JOURNAL: Can Georgia become a MicroPower?

NOTE: Here's some interesting thinking. The idea is that small states can protect themselves if they are willing to use economic systems disruption as a strategic weapon. You don't have to agree with it, but I serve it up here as food for thought.

The crisis between Russia and Georgia has escalated to mutual deportations of respective nationals and economic sanctions. Georgia is in a tough spot, its pro-western policies is not backed by reciprocal support from the US. Further, as the earlier disruption of Georgian natural gas and electricity proved, Georgia is heavily reliant on Russian economic connectivity. If things don't change in a hurry, Georgia will be forced to choose between economic stagnation and compliance with Russian hegemony.

The Ukrainian Solution

However, there is an indirect method that may provide Georgia a way out of this faustian bargain. The answer is similar to the approach used by Ukraine when faced with a similar level of economic pressure earlier this year. In that crisis, Russia tried to cut-off supplies of natural gas to the Ukraine while at the same time pumping natural gas through pipelines that ran through the country. Of course, the Ukrainians naturally siphoned off the gas they needed from Russia's european customers. These customers quickly forced Russia to resolve the crisis.

The uncomfortable fact for Russia, hidden behind the bluster of this crisis, is that it is reliant on oil/gas exports for 50% of the state's finances and the bulk of the vast portfolios of its top politicians. Further, the state owned firms that provide this bounty are also traded on global markets -- which provides the huge market capitalizations that provide Russia with the financial muscle for their entire natural resource strategy (which has become the centerpiece of Russian foreign policy). In sum, Russia's center of gravity is no longer with the will of its people. It has now shifted to its customers and the investors that buy its stock on global markets. Russia is reliant on the moral strength of people that scurry at the sound of a mouse, but it doesn't even know it yet.

Adopting global guerrilla methods (particularly systems disruption) as state policy

Georgia does have a way out of the predicament. It could adopt the global guerrilla methods (aka fifth generation warfare) and use system disruption as a strategic weapon to coerce Russia to relent. Like the Ukraine found out (I suspect unwittingly), the best way to coerce Russia is to disrupt its export of natural gas/oil. Fortunately for Georgia, Russia's vast distances yield a pipeline transport system that is both heavily concentrated and extremely vulnerable (I've done the network analysis and it would be very easy to do, it is rife with systempunkts). A dozen small teams (2-3 at most, my personal choice would be mercenaries to enhance plausible deniability) dedicated to blowing up sections of these pipelines (either within Russia or in 3rd party nations like Poland and Ukraine), would likely yield a 20% to 30% sustained reduction in Russian exports.

The result would be predictable. The rapid and severe customer/investor reaction to a reduction in Russian exports would be so severe that Russia would be forced to promptly concede. All Georgia needs to do now, is adopt 4GW and go to work defending itself.

Comments

[dan]

I don't see any way that tactic could play out that wouldn't be disastrous for Georgia.

If I understand you correctly, it would only work if Russia knew that Georgia was behind the attacks, and so 'plausible deniability' doesn't come up (except perhaps in some purely legal context).

If Russia knows that Georgia is behind the attacks, then you have just given Putin both the incentive and the diplomatic cover to do any nasty things he likes to Georgia. An outright invasion probably wouldn't happen, but overt bombing of Georgian infrastructure would.

Plus, the current persecution of Georgians in Russia could turn into something more unpleasant. The talk of 'ethnic cleansing' is currently just hyperbole, but who knows. Certainly life would become pretty grim for a lot of (ethnic or political) Georgians living in Russia.

Also, it would be politically impossible for Russia to give in to that kind of blackmail from a tiny country it thinks of as a child. Russia would probaby suffer a 30% drop in oil output rather than be browbeaten in that way.

[John Robb]

Daniel, you may be right. Russia may not care about a decade of economic progress, its global market position, energy based foreign policy, or hundreds of billions in income. Georgia is just that important.

[Azr@el]

Georgia and it's importance to russia is irrelavent, all that matters is that the russian leadership, much like any collection of thugs, gang leaders and warlords will never accept being dictated to by a nation-state smaller than moscow. A russian child is taught from a very young age that you can be either the bully or the bullied and their is no middle ground, And quite frankly russian pride will not accept being bullied by some georgian leader( stalin aside of course :) ). I'm of the opinion that if georgia we're to embark on this course of terrorism than russia will convert that very lovely country into a very flat parking lot. And yes , they'll do it just to make a point , just to keep they're power structure in order , just to maintain their reputation, just as they did in chechenya. The far west eurasian powers will crow about human rights and what have you , the u.s. will accept it as part of quid pro quo to maintain russian aloofness from u.s. "adventures" and everyone else will take go on with their lives , except of course the georgians.

