OPEN SOURCE INSURGENCY >> How to start

Superempowerment -- an increase in the ability of individuals and small groups to accomplish tasks/work through the combination of rapid improvements in technological tools and access to global networks -- has enabled small groups to radically increase their productivity in conflict. For example, if a small group disrupts a system or a network by attacking systempunkts, it can amplify the results of its attacks to achieve as much as a 1,400,000 percent return on investment.

Open source warfare is an organizational method by which a large collection of small, violent, superempowered groups can work together to take on much larger foes (usually hierarchies). It is also a method of organization that can be applied to non-violent struggles. It enables:

• High rates of innovation.
• Increased survivability among the participant groups.
• More frequent attacks and an ability to swarm targets.

Here are some suggestions (this is but one of many methods based on recent history, I'm sure that over time a better method will emerge) for building an open source insurgency:

A)The plausible promise. The idea that holds the open source insurgency together. The plausible promise is composed of:

• An enemy. The enemy serves as the target of attacks. This enemy can either be either received or manufactured (any group or organization that can be depicted as a threat). The enemy can be any group that currently holds and exerts power: invader, the government, a company, an ethnic group, or a private organization.
• A goal. This objective animates the group. Because of the diversity of the groups and individuals that join together in an open source insurgency, the only goal that works is simple and extremely high level. More complex goal setting is impossible, since it will fracture/fork the insurgency.
• A demonstration. Viability. An attack that demonstrates that its possible to win against the enemy. It deflates any aura of invincibility that the enemy may currently enjoy. The demonstration serves as a rallying cry for the insurgency.

B)The foco. Every open source insurgency is ignited by a small founding group, a foco in guerrilla parlance. The foco sets the original goal and conducts the operation that provides the insurgency with its demonstration of viability. It's important to understand that in order to grow an open source insurgency, the founding group or individuals must follow a simple path:

• Relinquish. Give up any control over the insurgency gained during its early phases. In practice, this means giving up control of how the goal is achieved, who may participate, how to communicate, etc. The only control that remains is the power of example and respect gained through being effective.
• Resist (temptation). Stay small. Don't grow to a size that makes the original group easy for the enemy to target (very few new members). Further, don't establish a formal collection of groups, a hierarchy of control, or set forth a complex agenda. This will only serve to alienate and fragment/fork the insurgency. In some cases, it will make the foco a target of the insurgency itself. It will also slow any advancement on the objective since it limits potential pathways/innovation.
• Share. Provide resources, ideas, information, knowledge, recruits, etc. with other groups and individuals that join the insurgency. Share everything possible that doesn't directly compromise the foco's integrity (operational security and viability). Expect sharing in return.

Will keep adding to this doctrine over the next couple of months. Could potentially package it into a PDF document for wider distribution when done.

UPDATE: Here's a very smartly penned application of OSW (and the foco) by a member of Anonymous.

Comments

[ikez78]

John,
Any comments,thoughts on the Saddam/terror Pentagon report?

[adam]

John,

I'd add another requirement to the plausible promise is that of shared values, by which I mean a shared ontology (world view). I suppose that its similar to the goal, but starts from a much lower level.

If we take the case of Bin Laden he uses these shared values to discuss world events, and lead the reader to the conclusion that fighting back is the right thing to do.

Now if we say that the specific political conclusion is the goal, then the shared values are the starting point. In the specific case of Bin Laden its Sunni Islam, but far-right Americans did the same thing with Tim Mcveigh's thinking.

Without this base ontology then recruitment into the insurgency can't really occur, the recruit has to be made ready first - often by a period for education and indoctrination.

Jkez78,

John hasn't replied, and I've got 5 minutes.

Back a long time ago this report was meant to be posted on the internet by the US as clear proof that the war in Iraq was in some way justified because of an "unknown unknown". Not any more its not.

Sadly, on planet Earth, it seems that a group of Sunni Fundamentalists dedicated to the overthrow of Secular Dictators aren't the type of people that Secular Dictators play with. Who'd have ever thought that?

The laugh out loud section is in the summary when the US says that Saddam stayed clear of religious fundamentalists because he was worried about blow back from them. I wonder if the Americans that supported the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan were as wise? Evidently not. The irony is delicious.

The depressing thing is that the bloody obvious needs to be reported in the US as if its news. Dog bites man shouldn't have to be. Its a tribute to the casual mendacity of American politicians that the report is considered to be important, because they have talked so much cobblers.

