JOURNAL: Sadr's Defensive Strategy

The Iraqi government's militias (Army/police) are on the offensive in Basra, in an attempt to eliminate the Sadr's militia. In contrast to previous engagements with the Mahdi army, this fight is going to more interesting. A leaner and more efficient Mahdi army has learned from Hezbollah's success in southern Lebanon that a carefully planned defensive strategy in combination with a strategic timer (a series of actions that inflict visible strategic damage to the opponent) can rapidly dissolve the political will of a weak adversary (Maliki certainly fits that description). In addition to the defense of Mahdi army neighborhoods and efforts to interdict the supplies of Iraqi army/police forces operating in Basra, here's what will be done on the strategic side:

• Increase US casualties/embarrassment during a politically sensitive time. Rocket and mortar attacks on the Green zone. More IED/small arms attacks on US troops. The objective is to increase US pressure Maliki to accelerate his time table or ending it early if objectives aren't quickly achieved.
• Disrupt daily life/economics. There is already an economic slowdown/strike underway under the banner of civil disobedience. Businesses are closing due to a lack of workers. This will quickly exacerbate an already dire economic situation and increase pressure on the government to stop the conflict.
• Disrupt the oil system. This hasn't occurred yet, but it is very likely to occur shortly. The Mahdi army has the ability to shut down, indefinitely, all oil production (1.6 m barrels a day) in southern Iraq. This effort will cost the government tens of millions in revenues for each day of the conflict. It may prove be the most effective means of prematurely terminating Maliki's offensive.

UPDATE: The assault on Basra already appears to be stalling. The Mahdi army has better weapons than the Iraqi government opposition and is fighting well in urban zones. If the strategic timer adds oil system disruption, it's over (and potentially Maliki's hold on power).

UPDATE2: Strategic timer activity for Thursday: The disruption of oil production has begun. The Zubair-1 export pipeline was bombed (impact 1/3 of Iraqi oil production). Green zone mortar attacks for Thursday: 9:15AM, 1PM, and 3PM.

UPDATE3: NYTimes on Sunday 30 March: "Many Iraqi politicians say that Mr. Maliki’s political capital has been severely depleted by the campaign and that he is now in the curious position of having to turn to Mr. Sadr, a longtime rival and now his opponent in battle, for a solution to the crisis."

Comments

[Miguel Barrientos]

Interesting predictions, as usual. What is not clear to me is if there is any evidence that the Mahdi army has learned from Hezbollah. Are you just speculating or do you have any actual proof? I guess what I'm looking for is something that demonstrates that the Mahdi army's recent actions are guided by clear strategy, objectives, and tactics rather than simply orders to create as much mayhem as possible.

[adam]

Miguel,

"What is not clear to me is if there is any evidence that the Mahdi army has learned from Hezbollah."

We know that Sadr has been up to Lebanon on a number of occasions, including in February 2006. As a noted Shi'ite cleric with serious political aims its pretty much an absolute certainty that he'd get to meet his Lebanese counterparts. In this case its Hizbollah. Whether the two areas hot-swap tactics and methods so easily is another matter - Hizbollah is far more independent than the Sadrists are. John says that they can, and he knows quite a lot about it.

"I guess what I'm looking for is something that demonstrates that the Mahdi army's recent actions are guided by clear strategy, objectives, and tactics rather than simply orders to create as much mayhem as possible."

The Army of the Mahdi has expressed some defensive objectives, but whether they are clear depends on a lot of things. The reality is that in a period of complete chaos very little is ever clear. Iraq's been in complete chaos for some time now. Sadr has said that the objective is:

a) an end to the government offensive against his people.

This will be done by:
1) a campaign of civil disobedience.
2) defensive fighting to get the US Army and their Islamic Supreme Council allies off their backs.

The current situation is that all of these things are happening. The Sadrists are fighting defensively, especially around Sadr City and Basra, whilst looking for a political solution.

1) In Basra the Sadrists have overrun
the headquarters of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and their paramilitary wing (ISCI, formerly SCIRI), the Dawa Party. In short the Sadrists, and their Marsh Arab allies, have Basra for the moment. This means that they also have control of the roads through Basra, which means that the US military has a supply problem.

1a) The Green Zone is being shelled. This may be the Sadrists showing that they can. On the other hand its Iraq, so who knows?

1b) The US will demand that the British forces currently near Basra act to pull them out of the hole. Currently 2 battalions of TA reservists are scheduled for Iraq, whilst 16th Air Assault Brigade is down for Afghanistan.

