CONVERSATION: TX Hammes on Catastrophic Superempowerment

Had a great, albeit brief, conversation with TX Hammes (author of the excellent, The Sling and the Stone), on Sunday afternoon. The occasion was that he had just finished reading Brave New War (he liked it) and wanted to compare notes on long term scenarios.

To quickly summarize the conversation: we both agreed that the trend towards catastrophic superempowerment was correct. This means the productivity of small group warfare would continue to increase. The assumption is that eventually the correct technology for weapons of mass destruction (acquired, developed and deployed by terrorist groups) would be found. That's not likely to be nuclear weapons, despite the hype (sorry William!). Instead, it is likely to be bioweapons -- which I believe will be due to the fact that the underlying processes of the technology fit hand in glove with how small group warfare in the 21st Century operates (a couple of nights before this conversation, I had a confirmatory discussion with a very sharp molecular biologist on the same topic).

In conclusion, TX was heartened by recent changes he saw in how the Feds were gearing up for attacks by biotech weapons and pandemics. I am, of course, less sanguine on the ability of the DHS bureaucracy to keep up with the future given the dynamics of how these weapons will be produced. Further, even if we were prepared as TX hopes we will be, we both see a strong possibility that even a mildly successful biotech attack could seriously slow globalization due to massive border clampdown by the US -- a futile act, since future attackers (unfortunate, but true) are as likely to be Americans as anyone else.

Parting shot: we have a window of opportunity today to get a solution into place that can handle a variety of systems shocks. My belief is that this solution starts with resilient communities.

Comments

[dcunited2003]

One thing that Katrina showed us is what would happen if a major city's systems are shocked. It took days for the help operations to get underway, mostly because the local governments were waiting on the central "Cathedral" government to send help. The centralized response method works well when there is one catastrophe, but when two (or more) strike, the limited resources must be prioritized, even to the point of sacrificing one group in need for another. In the case of Katrina, many residence of Mississippi were sacrificed for the initial assistance of New Orleans. It was a political decision, mostly, but even if it was a completely sound choice, people were still left without assistance. A centralized support system is efficient and works well under normal circumstances, it can even quickly respond to one issue, using the resources of other, healthy parts. What it can not do is respond to multiple disruptions, particularly ones that break down the ability of the central agency to respond.

The resources of a centralized response team are limited and sent to either the place of most perceived need or of political clout. Either way, if two shocks were to happen simultaneously, particularly in different parts of the country, it is inevitable that one group would be sacrificed for the needs of another. Resilient communities are really the only way to provide the basic necessities while waiting for the centralized response to appear.

[joep]

Thanks for your always interesting blog. As soon as I've finished my thesis, I'll read your book for a break.

Could you digress some more on the solution you propose, the 'resilient communities'? This phrase seems perhaps too abstract for direct application. What could this resiliency consist of in a material or immaterial way?

[TheDreamer]

I've always been fascinated by the idea of resilient communities.

I've imagined them best in the form of a town, just for conceptual ease. Every house is coated in solar panels or that photovolatic nanopaste i've heard mumblings of. Meanwhile the shortage is offset by a set of wind turbines. This would effectively make every house and community a power exporting node as opposed to a weak receiving point on the grid. Interestingly, if you do this everywhere the likely outcome is an abundance of effectively free energy.

Also the communities should all switch to high efficiency light bulbs, which will cut the town's collective usage by at least a 3rd, making the target power production a lot easier to reach in any case.

On top of this, another idea I've had is for towns to support a new town common, where the town either through collective labor or employs (or more likely a combination of both) a town farmer/live stock raiser/food production dude. This guy's job is to make sure the town can last on its own for 2 years at any given time. This not only will result in a larger variety of food in times of calm (cheeses from all different places will all be different, for example), but if a hurricane rolls through things would be more OK. On top of this, every town would need a granary, preferably a few stories below ground which also would serve as a local command post. And if you really want to get resilient the town can maintain an armory down there to protect from bandits or fascists. As well as a large water reserve and beds for the community.

And the last idea is the resurgence of the public transport, even if we just rebuilt the trolley system as it was before GM destroyed it, well, back then the American trolley system was considered the best in the world, again not defendant on oil/gas but utilizing this system of sustainable energy.

[dcunited2003]

Personally, I see the resilient community as, first and foremost, setup to handle the immediate survival, not a completely self-contained unit. Two years of food for a town is practically unheard of, except for drought, I can not see its usefulness. Most disasters that would require that amount of stored food would most likely render it useless (flood, invasion, nuclear disaster). Secondly, I see it as a collection of individuals, not a government system. The bazaar philosophy is that I do what I need to survive and I can leverage off what you have, not a top-down approach. I have corn, you have beef, I will trade some corn for your beef to get me through this peril. The community comes together in an ad-hoc method in the time of need, not a full-time operation. Unless, of course, the shocks come along with such regularity that they are no longer unexpected but the norm.

