Global Guerrillas

JOURNAL: Tibet, Protests, and Insurgency

[The torch relay is] “really giving a focus to groups like ours around the world for the next three months.” Paul Bourke, an officer with the Australian Tibet Council to the NYTimes.

JOURNAL: Gored by the Horns of a Dilemma

The US military is on the horns of a dilemma in Iraq. Here's why:

JOURNAL: Sadr's Defensive Strategy

The Iraqi government's militias (Army/police) are on the offensive in Basra, in an attempt to eliminate the Sadr's militia. In contrast to previous engagements with the Mahdi army, this fight is going to more interesting. A leaner and more efficient Mahdi army has learned from Hezbollah's success in southern Lebanon that a carefully planned defensive strategy in combination with a strategic timer (a series of actions that inflict visible strategic damage to the opponent) can rapidly dissolve the political will of a weak adversary (Maliki certainly fits that description). In addition to the defense of Mahdi army neighborhoods and efforts to interdict the supplies of Iraqi army/police forces operating in Basra, here's what will be done on the strategic side:

• Increase US casualties/embarrassment during a politically sensitive time. Rocket and mortar attacks on the Green zone. More IED/small arms attacks on US troops. The objective is to increase US pressure Maliki to accelerate his time table or ending it early if objectives aren't quickly achieved.
• Disrupt daily life/economics. There is already an economic slowdown/strike underway under the banner of civil disobedience. Businesses are closing due to a lack of workers. This will quickly exacerbate an already dire economic situation and increase pressure on the government to stop the conflict.
• Disrupt the oil system. This hasn't occurred yet, but it is very likely to occur shortly. The Mahdi army has the ability to shut down, indefinitely, all oil production (1.6 m barrels a day) in southern Iraq. This effort will cost the government tens of millions in revenues for each day of the conflict. It may prove be the most effective means of prematurely terminating Maliki's offensive.

UPDATE: The assault on Basra already appears to be stalling. The Mahdi army has better weapons than the Iraqi government opposition and is fighting well in urban zones. If the strategic timer adds oil system disruption, it's over (and potentially Maliki's hold on power).

UPDATE2: Strategic timer activity for Thursday: The disruption of oil production has begun. The Zubair-1 export pipeline was bombed (impact 1/3 of Iraqi oil production). Green zone mortar attacks for Thursday: 9:15AM, 1PM, and 3PM.

UPDATE3: NYTimes on Sunday 30 March: "Many Iraqi politicians say that Mr. Maliki’s political capital has been severely depleted by the campaign and that he is now in the curious position of having to turn to Mr. Sadr, a longtime rival and now his opponent in battle, for a solution to the crisis."

JOURNAL: Tibet and beyond

Tibet is proving to be much more than a flash of unrest in a remote Chinese province. It may be the trigger for much greater dislocation and disruption (from "When China Derails"):

So, what happens when China's high performance, globally connected capitalist economy which is flying at dangerously high speeds hits the inevitable speed bump? The answer is: it will derail (hollow out and fragment). The chaos it will produce in SE Asia is the real threat we have to deal with. Predicting the black swan that kicks off the death spiral is impossible... In anticipation of this, the Chinese government is following the lead of many other nations by radically improving the capabilities of its paramilitary force for domestic security (to the tune of one million men). However, this many not be enough. Global guerrilla theory indicates that endemic corruption will combine with the same forces of anti-state guerrilla action we have seen in other places to disconnect portions of China from the central government.

JOURNAL: Vigilante Hackers

To fight wars on the Internet, a growing number of nation-states are using vigilante/criminal hackers as proxies (earlier example: Russia vs. Estonia). A new conflict (numerous sources) raging on the Internet between Chinese vigilantes and the supporters of Tibet is yet another example. It evokes the scenario I described in an article I wrote for Wired (here's the graphic). Essentially, this approach enables a government to enlist tens of thousands, some of whom are making Wall Street level incomes from cybercrime, to attack foes. In contrast, the US approach is limited to a government centric approach (using the typical bureaucratic formula => warm body + a little training = highly paid government contractor). Which approach is more likely to generate results? To me, it's not even a contest.

For those that are interested, this type of conflict is a form of open source war (I'm currently working on the draft of a doctrine for fighting this type of war).

OPEN SOURCE INSURGENCY >> How to start

Superempowerment -- an increase in the ability of individuals and small groups to accomplish tasks/work through the combination of rapid improvements in technological tools and access to global networks -- has enabled small groups to radically increase their productivity in conflict. For example, if a small group disrupts a system or a network by attacking systempunkts, it can amplify the results of its attacks to achieve as much as a 1,400,000 percent return on investment.

