THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR: Into the 5th Generation (5GW)

In 1989, as the Berlin wall was being torn down, Bill Lind (with Nightengale, Schmitt, Sutton, and Wilson) wrote "The Changing Face War: Into the Fourth Generation" for the Marine Corps Gazette. This seminal article made the case that while large scale interstate warfare was going the way of the dodo, low intensity guerrilla warfare and terrorism would thrive in its stead. They were right.

To make their point, Lind and his collaborators divided warfare over the last two centuries into four generations, where each previous generation was defeated by a successive generation of warfare. While, the first three generations deal with interstate warfare (although I make the point in my upcoming book "Brave New War" that the real fourth generation, missing from the framework, is nuclear warfare -- extreme mobility via ICBMs and SLBMs with extreme firepower via nukes), Lind's Fourth generation was between states and non-states. On the surface, many of the elements described as core to the fourth generation are not new and reflect guerrilla wars we have seen in the past:

• The emphasis on extreme dispersion.
• Decentralized logistics. An ability to live off of the land.
• Psychological warfare aimed collapsing the moral cohesion of the enemy (internal collapse).
• Extreme emphasis on maneuver at the expense of firepower.

However, Lind argued that the use of these methods of warfare on a global scale, with new technology, and through new methods of employment in combination with the decline of the West would radically increase the threat posed by fourth generation opponents. This has proven out as these opponents use our strength against us (judo moves) and our rear areas are increasingly targeted (rather than our military forces).

Into 5GW

Lind: Whoever is first to recognize, understand, and implement a generational change can gain a decisive advantage. Conversely, a nation that is slow to adapt to generational change opens itself to catastrophic defeat.

Things would be bad enough with just fourth generation opponents but as the research on global guerrillas has borne out, a new more dangerous generation is forming: potentially a 5th generation of warfare. Much of this new generation was derived and accelerated in cauldron of Iraq, just as the basis for 3rd generation of warfare was proved out in the Spanish Civil war. What we see is jarring:

• Open source warfare. An ability to decentralize beyond the limits of a single group (way beyond cell structures) using new development and coordination methodologies. This new structure doesn't only radically expand the number of potential participants, it shrinks the group size well below any normal measures of viability. This organizational structure creates a dynamic whereby new entrants can appear anywhere. In London, Madrid, Berlin, and New York.
• Systems disruption. A method of sabotage that goes beyond the simple destruction of physical infrastructure. This method of warfare, which can burst onto the scene as a black swan, uses network dynamics (a new form of leveraged maneuver) to undermine and reorder global systems. It is through this Schumpeterian "creative destruction" that new environments favorable to opposition forces are built (often due to a descent into primary loyalties and pressure from global markets).
• Virtual states (ala Philip Bobbitt). Unlike the guerrilla movements of the past, many of the 4GW forces we are fighting today have found a way to integrate their activities with global "crime." No longer are guerrilla movements or terrorists aimed at taking control of the reigns of the state or merely proxies for states. A new form of economic sustenance has been found. This black globalization is already vast (a GDP of trillions per year), and gains momentum through weakening and disruption of states. This military/economic integration creates a virtuous feedback loop that allows groups to gain greater degrees of independence and financial wealth through the warfare they conduct.

  NOTE: Whether you call these developments 4GW on steroids or the start of a 5th generation, it just doesn't matter. Whichever way you cut it, things are developing quickly and in the wrong direction.

Comments

[Azr@el]

5GW seems more about selling books and stocking lectures than delinating between different eras of warfare. Warfare seems to be a cylical phenomenon closely linked to the economic potential of the combatants. Thus hunter-gathers, agrarianist, industralist all fight in different ways. At the boundaries of these epochs there are transitional conflicts such as u.s. civil war/ww1/ww2 where agrarian( 2nd gen ) armies painfully transformed into industrial( 3rd gen ) armies. The 4th generation of warfare is also linked to economic ( and attendent social ) transformation underlying the combatants, this is of course globalization and the rise and resurrection of tribes. In a way eventually 4th gen warfare will be very similar to 1 st gen warfare of the hunter gatherers. What we are witnessing now is merely another transitional epoch.

When 4th gen becomes the dominant paradigm of warfare( which it isn't now , probably it's 20% agrarian, 70% industrial, 10% neo-tribal) then we'll percieve a world where our normal geography , time and space , will be supplanted by a new shifting , dynamic psuedo-geography where 2 tribes on the opposite side of the planet will be close allies and digital neighbors able to coordinate attaks and disruptions thanks to the global network now springing up around the planet. In a 4th gen world tribal affiliation,culture and world view will be dominate over distance and time. A normal map of the future may be completely useless to a military leader in 4th gen, since his potential enemies may be interwoven to closely to his life and the life of his troops; imagine fighting a war in el salvador and having your enemy tribe retaliate against your kids day care in los angeles, your grandparents in chicago, etc..