[Joshua]

My local B&N is finally carrying Brave New War, so I picked it up today and hope to be able to read it this week.

Re: catastrophic superempowerment - I wonder how far that will go. On one hand, I'm still skeptical that someday one man can really declare war on the world and win, if only because once this is demonstrated to be possible, that one man is likely to get untold thousands of competitors looking to do the same thing. (Then again, for all I know your book sheds more light on this scenario. I guess I'll find out soon enough.)

On the other hand, if small terrorist groups and lone wolves can someday acquire and use WMDs, so can common criminals, street gangs and organizations on the fringes of the law. (Think NAMBLA with nukes.) In the latter case, WMDs or even mere dirty bombs would be more useful as a deterrent against law enforcement than as an offensive terror weapon.

[Bill Moore]

Maybe another angle on the resilient community is community that is more decentralized, so an event that impacts city A won't severly disrupt city B. I wonder if another angle is the systems themselves, think back to the Great Blackout in the late 1960s in the NE. Shouldn't we have resilient systems for power, telecommunications, (self healing or redundant)? Definitely an interesting and important topic, as pointed out by dcunited above on how easy it is to overwhelm a centralized response system.

[Duncan Kinder]

John Robb:

"Instead, it is likely to be bioweapons due to the fact that the underlying processes of the technology fit hand in glove with how small group warfare in the 21st Century operates (a couple of nights before this conversation, I had a confirmatory discussion with a very sharp molecular biologist on the same topic)."

There's some sort of convergence going on here. Compare John's above statement with Patrick Lang's:

"In accordance with the principles of "Chaos Theory" as elucidated in "Jurassic Park," it proved impossible to fully control the outcome in a system as complex as the multiplicity of faction and conspiracies that is Lebanese public life. In other words, some of the "dinosaurs" escaped and started acting like dinosaurs instead of convenient "tools" in the game against the "opposition.""
http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2007/06/lebanese_mischi.html#comments

[dryki]

Biowarfare - like the current Farm Bill that aims to overrule all local and state ability to prevent GMOs. Seeds destroyed.

On the resilience side, Homer-Dixon's work, "The Upside of Down" addresses what it takes to make a catastrophe in a maxed out environment. If all it takes a is a branch falling on a power line to take out half a continent's grid, what about someone with a chain saw pissed off at the electrical company? Or a farmer pissed off about losing her seeds? Our economic system destroys itself.

[dano]

One day in late 2005 I had a long talk with the author of the novel The Jihad Virus. Yes, it's just a novel, but Tom Hopp has a PhD in genetic engineering and made a bundle when he sold his company and all his patents to a bigger biotech firm. He convinced me that with just a few of the right people - well-trained mainly, and either committed or well-funded as well - a very effective bioattack would be fairly easy to pull off. It's just a matter of time.

http://www.amazon.com/Jihad-Virus-Novel-Thomas-Hopp/dp/0595316239/ref=sr_1_1/105-4698317-5827663?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1181020294&sr=1-1

A fair number of other smart and strategic-thinking people I talk to believe the same.

[adam]

John,

Great news about Hammes. I rather like the Sling and the Stone.

Just a random thought: Why are we only worried about bioweapons attacking people? The most obvious target for a bioweapon is agriculture. Its just about as easy to destroy, say, a grain monoculture as target a disease at caucasians. There are massive advantages in the attack - certainly grain does not wander down to A & E, or call a doctor when its feeling unhappy.

If we want an example of how things can go pear-shaped quickly in agriculture worldwide lets look at the bees.

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/03/02/colony_collapse_disorder/
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/04/26/taiwan_bee_mystery/
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/04/27/ccd_fungus_link/

Bees are vital agicultural implements but now being wiped out by a mysterious ailment. And the result from the media and government? Well, lets just say that Anna Nicole Smith or Paris Hilton are far more important. They have breasts and bees don't.

So what does this mean for a bioweapon attack? Well if a whole bunch of people somewhere else die of something, life goes on, its just a news item, who cares? The Anthrax attack in the US, at the heart of the US government. No clue whatsoever who did it. Its as if no one important enough to care about was dead. And that is the definition of a successful bioweapons attack.

On the other hand if three meals are missed - or if people think that its likely to happen - then that's pretty much it for a civilised nation. Food riots and collapse of the civil government starts from there.

[joep]

Thanks for your thoughts on what could constitute a resilient communities. I think the raised issues are worth working to, but I'd like to add that the word 'community' helps to mystify other options. I'd rather think of a resilient society. Communal thinking is, as important as it is, leading attention away from the infrastructures and technologies we consider part of what to defend.

We ought to make our technologies as resilient as possible, that means, less vulnerable to attack. Therefore, the sewers, electricity lines, and the like should be getting more and more connected, so that when one element fails, others can jump into it. A too strong reliance on the resilience of a local community is, without downplaying its relevance, too little to prevent our systems to disrupt.

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