THE STRATEGIC BARRAGE

The US military and the Iraqi government are currently caught in the grip of a strategic barrage. The strategic barrage, a method used by great generals across history, works like this:

• the attacker maneuvers its forces to seize critical territory in an enemy's rear zone (astride lines of communication and supply for example),
  
• it makes extensive defensive preparations to hold that territory (i.e. a hedgehog),
  
• which then forces the enemy to either make a series of hasty attacks (very costly) or a strategic retreat/surrender.
  

This method has been adapted by virtual states (a much more formal type of networked organization than a pure open source insurgency) like Hezbollah, Hamas, and Sadr's Mahdi Army to defeat their nation-state foes. Here's how:

• By default, the Mahdi army controls territory within the Iraq's rear zone -- Baghdad's and Basra's slums. Further, Sadr's militias have the popular support and resources necessary to create defensive hedgehogs using modern weapons and light infantry tactics. Extensive financial resources allow them to get advances weapons/training (Sadr's militia makes billions from smuggling etc.).
  
• They can turn this territory into a platform by which to attack the strategic interests of the state. In Baghdad, this translates into rocket/mortar attacks on the Green zone and US forward operating bases. In Basra, this means attacks on the oil export system. This puts a timer on the conflict. The longer the attacks go on, the worse the strategic position of the nation-state and its allies.
  
• The nation-state is either forced to attack the defensive position (a very costly option) or submit to the demands of the virtual state.
  

Comments

[Duncan Kinder]

Re: Sadr being firmly based in slums.

I might as well repost the comment I just made on Juan Cole's website to the effect that Sadr should be considered as a "slum thing":

since the US clearly cannot intensively occupy the labyrinthine Shiite slum

I would like to propose, as an alternative way of looking at the Iraq crisis, that the status of Sadr city as a slum makes it, and the Sadr movement, a subspecies of the broader issues of the worldwide growth of slums in megacities.

An arising worldwide phenomenon is that huge megacities with vast slums are spreading. This is an unprecedented situation. The best book on the subject with which I am familiar is Mike Davis' Planet of Slums.

http://www.amazon.com/Planet-Slums-Mike-Davis/dp/1844671607/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1207575525&sr=8-1

This disturbing new development obviously would seem to be associated with various forms of social unrest.

In other words, in addition to viewing Sadrism as an "Iraq thing," or as a "Shi'ite thing," or as an "Arab thing," or as an "oil thing," it could be useful to view it as a "slum thing."

I presently have nothing specific to assert about Sadr in this context, but intuitively it seems to me that it could be worthwhile to sift Iraq-related news through this lens.

Note that Gaza also is a slum.

[John Robb]

Duncan. You are on the right path with this. Think globally connected slums. That's the real gap, and it isn't defined by the borders of states.

[Duncan Kinder]

One of the points that Davis makes is that slums are a byproduct of the agricultural revolution. Slum dwellers are not so much being drawn to the cities as they are being evicted from the countryside.

[Mark]

>Think globally connected slums.

There is something missing in this. Maybe it is the fact that TV has been connecting (brainwashing) slums for over a generation. Maybe it is the fact that 'slums' don't connect, people do.

Here are some variations:

Think globally connect slum-lords

But, slum-lords don't seem 'of the slums'.

Think globally connected slum-warriors.

But, successful slum-warriors will generally leave the slums at the first opportunity. To get a group who have no interest in leaving (i.e., no slum, just home), you end up with

Think globally connected ethnic-lords.

Which seems to reduce to:

Think globally connected localists.

Maybe that's the world we end up in with $50/gal gas. Few can go anywhere, but there is enough energy run a slimmed down Internet.

[Terry]

Interesting discussion; are we infering and or implying that there is a relationship between radical ideology and those from the slums? That radical and violent ideology is a product of the slum?

If this is so, what benefit does Sadr arrive at by disarming his militia? If he is a slum-warrior, what benefit does he gain by adhereing to the wishes of the Iranian leadership?

This last question is based on the assumption that, according to some sources, that Iran is influencing and giving orders to al Sadr and his militia as part of a larger geo-political strategy of leveraging the US and Iraq in order to gain geo-political advantage.

