Global Guerrillas

Pin-Point Liquidations (via PPS) and Network Collapse

What does it take to collapse an open source insurgency/terrorism? Isaac ben-Israel, the former head of R&D for the Israeli MOD, describes the Israeli approach. They used a combination of thermodynamics, information theory (Shannon), and Stirling's approximation to develop a theory of systems/network collapse absent any specific knowledge of where a target network's critical points are. In short, the probabilities for collapse are:

• Rate of failure (of network nodes) = 11%. System collapse = 50%
  
• Rate of failure 25%. System collapse = 81%
  
• Rate of failure 50%. System collapse = 100%

Notes: The design of the network has a significant impact on the probabilities seen above. Induced failure of nodes must be applied to every autonomous network of interest.

Systems Collapse In Practice
To reduce terrorist attacks on Israel that started with the 2002 Intifada, the Israeli's used successive OODA loops and better information acquisition to improve their decision making (which allowed them to collapse bad assumptions). Armed with this improved decision making process they were able to put theory (above) into practice, via a process of pin-point assassinations (PPS). Here's what happened when they reached a level of 25% liquidation:

At first we used such liquidations as our response to terrorist attacks: they start - we respond, then they respond again. But starting from February 2003 the liquidation practice was not in any way linked with their attacks. We just have a list of the key figures - the list of organization leaders, of the so-called "field commanders", etc. So we started neutralizing them according to our list: we arrested those we could and liquidated those we could not. And in a short while, from mid-2003, the rate of terrorist attacks started decreasing - not only the rate of their successful attacks, but of the plotted attacks as well.

The results can be seen in the inset graph.

What this Means
It's clear that approach that combined system/network collapse and pin-point strikes were effective at slowing the rate of urban/networked terrorism aimed at Israel during this period. However:

• It takes a concerted effort. This theory/experience points to the direction the USAF should be moving: towards UAV/drone systems with pin-point lethality and large volumes of real-time information flows. Ultimately, "cloud" systems (coordinated via stigmergy) that blanket areas with sensors and UAVs with pin-point lethality (far above the level of current weapons systems) will evolve. The USAF is resisting this dominant evolutionary path and will suffer mightily as a result.
  
• It can evoke an evolutionary response. Open source insurgencies can evolve under pressure from this type of targeting (as we saw in Iraq). The dominant method is to fragment into ever smaller groups or ad hoc networks (a bazaar). This evolutionary response reduces the efficacy of the pin-point approach since it exponentially increases the intelligence burden and limits the effectiveness of any disruption achieved. NOTE: Of course, there are alternative, for example: the US chose to "purchase" these groups from the bazaar via the "Anbar Awakening" program.
  
• This method will likely only mitigate strategic attacks that require complex supply chains and planning. Tactical/local operations will suffer much less since they can be accomplished by smaller groups (see point above). Therefore, this method of approach does not lead to any meaningful pacification/peace.

JOURNAL: Global Oscillations

When a dissipative system exceeds its design envelope, you will often see oscillations (potentially as a prelude to bifurcation). We are seeing an oscillation right now as rising energy costs impact the behavior of the global economic system. The economist Jeff Rubin at CIBC has a great report on the topic. I believe that we may see several iterations of this "cycle" before we see stabilization on an attractor defined by high cost energy and hyper localization.

QUOTE: Dissipative Structures at War

"So in a sense, (John) Boyd saw conflict not just as a contest between two (or more) knowledge / novelty-generating systems but between dissipative structures." Chet Richards

NOTES: Isolate your opponent from the external environment to prevent energy acquisition and trap entropy (force them towards thermodynamic equilibrium and "heat death"). Increase your own connectivity to acquire energy and expel entropy faster (movement farther away from thermodynamic equilibrium and greater structural complexity).

CROSSING THE ENERGY CHASM

The EIA (Energy Information Administration) announced that it is now in the process of radically lowering its estimates for future oil production. So, here's a brief that put this news into context.
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In tech and marketing literature, "crossing the chasm" is a popular tag for describing how a company crosses the gap between the early adopters of its products to the start of mainstream acceptance. It's also a good description for the energy situation we find ourselves in today.

