OPEN DECISION MAKING

Here's my theoretical extension/redux of John Boyd's thinking. If you are inclined to enjoy deeply theoretical works, please read on (it's a work in progress).

Let's start with an assumption: War is a contest of minds. Therefore, the process of using minds -- decision-making -- is the core process upon which all warfare is built. Weapons, tactics, methods, systems, organizations, strategies, etc. are all derivative of this fundamental framework. Therefore, a narrow view of warfare is that it is a race to make decisions that optimize these derivatives within the restrictions imposed by access to resources and the other side's attempt to do the same (friction).

A more expansive view is that all decision making processes exist within the abstract mental models we use to understand the (complex, uncertain, and complex) environment we live in. Unfortunately, these models are at best flawed approximations that only get more flawed over time. So, we may conclude that warfare is in large part an ability to use decision making, in particular cycles of analysis/synthesis, to create new/revised mental models that are closer approximations of the environment's true nature.

John Boyd's Approach

John Boyd, arguably the greatest military strategist produced by America, produced the background material core to this argument. In "Destruction and Creation," Boyd lays out the philosophical elements of decision-making that limit potential optimization and eventually forces the creation of more effective mental models to explain the environment. In the "Conceptual Spiral," he formalizes the process of decision-making (novelty production) that produces new mental models. This eventually serves as a foundation for the final version of the OODA loop (observe-orient-decide-act).

The Problem

This gets us to the nexus of our current problem. The environment within which we fight war is getting more complex, uncertain, and incomplete at a faster rate than the mental constructs we use to model it are being improved. To wit: ever greater amounts of novelty (for example: new technology) is being produced than ever before yet our military strategies and methods are scarcely different than those we used half a century ago.

Why?
The reason is likely due to the limits of a unitary decision making system. Even under the most ideal conditions, its dubious whether the US military's decision making loop (the sum total of the intellectual product of the entire military bureaucracy) can even closely approximate the requirements of the rapidly evolving global environment we currently find ourselves in. In short, we are falling behind ever more every day.

What This Means

Given a situation where decision making is falling behind the requirements of the environmental reality, we can expect inevitable catastrophic failure at some point in the future. When this occurs, one of the following new approaches will emerge:

A) Radical limitations on the environment within which the US military operates. In short, reduce the required effort. However, this reduces the utility of the solution provided.

B) Decentralized decision making within the current structure. This is the approach advocated by the proponents of maneuver warfare (and Boyd himself). This is accomplished by ensuring all of the component decision making bodies share a common outlook (a harmonization of orientation). This means that each component's decision making processes will enjoy a high degree of similarity and synergy with that of parallel efforts. Unfortunately, this homogeneity of approach can reduce the production of novelty.

C) Decentralized decision making via a market mechanism or open source framework. This approach is similar to process "B" detailed above, except that a much wider degree of diversity of outlook/orientation within the contributing components is allowed/desired. The end result is a decision making process where multiple groups make contributions (new optimizations and models). As these contributions are tested against the environment, we will find that most of these contributions will fail. Those few that work are then widely copied/replicated within components. The biggest problem (opportunity?) with this approach is that its direction is emergent and it is not directed by a human being (the commander) .

Comments

[SinnerG]

John – Good work! I am interested in connecting your thoughts about 4GW with non-violent transformation of public schools. I discovered your BNW book several months ago and began think about school reform in more adversarial rather than necessarily collaborative terms. Now I find your posts on OSW and Open Source Decision Making. My question is this: How does chaos theory, as applied to complex, self-organizing (human) systems ala Margaret Wheatley and others relate to open source warfare and dm? I am mostly interested in Scenario C, since the hierarchical, unitary model in schools, districts and states is clearly ineffective.

[Cliff Nickerson]

I think it would be wise to carefully consider the idea of "inevitable catastrophic failure". There are degrees of failure, and some actually result in improvements.
What is inevitable is change. This change may be catastrophic, and it may be failure. But ideally it will be a fundamental reassessment of what we mean by war, the conduct we expect and accept within it, and the ability of American leadership to fight real world violent instability, economic terrorism (think China holding liberal governments at bay with their huge cash reserve) and information crime in an effective manner that doesn't just quell America's enemies, but spreads its fundamental values.

