ADRIFT

The US military is now "nominally" in charge of both the Iraqi insurgency and the Iraqi military/police (see February's "Open Source Counter-insurgency?" for more). Journalist Nir Rosen, fresh from a walking tour of Baghdad's hot zones, concurs with my previous analysis in a new article, "The Myth of the Surge" (it's a good read):

Having lost the civil war, many Sunnis were suddenly desperate to switch sides — and Gen. David Petraeus was eager to oblige. The U.S. has not only added 30,000 more troops in Iraq — it has essentially bribed the opposition, arming the very Sunni militants who only months ago were waging deadly assaults on American forces. To engineer a fragile peace, the U.S. military has created and backed dozens of new Sunni militias, which now operate beyond the control of Iraq's central government...

A Trashed Doctrine

This situation puts the US military in a difficult position, one that goes deeper than being caught on the horns of dilemma (as in: caught between supporting "former" insurgents or government forces). The improvised theory that led the US military to fund the insurgency (the "Awakening") has transformed the US Counter-Insurgency doctrine (COIN) -- a document was so carefully prepared and announced with such fanfare -- into a mere pile of paper. Why? Because we have abandoned the doctrine's binding assumption: that everything we do in counter-insurgency should increase the legitimacy of the host government. Essentially, the abandonment of our doctrine means that the US military is now completely adrift in Iraq without a counter-insurgency roadmap.

So, what happens next? If you analyze this development through the perspective of Boyd's OODA loop, we can conclude that the US military has lost one of its primary sources of orientation (here's an excellent PowerPoint from Chet Richards that details the OODA loop). At a core process level, here's what we can expect to see:

• Non-cooperative centers of gravity will form. Without a common source of orientation, different parts of the US military (and all other arms of the US government operating in Iraq) will begin to gravitate to conflicting approaches based on alternative interpretations of what the correct path is.
• Slower decision making. Decisions will be more difficult to make and once they are made, they will be more difficult to implement (organizational resistance). Paralysis may emerge as events evolve (open warfare between police and Awakening militias, pressure to withdraw US forces due to political changes, etc.) since a way forward isn't defined.
• A failure to correctly analyze unfolding events. Without effective orientation, critical information will often be ignored and/or misinterpreted. Surprises will become more frequent.

NOTE: Thanks to Chet Richards.

Comments

[Duncan Kinder]

John:

What is the difference between OODA loops and Bayes Theorem?

[mittelwerk]

it seems to me that elsewhere you've described these processes -- the de-legitimatiion of the state and the decentralization of power -- as not only inevitable, but under certain circumstances desirable.

since it's clear that a purposive "macro" unification strategy isn't going to work in iraq, why not let the market take over -- and in essence be the market-maker, since we have the cash and the toys? in a sense this could serve to "liberalize" conflict in iraq, and over time, as winners and losers emerge, give rise to more organic and fluid power arrangements.

sure it's cynical, but no more so than corporations in liberal democracies funding political antagonists in an election, or, less cynically, letting different divisions of the same corporation compete against each other for capital.

criticism aside, i've been following your blog for a year. no one else is doing what you're doing, or more accurately, doing it so well. you should have a bigger audience.

[John Robb]

mw, thanks. An open source COIN doctrine is very much like what you are talking about. As in: management of thousands of armed groups operating within a hollow state.

[Jason A. Lefkowitz]

How long can you pay people who hate each other to pretend they love each other?

Which runs out first, the money or the willingness to pretend?

[zenpundit]

"How long can you pay people who hate each other to pretend they love each other?"

Judging by Egypt and Israel, quite a while. If we could reduce our costs in Iraq to the level of Foreign and military aid to those states, who wouldn't consider that a bargain?

[Barry]

Mittelwerk:

"since it's clear that a purposive "macro" unification strategy isn't going to work in iraq, why not let the market take over -- and in essence be the market-maker, since we have the cash and the toys? in a sense this could serve to "liberalize" conflict in iraq, and over time, as winners and losers emerge, give rise to more organic and fluid power arrangements."

In a sense, that's what the administration is doing. Notice that the accomodation with these Sunni groups came after the administration launched a propaganda campaign against 'Iranian-supported factions' in the Iraqi government? From what I've been able to gather, 'Iranian-supported factions' means all of the Shiite factions except Sadr (whom the administration also hates). In addition, various 'unnamed sources' in the administration announced an anti-shiite shift by the administration, to counter increased Iranian influence in the ME.

It looked to me like the US decided to back the anti-government forces, to weaken the government. This also had the effect of reducing the violence long enough to kick it to the next administration, but there seems to be a two-faced game here.

[french swede the rootless vegetable]

But how will this balancing of opposite sides bring an end to the war? And what is now the grand strategic goal? As far as I can see, there isn't any more.