JOURNAL: Open Source Infighting

The details are still sketchy, but by most accounts, there has been a bloody multi-week feud going on between groups within the Sunni open source insurgency in the Baghdad neighborhood of Amiriya. The neighborhood, ostensibly a temporary autonomous zone (TAZ) controlled by al Qaeda's Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) which has claimed it as part of an "emerging" virtual Caliphate, has been the site of numerous clashes between the ISI and the ex-military/Baathist groups: the 1920 Revolution Brigade and the Islamic Army.

While infighting between opposition insurgent groups is good news, the underlying dynamics paint a more complicated picture that is more of a function of the success of the insurgency to date rather than any inherent weakness. Several of the dynamics driving this are:

• The core plausible promise is breaking down. The underlying narrative that holds an open source insurgency is the plausible promise that the US can be ejected from Iraq. As this goal nears, most particularly due to the free-fall in political support for the war within the US, we will start to see groups jockey for power.
  
  
• Opposition to a fork in development. Open source insurgencies are prone to forks, in the sense that some groups may start to push the path of development into areas that many of the original participants are unwilling to agree with. So far, al Qaeda has been able to win the battles over forks in the development path by expanding the conflict beyond attacks on American troops to attacks on the emerging Iraqi army, Shiite civilians, and most recently Kurdish civilians/government. Disputes over the path of the development can erupt into open conflict, as we have seen here.
  
  
• De-escalation and the effectiveness of the surge. Throughout most of the fighting in Amiriya, the US army was urged not to intervene. The obvious reason is that if they did the groups would quickly forget their dispute and join together again to fight the American troops. This points to value of de-escalation when fighting open source insurgencies (something I pointed to back in 2005). It also implies that the Baghdad surge has not been effective in controlling restive neighborhoods, in that the guerrilla groups felt secure enough to fight each other rather than US troops. Some reasons for this may be that the expansion of the conflict to Shiite groups (particularly the Mahdi army) and the current hostage dramas have succeeded in distracting Baghdad's generals from its core mission.

Sorry, this brief is a quick note that contains lots of terms and concepts that may be unfamiliar to new readers. For deep background on this in an easy to read format get my book, "Brave New War."

Comments

[Duncan Kinder]

For another viewpoint, apparently on the same, subject, goto Douglas Farah's post, "A Potential Glimmer of Hope in Iraq."

According to Farah:

quote:
The most important is the apparent new willingness of Sunni groups to confront al Qaeda without U.S. assistance.

The reports of fighting in western Baghdad between Sunni groups and al Qaeda-linked groups, as well as a turn against al Qaeda by some of the tribal leaders in Anbar province show that the jihadist inability to compromise on any issue, while a great motivating factor and recruitment tool, cuts both ways.

Eventually, one kills to many of one’s own, alienating many potential allies.
:end_of_quote

http://www.douglasfarah.com/article/208/a-potential-glimmer-of-hope-in-iraq.com

[Bill Moore]

I have a foot in both camps on this one. The different elements were fighting one another since 2003 (actually prior to entry into the party), so it isn't necessarily a sign that they're doing it because they're not worried about the U.S. military, but rather they're fighting for dominate terrain, which is the support (coerced or not) of a population base. I agree with John that if U.S. forces put a U.S. face on it, we do run the risk of bringing the groups together, which may actually be the underlying strategy of the fighting to begin with (drag the U.S. into the fight). Still, there is a good news story here, and that is the Iraqi people are rising up against Al Qaeda throughout Iraq. I wouldn't read into that as support for the central government or the coalition, but at least we may not leave a new safe haven for AQ when it is all said and done.

[adam]

Duncan,

Its been a long day. And for that matter a long night. Even so, I kind of feel guilty about this but has anyone gently explained to Douglas Farah that the FMLN more or less won their war? The El Salvadorean Junta is gone. FMLN are elected these days and IIRC the mayor of San Salvador is one.

I suppose that ARENA - the far-right US backed party currently in power in El Salvador after the 2004 (?) elections might be seen as a victory for military dictatorship, but saying that is the sort of thing you really need to argue out. It was a military dictatorship, now it isn't. The bottom line is that this kind of reality does rather ruin the point that Douglas is trying to make.

Scout006,

I agree with you. The situation that John mentions is incredibly complicated and is not getting any clearer as time passes, certainly things are more confused than his post made clear probably owing to John's time limitation.

Amiriya is one of the last remaining districts in Bagdhad where Sunnis were more than half the population (they're a lot more than half now). In effect this district and its neighbours represents their last major organised Sunni population in the capital. According to the Sunni Iraqi Accord Front the current fighting is for control of the districts of Adl, Mansur, Ghazaliya, Amiriya, and Dura - effectively the Sunni strongholds in the Kharkh region of Baghdad.