[John Robb]

Posted via e-mail:

Until or unless ubiquitous and real-time communications and persistent intelligence throughout the battlespace are realities, similar to the fleet conflicts from Ender's Game, where both unified command and decentralization are possible, we will never achieve a military, let alone a state that will have a seamless and flat decision-making process. Nonetheless, our generals and contract-fat military leaders continue to fool themselves those ideal conditions are possible with today's technology, dragging down the decision-making process and making decentralization at the highest levels an impossibility.

If war remains to some extent, "merely a continuation of politics," then the rest of the elements of Government need to learn the basic theory behind warfighting as well. Bringing Boyd's theories into the non-DoD elements of the Government is a start. At a fundamental level, Boyd's theories feed the capitalist model. They also feed the decentralized decision-making model. Several elements within DoD have made progress, however imperfect, using Boyd's theories. Figuring out how to implement his theories into the rest of DoD, the Intelligence Community, and the other Departments of government is one way to begin pushing the monoliths towards the decentralization so desperately needed to face the catastrophic potentials represented by black swans and superempowerment.

- JDO21

[jeefurt]

Hmmm. Seems like Iraq's PM Maliki has gotten inside our decision loop...of necessity for him personally and for Iraq's future as a successful state.

If Nibras Kazimi (http://talismangate.blogspot.com/) is to be taken seriously--seems he ought to be considered well--then PM Maliki had to trounce the Gangs of New York in Basra independently of even the agile General Petraeus.

If Mr. Kazimi is correct, Mr. Maliki has practised admirably decentralized (i.e. outside the U.S. planning process) action that is breath-taking in its independence, audacity, and success. I hope so.

Kudos to our Iraqi compatriots: may our friendship mature and endure! If PM Maliki had to come down on "our" side in order to push away the Iranians as well as decimate the hordes of gangsters infesting Basra, and has risen above our tutelage to major success, well, what's not to like about that?

Better to have a strong, albeit independent, ally than a whining puppy dog client, no? Let Speaks-too-much Pelosi spin in spite and let us also pray for General Petraeus' success in his upcoming jousts with her and the nimdwits in Congress. Let us celebrate Iraq's coming of age, too.

And let us recognize an agile warrior who leaped ahead of our best warrior statesmen, albeit on the foundations of their achievements. This all depends on the judgement that what we witnessed in Basra is a well-executed air assault that knocked everyone off guard, from the Green Zone to Teheran.

Outside everyone else's decision loops, indeed!

[John Robb]

Jeefurt. Good example. Open decision making assumes a common goal, albeit different motivations/orientations for achieving them. That clearly isn't the case in this example, as I have pointed out before. The US military's actions are clearly focused on maintaining the status quo, Maliki's are on upending the status quo and aggregating power.

[lancemiller]

Commenting on the

B) Decentralized decision making within the current structure.

C) Decentralized decision making via a market mechanism or open source framework.

A logic/math professor of mine once had a poster that said "When given a choice between two things, choose both". Here is my attempt at the advantages of both a "current structure" and "market mechanism" social structures.

This theoretical framework needs more articulated depth to the "C" category. Lets associate two other dichotomies onto the structure/free-market ( B, C ) categories: Language and Ideology.

Structured-decentralized is mapped to Ideology.
Free-market-decentralized is connected to Language. ( Emphasis : A single language, or at least all languages the agents truly operate with on the ground now. )

A language that can perceive and record the empirical, send/receive information with emotion and without it,
and has both a thematic, living relationship taxonomy (e.g. old Asian framework) and purely logical taxonomy( e.g. Aristotle).
Then the language would need to communicate the above meta
properties, and the agents be able to communicate with these also.

My avant-garde graduate school hated my above almost android
approach. They wanted the decentralized market of idea exchange to be an infinity of unique subjective experiences compassionately recognizing each others uniqueness. Therein
lies the problem with the "C" flat-society methodology, it has been sort of owned by the (Western) postmodern left. And the
military has owned the "B" ideologically bound flat-like society.