Lets not be quick to start talking about the 5th gen of warfare, we have yet to scratch the surface of the 4th gen of warfare, the era of digital hunter gatherers.

[ramsis]

since when is classic gurilla warfare a new kind of warfare. your right this stuff is just for selling books.

[John Robb]

You guys are free not to read this. In fact, I encourage you not to. It isn't written for you. It is for those people that are going to fight the next wars. My effort is for them.

[zenpundit]

Hi John,

Keep writing.

The open source aspect is particularly important as a variable of 5GW in my view because it is neutral; it can be applied destructively ( GG) or constructively ( software/IT/networks etc). Ths running the gamut of Boyd's tatical-strategic continuum.

[Anton Vereshchagin]

John - I'm with Zenpundit, Keep writing!

[bobw]

Aside from the crime syndicates (Chechen, Israeli, Columbian, etc) which are virtual states, what are the guerilla movements that are not aimed at taking political power? Hisballah and Hamas (if Hamas qualifies as a guerilla movt) are both parts of their states' governments; as are or desire to be the various groups in Iraq.

[Hakim Hazim]

John,

Not that you need encouragement, but the first two commenters fail to realize, no one who is sincere in this field writes for the sake of being popular or selling books. The opposite often happens. Conviction has to guide the research of those who are true watchmen. Keep up the good work.

[E Stepp]

John,

I also see a distinct difference in outcomes or goals associated with the different generations of warfare. As I see it, 1GW looked towards localized resource acquisition. 2GW looked towards long-range land acquisition (different from 1GW in the "colonial" aspect). 3GW for total warfare or regime change. 4GW looks towards either punishment (Al Qaeda, systems disruption) or towards reversal of status quo occupation (Hamas, Iraqi insurgency).

What would be the end-goal of 5GW? I mean, I understand the methodology of what you're saying 5GW will look like, I just don't understand what the end-goal would be.

[Eric_P]

I think the scariest thing about the concepts that make up what is being called 5GW is the secrecy surrounding the goals and motives of the people initiating it. At least with 4GW you could trace back from the attack to the attacking terrorist cell/group, with 5GW the network of attackers is dispersed and have divergent interests and continuously form different temporary alliances of convenience. We can identify individual guerilla entrepreneurs and “factors of production” for each attack, but who are the consumers in the bazaar? Whose needs motivated the guerilla entrepreneurs to begin forming these networks and interacting? Who are the guerilla leaders presenting their goal and vision to? And how do they perceive changes in the preferences of their “consumers?”

It probably shifts from group to group; each has a different degree of independence from their sources of funding and ideology holding together the various levels of the organization. I think that Hezbollah and Hamas can be considered 4GW organizations because they want to fill the gaps left by the state, they clamor to compete with states for social capital and primary loyalties, and their driving ideologies and desires are easy to identify (which are strengths for their organizations.)

I’m new to these ideas and I think the blog is great. Keep writing John!

[RevG]

This is the best overview of 5GW I've read yet, great synopsis, great overview of theoretical parameters. What we need next is some creative brainstorming concerning how this may manifest. I suggest (http://soldiers.simplemauiweddings.com/category/5gw/) echo-boomers be examined relative to Dr. Marc Sageman's work profiling terrorists. I would appreciate thoughts going beyond 4GW on steriods.

[Z]

4GW will look very different 30-40 years from now, just as WWII looked very different from WWI. But both were wars between states and depended on the states' industrial capacities. And they were both extremely expensive for the nations waging them. And in both, victory was defined by capturing and holding territory.

By contrast 4(5)GW will be non-state, require minimal expense or industrial production, and victory will be defined extracting political concessions from opposing states.

Opens Source exchange of knowledge and the growing availabilty of cheap and reliable weapons that can counter the veryexpensive weapons systems nation states rely on for dominance will prove key factors.

For example, Hizbollah used primarily older style wire guided 'sagger' missles (with a sprinkling of newer ATGMs and RPG 29s) to defeat Merkava tanks. For such movements, there is plenty of room to grow. Imagine the impact once newer ATGMs are abundant. Imagine if (relatively) simple anti-aircraft missiles, Which China and Russia are no doubt developing) become widespread.

If such a war against a heavilly armed 4GW force were to take place, it would look as different from previous guerrilla wars as WWII looked from WWI. Like John says, it wont matter so much what you call it so long as you recognize the progression.