[nykrindc]

Daniel, you may be right. Russia may not care about a decade of economic progress, its global market position, energy based foreign policy, or hundreds of billions in income. Georgia is just that important.

It's not that they don't care, rather, it is that most of the world, as you yourself noted cares alot less. Hence, given that Georgia would have to engage in offensive operations against Russia (if Russia can trace it back to Georgia) then Russia gets enough diplomatic cover to aid Abkhazia, Ajara, and South Ossetia in their pursuit of more autonomy, if not, outright independence from Georgia. Meaning that while Russia would give in, in the short term, Georgia would have t contend with three reinvigorated autonomy movements that would then be backed and urged by Russia to harm Georgian interests.

[John Robb]

I think you guys are conflating the moral outrage of a Beslan with economic disruption. It's not the same. Further, the requisite of any Russian policy within today's context, drawn from the words of Putin, is to "not kill the golden goose."

[zenpundit]

If Georgia embarked upon this 4GW strategy, presumably because they saw their independence hanging by a thread anyway, it would have to be coupled with secret negotiations so that Putin and the Siloviki know that Georgia was behind the systempunkt and the Russian public was left guessing ( It could be Chechens after all).

While the " the will of the market" might prevail in the long run, short term decision making is done by a very narrow circle of Siloviki around Putin. They are nationalistic but they are also prudently machiavellian - saving their and Putin's face via plausible deniability obviates the domestic political need to retaliate by whacking Georgia with armored divisions and fighter-bombers.

Embarrass them in public and Georgia probably will get a " spasm" response, whether or not that push could be sustained in the face of international diplomatic and market pressure. Israel ultimately lost but the IDF still whacked the living hell out of South Lebanon, the Russians might end up in the same situation in Georgia writ large.

[BJ Bjornson]

I don’t see this scenario working out quite so clearly. The Ukrainian situation is not a good model for a 4GW approach. It was the state that basically made the decision to siphon the gas, although elements within Ukraine were suspected of doing it prior to the crisis. It is also important to note that the pro-Russian Yanukovych was given the Prime Minister’s position recently. The concessions may not have been all that one-sided.

Another big difference I see is that Ukraine straddled the pipelines sending gas to the rich, market-price paying, Europeans, and could use them as a force multiplier in their dispute by cutting their gas supplies. I don’t know enough about the Russian pipeline system, but who is downstream of the Georgians that can apply that kind of pressure?

For this to work, Georgia would have to send teams far outside their own territory and hit Russian pipelines headed to other consumers. That’s a good way to make enemies. The international pressure could just as easily turn on the Georgians as help them against Russia.

Also, if the Georgian government goes 4GW on the Russian gas supply chain that they themselves are dependant on, doesn’t that destroy their own legitimacy when the gas supplies they need to stave off bitterly cold winter don’t arrive? The 4GW approach could probably do the kind of damage to Russia you postulate, but it seems to me it would destroy the Georgian state government in the process. This sort of warfare seems to rapidly move beyond the control of the states that initiate it. “Market forces” may not be enough to put the genie back into the bottle once unleashed. Have market forces forced the US to come to an agreement with the Iraqi insurgents disrupting Iraqi oil delivery?

[Valdis]

Northman makes a goood point... Ukraine had the right "location" in the network to exert power -- they were "between" Russia and its customers. Is Georgia in a similar location?

"Location, location, location" works in both real estate AND networks!

See this simple network map to understand "being between"...
http://www.orgnet.com/sna.html

Ukraine appears to be in a similar location to Heather on this map. Is Georgia more like Ed or Carol? [The network map and the network metrics for the map are in the same diagram].

[James Bowery]

Speaking of location, location, location...

Georgia sits between two petro states: Russia and Iran with Armenia and Azerbaijan between Georgia and Iran. So what is the big deal with Russia? Cut some deals with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Iran and get on with being a port state on the Black Sea.

[John Robb]

Thanks Zen.

The Ukraine solution was merely useful as an example of Russia's vulnerability to market pressure. I understand the differences in the situation.

One of those differences was correctly pointed out by both Valdis and Northman: Georgia doesn't have access to Russian gas/oil pipelines within their territory (which would make it easier). It would need to project strategically.

My thinking is that if a small army of terrorists could bribe their way into Beslan, it doesn't seem impossible that an even smaller set of teams gain access to Russia's critical systempunkts -- the size of the network (unable to defend even critical portions), high capacity (full utilization), and lack of redundancy (the distance has forced the Russians to concentrate their transport) this should make this easy. Finally, distance is shrinking due to the emergence of a global superinfrastructure.

That being said, it really comes down to whether the Georgians A) see the solution (however, since it is still an evolving method of warfare, they probably won't) and B) they are threatened enough to use it. Again, this is just food for thought.

[John Robb]

James, Georgia is doing that with the BTC. That is part of the problem for Russia.