The British forces around Basra are:

A, B and D Squadrons of the Royal Dragoon Guards (42 Challenger 2's), 1st Scots Guards (armoured infantry - Warriors) , Royal Scots Borderers (foot infantry), 1st Battalion the Duke of Lancaster's Regiment (Mechanised Infantry - Bulldogs and Saxons; not RPG immune), 1st Mercian Regiment (Cheshires) (foot infantry)

For a total maximum number of shooters: 2,500 or so. Now barely 2,500 troops and some tanks, even with some hobbyists in support, are not going to be enough to hold hundreds of miles of roadway against really pissed-off locals so we may have to switch the two assignments at short notice. But that still means that British soldiers will be attempting the impossible, whilst Afghanistan goes to hang.

2) The Sadrists are going to boycott parliamentary sessions. The Sadrists have 30 seats in parliament. That takes the governments majority with it.

2a) A major part of this operation is aimed at the October 2008 election. Dawa and ISCI want to win the local elections, which they are worried that the Sadrists will dominate. If you can't win the election, shoot the electorate.

3) The Sadrists have ordered a campaign of civil disobedience. They have the support of the vast majority of the poor in the population. Not even the US Army can shoot everyone in Iraq before the entire thing comes crashing down.

Basically the situation is a bloody mess. Its the end of March, The Surge (TM) has ended, and its "game on" for Iraq.

[NietzschesGhost]

"Its the end of March, The Surge (TM) has ended, and its "game on" for Iraq."

That seems to echo the general opinion that the violence in Iraq had been suppressed by "The Surge", not eliminated. It is very much in line with the basic guerilla strategy of engaging soft targets and avoiding hard ones.

It's an interesting predicament: Maintain "surge" troop levels and risk allowing other hotspots around the world (Nigeria, Pakistan, Mexico) to go to flashpoint, or freeing up those troops and watching Iraq completely disintigrate.

As for Miguel's concern for whether or not the Mahdi Army has learned from Hezbollah, I think the entire point of the issue is that they are learning stigmergically. No formal contact is even necessary. Hezbollah basically said to the world "This is how you conduct a defensive operation against a superior attacker". Non-state entities all over the world learned from Hezbollah's success in Lebannon on CNN, and are adapting those successes to their own ends as we speak. The Mahdi Army is only one of those entities.

[Miguel Barrientos]

Thanks for addressing my questions, Adam and NietzschesGhost. I'm just playing devil's advocate. The main assumption that seems to be at the core of John's posts is that groups like the Mahdi army are learning organizations, i.e. they have the capacity to observe, analyze, synthesize, and adapt.

I am somewhat skeptical, since to my untrained eye the Mahdi army seems to be a fairly primitive group. After all, didn't they lose thousands of members a couple of years ago fighting a much stronger force? Their actions back then seemed to be governed by emotion (anger), not by intelligence. Are their current actions fundamentally different? Or are they simply reacting to provocation by the Iraqi government in the only way they know?

[NietzschesGhost]

"Their actions back then seemed to be governed by emotion (anger), not by intelligence."

I think you will find that, for the most part, the "emotional" (read: reckless) individuals have long since been killed. Insurgency has an impressive way of accelerating evolution. Remember, the current crop of fighters have survived 5 years of ethnic cleansing, political backbiting and engagement with US forces. The fact that they have managed to orchestrate simultaneous attacks in Baghdad, Basra and half a dozen other cities for 5 days now is a testament to how organized they are.

[jeffvail]

To the extent that Sadr can effectively control the Mahdi army (signs point to yes), we must remember that Sadr has shown both an ability and desire to act within the political sphere. By Sunday or Monday--e.g. when it is clear that he has pushed past Maliki's deadline without collapsing--he will face an important political decision: is it better to now call another of his truces, demonstrate his ability to command his forces at will, and move back to the political side of this crisis having established a viable capability to take Iraq into chaos and bring down Maliki if HE chooses; or is it better to actually bring down that government and hope that he can come out on top of the ensuing chaos? His past actions (and lessons he should have learned from past failures in pitched battles) suggest that he will choose the former option unless confronted by a situation too promising to pass up on the ground. Even then, he strikes me as both conservative and pragmatic, and realizes that he will do better using the current violence to establish a powerful negotiating position, while avoiding the need to sustain the current ops tempo for more than a week. Also, his organization's legitimacy is based (largely) on providing social services, so he has an incentive to avoid creating a prolonged humanitarian situation anywhere in the South. Wildcards are whether Iranians have sufficient hooks in him to press on with operations beyond optimal return to Sadr, or if he really only has the level of control necessary to fire things up, but not to shut them down. Should make next week interesting.

[Duncan Kinder]

"Also, his organization's legitimacy is based (largely) on providing social services, "

A lot of these organizations, e.g. Hamas and Hezbollah, also seem to base their legitimacy upon their providing social services.