Z

[Thunder Pig]

John,
People are fighting using 5GW techniques all over the world, even in America. White Hats, Grey Hats, and Black Hats, it all ain't about bullets. Although plenty are being bought up and cached underground...just in case.
Keep it up.

[Duncan Kinder]

"A new form of economic sustenance has been found."

To my way of looking at things, this sentence is key.

I, personally, would differ from John Robb just a bit on this point. I would assert that "a new form of economic sustenance is evolving" or "is emerging." To say that "it has been found" suggests that we already know what it is.

The precise contours of this new form are by no means clear, ascertainable, or predictable at this point There are apt to be some failed variations, just as - for example - the electric-powered and the steam-powered versions of the automobile failed.

A great deal of what current American capitalism is about is the shifting of risk onto others. This is a great deal of what downsizing out outsourcing is about. This is what the medical insurance industry is about. One of the reasons the Bush administration provoked so much European opposition to invading Iraq even before the war was not that Europeans are intrinsically more intelligent than Americans but rather that his unilateral policies monopolized the decision making authority but shifted much of the risk onto the Europeans. There are many other examples.

Shifting risk onto others can provide short term benefits - as the tactical political success of the Bush administration demonstrates.

But by shifting risk onto others, you thereby also incur a risk. This incurred risk is that others will successfully deal with this shifted risk. Thereby, they will develop expertise which you lack. This would empower them to come back and bite you in ways which you are not equipped to deal with.

In essence, this is what the so-called "War on Terror," is all about.

[Marcello]

"For example, Hizbollah used primarily older style wire guided 'sagger' missles (with a sprinkling of newer ATGMs and RPG 29s) to defeat Merkava tanks. For such movements, there is plenty of room to grow. Imagine the impact once newer ATGMs are abundant. Imagine if (relatively) simple anti-aircraft missiles, Which China and Russia are no doubt developing) become widespread."

Judging from the captured arms caches Hizballah had sizable numbers of Fagot,Sprandel,older generation TOWs and Saghegh RPGs.Not new stuff but at least a generation ahead of the Malutka which was used but probabaly more in antipersonnel role (allegations of use of PRG-29s or Kornet were not backed by solid proof).
The problem with ATGMs and MANPADS is that decent ones cost several thousands of dollars per missile.That is unlikely to change anytime soon.The Hizballah are well funded and they have stockpiled for years.
Not many organizations can afford that.

[Marcello]

"PRG-29s"
Read as RPG-29

Regarding 5GW, I believe the term is unwarranted.What we are seeing is mere 4GW affirming itself.The 5GW should be applied to something new.If,for example, in the future robotic armies and population control technologies shifted the balance of power back to state like organizations then what would ensue would warrant the 5GW term.But at the present using the 5GW label is little more than than repackaging 4GW for the masses.

[Z]

"The problem with ATGMs and MANPADS is that decent ones cost several thousands of dollars per missile.That is unlikely to change anytime soon.The Hizballah are well funded and they have stockpiled for years.
Not many organizations can afford that."

True enough. Few groups are as well funded as Hizb. Iraqi insurgents don't seem to be. But the relative cost difference give then a major advantage. I imaging a good modern Main Battle Tank runs a couple mil, needs plenty of maintainance, some decent crew training and lots of fuel and is pretty labor intensive overall. States will have to spend copiously to maintain a decent sized armor force, whereas (in theory at least) a guerrilla force needs but a fraction of that to counter the MBT threat.

Airpower Vs. SAMs is a different matter and I don't know much about it. (I'd love to hear your thoughts about it, or anyone with techical knowledge) But I imagine that while good SAMs are beyond the means of even a well funded organization, airforces are the lion's share of any state defense budget. Any future developement that gives the SAMs an advantage over airplanes would cause a radical shift in the ballance of power. Division of labor is also not inconcievable, where for example, the Lebanese state obtains an airdefense system (with asitance, of course) while the nonstate actor continues the ground war.

[Azr@el]

ad marcello re 5gw
concur

ad z re sam
I think the 4th gen solution to airpower dominance of the nation state doesn't rest with sams but rather in a python like embrace of airpower's logistics chain. Fighter jets and bombers are complicated platforms to maintain and supply. A competent 4th gen organization will try to deny the nation state's control of the air by attacking airbases, fuel and arms depots and even the very manufacturing facilities of the aircraft and their critical components. A stinger manpad will run in the usd80k-usd100k range, for the same amount i'm sure some multinational 4th gen group could ram a jetliner into the f-22 assembly line putting back the program significantly. With sophisticated systems like fighter jets there must be hundreds of bottlenecks that could be targetted. Remember 4th gen is strategically attritive and as we see in iraq there are already shortages developing , imagine how much worse they could be if the opfor were targetting the full length and breadth of the logistic network all the way back to the factory floor or even all the way back to economic system funding the R&D.