For the US the district is important because its near the airport. But for Sunnis - indeed for Iraqis - the neighbourhood is better known as the site of the Amiriya air raid shelter. Most Americans, and certainly the vast majority of US troops (who were, lets face it, only kids then and who went through US schooling) are unaware of this historical fact. During the 1991 Gulf War a "smart" bomb hit the air raid shelter burning to death 400 civilians - old men, women and kids. By happy chance 400 Iraqi civilians is a comparative number to the number of US dead on September 11th. The US claimed that they thought it was a command post, but then the US always does think that everything is a command post. The place itself is something of a shrine in Iraq - both for the civilian dead in the Gulf War and for those that then died in a decade of sanctions. There's a lot of hatred for the US in Amiriya, and not all of it has to do with US incompetance in 2003-2007. In Iraq the past isn't dead, its not even past.

Anyway as of January 2007 ethnic cleansing had (according to the Sunni Iraqi Accord Front) been completed in:

a) the districts east of the Army Canal (effectively Sadr City, Talibiya, Shaab, Ur, al-Ubaidi, and New Baghdad)

b) the area west of the canal (including Rusafa, Salikh, Tunis, Adhamiya, Karrada, Jadiriya, and Palestine street)

These areas, which had been 30% or so Sunni are now reported to have no Sunni families living there. Obviously its hard to get independent confirmation of these things, but Iraq has millions of refugees now and they had to come from somewhere.

Of course it does take two to tango. In the Sunni districts you'd have to look hard to find a breathing Shi'ite family.

Now lets look at the people behind the TAZ, the ISI. We think that the ISI was formed in December 2005. Like most things in Iraq, its hard to say. The breakdown of Iraqi civil society means that all considerations become guesswork. Effectively these days I'm in the situation of saying "when I cut open the chicken this morning it crapped on me, so the omens are good".

As John notes, the peculiar beauty of Iraq is that Bush cannot attack the ISI without restarting a war with the Sunnis, and frankly he's only just attacked the Shi'ites. Changing course now merely means that both groups will attack.

The ISI's main current political position is reaction against the position of the US which is that America's presence in Iraq is precisely to thwart the establishment of an Islamic state (aka a caliphate), which will "endanger Western interests and threaten America at home." (11th October 2006, George Bush in another of his barking mad diatribes). In fact the creation of the group only achieved mention in the US. President Bush, stated that he "will not allow" the establishment of an Islamic state in Iraq. An Islamic state in Iraq represented a "deadly assault" on US policies in Iraq and the region, and a "devastating failure" for Bush.

A video announcement of the establishment of the ISI was made on 13 October 2006, two days after Bush's speech, with the appointment of an emir of the state (each province has an emir). We think that the ISI began sometime after the 15 December 2005 formation of the "Mujahidin Shura Council," which aimed at uniting all the insurgents efforts against the American occupation and its allies. Besides Al Quaeda in Iraq the meeting included a vertiable who's who of the insurgency.

The objectives of ISI are:
a) protect Sunnis - physically and morally
b) fight and defeat the apostates (Kill Shi'ites)
c) kill Crusaders and Jews (Kill Americans - their nickname is The Jews, its nothing to do with religion as such, its to do with Iraqis viewing themselves as the new Palestinians)

Each province has a Council composed of three individuals from each group, regardless of the number of fighters in the group or the number of their operations. You'll probably note how similar this is to the organisation of groups in Nicaragua. Other non-military political issues were back-burnered with a separate five-member council to discuss and decide important issues when needed and when time demands it.

Overall the ISI are realists. The American invasion and occupation of Iraq means that sectarianism, ethnic cleansing, and ultimately partition of Iraq is now inevitable. The ISI see that the result will be a Kurdish state, a Shi'ite state, and the Sunnis in a vice and no role to play in Iraqi politics. On the other hand if they hold in Bagdhad they'll still have some cards to play. In short, they've got to win in Bagdhad. This means that the US has to see them win in Bagdhad otherwise Sunni compromise is right off the table. The Sunni choice isn't violence or non-violence, its violence or non-existance. It will be the massive, empty, Sunni rural areas that will provide the future locations for terrorist training camps - probably with live fire training provided by an ambush or attack on the US or Iraqi military as a final graduation exercise.

Interestingly the ISI issued a call to former Iraqi officers to join them. Officers have to meet conditions - the main one is studying the Koran and passing a test in Islamic thought to prove that they're not a Ba'athist. This is an interesting shift in Sunni expectations and may mean that the secular Sunnis are no longer in any control of the situation.