[londamium]

John

Your analysis is deeply flawed.

Assuming that the goal of 20-30% disruption was achievable - which it's not - you're neglecting the fact that given current market conditions the loss of this capacity would likely double spot natgas and crude oil prices. This effectively means that Russia probably earns more for its reduced output, and that the economic effects it suffers are either neutral or positive - it may be an explanation for why the Chechen separatists haven't bothered trying this, as they did the maths; as an economic coercion strategy it's a big bust. The really nasty spin-off is that Russia's customers in the EU, the US, China and Japan are left with a severe financial hangover due to the downsides of marginal pricing. In the short run this leads to just about every intelligence agency in the world queuing up for the privilege of putting bullets in the backs of the heads of Georgia's leaders, their families, their children, their friends, their creditors and their debtors. This is not a game that weak state actors who want to be seen in public can indulge in given current hydrocarbon market conditions.

The only current examples of your strategy being implemented are in Nigeria and Iraq, where sub-state actors drawn from the local population are in conflict with the state/foreign occupation - they are autonomous, autochthonous, well-supported and can operate with minimal reference to external political risk constraints; there is no corresponding organic Georgian resistance within Russia to implement this strategy and creating one from scratch isn't an option.

A variant of this strategy is being pursued by Kurds in Turkey, who attack the natgas pipeline that goes from Iran and supplies domestic Turkish needs; attacking the BTC, which passes through the same area, is a big no-no however, and reminds us that some sub-state actors have to operate within defined political risk constraints. The only other actors that are pursuing this option are AQ and their affiliates, who have attempted to knock out Iraqi loading platforms and Saudi infrastructure, and are explicitly acting against both the target states AND their customers. It's also notable that the isolated attacks in Iran and Venezuela have been mounted against internal supply infrastructure - again, messing with exports is a big no-no for opposition/proxy groups, as it costs your potential third-party state allies/backers shed loads of cash if you succeed.

Whilst mapping the network infrastructure may be easy to do, the mechanics of translating that into actual attacks are far more complex than you imagine. The intelligence, CI, personnel, logistics, hardware and support infrastructure required for this sort of endeavour are huge - and Georgia simply lacks the installed resource base and the cash to do this in a sustained fashion.

[James Bowery]

Iran offers Georgia gas to replace Russian shortfall

AP , TBILISI
Thursday, Jan 26, 2006, Page 6

Iran has indicated it is prepared to export natural gas to this former Soviet country, which has been severely hit by a sharp drop in Russian gas deliveries, Georgia's energy minister said on Tuesday.

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2006/01/26/2003290806

[John Robb]

Londamium, nice feedback. Thanks. However, there are a couple of points you might want to consider.

First, the economics of this aren't as straight forward as you assume. Natural gas is not globally fungible (it is tied to its distribution system). Also, any restriction on oil output would be muted by global production (not nearly a one for one replacement for Russia) and the benefits would be shared by all parties in OPEC. As a result, Russia suffer immediate (cash) and long-term damage (reliability as a supplier) to its market position.

The Chechens have not accomplished this due to an inability to move beyond terrorism. While innovators in tactics, they are less than stellar in strategy. If the Chechens are an indication of anything, their movement is an example of the the impact of legacy leadership that was unwilling to change method (too rigid).

In regards to the spread of this system disruption, we are only in the early stages. That early examples of Iraq and Nigeria are just that, early examples. What I am looking for here, and most likely won't see it (not yet, anyway), is either a small state or a guerrilla/terrorist group moving beyond local disruption to strategic. Al Qaeda is and Jihadi Internet chatter is starting to move in the direction as we discuss this here. It will percolate over time.

In regards to state sponsorship, you overstate your hand. They are a state and have the required resources. In regards to the Kurds and the BTC, the pipeline is only just starting to pump oil. It is not an example of a restraint on PKK activity since it isn't worth attacking yet. As it fills to capacity, it will become a lucrative target.

Your statement that the required resources for this would be huge, is wrong. This is small unit special ops work. The targets are soft, the weaponry required is found in households, and the teams would be small. It could be done on a shoestring. Of course, we may never agree on this, but consider that 9/11 was accomplished for a couple of hundred thousand dollars (and in constrast, it required extensive training and support).

[maagour]

Well, the two obvious plan drwbacks are:

-Russia will actually have a clear justification to remove or change the Tblisi government, your plan does not take into account that the energy markets does not care how the product gets to them, decades of support for regimes such as Saddam's and the Saudi royal family among others made this evident. Europe will have no problem in sacrificing Georgia's democracy if it meant an uninterupted energy supply-especially if Georgia is seen as the provocateur in the story, after all the Georgian government is expected to maintain law and order on its territory.
Ironically Russia would even want to blow its own energy transportation infrastructure to achieve their goal of getting georgia "back into the fold".

