Global Guerrillas

JOURNAL: VBIEDs in London

Two car bombs were found in London today prior to detonation (one in Haymarket and one near Trafalger Square). The interesting analysis is that while the desire to manufacture of car bombs has percolated to London (in this case, an amateur DIY fireball through the use of propane cylinders, gasoline and cell phone triggers), the operational technique is still underdeveloped and likely to remain so in the majority of instances (until certain preconditions are met). However, in this security environment, there doesn't need to be much of an explosion in order to prompt a considerable and expensive over-reaction. Of course, the really smart organic guerrillas cognizant of their limitations won't plan for show, they will plan for leveraged effect and repeatability (systems disruption).

NOTE: Interview

TCS contributor James Joyner recently interviewed John Robb of the Global Guerrillas blog on his new book Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization. Robb paints a picture of a resilient enemy that morphs into something new just as we develop ways to protect ourselves. He offers no quick fixes and argues that terrorists are the equivalent of computer viruses: A nasty reality of modern life that should cause us to take reasonable countermeasures but, mostly, something we just have to live with. Full text of interview.

JOURNAL: Decision Loop Test

The Petraeus team's attempt to try to (at least temporarily) change the game in Iraq's Anbar province by arming some tribes against the ISI (the loose Islamic State of Iraq) looks like it is already over. A significant failure in security allowed a suicide attack in the Mansour hotel lobby that killed key leaders (made critically important due to the imposed hierarchy deemed necessary to create a single Sunni "front") of the "Anbar Salvation Council." In parallel, there are rumors of bitter rivalry and that a tribal leader absconded with $75 m in US money given to fund militia development.

NETWORK EFFECTS

As anticipated, the much touted "surge," that promised to clear, hold and pacify Baghdad has succumbed to network effects (see the 2005 brief, "Clear and Hold?" which is as valid now as then). Essentially, Iraq's guerrillas destabilized the previous strategy by using essential connectivity to attack previously cleared areas. Unable to hold these areas put the Petraeus team on the horns of a dilemma, to either reinforce the Baghdad strategy by creating walled and garrisoned enclaves (which ran into political/media opposition, drove up the potential for an overrun of a US outpost, and posed a manpower challenge since Iraqi troops were insufficiently loyal to the government) or retake the offensive and go after the guerrilla networks.

The team chose the latter option. The result has been a surge in Baquba to tamp down guerrilla networks making some of the attacks, which as with previous experiences has proven to be of little efficacy since the networks evaporated when US troops arrived.

The Gaussian vs. the Paretian Strategist in Iraq

Here's an useful way of looking at the current situation that may yield additional insight. The classic clear and hold method (Baghdad) as well as enclave sweeps (Baquba) fall are part of a Gaussian strategy to dampen/slow/impair guerrilla activity in order to allow rebuilding to shift the curve of popular support in favor of the government and away from the guerrillas. The Gaussian strategy is also aimed at US domestic audiences, which would see a smoothing/slowing of numerical measures of violence as progress.

However, since the insurgency we face in Iraq is open source and not Maoist, this won't work. The opposition isn't seeking to shift popular support to an alternative form of national governance but to a hollow state (more due to emergent intelligence than group expectations). To accomplish this, the insurgency is using Paretian strategies that leverage network effects to amplify attacks that disrupt/fragment/destabilize Iraqi society -- essentially army of Davids experimenting, sharing innovations, and iterating towards a successful cascade of failure that topples Goliath.

Is this Asymmetric?

Probably not, since when we do adopt Paretian strategies of amplification, they often provide a pay-off that exceeds the cost in chaos. For example, the alliance with some Anbar tribes to force the insurgency into infighting is a point of light in otherwise dull strategic roadmap. So, if the use of the Paretian approach isn't completely an asymmetric advantage of an open source insurgency, why don't we use it more?

QUOTE: The hollow state problem

"We cannot build a state that has another state inside it, we cannot build an army that has armies inside it."
Nuri Kamal al-Maliki in Diwaniya during a June visit. Iraq is far from alone on this.

JOURNAL: Open Source War Settles in North America

Mexico's army, due to low salaries ($330 a month) and bad conditions/treatment, already suffers an 8-9% desertion rate -- these deserters are left unpunished due to an inability to pursue, prosecute, and imprison. That rate is is expected to radically increase as the war with narco-guerrillas in northern Mexico heats up. As a hint of what's to come, between 2000 and 2006 (the Vicente Fox administration), of the 4,890 soldiers assigned to Federal police duties, all but 10 deserted (according to IAPA journalist Maria Idalia Gomez).