[PenGun]

The Open Source section is kinda hard to understand. Oh well.

4GW is based now on the open sourcing of weapons and systems. At this point savy small geoups can take say a Russian RPG-29 and with quite cheap CADCAM tech produce duplicates. Iran has been copying Russian weapons for a decade.

Komet type and more complicated can be duped too as tech, especially computer tech advances.

The Israelie ECM, some of the best in the world was neutralized by Hizbollah laying fiber for their C3. Real 4GW going on even in the aftermath. Italy agrees to sell advanced anti-air to the Lebanon govt. Hizbollah will be knocking down F-15s soon.

PenGun

[Marcello]

"But I imagine that while good SAMs are beyond the means of even a well funded organization, airforces are the lion's share of any state defense budget. Any future developement that gives the SAMs an advantage over airplanes would cause a radical shift in the ballance of power."

It depends on what you mean for good SAM. Decent short range SAMs relying on IR or other non radar guidance methods are relatively affordable for an Hizballah like organization.They can make the sky unfriendly for helicopters, A-10s and similar.You will still be under a deluge of satellite guiged PGMs dropped from high altitude, but if the enemy is conscious about casualties you will not have to worry about a MC-130 dropping a daisy cutter on your position while you are having your breakfast.
That can be quite unpleasant.
On the other hand if you want a serious defense against the USAF/IAF, then you must be prepared to spend countless billions on modern radar guided SAMs, robust command and control networks etc.There are no cheap alternatives and basically nobody can afford an air defense capable of withstanding the onslaught those air forces can dish out.
Your typical country air defense will be neutralized in short order.

"and even the very manufacturing facilities of the aircraft and their critical components. A stinger manpad will run in the usd80k-usd100k range, for the same amount i'm sure some multinational 4th gen group could ram a jetliner into the f-22 assembly line putting back the program significantly."

This is not a world war running on a factory-front regime.Even if F-22 production is halted, so what?
These wars are fought with existing planes, not the ones rolling out the factory floor.
The last B-52 left the assembly line in 1962 IIRC.Even the ammunition used is what is already in the stockpile for the most part.

[Marcello]

"4GW is based now on the open sourcing of weapons and systems. At this point savy small geoups can take say a Russian RPG-29 and with quite cheap CADCAM tech produce duplicates. Iran has been copying Russian weapons for a decade."

Between being able to copy the design and actually putting it in production there is a wide gap.Manufacturing high performances shaped charges is a fairly high tech affair, which requires sophisticated machinery and know-how.If the Saghegh is an indication
the RPG-29 is probably beyond the capabilities of their industry.

[Marcello]

"But the relative cost difference give then a major advantage. I imaging a good modern Main Battle Tank runs a couple mil, needs plenty of maintainance, some decent crew training and lots of fuel and is pretty labor intensive overall. States will have to spend copiously to maintain a decent sized armor force, whereas (in theory at least) a guerrilla force needs but a fraction of that to counter the MBT threat."

The thing is that the state can afford those two millions more easily than the guerrillas can afford the thousands for the missile.
Or putting it that way, a fleet of submarines is a cheaper way to counter aircraft carriers than building a fleet of aircraft carriers and staging a Midway in the middle of the Atlantic.That does not mean that a submarine like the Kursk is for everyone's pockets.It is all relative.

errata corrige Sprandel should be Spandrel.
Or even better, Konkurs.

[PenGun]

I guess no one has been paying much attention. Hizbollah just kicked Isreal's ass ... hard.

The Italian govt is expiditing sales of Aster 15 SAMs to the Lebanese govt. Europe has had it with Isreal.

The reason Isreal did not attack Syria was the SA 18 SAMs the Russians sold em'recently. These SAMs and the supporting radar networks are also in Iran's arsenal. Iran is very good at copying Russian weapons.

The advantage in the 3GW west had is evaporating as modern weapons are appearing in many hostile hands. Tanks are easy meat for modern anti-tank tactics and are fast becoming an anachronism.

PenGun

[Azr@el]

B-52's and their ammunition are not constantly in motion, at some point they're in rest somewhere, whether that is stateside or abroad and at those points they're vulnerable to an intercepting fist attack by highly trained light infantry or another 911 kamikaze type strike. Again the day may rise when various groups that have no shared ideology or endgame vision are still able to come together to kill a "nest of birds" for the common good and welfare of all 4th gen type groups.

