THE BAZAAR OF VIOLENCE GOES GLOBAL

Prior to 2002, al Qaeda had the planning/support infrastructure to run tightly controlled global operations on a sporadic basis. That capability was greatly diminished with invasion of Aghanistan and has only recently shown signs of returning due to instability in Pakistan. In the interim, al Qaeda was able to use its directed network to generate global terrorist attacks through the use of communities (see the brief "Emergent Communities Dedicated to War" for more) that have spontaneously emerged to contribute to the movement's plausible promise (an animating narrative, given substance through events, that spurs groups to form and act).

In parallel to this, guerrilla groups in Iraq and Afghanistan have made significant progress using a more commercial model of entrepreneurship that makes money from "black globalization" and uses this funding to outsource attacks (see the brief "The IED Marketplace in Iraq" for a great example of this). The benefits of this commercial model are substantial since it is:

• self-sustaining (particularly in terms of ongoing funding),
• vastly expands the available pool of participants/skills/resources (particularly in poor countries),
• safer (little upfront exposure and an ability to cut off contact),
• and faster (doesn't require spontaneous group formation or lengthy planning).

The Bazaar in India

The is increasing evidence that this commercial model has made its way to India. Siddharth Srivastava (writing for the Asia Times) quotes a senior official of the Indian Intelligence Bureau in regards to recent attacks in Mumbai, Delhi, Beneras, and Samjhauta:

"The attackers are paid a handsome sum of money as well as ensured that he/she need not dies in the process of the attack. It is a win/win situation. In the past, diehard Afghan mercenaries or trained Pakistani nationals orchestrated the attacks from across the border. Now, there has been a shift in strategy."

The limitation of this approach is that large scale attacks (like 9/11 and other large assaults on symbolic targets) are not possible using this approach since the requisite planning and mass martyrdom isn't purchasable (small scale martyrdom can be purchased). This leaves attacks on soft targets such as public gathering places and systems. So far, most of the attacks accomplished appear to be a combination of both. However, as this method evolves, we can expect to see the focus shift towards systems targets, since attacks on systemspunkts (definition) would yield much greater returns on investment (see examples of ROIs in Iraq) and classic terrorism begins to demonstrate diminishing returns (see the brief "Terrorist Death March" for why classic terrorism produces negative ROIs over time).

Global Implications

Eventually, given the success of this method in Iraq, India, and Afghanistan, al Qaeda will begin to employ it in other locations. This would mean:

• A large increase in the tempo and breadth of attacks since more global locations could be reached in a shorter time than previously.
• An ability to expand the scope of operations beyond nations with Islamic populations. This is particularly interesting in regards to calls by al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia to disrupt oil systems in Mexico (where it may find willing allies from the participants in the current drug wars) and other locales.
• A potential to create home grown terrorist groups, unrest, etc. (including some that could become future collaborators) in target states in response to provocative attacks on social fault lines.

Comments

[arash sotoodeh]

Well people still believe US is fighting terror in Iraq, well so they can dream on that the politicians will fix it... But I think your post John explains, why Iraq is just a lab for the terrorists for producing new effective methods... Arash Sotoodeh

[Meelar]

Very interesting post, but I wanted to ask a quick question--why do you emphasize this hard boundary between systems targets and public gatherings? I think that you could argue that, say, Times Square is a system (for delivering entertainment and generating social cohesion and capital) just as much as a power plant (for delivering electricity)--I'm not sure I see the distinction.

[sammy small]

I suppose anyone with the money can buy disruption of another's systems via a system point attack. And since this hasn't been a problem for the last couple of centuries, systems have not always been designed with robust Fail Operational/Fail Safe conditions in mind. That will have to change.

But as the intertwined global marketplace continues to expand, attacking another's systems will likely cause negative effects elsewhere as well. Why would someone "sh*t in their own nest". Taken to its limit, it sounds more like global level anarchy.

