JOURNAL: The Negative Proof for the Surge

The ongoing US counter-insurgency effort in Baghdad, and Iraq in general, is (no surprise) operating without any meaningful milestones for success. As a result, it can go on indefinitely (since an "success" is always around the corner). However, it's possible to view this week's combination of attacks -- one on Iraqi legislators in the Green Zone and the destruction of the Sarafiya bridge -- as significant enough to provide a negative proof of the efficacy of the new US counter-insurgency efforts in Iraq. NOTE: A negative proof, or impossibility proof, is a way to show that a complex problem cannot be solved and that efforts to claim otherwise are false and misleading. Here's why:

• The US is unable to clear and hold territory. Even the most secure areas are vulnerable to insurgent attacks.
• Systems that underly normal societal function, even those under heavy guard/control, can and will be disrupted well into the future -- which will prevent any meaningful recovery.
• Any and all political solutions, even if they do occur, will not have any resonance since the participants lack any meaningful legitimacy. The participants cannot survive even within the US security bubble.

Comments

[Scout006]

John,

It seems you are quickly grasping for "conclusions" based on a few incidents. First control of area has never equated to 100% security (look at the U.S.). Second, having the U.S. clear and hold territory was never the strategy! Gen Petraeus stated that if the Iraqis (not the U.S.) don't step up to the plate, then the security plan won't work. The suicide bombers that hit the green zone penetrated (probably infiltrated) Iraqi security, not U.S.. As you stated that is a grave sign, but it is too early to see if the Iraqis will fix their security flaws, or continue business as normal.

Of course any system can be disrupted, it is impossible to defend all the nodes and links of most, but assuming they will "forever" be disrupted is a stretch. There are insurgent movements in a number of countries, and the disruption of systems is manageable (still painful) in "most" cases. In Iraq it goes back to the Iraqis have to step up to the plate. That means the average Iraqi citizen must be a sensor and have the will and capability to report suspicious activity. This is how a lot of crime in the U.S. is interdicted. If the local populace is indifferent, thus providing tacit support to the insurgents, then it is very hard to control anything.

Unfortunately you're probably right about the inability to reach a political solution (which is the only solution to the other problems you listed), but history could be on our side. The Islamic Extremists have a long history of stepping past acceptable boundaries of behavior, which is why most of their armed uprisings in the past have failed. In short their behavior pushed the population to support the government, because it was the lesser of two evils (sort of like our political system, what idiot do you want to put in office?).

[Cavolonero]

A ' hollow ' Iraq state ( as in the above post ) is just as much in our interest as a hollow Lebanon is to Hizbulla.

[adam]

Scout006,

I think you might being a little unfair to John. The Surge is now well into its second month, and is scheduled to be determined as success or failure by June. We're at the half-way mark. Its certainly an appropriate moment to look at the facts and a strong argument is made by John that the surge failed (if - as John points out - it ever had a basis for success beyond neo-con la-la-land).

I'll say that the surges success or failure doesn't mean that the multiple insurgencies in Iraq can be ended in a few months - thats the work of decades. Those US troops currently in Iraq will be back again a few more times before its done. The far simpler operations in Northern Ireland took the British Army 30 years to complete. Unless the next president shrugs and walks away from Iraq US troops can expect to be there for the rest of their careers.

You'll note that this idea of 'the Iraqis will fix their security' has been around since before the Invasion. By this stage its just a silly thing to hope for. Apparently if the Iraqis spoke English and were just a little more subservient to the Americans Iraq'd be a happy unified place just like England. I'll pause there for a moment.... Yep. The US military, the most expensive military force on Earth, is needing help from some 3rd World nationals or its all over. US taxpayers might well ask what they're paying for.

Quite why Iraqis will suddenly start helping American soldiers because of The Surge is not explained. I do adore the phrase "being a sensor" - its one I intend to nick, as its more than vaguely reminiscent of Isherwoods "I am a Camera" with, at the same time, wonderfully sinister overtones of dominance and control - I am a Camera, You are a Sensor. I am In Charge...) . The reality is that well over 80% of the Sunnis are actively supporting the insurgency; the last elections saw nearly 75% of Iraqis vote for parties (including the largest party in the current government, the UIA) that were explicitly demanding the end of the US occupation. One of these parties, the Sadrists, the ones the US are currently working against, were able to mobilise a million people (over 5% of the estimated population - equal to 10 million Americans) on the 9th of April to demand an end to the occupation. The Iraqis agree on nothing except they all want the US out, so why would an individual Iraqi help an American?

This situation is exacerbated as Iraqis know full well that the US can't be bothered to give protection (at the very least US passports) to its own Iraqi interpreters. No end of them have wound up in Jordan with their families, fleeing someones death list. Eventually the money will run out and they'll all go back to Iraq. The odds are high that they'll be found and executed.

If the Americans cannot be bothered to help their most direct Iraqi supporters what help do you think the US will give to an informer? None whatsoever. If the informer stays in the country the US cannot stop the informer and his family getting an electric drill through the back of the head. Thats not a particularly good incentive scheme.

Oh and in passing Iraqis don't step up to plates - baseball is an American game and its an interesting verbal insight into quite why the US military is having these problems of cultural fit. It segues quite nicely into your perfectly valid point about the Islamic Extremists - In Algeria they did overstep the mark, less so in other nations. The successful Islamic Groups (Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Palastine) have been specifically anti-Colonial or against an occupation of their lands by a foreign power, the failures (to date Algeria, Egypt, Saudi) are normally against a government that can claim some civil legitimacy. Its the civil legitimacy that enables the goverment to gather support from people, something which John mentions above. In Iraq the Iraqis get the positives, and none of the negatives, and no amount of Surges by America can change that.

[JDubbs]

Adam
"Americans cannot be bothered to help their most direct Iraqi supporters?"
OR
Unable to protect them?

What's the old addage of counterinsurgency?

"we, the government, can protect you from the guerrillas, but the guerrillas cannot protect you from us, and you are going to have to choose."

[adam]

JDobbs,

"we, the government, can protect you from the guerrillas, but the guerrillas cannot protect you from us, and you are going to have to choose."

Thats the 2003-4 US strategy in Fallujah. It failed. The depressing reality is that when large percentages of the population want the government gone, and are willing to use armed force to see it happen, its over for that government.

It gets better, in Iraq the government troops are the guerillas. The US military never managed to train an Iraqi Army, they actually trained a whole bunch of separate militias that just happen to wear more or less the same clothing. Actually having soldiers loyal to the Iraqi government was on the US wish list, but they didn't do anything to actually have it occur. One of the interesting things about consequences is that you usually have to do something to get them to occur.

As for the interpreters they didn't get a US passport after helping the Americans or the right to stay in the US as a refugee. That'd be the minimal level of support they need. Anything less than that at this stage is a death sentence - from the insurgents, not the US.