AL QAEDA REDUX

In leaks to reporters, intelligence officers voiced concern that al Qaeda's leadership has reconstituted in Pakistan's Waziristan tribal areas. This area is now considered a temporary autonomous zone (TAZ) due to a truce that Pakistan signed with local leaders (and by extension the Taliban) last year (see "Our Man in Pakistan" for more on the details).

The initial destruction of al Qaeda's hierarchical organization in Afghanistan drastically reduced the ability of the organization to design, develop, and launch global attacks. In effect, it was reduced to media messaging to catalyze organic growth of groups that would launch attacks locally. This has been relatively successful (London / Madrid / Egypt / Thailand / Pakistan / Saudi Arabia and, of course, Iraq), but it has damaged the groups ability to mount a spectacular global attack that gained it so much initial success -- in that it both incented US overreaction in Iraq and catapulted their organization into a global setting.

Here is what this means

The development of the TAZ in Waziristan and the reconstitution of a semblance of al Qaeda's previous organization means that larger attacks can and will be launched. These attacks will come in two forms, based on an analysis of al Qaeda's evolving strategy. The first type, reflects the recognition by al Qaeda that systems disruption has been extremely effective in Iraq. These attacks will likely be against the global oil system -- although rather than take the many small attacks approach used so successfully over the last three years, it will probably be focused on large events like the attempt on Abqaiq in early 2006. The second type might be another symbolic attack against the US like 9/11. With all indications that the US is in withdrawal, a new attack is likely needed to propel the US back into aggressive action (see "Al Qaeda's Grand Strategy: Superpower Baiting" for more on why).

See: "Al Qaeda Chiefs Are Seen to Regain Power" Mark Mazzetti and David Rohde, The New York Times, February 18. 2007 for the original leaked information.

PS>Extra credit: what happens when the "doughnut" network described in this exploration of al Qaeda's structure refills its "hole."

Comments

[waterboy]

Is the hole a hole? I mean - isn't this a fractal/iterative network, isn't the network sustained by the use of other connectors? Look at what happened in Iraq with Zarqawi. Al-Q leadership couldn't control him, couldn't get him to stop damaging the cause with fitna by pursuing the Shi'a. He was a connector in the Iraqi insurgent network, and with Al-Q leadership's presence reduced by the need to regroup outside Afghanistan he became the dominant node in that theatre. When Al-Q leadership decided it wanted back in, they couldn't get the same connectivity back.

Compare also what's gone on in the UK. The bombers there may have had some assistance from outside, but you had the same pattern within the groups. When one of the 21/7 bombers got cold feet, there were two (if I remember the numbers right) connectors who called him all night trying to keep him focused on the mission. I seem to remember there being similar dynamics in the 9/11 crews in the days before the attacks, though I don't recall the details off the cuff.

Anyway, just a thought.

[waterboy]

Is the hole a hole? I mean - isn't this a fractal/iterative network, isn't the network sustained by the use of other connectors? Look at what happened in Iraq with Zarqawi. Al-Q leadership couldn't control him, couldn't get him to stop damaging the cause with fitna by pursuing the Shi'a. He was a connector in the Iraqi insurgent network, and with Al-Q leadership's presence reduced by the need to regroup outside Afghanistan he became the dominant node in that theatre. When Al-Q leadership decided it wanted back in, they couldn't get the same connectivity back.

Compare also what's gone on in the UK. The bombers there may have had some assistance from outside, but you had the same pattern within the groups. When one of the 21/7 bombers got cold feet, there were two (if I remember the numbers right) connectors who called him all night trying to keep him focused on the mission. I seem to remember there being similar dynamics in the 9/11 crews in the days before the attacks, though I don't recall the details off the cuff.

Anyway, just a thought.

[jesus reyes]

This is beside the point, but do reporters not know anything unless it is leaked to them by the administration. Musharaf signed the peace treaty with the Taliban last September to reflect a reality probably as old as last May of June and this story has been all over the net during this entire period. Since this story is six months old why does it need to be "leaked" now?

[John Robb]

Jesus, while the emergence of a TAZ in Waziristan was known, the ability to al Qaeda's leadership to use it to reconstitute wasn't. That was purely speculation by people like me until the camps were identified.

[striplingmitch]

I think the thinking is that there is a core that is precisely made of those connectors you're describing, Matt--the idea being that the most popular hubs in the network were taken out after 9/11, thus leaving the "core" empty (Hence the doughnut hole analogy).

In a scale-free, "rich get richer" environment, the biggest hubs do form a kind of core to the network, although decentralized.

Of course, for the network to reconstitue, there have to be new popular hubs, or (in this case) hubs that have grown connections while the network has been without a physical base.

Because of how quickly these camps have sprung up, I wonder if history will show that the 'virtual sanctuaries' in use over the last few years were more robust and extensive than has been discussed. That would have allowed the germination of new hubs and connections which could have been migrated to the physical plane, instead of grown there from scratch.