John, you have written extensively about how global guerrillas undermine the legitimacy of nation states by disrupting their ability to provide electricity and similar services. Could one not likewise disrupt the social services provided by such entities as Hamas, etc., in the event one's objective were, instead, to delegitimize them?

If not, why not?

Stated otherwise, if I were advising the Maliki Shi'a faction (a.k.a, the "Iraqi Government"), would it not make sense to suggest that they lay off the aerial bombardment, etc., and start disrupting Sadr's services?

Or is this too clever by half? And, if so, in what respect?

[Marcello]

"Maintain "surge" troop levels and risk allowing other hotspots around the world (Nigeria, Pakistan, Mexico) to go to flashpoint, or freeing up those troops and watching Iraq completely disintigrate."

I doubt that sending troops to Nigeria or Mexico would be seriously considered regardless of how things are going in Iraq

"Hezbollah basically said to the world "This is how you conduct a defensive operation against a superior attacker"

Just because somebody shows something on CNN that doesn't mean it can be easily learned or copied. I have read about blitzkrieg but that doesn't make me a Guderian. Things like discipline, organization and technical skills aren't improvised. They must be built up.

"would it not make sense to suggest that they lay off the aerial bombardment, etc., and start disrupting Sadr's services?"

How do you disrupt a clinic or a food distribution program for the poor in such circumstances? You can apply brute force (blow up the clinic, bomb the food warehouses etc.) essentially engaging in total war against the civilian population. Other than that I can't think of much the US military could realistically pull off. It's not like the they can stealthy drop in a couple of soldiers to cut off the electric wires/mess with the generator feeding the clinic every monday or wednsday.

[Duncan Kinder]

"How do you disrupt a clinic or a food distribution program for the poor in such circumstances?"

One answer, of course, could be that, for some reason, you can't - that there is something fundamentally more robust about these Hamas/Sadr type organizations that would deflect such an attack. ( If so, what? )

But conceivably, these clinic and food programs and such would be networks which could be vulnerable to attacks analogous to those against electrical power systems, etc..

[adam]

"How do you disrupt a clinic or a food distribution program for the poor in such circumstances?"

Good question. Marcello and Duncan Kinder have taken excellent stabs. On the basis of the blind man at the back of the elephant my answer is slightly different.

I'd start with the question as to why would you want to disrupt the activity? Surely you would want it to continue, just under your control? After all, it works for them, it should work for you, right? My solution then is to send troops to protect it, and help their professional administrators nurture it.

Of course in order to do so you'll need a lot of troops, decent intelligence and basic linguistic competence....

[Duncan Kinder]

"I'd start with the question as to why would you want to disrupt the activity?"

Hypothetically, any reason.

There is a theory of cancer therapy that suggests not attacking the tumor through surgery, radiation, or chemo but rather by cutting off the blood vessels that feed the tumor. Something like this is going on in the back of my mind.

Israel might want to attack Hamas this way or the United States might prefer this sort of strategy to sending in Ethiopians into Somalia. The results, as you note, could be distinctly unpleasant for many innocent civilians; and I'm not trying to suggest otherwise. Pure malice could be a motive.

I am merely considering whether such a stratagem could be viable. The morality is an important, but distinct, issue. In chess lingo, could it be "seriously threatened" and, if so, how and under what circumstances? If so, it would be part of the current reality that we would have to deal with somehow.

[Duncan Kinder]

Just to be clear, despite my using "cancer tumor" as an analogy, I am drawing no moral inferences one way or another about the targeted organization.

Hypothetically, the Chinese might deploy this stratagem against the Dali Llama.

[gbnt73]

John, would you mind citing your sources for the facts and figures which you inlcude in your write-ups and analyses? It's hard to do our own analysis using your information when we can't check it and refer to it ourselves. thx.

[adam]

Duncan,

Agreed. We cannot ignore basic human emotions such as fear, hatred and malice.

Even so, I'd still argue that - if the pre-supposed enemy have a resource that gets local support - the state can just take it over and run it as before, getting the benefits.

You're right though, they won't. If they were this logical and reasonable they wouldn't have created the conditions required for a guerilla problem.

[Duncan Kinder]

"Even so, I'd still argue that - if the pre-supposed enemy have a resource that gets local support - the state can just take it over and run it as before, getting the benefits."

Obviously what I am talking about is very hypothetical but note one point. This is not necessarily "state vs. guerrilla." It could very well be "guerrilla vs. guerrilla," where we might posit that Hamas is contending with Hezbollah, for example.

[John Robb]

This appears to have played out per the script I outlined above. Here's the gains:

"As part of the deal, Sadr's aides say, authorities are to end roundups of his followers and implement an amnesty to free prisoners."

http://www.reuters.com/article/middleeastCrisis/idUSL31425442