- the second drawback is the environmental and cost in lives for the Georgian side.

The Georgian government would be insane to consider theis option as it plays into Moscow's hand.

[John Robb]

"Ironically Russia would even want to blow its own energy transportation infrastructure to achieve their goal of getting georgia "back into the fold"."

I don't see that. Of course, before the war in Iraq I ran into the same type of resistance to my analysis. I think the same holds today. Russia is not the leviathan power you imagine it to be.

[Duncan Kinder]

"What I am looking for here, and most likely won't see it (not yet, anyway), is either a small state or a guerrilla/terrorist group moving beyond local disruption"

A precedent for this sort of behavior would be the Elizabethan Sea Dogs, who began to prey upon the Spanish gold shipments from the New World.

Sir Francis Drake actually developed the idea of using naval power commercially to disrupt a rival power, thereby strategically weakening it. Prior to that time, navies had been used for Viking-style raids.

By analogy, some contemporary country could launch global guerrilla type disruptions on current commerce.

Elizabethan England could get away with this because it was far away and protected by the sea. Georgia's situation would be more like Portugal's attempting to defy Spain.

[londamium]

John

I appreciate that natgas is tied to a fixed distribution chain; this is why knocking out the interconnector from Russia to, say, Poland instantly generates blowback for a state perpetrator - as it by definition involves an attack on the client as well as the provider. Economically, the impact is (a) an immediate rise in spot prices due to forward risk calculations driven by new threat perceptions and (b) an immediate rise in contract prices due to those pesky force majeure clauses. Politically the impact is that Russia and Poland, and everyone else for that matter, agree that the perpetrators are the source of all evil on the planet and must be hunted down mercilessly and relentlessly. This is where the comparison with Ukraine falls apart.

Given that there is little spare capacity in the global crude supply chain at present ( OPEC's actual production figures show a relentless glide-path downwards over the past year ), starting a sequence of attacks against the second largest global exporter is going to have a very serious effect on prices due to the combination of forward risk calculations due to a radically new threat environment and spot supply constraints. The political consequence of this is that everyone agrees that the perpetrators are the source of all on the planet and that the bullet in the back of the head should be applied only after a liberal dose of unpleasant torture.

You're still being hopelessly naive about the mechanics of this: playing away is orders of magnitude more difficult than knocking off infrastructure on home turf, guarded by your cousin, that you used to play next to as a kid. The insurgents in Nigeria and Iraq have a massive, structural CI advantage that you lose as soon as you start heading off home turf; countering that is complex, resource-intensive, time-consuming and, above all, hideously expensive.

If you're subcontracting to mercenaries, they're going to want secure insertion and extraction, an installed intelligence, logistics and support infrastructre, serious kit and truckfuls of cash: ie 6-7 figure retainer payments/earnest monies that reflect the personal risks they are undertaking, bonus payments for each target hit pre-deposited in escrow accounts, and large insurance compensation for their families, again pre-placed in escrow, in the event of their demise or capture ( which means torture followed by death in most cases ). The moment that they ask about the availability of C4 or other military grade explosives and whether the smuggling network is secure only to be told that there's a chemist in Minsk cooking the stuff up from ingredients purchased at the local B&Q, they'll be out the door and heading over to the nearest Russki intelligence office in a desperate bid to cover the expenses of a wasted trip. I'd also note that mercenaries are, well, mercenary, being motivated by cash and staying alive long enough to enjoy said cash, unlike the 9/11 perps who leveraged a trillion dollar installed infrastructure to commit suicide, exploiting a security hole that could have been prevented for less than $1000 per airplane.

Cheap means amateur hour. Which in turn means that there is a high failure rate, attrition of personnel, both dead, and more disastrously, alive; and within a month witnesses are telling the Georgian press that they were sure that they heard a helicopter overhead just before the minister's house blew up, killing him and his family.

[totierne]

For a moment there I thought you were talking about Georga U.S.A. and the breakup of the U.S.A. . Does open source warfare possibilities exist in the break up of the U.S.A.? what would break off, San Francisco, Boston, New York, Texas?

Interesting point to suggest that these armchair general suppositions are assumed to be aimed at non U.S.A. territories.

[Claymore]

Ivan's side

http://en.rian.ru/trend/georgia/

[georgelarson]

Instead of attacking the physical oil infrastructure, would a "bear raid" on the stocks of Russian oil companies be a possible alternative? Jay Gould used it as a weapon against his business enemies. Gould did this anonymously. Could it be used in the less regulated markets of Russia? Destabilizing the value of Russian capitol would be away of devaluing their oil industry, disrupting its operations and weakening the government. Attacking the Russian currency and government bonds are a possibilities too, but I think it would be more difficult. Attacking all 3 would be better.