A Fragmented Opposition

"The Zetas don't ask the Gulf cartel permission for anything anymore. They simply inform them of their activities, whenever they feel like it." US law enforcement official, under condition of anonymity to Alfredo Corchado of the Dallas Morning News.

In contrast to the depletion of the Mexico's military, its non-state opposition is expanding rapidly. The Zetas (originally formed by 50 Mexican special operators, some with US training, recruited by the Gulf Cartel as enforcers) has ballooned to a network of 2000 members, including recruits from Guatemalan counter-insurgency forces called the Kabiles. Also, compared to the low rates of investment by the Mexican military in its recruits, the Zetas (according to US intelligence estimates) spend 50% of their substantial smuggling earnings on training, recruitment, intelligence gathering, and computer software. As a result, its operations have expanded to 24 Mexican states. In Nuevo Laredo alone, a focal point of smuggling, an estimated 200 Zetas with a support system of 300 are in operation.

Another sign of Mexico's decay, has been the arrival of a new paramilitary group called La Gente Nueva ("the new people"). Apparently loyalist (although it could be that this group is more about protection of its cut of smuggling revenue than support for the government), this network is composed of current and former police officers seeking revenge against the Zetas for their slaughter of policemen.

QUOTE: Innovation and information sharing in Iraq's IED marketplace

"People are calling me all the time, asking for new ways to ..." Abdallah says, pressing down his right thumb on an imaginary remote control, and adds, "... Boom!" to TIME correspondents. A classic example of shared innovation in Iraq's open source war.

TIME's Bobby Ghosh has a great interview with an open source IED developer working for Sunni groups (read the whole thing). More:

Brigadier General Joe Ramirez Jr., deputy commanding general of the Combined Arms Training Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., said, "For every move we make, the enemy makes three ... The enemy changes techniques, tactics and procedures every two to three weeks."

"They are not going to defeat me with technology," he says. "If they want to get rid of IEDs, they have to kill me and everyone like me." If they don't, Abdallah is only going to get better at what he does, with deadly consequences for American soldiers.

NOTE: Slowing down

Going to slow down the posts to this weblog for the summer. Need to go out and make some money, solve complex problems, work with tremendous people, and have a criminal amount of fun doing it. Take care.

JOURNAL: Soldiers as Hostages

The group Islamic Jihad, operating out of Gaza, broke through Israel's heavily guarded border zone in attempt to take a soldier hostage on Sunday June 10th 2007. They were beaten back after a two hour fire-fight. This attack, as with many others like it against Israel and the US, are examples of how the role of soldiers have changed in 4th generation warfare. Key points to consider:

• The abduction of a soldier is a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the state -- via a demonstration that even it's guardians are at risk of becoming merely hostages. As a result, this can form the basis for a causus belli if the hostage takers cross borders.
• Western military tradition fanatically follows "a no soldier left behind" policy. It has also become a critical part of the implicit contract with soldiers in professional western militaries. The result of an abduction of a soldier can generate a large/protracted manhunt. In general, abductions of civilians have much less of an effect.
• Elevation of the status of the abductors. In the media/moral landscape of this war, the abduction of soldier puts the offending group on a level equivalent to the state. These actions also attempt to raise the status of captive group members to POW (prisoners of war) status -- in terms of the requirements for treatment, moral justification for actions, and prisoner exchange. Finally, it's a PR/media coup for the group taking the hostages, which improves their position relative to competitors.

JOURNAL: Global Guerrillas in Mexico

Mexico plays its militarization card and is judged the weaker party:

They are trying to create a climate of intimidation and fear... in order to gain operational advantages. If the residents of a rural town or urban neighborhood come to believe that the drug traffickers cannot be defeated, they will refuse to cooperate with the authorities and create a "social space" of support for the traffickers.

Genaro Garcia Luna, Mexico's secretary of public safety in a press conference covered by the LA Times.

Some other tidbits from Hector Tobar:

• The war claimed 20 people in 24 hours (as of Friday) across the country.
• The Gulf cartel and the Zetas are fragmenting into smaller, more violent groups (this will continue across the board).
• Classic military breakdown in the face of guerrilla pressure (3 officers and 16 soldiers were ordered detained in the shooting of a funeral party at a checkpoint).