Open source warfare is an organizational method by which a large collection of small, violent, superempowered groups can work together to take on much larger foes (usually hierarchies). It is also a method of organization that can be applied to non-violent struggles. It enables:

• High rates of innovation.
• Increased survivability among the participant groups.
• More frequent attacks and an ability to swarm targets.

Here are some suggestions (this is but one of many methods based on recent history, I'm sure that over time a better method will emerge) for building an open source insurgency:

A)The plausible promise. The idea that holds the open source insurgency together. The plausible promise is composed of:

• An enemy. The enemy serves as the target of attacks. This enemy can either be either received or manufactured (any group or organization that can be depicted as a threat). The enemy can be any group that currently holds and exerts power: invader, the government, a company, an ethnic group, or a private organization.
• A goal. This objective animates the group. Because of the diversity of the groups and individuals that join together in an open source insurgency, the only goal that works is simple and extremely high level. More complex goal setting is impossible, since it will fracture/fork the insurgency.
• A demonstration. Viability. An attack that demonstrates that its possible to win against the enemy. It deflates any aura of invincibility that the enemy may currently enjoy. The demonstration serves as a rallying cry for the insurgency.

B)The foco. Every open source insurgency is ignited by a small founding group, a foco in guerrilla parlance. The foco sets the original goal and conducts the operation that provides the insurgency with its demonstration of viability. It's important to understand that in order to grow an open source insurgency, the founding group or individuals must follow a simple path:

• Relinquish. Give up any control over the insurgency gained during its early phases. In practice, this means giving up control of how the goal is achieved, who may participate, how to communicate, etc. The only control that remains is the power of example and respect gained through being effective.
• Resist (temptation). Stay small. Don't grow to a size that makes the original group easy for the enemy to target (very few new members). Further, don't establish a formal collection of groups, a hierarchy of control, or set forth a complex agenda. This will only serve to alienate and fragment/fork the insurgency. In some cases, it will make the foco a target of the insurgency itself. It will also slow any advancement on the objective since it limits potential pathways/innovation.
• Share. Provide resources, ideas, information, knowledge, recruits, etc. with other groups and individuals that join the insurgency. Share everything possible that doesn't directly compromise the foco's integrity (operational security and viability). Expect sharing in return.

Will keep adding to this doctrine over the next couple of months. Could potentially package it into a PDF document for wider distribution when done.

UPDATE: Here's a very smartly penned application of OSW (and the foco) by a member of Anonymous.

JOURNAL: More Evidence of Diminishing Returns from Terrorism

Traditional blood and guts terrorism suffers from diminishing returns. Essentially, the public/media becomes desensitized to it and in order for it to remain effective (and continue to build the brand for the group), each subsequent attack needs to be more spectacular than previous attacks (read: "Terrorist Death-March", my more expansive 2004 brief on the topic). Some additional evidence that this was a factor in the planning of subsequent attacks on the US (and not some vague notion of deterrence as the article this is drawn from claims):

George J. Tenet, the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, wrote in his autobiography that the authorities were concerned that Qaeda operatives had made plans in 2003 to attack the New York City subway using cyanide devices. Mr. Zawahri reportedly called off the plot because he feared that it “was not sufficiently inspiring to serve Al Qaeda’s ambitions,” and would be viewed as a pale, even humiliating, follow-up to the 9/11 attacks.

JOURNAL: Anonymous Responds

Here's an informative and well crafted reply to the original brief on Anonymous vs. Scientology (I've promoted it from the comments and deleted the IP record).

I am a member of Anonymous and a long-time reader of this blog. There are a couple of additional points I'd like to add to John's article.

Firstly, Anonymous is an example of viral organisation - there is no centralised leadership, and although there are nodes of organisation, these are dynamic - if one goes down or is taken down, others compensate with little damage done to the utility of the network as a whole. Organisation and decisions are made through what I would term "viral consensus" - the facts, questions and opinions are disseminated throughout the network by it's users, the most successful or popular of these possible courses of action are therefore repeated more often and gain traction - mutations to the idea occur and those that are popular flourish. As such, there are no leaders to attack - whilst there may be some individuals who are more visible (such as Mark Bunker) they are not essential-, no easily-accisble points of failure. Indeed, the only thing that would severely disrupt the insurgency as a whole is internal factional problems - which are near-impossible for an outsider to predict or cause due to the shibboleths John mentions; or a total disruption of the internet as a whole.