Speaking of "agents" as anyone reading this, I think progress would be made if the ideologically bound types lost all or most
of their ideology, and were left with the great language military people usually have. (sure, maybe the language could be improved). For the 'postmodern left' agent the transition to a more functional flat methodology may be more difficult, as the very idea of "functionalism" is taboo and mark of pathos in the postmodern orthodoxy. And the word 'orthodoxy' is used stingingly here, because having an orthodoxy is the heavy baggage that kills in an age of exponentially fast change.

Maybe reality is far more progressive than my preachiness. The types of individuals and groups that dialogue in that intellectual space of Brave New War indicates there already is a non-postmodern-left and non-militaristic-right that can comfortably work within, and utilize the energy of, this age flux.

The key is keep developing the language. Nay,rather, the key is distribute the language. Nay,rather, propagate the network with the protocol.

[SWIMMER21]

Some good stuff is provided by René Girard in his last book about Clausewitz, in French "Achever Clausewitz". It's all about violence and war as a mean to manage it. And to end it. Some outlook on generalised guerrilas.
Worth having a look.

[sethgalbraith]

Does the commander really control the direction of an an organization any less in a flat hierarchy? A deep, pyramid-like hierarchy certainly has a direction that APPEARS to be directed by a single mind, but is that the mind of the man at the top, or is he just creating a justification for the total momentum of the organization and all the assumptions and traditions that have developed within it?

In a flat hierarchy on the other hand, a lightweight leadership structure gives up control of managing operations but keeps strategic control, resulting in less detailed plans, but the same influence over the big picture. (Srategic decision making might even improve when the temptation to micromanage or hide behind the bureaucracy is reduced.)

[Miguel Barrientos]

One thought that came to mind as I was reading your post is that perhaps a deeper problem with the US defense establishment is that it is pursuing an agenda that is completely at odds with its original mission, which was to protect the territorial integrity of the US and the people that live within its borders.

Its current agenda has become to maintain, if not grow, its budget and headcount, regardless of whether such pursuit damages the interests of the majority of American citizens.

If you accept such hypothesis, then it becomes clear that most, if not all, political failures (i.e. military actions) in recent memory were not caused by decision making that was too centralized. Instead, they have been the inevitable byproducts of a bureaucracy that is out of control.

In other words, the problem with the defense establishment is not that its decision making is too centralized during a war, but that the only decision that it can produce consists of waging war.

The best way to win a war is to not start it in the first place.

[Vince]

It seems to me that one point John Boyd's theory does not address is : "what happens if the commander's intent is flawed". (Though I'm not a John Boyd expert)

One prominent example is Germany durin WWII : brilliant tactics, a common outlook shared by all Germans (or a vast majority of them), especially by the military and the Konzerns, decentralization, faultless implementation ... but a Grand Strategy doomed to failure. If everybody shares a common outlook based on the commander's intent, how will this intent be corrected if wrong ?

Please correct me if I'm wrong !

[Duncan Kinder]

A case study of open decision making would be Benerson Little's _The Sea Rover's Practice: Pirate Tactics and Techniques, 16301730 (Hardcover)_.

http://www.amazon.com/Sea-Rovers-Practice-Techniques-16301730/dp/1574889109/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1207403379&sr=8-1

Little, a former Navy Seal, describes the informal war against the Spanish Empire conducted in the Caribbean in the late 17th century. He concludes:

"Whatever their vices, weaknesses, and moral ambiguities, these buccaneers have in common with most sea rovers several tactical virtues, including innovation, loyalty, perseverance, adaptability, and courage. Collectively, they prove that a loose, uncentralized, and informal network can conduct significant, complex military operations. They show the effect that an irregular force can have on the resources of a powerful state, causing great economic damage and tying down significant forces. And, most importantly, they demonstrate that elements of broadly divergent and disparate cultures, races, nationalities, classes, professions, and personalities can act as one with a common goal."

