy Zalman (http://terrorism.about.com)

[Coathangrrr]

"I don't claim to know. But it seems like the small Emirates on the Persian Gulf coast are more loyal allies than large states like Saudi Arabia and Iran, maybe because the smaller ones look to the United States for protection against an organized invasion by one of their larger neighbors."

I'd very much doubt this. I know Yemen and Oman have huge problems around their "borders", and I put borders in quotes because they are essentially only lines on a map and nothing else. The regimes probably support the US but they have only limited control.

"Might there be an advantage in such a situation (I am thinking of the south) as opposed to a large consolidated Shia state supported by Iran?"

I'm still unclear as to why everyone is so damned freaked about Iran. Sure, they have a wacky president, but he certainly is no wackier than Bush, and he has far less power than Bush. For all of his nuclear talk he has pretty much zero control over that stuff. If the US hadn't been so antagonistic to Iran after Sept.11 then we could have easily transformed the region with Iran's help. The are the only country in the region that has both a decent ammount of power and the beginnings of a democracy.

Moreover, the al-Sadr Iran connection is way overplayed, Sistani and the Badr brigades are much closer.