What the Situation Looks Like
Our current global energy burn rate is 16 TW (terawatts), which is up from 0.7 TW at the turn of the 20th Century. This rate is growing at 0.5 TW a year (and accelerating), driven by three major sources of demand (China, India, and the energy exporting 14). It's very likely, given a judicious evaluation of the data, that this demand will double to 32 TW by 2025 (even with a global 1-2% decline in usage per $ of GDP due to efficiency improvements).

From Stored Solar to Active Solar
The bulk of the energy we feed this burn rate with is from stored solar -- essentially, energy delivered from the sun millions of years ago and stored inside the earth's crust. The problem we face with stored solar is that it is reaching production limits (particularly crude oil). In combination with this rapidly increasing demand, we will face a never ending series of price increases (occasionally mitigated by demand destruction) for stored solar energy as oil, natural gas, and coal deplete in series.

The only plentiful and scalable source of energy for continued growth of our civilization (as a dissipative system) is active solar, estimated to be in excess of 600++ TW per (recoverable). The problem is, when compared to liquid stored solar fuels, active solar energy is still 25-40 times more expensive (remember, electricity is a premium energy source when compared to liquid fuels) and must scale from a VERY low base (we are only in the "playground" stage of active solar). Further, by most optimistic technical estimates, we will only see equivalents to today's pricing and scale in 2050 and beyond.

The span in years between now and 2040 or so, is the CHASM we need to cross. Big money projects in the short term won't solve the problem (due to step function economics in an uncertain environment). In contrast, resilient communities provide a way to cross it organically.

THE GUERRILLA CATALYST

Open source insurgencies and resilient communities are both decentralized networks. Critical to the success of both are people that serve as catalysts (like Henry Okah and Rob Hopkins). What do catalysts do? They accelerate growth and effectiveness by increasing the trust and connectivity of the networks they inhabit.

You can find a surprising good examination of the personality attributes and characteristics of catalysts in the book, "The Starfish and the Spider" by Brafman and Beckstrom. Unlike traditional leaders, catalysts don't organize structure, aggregate power, and give direction. Instead, the serve as

• Connectors. Able to map, mine and connect loose networks of people with similar needs/interests.
  
• Onsite helpers and Trust builders. Willing to work with people on the ground in the role of helper. Forges emotional bonds and encourages trust.
  
• Supporters. They let the network navigate itself forward by walking away from leadership responsibilities/roles. They trust the network and embrace its ambiguity.

HOLLOW STATES: LEBANON

May's dispute between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah is an interesting example of the contest between hollow states and virtual states over legitimacy and sovereignty. As in most conflicts between gutted nation-states and aggressive virtual states, Hezbollah's organic legitimacy trumped the state's in the contest (an interesting contrast between voluntary affiliation and default affiliation by geography). The fighting was over in six hours.

A Parallel Communications Backbone
What's more interesting than the actual fighting is what the conflict was about. In summary, the government made an attempt to slow the expansion Hezbollah's fiber optics network, which provides secure/robust communications and surveillance (via automated cameras) to the group. Specifically, the government tried to shut down surveillance nodes of the network overlooking Beirut International Airport. Hezbollah responded by defining the network as a core part of its organization and that they were willing to defend it with violence if necessary.

So, we can now conclude that in addition to a 4GW militia and social services, a parallel communications/surveillance network is a core feature set of virtual states. This tracks with our emerging experience in Sadr City. It also implies we may see interesting virtual variants of this via the parasitic piggybacking of open source insurgencies (the PCC, al Qaeda, etc.) on cell phone networks and the Internet.

DISSIPATIVE STRUCTURES

NOTE: Here's one more exploration of thermodynamics as an underlying driver for the high levels of systemic malfunction we are currently experiencing. It also implies that the global situation will get much, much worse before it improves.

Sorry for all of the high level theory, but it is proving useful in defining the parameters for successful decision making in the future and where/how violence will erupt.
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If we view our world as a thermodynamic system, a simple application of the second law of thermodynamics won't suffice. Everything doesn't get progressively worse over time. Based on our collective experience, the global system, as well as simpler biological systems, operate on a different basis. They don't run down with the conversion of energy. Instead, they increase their structural complexity over time.

The modification of thermodynamics necessary to accommodate this observable fact was formulated by the Nobel laureate Ilya Prigogine in a theory called "dissipative systems" (read his excellent book: "The End of Certainty" for more). One important leap in this theory is that a dissipative system isn't a closed system. Rather, it lives within a larger system (an "environment") that it can interact with.