Despite some that might accuse me of wearing military blinders, I am honestly seeking understanding here.

[rick]

Terry, your questions make me wonder about framing. "Interesting discussion; are we infering and or implying that there is a relationship between radical ideology and those from the slums? That radical and violent ideology is a product of the slum?"

For instance, the term "radical ideology" - is that an appropriate frame for Sadr, such that Sadr's ideology supersedes the Shia/Sunni/occupier conflict? Or, is this just a strong hold for those prepossessing the ideology? And, I guess I wonder whether labeling their ideology as "radical", as opposed to some more neutral term, serves to advance or hinder a greater understanding of what the US is dealing with and help in developing an effective response.

Lastly, as to the relationship between slums and the development of violent opposition to a central authority. Intuitively, and I'm going from my memory of various histories and not actively researching right now, it would seem logical for resistance by those with the least to lose to rise at least early in a conflict as they often bear the brunt of the negative impacts of a society/conflict. I don't know of any social uprisings coming from the country club set since the rise of the impersonal state as an all powerful institution. Now that overthrowing a king or monarch does not lead to assuming that post, in much of the world, there does not appear to be a whole lot of incentive for the affluent to try to take over the state.

On the other hand, I think I can posit that very few uprisings begin w/o leadership, and that seems to generally come from disaffected and educated members of the middle or upper classes.

I'll think more on this...

[Terry]

Rick,
I concur with how you on how I "framed" the question. I'm struggling here. I understand that by framing the question in such a manner that I limit the query and potential response.
Is is safe for me to say that the line of thought is rather than respond to the ideology we might seek to first identify and respond to the leadership?
If I may use an illustration: How then would we respond to the so called successful slum-lord or warlord. the leader that has "everything" so to speak. The kind of leader that has the money and political power yet uses this to devious means. As a potential example, the Saudi Arabian Princes' that supported the Taliban with money and influence as they fought against the Northern Alliance.
Is my comparrison appropriate between al Sadr, and, say, Prince Faisel? They both seem to promote a brand of Islam and a line of thought that is both violent and contrary to the West? Is there a comparison at all? How then might we also respond to the Iranian leadership that is manipulating al Sadr or the Pakistani intelligence (ISI) that is feeding the Taliban? MY gut feeling tells me it is all related to ideology and perhaps more than that.
As a guy on the ground in Afghanistan, I am open to any and all suggestions. I work at the grass roots level. Any kind of "tool, approach and response" that i can add to the kit bag would be greatly appreciated.

[Duncan Kinder]

Problem:
If, as I have conjectured above, Global Guerrillas are a "slum thing," then how do we explain the Naxalites?

Possible solution:
As I also stated above, these slums appear to be byproducts of the agricultural revolution. Arguably, the Naxalites are pushback against the agricultural revolution. Therefore, Naxalites relate to slums along this broader nexus.

Caveat:
Note that all this is conjectural. It would take quite a lot of empirical research about the agricultural revolution, about slums, and about the the Naxalites to justify all this.

[The Buffalo In Da' Midst]

"Sadr's militia makes billions from smuggling etc"

Aside from the ETC part, sufficiently vague as it is, what, if any proof do you have that the Medhi army OR Muqtada al Sadr are involved in smugging anything except military equipment for their own, LEGAL under Iraqi law I might add, use?

Or is that little crack just the ranting of a loony global warhawk losing it's war, and not far beyond, the economy that was broken by the selfsame war, and a lifestyle that was utterly dependent on that war?

[Duncan Kinder]

Not only Sadr and Hamas, but Hezbollah is also, at least in some respects, a "slum thing."

The Dahiya suburb of Beirut, which is a slum, is a Hezbollah stronghold.

Hezbollah provides social services to its residents. For a discussion on slum dwellers' need for butlack of access to social services, read Mike Davis' book, referenced above.

For resarch on Dahiya, goto:
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&client=firefox-a&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&hs=2B0&sa=X&oi=spell&resnum=0&ct=result&cd=1&q=dahiya+beirut&spell=1