Table of contents:

1) The Perils of Wealth by Strategem and Force of Arms, Part 1: Of Greed and Desperation
2) Sea Rovers: Freebooters, Filibustrs, Cruisers, Corsairs, Buccaneers, Privateers, and Pirates
3) Wealth by Force ofArms: Of Purchase as Purpose
4) Roving Spirits, Charter Parties, and Stout Commanders: the Recruiting, Organization, and Leadership of Adventurersw
5) Piraguas, Sloos, and Ships: tools of the Trade, Part 1
6) Of Small arms and Fireworks: Tools of the Trade, Part II
7) Cruising for Purchase: Forewarned is Fore4armed
8) Baptism, Pissdales, and Dog Watches: The Routine at Sea
9) Riches and Dangers at Sea: Pirate Prey and Pirate Hunters
10) "A Sail! A Sail!" Descrying and Espying the Prey
11) Colors True and Colors False: In None We Trust
12) Stand to Her Forefoot: Giving Chase
13) Hailing and Showing Teeth: the Prey in Range
14) Plucking a Crow: Small Arms and Great Guns
15) Volleys, Grenades, andCutlasses: Laying Her Aboard Under Fire
16) Surprizals at Sea: "Jesus! These Men are Devils!"
17) Surprizals at Anchor: Quite Waters, Quite Oars
18) More Surprizals at Anchor: Of Trade and Other Pretenses
19) Sending a Smoker and Catching a Tarter: More Strategems at Sea.
20) Houses, Towns and Cities Sacked: The Sea Rover as Soldier
21) Plunder and Prisoners: The Sanguine Spoils
22) Rum, Women, Dice, Turtle, and Honor: The Routine Ashore and Soon Another Venture
23) The Perils of Wealth by Stratagem and Force of Arms, Part II: Dying by the Sword

[Mark]

John,

An interesting and dangerous outline.

Is your audience the DoD? Obama's staff? the Fed?

[Terry]

I am retired military and I am currently a military contractor. I have been a trainer in Afghanistan for the past several years.

John, I love your thesis; (no, i wont ask for the last beer! :-))

From my perspective at the tactical and operational level it is right on the money; regrettably the decision making process is getting worse. how do I know? because I am one of the trainers that is also teaching MDMP, a conventional method of decision making to fight an unconventional war. It may please this group to know that John Boyd got an honorable mention in FM 3-0, Operations dated June 2001, but it has just been replaced by the new FM 3-0 DATED 02/08 and it looks like they left Boyd out in favor of a more classical counterinsurgency approach coupled to conventional warfighting.
Lastly, I would also add that after a review of all the posts to this blog thus far, EVERYONE, WITH THE EXCEPTION of the comment on the Sea Rovers TTP, has missed a critical element in this entire process. Its about a "gut" feeling. you wont get that from technology, you get that from using the technology as a tool while you are forward and embedded with your indig's force.
Using a conventional example, WW II Grand Strategy may have been flawed, but good operational commanders, along with healthy doses of soft variables such as leadership, loyalty and courage, almost compensated for that failure. WW I Stosstruppen tactics also came close to achieving the same effect.
Additionally, the entire process should not only be decentralized, but highly integrated at the lowest levels ( I have a model that i sketched on my own based on my experience so far) so these staff's can combat the diverse origin of thought and ideology that is unified in its one purpose of promoting Islamism/radical Islam. once they achieve this they will worry about the factional in-fighting between cults and sects later. Need an example? despite the uneasy and not always cooperative allaiance between Syria-Hamas-Hezbollah-Iran (which is a combo of Sunni-Baathist-Shia) not necessarily in that order.

[Terry]

P.S sorry, also meant to mention Fatah as well (Hamas, Fatah, Syria, Hezbollah, Iran); which are all different facades to the same islamism; they all promote intolerance.

[Uncle Remus]

"which are all different facades to the same islamism; they all promote intolerance."

Sounds like you kept your military issue blinders.

[Terry]

Uncle Remus, thank you for your kind words; would you please care to expound on your position?
I would also like to hear your view on how the different sects and differing ideological positions of Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas are able to cooperate and unify on more than just an occassion or two? Perhaps facade is a poor choice of words.
How does one explain the uneasy cooperation between these elements and their organized acts of violence.

I seek first to understand.

[Duncan Kinder]

Re: Analogies between today's global guerrillas and the pirates of yore.

Bruce Schneier has posted "Comparing Cybersecurity to Early 1800s Security on the High Seas":

He states:

"This article in CSO compares modern cybersecurity to open seas piracy in the early 1800s. After a bit of history, the article talks about current events:

In modern times, the nearly ubiquitous availability of powerful computing systems, along with the proliferation of high-speed networks, have converged to create a new version of the high seas--the cyber seas. "

http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/04/comparing_cyber.html