Secondly the other method to neutralize the nation-state's air dominance is by interleaving your own forces with civilians and using the power of global media to shame particular nation states into restraint.

Generally problems have more than one solution and that seems to hold true for the problem of how 4th genners deal with 3rd gen airpower.

note* i consider uavs to be 4th gen airpower and the low cost per unit, the high mobility and lack of infrasture make them something altogether different from the hanger queens that rule the sky now.

[Duncan Kinder]

According to the following Asia Times Online article, the Indian defense procurement strategy has been plagued by issues of kickbacks and corruption.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HJ19Df03.html

This apparently has serious implications for India's ability to maintain an effective defense.

In turn, this suggests that one strategy for global guerrillas seeking to degrade conventional militaries - including particularly the air power we now are discussing - would be to infiltrate the various arms suppliers and - through bribery, kickbacks, etc., degrade the overall systems.

[Marcello]

"The Italian govt is expiditing sales of Aster 15 SAMs to the Lebanese govt. Europe has had it with Isreal."

Iraq had over a hundred of Roland missile systems, a very good french SAM in the same category of the Aster 15, back in GW1.It did not stop the USAF from pounding them into the ground.Those Aster will be a speed bump for the IAF and nothing more.

"Tanks are easy meat for modern anti-tank tactics and are fast becoming an anachronism."

This particular claim has been around for decades.I have found almost the exact words in 70's magazines.For some perspective on that matter allied tanks were "easy meat" for german artillery already in WW1.

"B-52's and their ammunition are not constantly in motion, at some point they're in rest somewhere,"

That "somewhere" means Barksdale in Louisiana or Diego Garcia or similar places.
If you can pull that off, then you can inflict much more damage by attacking others targets.Realistically it would be next to impossible.

"Secondly the other method to neutralize the nation-state's air dominance is by interleaving your own forces with civilians and using the power of global media to shame particular nation states into restraint."

The "We should invade their countries, kill their leaders and convert them to Christianity." style conservatives do not lose their sleep on such things.Appealing to the enemy sense of shame can get you only so far.

[zenpundit]

"Europe has had it with Isreal"[sic]

Ironic commentary, given that it was Europe's previous experience of having " had it" with Jews that substantially caused the creation of the State of Israel.

[PenGun]

No Marcello, Rolands are not in the same class as Asters. Rolands are from the early 80s and were regarded as good SAMs then. The modern Aster is the only missile to shoot down an Exocet SA and have succesfully destroyed mach 1 vehicles at 100 meters altitude.

Some speed bumb.

The Hizbollah anti tank squads damaged and destroyed over 60 Merkavas and killed many Israelie troops in buildings. As one 16 year old Hizbollah fighter put it "It was just like on my playstaion. We hunted them like birds"

PenGun

[Marcello]

"No Marcello, Rolands are not in the same class as Asters. Rolands are from the early 80s and were regarded as good SAMs then."

They are both short range radar guided SAM meant for point defense.In that sense they belong in the same class of weapons, even if the Aster has of course greater performances.The iraqi Roland faced the coutermeasures of the time, less sophisticaded than contemporary ones.They were smashed and the same thing will happen to an handful of Aster.15 systems an air defense do not make.

"The modern Aster is the only missile to shoot down an Exocet SA and have succesfully destroyed mach 1 vehicles at 100 meters altitude."

This looks good on the sale brochures.When you will be jammed and with antiradiation missiles coming your way things will look a lot less rosy.

[Marcello]

The Hizbollah anti tank squads damaged and destroyed over 60 Merkavas and killed many Israelie troops in buildings. As one 16 year old Hizbollah fighter put it "It was just like on my playstaion. We hunted them like birds"

The egyptians took out a lot israeli tanks in 1973 with ATGMs and RPGs.It was not the end of the tank.Improved tactics and technologies supplied an adequate counter to that threat.

[Azr@el]

>Barksdale afb near shreveport can be infiltrated by a dedicated force, it can be a victim of a kamikaze airliner, etc.

>Diego Garcia is a much harder nut to crack since it exists almost completely isolated from civilian infrastructure and the 4th gen gains it's mobility from riding the network of civilian infrastructure.

Ultimately 4th gen will win if it can outmanuver militaries by avoiding a "fair" fight and utilize the global telecomm, transportation network to strike directly at the societies that maintain those militaries and convince them that conflict is not a harmless thing that exists distantly on cnn, shades of tecumseh sherman.

[Marcello]

"Barksdale afb near shreveport can be infiltrated by a dedicated force, it can be a victim of a kamikaze airliner, etc."