[DJ]

I can't help but compare this development to events in Sri Lanka that appear to parallel. In 1986, the insurgency there was made up of six Tamil groups that were roughly equal in power. By 1989, LTTE stood alone. They had out-maneuvered, absorbed, or eradicated their competition. (Two of those groups made peace with the government, which essentially eliminated their strength in the field, though they are reportedly active again in small ways Batticaloa this year.)

In an environment of multiple groups with overlapping goals, the forward-thinking leader will consider not only vanquishing the common enemy, but also his/her position with respect to competing groups. Because whether or not the common struggle can ultimately be won, position within one's own constiuency is essential in terms of funding, recruits, and influence.

[adam]

Dj,

Good point. I'd just like to point out that this kind of behaviour doesn't stop with guerillas.

Lets take the Free French circa 1942. Serious, professional, middle aged, mature, military men who want nothing more than to liberate their homeland, right? Not a bit of it. Even in the middle of World War 2 the manoeuvers over power, recruits and funding were deadly.

The eventual winner of these power struggles De Gaulle was based in London in 1942, but he wasn't the highest ranked Free French officer. The higher ranked officers were General Giraud (Free French) and Admiral Darlan (the Vichy French Commander).

Once in Algeria Giraud lacked the authority to take command of the French forces. The Americans then contacted Darlan offering him personal control in North Africa. We don't know what happens next, but Darlan gets murdered by a Gaullist on December 24, 1942.

De Gaulle would later became Joint Head of the Committee of National Liberation (with Giraud), and then sole chairman, in a much smoother bureaucratic coup. This was despite the opposition from Roosevelt and American support for Giraud.

Not bad for one convenient assassination. There's no indication that De Gaulle ordered it, but it did remove the split in the Free French.

[DiamondBack 01]

Here is the perfect fork in the road example taken from the 2.6.07 QJBR website:

Not every caller merits to be responded , yesterday we heard on al-Jazeera Channel TV what the official spokesman of the Islamic army had said, he mentioned things which are not true and falsified. There are three points which are obvious for all the people:

1- The Martyrs Battalions were on the top during four years in confronting the Crusade campaign against the Ummah (Nation).

2- The Islamic State's soldiers were on the top in stopping the Safawid extension represented by Ghadr "Badr" corps and al-Dajjal "Mahdi" army, so ask the quarters of Dyala to tell you about the heroism of the State's soldiers.

3- The Islamic State's soldiers were never worry about neither equipment nor war materials of the enemy, and they fought courageously and stood firm in the battlefields which made all the supervisors astonished.

QJBR has at every turn driven the forks for the other Iraqi insurgent groups.

IAI has been an interesting animal in that it was for a long number of years a Salafi prayer group in the underground inside Iraq under Saddam and we simply did not know that and they came out swinging when we dissovled the old state security. The interesting thing about IAI is that it's true leader is a Salafi and not a Baathist as many assume and the internal struggle between 1920 and IAI has been between QJBR on the Salafi side and the secular Baathists on the IAI and 1920 side.

In fact QJBR is correct in the comments above---the battle videos and battle communiques reflect also nothing from 1920 and IAI for almost six months---the exact time they were conducting talks with the Maliki and US side---exactly the same time frame that QJBR set the forks by killing a large number of IAI/1920 battlefield cell leaders as a not to subtle warning to stop the side show.

QJBR even issued them a challenge---show us your attacks if you are so strong---nothing came but a weak video of composites over the period of 2006 and nothing since.

If in fact the internal struggles are weaking the insurgency I would counter by looking at their current battle tempo and battle space ops--there is no slacking off even in the face of an internal struggle. One might in fact state that one of the forks driven by QJBR was the subtle but effective unification of all Salafi/Tikfiri jihadists under one banner--therefore no slacking battle tempo even when IAI is talking truce.In 2005 it would normally take them 2 weeks to reconstitute after a hjigh tempo rate

It should be noted that truce is in exchange for positions as officers in the IA and a piece of the oil money pie as well as a piece of the billions in US corruption monies.

John as the Brits say you are spot on on your premises---it is a shame that the current US military MI seems to want to stay driven by toys---maybe it is the billions that are flowing for toys vs the hundreds for effective analysis driven by your premises.

Hate to say it but in a number of comments by QJBR you can see the campaign strategy develop-but hey no one wants to read their lips.

One comment was in their 4th war year communique---in 2003 we got you into a UW, 2004 we got you in a cities and towns war like WWII and since 2005 we have gotten you into a war of movement---and you follwed us---why-we wanted you to forget your experience from Vietnam. A telling statement.

A second recent comment was --we spent a long time trying to figure out how to get you out of your FOBs so we could fight you---I would argue that the sectarian killing and the chaos before the US surge was designed to get more targets into Iraq, and by spreading the troops thin in the Petrasus plan it offers more targets for IO.