Secondly, the initial campaign of DDOS and internet insurgency can be seen as an example of the internet as an enabling force - most members of anonymous are not hackers or computer security experts, but the information available on how to conduct operations such as DDOS attacks etc is readily available on the internet, and can be spread concisely and practically throughout the group itself through other networking tools (IRC, message boards, forums, p2p). However, the interesting thing in particular about the methodology of anonymous is that it is intensely adaptable - when the opinions of Mark Bunker that the illegal aspects of anonymous actions (DDOS etc) were tactically efficient but strategically detrimental entered the viral consciousness, the methodology drastically changed - to real life protests organised over a number of countries, and to information dissemination tactics aimed at the public.

Anonymous' actions can be seen as Effects Based Operations - they fulfill all three criteria:

• They employ systems disruption of scientology operations both online through DDOS and information dissemination, and in real life through information dissemination and protests aimed at disrupting their activites through altering their legal and public situations.
  
  
• Psychological isolation is brought about by isolation of COS views from the mainstream in highlighting cult practices and achieving widespread dissemination of such views, and by engaging in a war of opinion on the internet - colouring public perception, and preventing COS propaganda from being effectively broadcast.
  
  
• Minimal collateral damage: aside from one misguided retributive attack in the early stages, the whole operation has been marked by an astounding level of focus. With protests in over a dozen countries occuring on two occasions with over 8000 people participating, there has been only two arrests (for noise violation) and no negative actions. These are the protest equivalent of surgical strikes.

The next round of Anonymous protests will be held on the 12th of April. Codenamed Operation Reconnect we aim to reestablish communication between cult members and their families/friends.

Be watching, because we are watching you.

ANONYMOUS

Here's some quick analysis of the "war" between Scientology (well known for its ability to use lawfare to silence critics and investigators) and a group of unknown hacktivists called Anonymous:

• Tom Cruise Scientology video. The attempted suppression of this video by the Scientology PR/legal team ignited the "war."
• Declaration of "war" by Anonymous on YouTube (seen 2.6 million times). Very creepy/cool use of the medium. The key objective of this war is to make Scientology transparent through greater media exposure.
• Insurgent campaign directed at Scientology. An insurgency wiki for Anonymous called Project Chanology. The effort generated multiple denial of service attacks and physical world protests against Scientology websites and facilities respectively. They were also able to use Google bombing and Digg to focus public attention on their message. Current focus is on an attempt to deny Scientology its tax exempt status.
• Counter attack site/video by the Scientology PR/legal machine. Keywords: hate crime, cyber-terrorists, propaganda. The Scientology PR/legal machine is unable to follow previous script since Anonymous is operating on an extralegal basis. Further, since Anonymous was in place for years, it was able to develop conversational shibboleths that have prevented penetration into the group by Scientology plants/spys.

What does this mean?

It is, first and foremost, a nicely packaged demonstration of the ability of an open source insurgency to conduct information operations against an opponent (made even more effective by the secretive and reactive nature of that opponent). It is also a demonstration of the limits of what an online group can do without "crossing the line" into terrorism. As such it should be used as a template for other non-violent efforts.

JOURNAL: Homo Economicus Goes to War

Richard Oppel, writing for the NYTimes, has a good background article on the uptick in the US military's adoption of global guerrilla theory called, "Iraq's Insurgency Runs on Stolen Oil Profits" March 16th, 2008. Choice quotes that depict guerrilla entrepreneurs:

...money, far more than jihadist ideology, is a crucial motivation for a majority of Sunni insurgents, according to American officers in some Sunni provinces...

"It has a great deal more to do with the economy than with ideology,' said one senior American military official, who said that studies of detainees in American custody found that about three-quarters were not committed to the jihadist ideology. "The vast majority have nothing to do with the caliphate and the central ideology of Al Qaeda.”

In Baiji, dozens of active insurgent groups feed off corruption from the refinery, said Lt. Ali Shakir, the commander of the paramilitary Iraqi police unit here. 'If I give you all the names, your hand is going to be tired” from writing them down, he said.

Effects of systems disruption (a feedback loop that feeds the above):

Capt. Stephen Wright, who works at the refinery with Captain Da Silva, is concerned about whether there may be unseen problems looming, like the sort of fatigue that ruptured a propane unit in January. “If something happens to this refinery from neglect, you won’t have fuel for eight provinces,” he said, “and we’ll have 6,000 unemployed Sunnis, who are people we definitely don’t want unemployed.”