If you have the people that can infiltrate a major AF base in the USA and blow up a sizable number of planes, ammo dumps etc and on top of that you can repeat the stunt then you would probably be better off going after others targets.
It also implies capabilities much superior to those of the current enemy threat.
Basically to make such a scenario feasible the USA would have to be into the shit up to the eyeballs.

[PenGun]

OK Marcello ... you buy tanks and expensive aircraft and I'll buy state of the art anti-tank and anti-air. We'll see who walks away ... where did I put my Hizbollah T.

The Russians are doing payback for Afghanistan and lots of fancy weaponry is available, Iran has lots of money and is into dispersing weapons to interested anti US types.

PenGun

[Marcello]

"OK Marcello ... you buy tanks and expensive aircraft and I'll buy state of the art anti-tank and anti-air. We'll see who walks away ... where did I put my Hizbollah T"

If we start with the same resources and I attack, you win.But that is not the case here because it boils down to what resources you are capable of throwing at it.Are SAMs cheaper than planes?
Of course.Can you afford enough of them to match the USAF or the IAF however? Probably no.
It is simple economics.The relative lower costs of SAMs cannot make up for the huge disparity in funds.

"Iran has lots of money"
And a zillion or so of programs which need it.Including their own indigenous fighter jet program.

[Marcello]

In case you were wondering the good iranians are not pouring every dollar they have into ATGMs and SAMs and such.They are spending much of what they have on conventional equipment like tanks, APCs, self propelled artillery, planes, corvettes and stuff like that.Which is not to say that they aren't making antitank weapons but when you are procuring two or three types of tanks at the same time in sizable numbers the funds left aren't unlimited.

[Z]

"The thing is that the state can afford those two millions more easily than the guerrillas can afford the thousands for the missile."

Maybe, but taking the Israel-Hizbollah war as a model, the point is that with relatively cheap, less-than-state-of-the-art ATGMs, Hizb was able to negate the fire power and maneuver advantage the Israelis thought they had with their rather expensive tanks. (I grant you, the same may not work in every type of terrain.)

As for air defense, that will be far more challenging, though new advances *could* change that. (BTW, has anyone heard of non-radar guided SAMs? Supposedly Russia/Ukrain has such a system?)

Bear in mind what Hizb-Lebanon's goals with air defense would be. Its not a matter of impenetrable steel umbrella or nothing. Downing even a handfull of IAF fighters would improve their standing imeasurably in any conflict.

As an aside, I would note that Hizb's fate may be partially in the hands of others. Namely, what are they thinking in the Kremlin? If its "we have to keep America and Israel sweet," Hizb will be hard pressed to gain the weaponry it really needs. If the Russians are thinking "we may be able to change the ballance of power favorably" then Hizb could look forward to wine and roses. The Russians may happily sell some top of the line ATGMs to Iran and Syria and express total shock when they end up in Hizb hands.

[tim302]

Guys,
Have any of you read the book "Fab?" It's about the MIT lab that is working on building microscale fabrication labs that, fed with basic working stock can yield sophisticated electronic devices.

It's not too far fetched that in the future (say 10 years?) people will iteratively design SAMs, share the designs online and manufacture the guidance systems in compact fab facilities.

Worth thinking about...not sure what the counter is to that kind of thing.

[Azr@el]

If israel knew what it knows now it would've never launched a military incursion into lebanon to recover it's captured soldiers.
If hizb-3-allah knew what it knows now, i'm 100% positive they would have rolled the diced without a second thought.
And ultimately this is what matters, atgms were able to raise the cost of military action for the israelis to a point where they were uncomfortable continuing, in gaza that point has not been reached. Atgms have changed the calculas of war for the israelis ,hizb-3-allah has made warfare less attractive than negotiations and it didn't have to destroy 100% of idf armour to do so; only ~5%. According to sun tzu, the greatest form of warfare is that which attacks your enemy's plans, hizb-for atgm tactics shattered israel's plans and convinced her leadership to accept hizb-3-allah formula for conflict resolution.

[Marcello]

"Maybe, but taking the Israel-Hizbollah war as a model, the point is that with relatively cheap, less-than-state-of-the-art ATGMs, Hizb was able to negate the fire power and maneuver advantage the Israelis thought they had with their rather expensive tanks."

"relatively cheap", yes but still much more expensive than what your typical guerrillas can afford.They had also good defensive terrain reinforced with prepared positions, good training and so on.These guys are lightyears ahead of your typical guerrilla outfit.

"As for air defense, that will be far more challenging, though new advances *could* change that. (BTW, has anyone heard of non-radar guided SAMs? Supposedly Russia/Ukrain has such a system?)"

