JOURNAL: When will Brazil's Gangs/Militias Make the Jump?

Over the last 24 hours, gangs (see my earlier brief on "Transnational Gangs" for more) in Brazil's Rio de Janeiro unleashed a series of attacks that torched a eight police stations/outposts and 1 bus (18 died, although the deaths from the bus attack appear to be an error). This incident is similar to the flare ups earlier this year in Sao Paulo that pitted the police against the PCC.

Stated (MSM) reasons for these Rio attacks include the election of Sergio Cabral to the governorship of the state on a security platform and pressure from rival vigilante militias that are now in a contest with the drug gangs for control of the street and the economic (these militias charge residents and businesses for protection) power that confers:

"It's a fight for economic power... The militias exist, they are the fourth major gang in the state," (Asterio) Pereira (Rio state penitentiary chief) said (Reuters).

The reality may be more complex. In sum, this is a situation where rapid urbanization, enormous profits from black globalization, and a lack of security have put the gangs and the home grown militias that combat them in a collision course with the state. As semi-legitimate contenders with the state, they are increasingly in need of some measure of political power (which for them is to be left in control of a patchwork urban TAZ). Of course, violence is likely to grow, given the Federals are are going to push back, "corrupt/autonomous police units" have formed to vie for control of the street (already in the drug game), and the gangs/militias will continue to war with each other. The inevitable result is that Brazil's urban gangs and neighborhood militias, as the true organic players here, will adopt the methods of 4th generation warfare to survive and continue their growth. The only question is: how fast?

So far the process of evolution, while inexorable, has been reasonably slow and inept. That could change quickly. It would radically shorten if target cities were forced into failure through systems disruption. Further, if the gangs/militias expanded their endeavors to include all the aspects of viable virtual states -- energy smuggling, human welfare/support, and "security" services -- to better integrate themselves into the fabric of society (a carrot/stick combo), the result would something that would contrast favorably with the government. Finally, cross connections to other global open source insurgencies and stand alone 4th generation forces would rapidly provide the training, weapons, and methods necessary to reverse the outcomes of any engagement with any Federal police/military forces. It will be interesting to see if they are smart enough to make this happen.

Comments

[Bill Moore]

John these guys have demonstrated the ability to coordinate a mass uprising of sorts, but they are void of any ideology. This is a gang / subculture based on a black economic model. If the state destroy's their economic model, or seriously degrades it, its followers will quickly dissipate (so one hopes). What cause are they fightng for other than their pocket book? The State will have to provide alternatives, so this is a classic carrot and stick approach. If I continue in the gang I'm going to end up in jail or dead, and now the State is going to let me pick up trash for a decent wage, um? I'm happy to see that Brazil has the courage to face these gangs, and I only hope Mexico follows suit.

[tim302]

Scout,
I really don't see how the Brazillian state can beat the drug gangs by "confronting them", considering that
1) the gangs have a shorter decision cycle than the government.
2) the gangs have a guaranteed revenue stream from drugs.

Legalization might draw their fangs, but since Brazil is a signatory to the UN drug convention, as well as a bilateral treaty with the USA, that's not going to happen anytime soon.

[Artful Dodger]

he situation in Brazil is extremely interesting and I commend you for including 3rd generation street gangs as part of your global guerillas matrix. Many other security experts fail to recognize 3rd generation gangs as such, or they over-state the threat posed by unevolved 1st generation gangs and label them as being "terrorists" or "urban guerillas", when in fact the only thing they all share in common is a propensity for violence.
First of all, I want to dispute Scout's notion that Rio's gangs are completely devoid of ideology. In the excellent documentary "News From a Personal War",which is included as a bonus extra on the City of God DVD, it is shown that Rio's largest street gang (the Commando Vermellho, or Red Command) was spawned during the military dictatorship when left-wing activists were put in the same jail with street criminals. The main difference between the CV and some 1st-generation gangs is that CV members and leaders stake claims on moral righteousness by making vague allusions to "liberty and justice" which are backed up by providing a de facto favela court, "security", and alms gestures such as buying medicine for sick children, buying materials for damaged shanties, etc etc. This is NOT an ideology per se, but it is definitely more evolved than a 1st-generation gang. I believe a former police chief in the documentary referred to it as a "proto-ideology", which is quite accurate, in my opinion.
In analyzing the roots of the Brazilian situation, I think you hit on most of the major points, although I believe income disparity (Brazil has the worst in the world), ethnicity (legacy of slavery and a racial classification system which undermines the ability to form a broad ethnic consciousness), and Brazil's history of non-democratic governance are also equally to blame. In the USA blacks were able to attain a bigger piece of the pie by organizing a non-violent social justice movement that was rooted in Protestant churches (Brazilian Catholicism tends to avoid political discussion) and was chiefly concerned with achieving better conditions through political organization. It appears that the legacy of dictatorship and corruption is largely to blame for the absence of a political role in the struggle between Brazil's gangs and the state.
The aforementioned realities are to blame for why there was never a civil rights movement in Brazil. The consequence of this is the present day situation of low-intensity war. Brazil's government is presently trying to begin creating affirmative action programs similar to the USA. However, it remains to be seen if the corrupt, lethargic and inefficient Brazilian government will be able to make changes that will be far-reaching enough to affect the present situation.
I find the Brazilian stiuation to be fascinating and extremely frustating. It frustrates me that the government is so slow to see that incorporating the enormous untapped human potential of the slums into their state and economy would be beneficial for all. It also frustrates me that Brazil's gangs have been so slow to make any kind of move toward achieving broader legitimacy. While they are the de facto rulers of their communities, one would think that they at least would start bribing off some politicians and forming some "unaffiliated" political and service organizations, similar to the FSLN and 19th/20th century Irish/Italian street gangs. The shifting dichotomy between the violent bumbling Brazilian state and the violent bumbling Brazilian street gangs will be the primary determinant of how Brazil's future will play out.