[PapaBear]

The key words here may be "The attackers are paid a handsome sum of money"

If the world (particularly the US) starts treating all those who contribute finances to terrorists as legitimate military targets, without regard as to where they are, or how prominent they are, then perhaps we could start to get a handle on this

[sammy small]

John,

You talk about a "swarm of small insults" in your Systempunkt description, but I haven't heard of much coordinated follow-up on any of these type of point attacks in the news. Without this, point attacks become more of a nuisance rather than system cratering potential.

After 9/11, when the airlines industry began to creep back to life two weeks later, the follow-up attack was nowhere to be seen. They missed a great opportunity to inflict massive financial damage on the U.S. and instead had tunnel vision for just the WTC shock impact. As it was, the airlines lost billions.

But had just three jihadis with MANPADs, two weeks after 9/11, simultaneously shot down airliners from different cities, the airline industry would have totally collapsed in the U.S.

I don't think they have yet mastered the art of strategic thinking.

[John Robb]

Sammy, not at the global level yet. In Iraq, small and ongoing attacks have worked as advertised on the electrical and oil networks.

[pm2075]

'This is particularly interesting in regards to calls by al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia to disrupt oil systems in Mexico'

Hmm, i guess they ARE really looking at Mexico. All i can say is stunning! If it is indeed true!

It would be a logical choice. If you had Canada or Mexico to launch, choosing the lower barrier to accomplishment would be the latter. Corruption and poverty are still having a bad effect on the infrastructure security of potential targets. Just an opinion.

yhoo search "invest_mavin"

[gmoke]

MS-13 anyone?

[londamium]

Sammy

You do have a wonderfully short memory.

There was an attempt at a "follow-up" to 9/11 - shoe-bomber Richard Reid, having done the hard part of getting the explosives on board the plane, was just incompetent when it came to the execution; Sajid Badat, who was tasked to do the same, lost his bottle and backed out - he's now doing time as well. This happened a couple of months after 9/11 - just as the airlines were regaining their composure.

In 2002 there was an attempt to shoot an Israeli charter plane down with a Manpad in Mombasa. Overall, however, it would appear that the number of Manpads available to AQ or similar groups remains low.

Whilst not strictly in the narrow purview of Al Qaeda vs the US, Chechen separatists managed to down 2 Russian passenger craft by infiltrating "black widows" with bombs on to planes in, IIRC, 2005.

[pm2075]

Making money from black globalization...

It maybe be long overdue but the one thing that the administration can do is to give the ownership of oile fields back to the people. So long as the U.S. holds any piece of control the siphoning of fuel to be sold for ARMS is going to continue. At least from the outset, Iraqies look like they do not have the economic incentive to not procure such acts. They may have a political incentive in being part of the new constitution or government policies but economic, in this area, it remains to be seen
or at the very least one can say they're prevented from having one.

thoo/goog search "invest_mavin"

[sammy small]

londamium

Oh I remember those well, but they were really disconnected from 9/11 in a strategic way.

9/11 caused the loss of tens of billions of dollars just in the airline industry alone. The U.S. had declared that increased passenger screening and terminal security would allow airline travel to be relative safe again.

Now imagine how easy it would be to use the multiple shootdown of several airliners on the same morning as a crushing blow to American's confidence to use air travel at all. It would have been like 9/11 was the jab and downing a few airliners the right cross to put them down.

It could still happen, but wouldn't have the total staggering effect it would have then.

[pm2075]

Business is War!

http://www.orlandosentinel.com/business/sns-ap-terrorism-bananas,0,3173673.story?track=rss

[french swede the rootless vegetable]

Don't wanna pick nit, pm2075, but Smedley Butler's quote is "War is a racket"(;..

[adam]

:-D Well if we're playing quoteables....

The problem in defense is how far you can go without destroying from within what you are trying to defend from without.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

History teaches that war begins when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap.

- Ronald Reagan

Who would have thought that 2 such under-rated presidents would have said such wise things in the light of today? Of course Reagan didn't think it would apply to the US, whilst Eisenhower did.

[Tom Lord]

adam: History teaches that war begins when organizations with the capacity to wage it believe the price of agression is the best use of their capital. -- me