[felixdzerzhinsky]

You might find this interesting.

http://www.insurgentamerican.net/intellectual-hardball/insurgent-americans-35-point-practical-guide-for-action/

[John Robb]

ikez78, the report makes sense. Al Qaeda piggybacked on Saddam's insurgency plans. Not the other way around.

Adam, actually no. Shared orientation ala Boyd is not necessary for an open source insurgency to work. If the goal is minimal, multiple orientations can align themselves with it. Attempts to force a shared orientation, max goals/rules, only result in fragmentation/forks. It's toxic and should be avoided.

In my view, this is modern update to the way warfare was fought for vast bulk of our history as human beings (think tribal).

[adam]

"Adam, actually no. Shared orientation ala Boyd is not necessary for an open source insurgency to work. If the goal is minimal, multiple orientations can align themselves with it. Attempts to force a shared orientation, max goals/rules, only result in fragmentation/forks. It's toxic and should be avoided."

John,

A very fair point. I'm not sure that I phrased my point correctly, and the example was simply horrible. Particularly as I used Bin Laden, which simply complicates the issue I was trying to draw out. Sorry. Perils of being in haste and all that.

I'd agree that a shared orientation isn't what we are seeing in the development of radical Islamic groups in Iraq. There are lots of disputes and political differences still to be resolved. I suspect that most of them cannot be resolved without one side or other completely capitulating. Certainly there is a lot of violence between the groups. Which isn't going to end any time soon. If we take Basra we have the Virtue Party v Marsh Arabs (+ Sadrists... to an extent) v Oil Smugglers v Army v Police v British Army v SCIRI v quite a number of other, minor parties, criminals, shop keepers, and minor political parties. Sometimes they ally, sometimes they don't. They are all insurgents to a greater or lesser extent. And that's in one small port city alone.

Interestingly there is also a lot of cross recruitment between groups, despite the factionalism. The US hasn't made an issue of it, but many of the people in the Awakening Councils are former Al Qaeda (In Iraq) guerillas.

What I was trying to say (badly) was that the requirement for recruitment into the insurgency, almost any part of the insurgency, was a starting base view of the world. In the case of Iraq its Islam, whilst in other nations it may not be. This is significant as prior to 1991 Iraq was a very secular country in the Middle East.

As evidence for saying this I would have to note however that there are, as far as I am aware, no secular or Christian insurgent groups in Iraq. I am quite willing to be wrong on this, as back in 2005 SCIRI walked out on a meeting after being accused by a Christian group of being puppets of the US. Mind you, back in 2003 the Christians asked for their own province, and they haven't got that either.

Nevertheless I cannot find in the lists (and lets face it, they're hellishly long lists, so I might easily have missed something) any sign of a Christian militia, insurgency, or Christian political group dedicated to violent politics. If this is the case in Iraq this is a significant issue and has to be explained.

I'd argue that, with around 3% of the population of Iraq (pre-invasion; its a lot less now - more than half have fled to Syria), the Christians in Iraq have been surprisingly quiet. They have been attacked on any number of occasions, and churches have been burnt out, yet there has not been a retaliation. Lets take Basra as an example in December two Christians (a brother and sister) were killed, possibly as part of a kidnapping, and their bodies dumped. This is business as usual in Basra. The response from the Christians in Basra was unusual in that they cancelled Christmas. That's all. No gifts or trees this year. No militia was formed, no car bombs were set off, no retaliation was ordered.

One would have assumed that they were natural US allies, except for the fact that they are, unfortunately, heretics. The majority are Uniates, a breakaway faction which are admitted into the Roman church, but they use use Aramaic, the language of Jesus, rather than Latin. The remainder are Nestorians / Assyrians who use Syriac (rather than Latin) and do not believe that Jesus is the son of God (they believe that he's human, not divine, whilst the divine part is a separate entity). You can imagine how that kind of complicated belief went down at the good-ole-boy convention that is the US occupation of Iraq.

In short I submit that the Christians in Iraq are a number of "tribes", they have political aims, but they have not followed the path of insurgency.

The fact that they haven't means that we need to explain why, which brings me to the shared base world view sufficient for recruitment into insurgency. In the specific case of Iraq the Islamic groups have it, the Christians and secularists apparently do not.