JOURNAL: Targeting PMCs

Iraq. Here's an interesting data point on the level of tactical sophistication the US military is up against in Baghdad. Robert Young Pelton, the author of "Licensed to Kill", has the details on a series of attacks that targeted Blackwater USA on Tuesday (23 January 2007). Here's a recap:

• Hook. A State Department official protected by a Blackwater PSD (personal security detail) convoy was attacked.
• Line. QRF (quick reaction force) ground teams were dispatched from the Green Zone to relieve the convoy. These teams were ambushed. One retreated and the others were halted.
• Sinker. Two Blackwater Boeing Little Birds (small helicopter gunships) were dispatched to provide support. One was shot down and the other was damaged and forced to return to base. Recovery teams found the four bodies (one more died on the other helo that returned to the green zone) from the helicopter crash were stripped of their weapons.

UPDATE: Ansar al-Sunna followed up the attacks with a fast media loop by posting pictures of the four dead men's ID cards on their Website. The 1920 Revolution brigades got cell phone video of a smoldering chopper to al-Jazeera.

Comments

[=0=]

I wonder what the insurance profile looks like for a Blackwater employee, and if adjusters have a method of looking at the delta on evolving tactics.

[adam]

John,

I know that we're not meant to use Vietnam analogies (Whats the difference between Iraq and Vietnam? Bush had a plan for getting his ass out of Vietnam) but this doesn't half look like the Ap Bac ambush. Which isn't good.

To run that kind of multiple ambushes requires pretty good intelligence, spotters, multiple teams (we know of at least 2 machineguns beign used), and immense personal courage. Bear in mind that they did this close enough to regular US troops that these were the first to break through, but only after the ambushers retreated.

I'm also quite interested that a "Little Bird" - even a cheap and cheerful field expedient version - was shot down. IIRC this is a significant development as usually they're small and fast enough to avoid fire. Certainly none went down during the "Black Hawk Down" incident when quite a lot of very enthusiastic people were shooting at them.

"The surge" looks like its going to be very exciting to watch. Preferably from a distance.

[rmiller]

looks like the surge might get turned into a "sunday go to meetin' breakfast" for the insurgency, with an extra side of blackwater fries.

[Z]

Two vital questions;
1) to what degree does the U.S. occupation/couter-insurgency depend on contractors? Can they make do without if need be?
2) What kind of casualties do the insurgents need to inflict to make contractor use prohibitively expensive?

Bear in mind that the morale degradation factor does not seem to exist so much, since the U.S. public is not overly concerned about "mercenaries" (even though many are veterans"
Thanx,
Z

[John Robb]

Z,

Contractors in aggregate total well over 100,000 people. They provide much of the support in theater. In terms of PMCs, the number is closer to 20,000. They provide security to everything from hotels to engineers to diplomats...

It already is expensive to employ them. Overall, 30-40% of every dollar spent on reconstruction in Iraq was/is sucked up by private security costs. Attacks like this maintain that percentage at the top of the range.

[Z]

Thanx John, for the info.

Launching a draining economic assault on the occupying power may be effective. But I see two drawbacks;
1) The U.S. has a lot of money (or at least can borrow a lot) and as long as the price is right, contractors will come to Iraq. The U.S. government is not run like a business, so even if contracting is expensive they will pay the price.
2) Casualties among contractors seem to largely pass unnoticed in the U.S. This, combined with 1) may even make this the prefered mode.

So the question is weather the insurgents see their best chance at driving out the americans out is by econimicly draining them (in which case spend resources targeting contractors), or by reducing morale of the U.S. public (keep GI casualties high)

[adam]

Z,

I agree with your points but I'd like to make the point about PMCs that they failed to deliver their target.

Bush's first Iraq budget of $87bn had 30% earmarked for security (meaning PMCs). Thats certainly enough money to set up a pretty good industry right there. As a result a whole load of people flooded into what was effectively a new California gold rush. Some companies, like Custer-Battles didn't particularly exist prior to receiving their contracts for Iraq and they got the contract for protecting Bagdhad airport. They created the entire thing from scratch in 14 days. I think we can all agree that there's nothing as comforting as the ring of solid professionalism. Apparently their "bomb-sniffing dog" refused to go near cars, so people more or less assume that it was just someones pet. Custer-Battles would later be slapped on the wrist for this, but it still meant that critical parts of Iraqs infrastructure were in the hands of Dell and Rodney.

Others were more competant, but by their actions were really awkward for US policies. Contractors hired to protect VIPs took that to mean that shooting Iraqi cars (and Iraqis) full of holes if they "felt threatened" was a good thing to do. PMCs were outside both US and Iraqi law so there was no reason not to bump off people left and right. As a result it soon became clear tbat the PMCs were themselves both a part and a cause of the increasing anarchy in Iraq. But the US military couldn't do anything about this Frankensteins monster.

Despite this cash and the PMCs "skills" nothing actually got built. A 'perfect storm' combination of US incompetance, neo-con economic theorising and the growing insurgency stopped the remaining $50bn or so being of any use at all. In short the PMCs failed to deliver and the money was wasted.

You are quite right that PMC casualties have been very heavy (far more so than the relatively light US casualties 3k dead, 47k wounded) and are massively under-reported; dozens of troops from places like Fiji or Peru have been bumped off.

Actually its been quite amusing watching globalisation and outsourcing occur in the mercenary world - to the shock and distress of Western soldiers.

First hired were former elite Western soldiers and then standard Western soldiers but they were too expensive and PMCs found that third-world squaddies were just as good and a lot cheaper. A Western soldier got paid around $500 a day, a Peruvian gets $100. Of course the US government doesn't get charged any less for these troops so its all profit.

Which brings us to the next point - a number of Western trained PMC-veterans have gone on to Africa as "Security Consultants", leaving the cheap and badly trained PMC soldiers in Iraq.

Actually you'll notice the one thing missing here is the Iraqis. Outside of translation the Iraqis didn't get into the PMC lark. Which meant that unemployment remained high.

[french swede the rootless vegetable]

Yes, Uncle Sam has the cash; but the people are only willing to let him spend the small change, not the big bills, As John Robb wrote (http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2006/08/playing_at_war.html):

"Marginal placement within national priorities: Militaries are increasingly professional (with a trend towards the use of mercenaries) and conscription has become impossible. This drastically limits the number of soldiers that can be applied to any conflict. In addition, to retain competitive positioning on the global stage, states and their economies are operated as if war is not going on. To wit: military budgets are considered just another line item on a more complex national budget. Gone are the days of massive mobilization and economic restructuring for war."

Only the relative rate of attrition matters. My opinion is conventional, that only massive democide can increase the insurgent's rate above that of the US'.

Economic vs morale attrition are not mutually exclusive, as this incident proves. Kill enough (US) PMC in one go so it gets mediatic attention, and you also have a morale effect.
Soldiers do and die. When they bite the bullet, it doesn't go against expectations.
Mercs are like jackals, they take almost none the risks of the hunt but they get most of the spoils of the killing. They're not supposed to buy the farm; hence the (disproportionate, since it was a first) moral impact of a "Fallujah".

I think this incident is a harbinger of more to come, and they will increase in scale ("scale-free networks can upgrade with little transaction costs").If and when they reach battalion level, the occupation forces will have for practical purposes been routed on the battlefield .

[lopezp]

The problem I have with mercanaries is that they have no vested interest in peace. See the 30 years war as an example