JOURNAL: An Inconvenient Truth about Private Military Companies

"If we drive out or expel this company [Blackwater] immediately there will be a security vacuum..." Iraqi government spokesman to Reuters.

An inconvenient truth missing in the debate over Blackwater (which is currently in trouble with the Iraqi government over a shooting incident), is that the US military is completely dependent on private military companies (PMCs). This dependency can't be wished away or reversed. If anything, given the trend lines, PMCs will increasingly replace conventional military forces well into the future. The reasons are simple. Private military companies are:

• Efficient. If you count the costs of 8 to 9 support personnel (in the DoD's extremely long bureaucratic "tail") needed to field every US soldier in the field and state-side rotations, the high pay for individual private military employees is a bargain (certainly less than half the cost for a government soldier, not even counting the savings associated with medical care/retirements).
• Scalable. There are currently 20,000 PMC trigger pullers in Iraq. These men are guarding facilities and key people across the country. This is likely nearly the same number of trigger pullers (as opposed to support personnel) as the entire US military currently has in the country. Without these men, the US military would barely be able to field a force large enough to patrol Baghdad.
• Contingent. Unlike the hordes of bureaucratic Defense contractors that will permanently infest the halls of the DoD, private military companies field mission specific employees. IF there is a withdrawal from Iraq, there will be bust in the PMC industry as firms quickly shed employees.

Comments

[Brett]

What happens to these private security forces when the war is over? Are we eventually creating another military force not bound by a country but by profit?

[John Robb]

Their contracts are terminated. The companies shrink and shed their contract employees (most don't use full time employees, these firms contract their workers for short terms of employement). The industry goes bust. It's not a standing army.

[TheDreamer]

So more like an ad hoc army?

[John Robb]

Correct.

Food for thought (and potentially scary depending on your perspective), given the experienced/growth in this industry over the last four years: you could triple the actual ground forces actually engaged in counter-insurgency if you withdrew the conventional military, replaced them with PMCs (focused on the CI mission), and cut the budget allocation for Iraq by 70%.

[Duncan Kinder]

One way to formalize this would be for Congress to issue Letters of Marque, which once were used to generate private navies.

See:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Letter_of_marque

One obvious problem, which the article notes, is that famous recipients of such letters include Sir Henry Morgan and William Kidd, both of whom were tried for piracy.

I'm sure that John is fully aware of Machiavelli's discussion of why mercenaries are never good. For the rest of you, mercenaries are either militarily ineffective, in which case they are useless, or they are militarily effective, in which case they are a threat to you.

Another problem is that there is widespread sentiment for "support the troops." "Support the mercs" would be different.

The fundamental problem is that it is one thing to take a bullet for God and Country, Mom and Apple Pie. It is quite another to take one for a paycheck. And this distinction needs fully to be considered.

[broth]

Duncan,

The "problem" for Mr. Morgan and Mr. Kid is relative. Plausible deniability is convenient for the state when the company is no longer considered an asset (or the contract has expired).

These days, the PMC's or "mercenaries" (as you refer to them) are largely more experienced and agile than today's state militaries.

The "fundamental problem" is usually overcome by the dollar, euro, pound or yen. Be cautious of stigmas and indifference in the age of 4th generation warfare.

Brandon

[Cavolonero]

Private control of the military is the logical outcome of Capital.

PMCs different from , and aren't subject to the Macheavellian problem, because they 'come home' to here. ( The 'useless mercenaries' are drawn from outside )

Once operations of PMCs all are going, ( fully captialized, with a good amount of tax money ) , then they MUST start cutting taxes. ( And cut them again, and then again ... )

The onion in the onitment ... a big war ( Iran, China, .. ? )

[NietzschesGhost]

Posted by: Cavolonero:

"PMCs different from , and aren't subject to the Macheavellian problem, because they 'come home' to here. ( The 'useless mercenaries' are drawn from outside )"

But when those 'useless mercenaries' return home, they immediately become part of the open source warfare community - sharing thier skills with friends and family and selling thier services to the highest bidder.

Imagine if you will, 20 thousand battle-hardened Blackwater employees returning home to El Salvador, flush with marketable skills and a taste for big paycheques.

[Cash]

The natural inclination of PMCs, as with any corporate or organic entity, is to continue itself. Isn't it logical that PMCs in a post-Iraq environment would look for other conflicts where their services might be needed? In this I'm thinking of failed or failing nation-states, such as Mexico, where the aristocracy requires a reliable (?) security force that isn't drawn from the segment of the population most eager to see their downfall.

After all, what's the difference between a PMC providing diplomatic security in the Green Zone and a hired security firm manning the guardhouse at a gated community in Florida?

It seems likely that the American experience with PMCs in Iraq is being watched carefully in many quarters.

[Cavolonero]

" Flexabilty " should also be high on the list of the benefits of PMCs. I think the ' who polices the police ? ' problem of at home PMCs, will be solved by common sense a ' don't shit where you eat ' policy. ( or maybe the coast gaurd ? )

[GregRe]

Food for thought (efficiency/costs): What will happen to PMC fees when there are no more members of special forces to recruit (lured away from regular armies) and highly qualified manpower has to be produced/trained inhouse?

And how would the (above mentioned) ratio change if a sufficient number of employees would have to be hired to oversee performance etc. of contractors (the number of black sheeps might eventually rise)?

[GregRe]

And how would the (above mentioned) ratio change if a sufficient number of employees would have to be hired to oversee performance etc. of contractors (the number of black sheep might eventually rise)?

[Marcello]

"If you count the costs of 8 to 9 support personnel"

That's because the DOD operates the tanks, planes and artillery which make impossible for the guerrillas to do more than emplacing IEDs and the occasional hit and run attack. Give or take a few utility helos and a few armored cars (and the iraqis could make the latter if needed) the mercs are not much better armed than the insurgents. Even if better trained they will be outnumbered and massacred in detail.

[Matt]

Boy, interesting discussion about private contractors. I actually have a blog that takes a serious look at the industry, and how we are being used, and could be used in this war.
I am a security contractor, and have worked in Iraq and elsewhere as such. It is my belief that if contracts are properly monitored by the client(government/state/military), that we can be incredibly effective. We are a tool in this war, and we can help increase the lethality and efficiency of today's war fighters. We'll watch the base and secure the convoys and leaders/diplomats, and let the military to the good work of hunting and killing the enemy.
I also get my influence from John Boyd, and today's thinkers like Kilcullen and Nagl. Check out my blog Feral Jundi, if you guys are curious about the security contracting industry.