Everyone has some sort of non radar guided SAM.Short range man portable systems like the Stinger of the Igla use infrared seekers.The RBS-70 uses laser guidance.And so on.The limitation inherent in optical systems versus radar guidance mean however that they have rather limited effective ranges.
Taking on high altitude planes purely with optical systems is a very tricky proposition.
Radar can offer longer ranges but this means an active sensor which is broadcasting its position to the benefit of the enemy.As such is vulnerable to a wide array of countermeasures, ranging from jamming to dedicated PGMs.The USAF and the IAF are very good at playing the SEAD game.

"Bear in mind what Hizb-Lebanon's goals with air defense would be. Its not a matter of impenetrable steel umbrella or nothing. Downing even a handfull of IAF fighters would improve their standing imeasurably in any conflict."

A small number of planes can be a victory for Hizballah.It will not prevent the lebanese state from being bombed into the stone age afterwards.And the US will be happy to replace those planes anyway.

"it didn't have to destroy 100% of idf armour to do so; only ~5%."

Bear in mind the following things
1)Most of those few tens of tanks which were knocked out are repairable.Only a small number are total losses.
2)There are 1500 Merkavas in service, plus another 2000 tanks like Magach 7 and such.

"If hizb-3-allah knew what it knows now, i'm 100% positive they would have rolled the diced without a second thought."

Nasrallah was not so cocksure in some of his interviews.Maybe he was playing politics but I suspect he knows that if the israelis really go after them in strenght and run a schorched earth campaign things might get rather unpleasant.

[Marcello]

"Worth thinking about...not sure what the counter is to that kind of thing."

The sort of manufacturing tech that would enable to pull that off would also enable the US to make enough UCAVs to cover the skies with.In such a war of attrition superior economic power carries the day.

[ramsis]

i think marcello hit the nail on the head, Unmanned air and ground tech is the only way to fight this war while living in a casualty queezy society. we must also keep in mind that the israelis were trying to dislodge and reduce hez capicity to wage war. i suspect that if the goal was to destroy the enemy things might have looked a little different for them and nasrallah would have been lord of a rubble pile.

[Z]

"Nasrallah was not so cocksure in some of his interviews.Maybe he was playing politics but I suspect he knows that if the israelis really go after them in strenght and run a schorched earth campaign things might get rather unpleasant."

Nasrallah ussually comes off as very reserved in his interviews (distinct from speaches.)

Israel pretty much did run a scorched earth policy. Hence, 1 million refugees from South Lebanon, cluster bomblets all over the place, border towns pretty much rubble. Yes, I'm sure they could have done *even* worse than that, but that would have collapsed the Lebanese government (definately NOT the wishes of the Bush admin) and would have had a marginal effect on dug-in Hizb fighters.

Trying to root them out with large ground forces would have opened Israel up to an even greater catastrphe. It would have meant a much larger call up of reserves, which means halting the Israeli economy for whatever perod this counter-insurgency lasted. Nobody could promise it would be short, and stopping halfway would have been catastrophic. Also, it would expose large numbers of reservists to combat against forces able to extract heavy casualties from Israel's best units. 40 year old grunts make for poor counter-insurgents.

In short; If there were a way to destroy Hizb with airpower, they would have done it. If there were a way to do it with 20-30k troops, they would have done that.

[Z]

"Everyone has some sort of non radar guided SAM.Short range man portable systems like the Stinger of the Igla use infrared seekers."

I was thinking of something called the "Kolchuga" (the name had escaped me) which according to Janes last month(don't have subscription) was sold to Iran. Any info you have would be interesting.

Thanx

http://www.janes.com/defence/news/jdw/jdw060922_1_n.shtml

[Marcello]

The israelis were attempting to crush Hizballah on the cheap using airpower and limited ground incursions.Unsurprisingly airpower was unable to deliver. More surprisingly (but only up to a point) a warm welcome was ready for the IDF on the ground as well.The politicians went in panic mode remembering what it happened in the 90's and the rest is history.
That being said even the strongest defense can be penetrated with enough overmatch.If the israelis really get fed up with the hizbos and are willing to take some casualties they can roll over them. After that it becomes a matter of being ruthless enough with the civilian population.The palestinians have not been much of a threat in their walled pens lately.

[Marcello]

"Trying to root them out with large ground forces would have opened Israel up to an even greater catastrphe. It would have meant a much larger call up of reserves, which means halting the Israeli economy for whatever perod this counter-insurgency lasted."

This would not be a counterinsurgency campaign in the classic sense of the term.
It would be the equivalent of taking on the japanese defenders entrenched in the Pacific.It would be a brutish and bloody affair but neverthless quicker.You cannot hide in a bunker behind the enemy lines for years in the same way you can be supported by civilian populations in a classic insurgency.