This upshot of this is that it can extract energy from this larger external environment to increase its structural complexity (build itself up through a process called self-assembly). It can also use this external environment to dump the entropy created during the energy conversion process to minimize the deleterious impact on its structure.

In summary, the global civilization we inhabit fits nicely within Prigogine's theory of dissipative structures. Unfortunately, there are numerous signs that that our system's structure has grown so large, that is now nearly equal in size of its external environment. This implies that disruptive fluctuations will likely increase in intensity (positive feedback loops) until the global system either reverts to a much simpler model (closer to thermodynamic equilibrium, think Kunstler's "World Made by Hand") or evolves into a more stable configuration (think "Resilient Communities").

JOURNAL: Why use the Thermodynamic Crisis as a framework?

As many of you already know, a large part of what I do is to provide people with useful frameworks for thinking through difficult or complex problems. To the extent that these frameworks get you thinking (even if you disagree with me, which is encouraged), they are a success.

The benefit of using the "Thermodynamic Crisis" as a framework is that it is a relatively complete and simple explanation for many of the global trends we are currently seeing. It also appeals to a scale that is beyond the noise generated by cycles of introspection (at the political, social, and economic levels) that forces analysis paralysis. As John Boyd points out in "Destruction and Creation":

...we find that the uncertainty and disorder generated by an inward-oriented system talking to itself can be offset by going outside and creating a new system. Simply stated, uncertainty and related disorder can be diminished by the direct artifice of creating a higher and broader more general concept to represent reality.

To repeat: by moving up the scale to a global thermodynamic systems approach, we can start to see the outlines of the real situation. A situation not adequately modeled by global and (even less) national political/economic analysis. Keep this in mind when I begin to expand this framework in the next months.

THE THERMODYNAMIC CRISIS

Globalization has catalyzed the decline of the nation-state and spawned decentralized violence/opposition (which is increasingly effective due to innovations in theory and DIY technology). The result has been an ongoing crisis in the global control system we use to mitigate the impact of emerging challenges -- our responses/efforts are therefore slower, less effective, and more divisive. Much of this has been documented in this blog and the book, Brave New War.

The Other Crisis
This "Control System Crisis" is particularly unfortunate since globalization has also created a "Thermodynamic Crisis" characterized by increasingly expensive energy (demand growth that far exceeds supply growth as well as expensive/inefficient substitution for declining sources) and ecosystem overload (global warming, pandemics, water/soil depletion, etc.).* The reason for this is that our global scale civilization has exceeded:

• The production capacity of stored solar (oil, natural gas, etc.) energy resources. As demand (driven by 2 billion more people, a 3x gain, becoming middle class consumers) continues to outstrip supply, we will see energy inputs become increasingly expensive.
  
• The carrying capacity and natural defenses of our ecosystem. More specifically, our civilization's entropy production has exceeded the baseline negative entropy of our environmental systems.
  
• Our global system's capacity for evolutionary change. Incremental changes to the global system through technological innovation, economic restructuring, and social reengineering can't produce the results needed to reverse or slow this crisis.

The Impact
Worse, there are signs that these crises are coupling into a global scale positive feedback loop that threatens increasingly frequent disasters (of a wide variety of types).

*I'll provide a MUCH more detailed examination of this in my new book, "The Resilient Community."

JOURNAL: Searching for Assumption Errors

One of the best ways to determine the viability of any future scenario is to examine its assumptions (aka its initial conditions). For example, there's an interesting 2001 report from Shell on energy futures called, "Energy Needs, Choices and Possibilities: Scenarios to 2050." This report paints a rosy picture of a technological fix (through an energy substitution process, which is commonly conveyed via intellectual fast food like the Whale oil story) to future energy needs. However, if you dig into the assumptions you find this:

“Personal Choices – related to values, the environment and lifestyles – influence the energy system. Affordability is not the key constraint in OECD countries.” (page 24)

and this:

"... scarcity of oil supplies -- including unconventional and natural gas liquids -- is unlikely before 2025... Technology improvements are likely to outpace rising depletion costs for at least the next decade, keeping new supplies below $20 per barrel. The costs of biofuels and gas to liquids should both fall well below $20 per barrel of oil equivalent over the next two decades, constraining oil prices." (page 18)

Of course, seven years of hindsight makes it easy to see these assumptions are false. It is much harder to find assumption errors that have yet to play out.