[Z]

" "relatively cheap", yes but still much more expensive than what your typical guerrillas can afford.They had also good defensive terrain reinforced with prepared positions, good training and so on.These guys are lightyears ahead of your typical guerrilla outfit."

Sorry, hate to keep posting. I'd be the first to admit that Hizbollah is pretty unique among guerrillas and that south leb terrain offers the defender a big advantage (though it didn't help the PLO in '82.)

But they did prove that what once seemed impossible is now only very difficult. That's a big distinction. Meanwhile, the Iraqi Insurgents are proving that even not so well equiped forces fighting in not advantageous terraine could deny a superpower any benefit from agression: which is all a guerrilla force need do.

[Z]

"That being said even the strongest defense can be penetrated with enough overmatch.If the israelis really get fed up with the hizbos and are willing to take some casualties they can roll over them. After that it becomes a matter of being ruthless enough with the civilian population.The palestinians have not been much of a threat in their walled pens lately."

Nobody really doubts that a 400,000+ Israeli army+IAF+unlimited U.S. support could *eventually* push back 3000 or so Hizb defenders.

Having done that, they could choose between staying and fighting an insurgency, exactly as they did for 18 years (what do you think they would do differently this time?) or leaving and giving back the ground they had just taken. Israel's Political leadership did indeed panic, but only because those were their only 2 practical choices.

Of coure they *could* destroy Lebanon...just like the U.S. could (did?) destroy Iraq, or Vietnam or the Russians Afghanistan. That capabilty, while comforting to some, isn't as practical as some think.

[Marcello]

"I was thinking of something called the "Kolchuga" (the name had escaped me) which according to Janes last month(don't have subscription) was sold to Iran. Any info you have would be interesting."

Basically it seems to be a good ESM system.
Such systems are typically used to detect enemy radar emissions.This makes possible for example detecting enemy aircrafts without having to use your own active radars, provided however that they are using their own, which may not be the case.It can provide early warning to air defense batteries but it is not a weapon in itself.It isn't accurate enough to be used to provide guidance to a SAM.

"Of coure they *could* destroy Lebanon...just like the U.S. could (did?) destroy Iraq, or Vietnam or the Russians Afghanistan. That capabilty, while comforting to some, isn't as practical as some think."

Z, the idea here would be depopulating southern Lebanon, by whatever means necessary.The soviets and the americans were and are trying to build friendly regimes for relatively sophisticated political purposes.Israeli ends would be much more basic and therefore more easily attained with an application of brute force and firepower.
Concentration camps are a counterinsurgency classic and indeed are working with the palestinians.

[Z]

Marcello, my last post on this topic.

"Concentration camps are a counterinsurgency classic and indeed are working with the palestinians."

You may recall Israel's policy of 'arresting' and interning Shiite Lebanese men of milltary age in 'detention camps' back in the 80's (remember the hijaked TWA flight in 1985?) They've tried that one already. They also tried depopulation. Several times; In 1982, in 1996 (Grapes of Wrath) and in 2006 among other times where hundreds of thousands of Lebanese were made into refugees fleeing northward.

None of this is to argue it can't be done (of course it could be) only that it has been tried several times by the Israelis who, for whatever reason, were unable to achieve it. Of course, next time may be the charm, but this Israeli government wasn't ready to roll the dice.

Thanx for the info on the Kolchuga. I guess its usefull but hardly as decisive as thought.

Z

[Coathangrrr]

There seem to be a couple of salient points being glossed over in all this Israeli-Hezba war talk.

1) This quote:
'As one 16 year old Hizbollah fighter put it "It was just like on my playstaion. We hunted them like birds"'

What we have here is the integration of the modern media into 4th(5th?) gen warfare in a manner other than propaganda. Media as training.

2) The air war:

Perhaps I'm a bit misled here but if the theory of open-source warfare holds we should see in the near future the development of a High Alititude Improvised Explosive Device (HAIED, copyright pending). If I had to make a guess at the form, I'd say likely it'd be ballon based. Either a simple ballon with passive detetors of some sort and explosives that have a wide area of effect but not a powerful impact, just enough that a lucky shot would take down a f-16. I'm thinking of when the cong would try to take down american planes with small arms fire by just sitting in a field and shooting at 'em, not the best idea, but if you do it enough you get lucky. Alternatively you could have some sort of projectile weapon up there. Who knows, throw an AK un a weather ballon with some auto controls and it might work, though not likely I know.

Of course the real breakthrough will come when 1 progresses from training to control, maybe even of the HAIED.

Just some thought.

[Coathangrrr]

Or "balloon" even