Pin-Point Liquidations (via PPS) and Network Collapse

What does it take to collapse an open source insurgency/terrorism? Isaac ben-Israel, the former head of R&D for the Israeli MOD, describes the Israeli approach. They used a combination of thermodynamics, information theory (Shannon), and Stirling's approximation to develop a theory of systems/network collapse absent any specific knowledge of where a target network's critical points are. In short, the probabilities for collapse are:

• Rate of failure (of network nodes) = 11%. System collapse = 50%
  
• Rate of failure 25%. System collapse = 81%
  
• Rate of failure 50%. System collapse = 100%

Notes: The design of the network has a significant impact on the probabilities seen above. Induced failure of nodes must be applied to every autonomous network of interest.

Systems Collapse In Practice
To reduce terrorist attacks on Israel that started with the 2002 Intifada, the Israeli's used successive OODA loops and better information acquisition to improve their decision making (which allowed them to collapse bad assumptions). Armed with this improved decision making process they were able to put theory (above) into practice, via a process of pin-point assassinations (PPS). Here's what happened when they reached a level of 25% liquidation:

At first we used such liquidations as our response to terrorist attacks: they start - we respond, then they respond again. But starting from February 2003 the liquidation practice was not in any way linked with their attacks. We just have a list of the key figures - the list of organization leaders, of the so-called "field commanders", etc. So we started neutralizing them according to our list: we arrested those we could and liquidated those we could not. And in a short while, from mid-2003, the rate of terrorist attacks started decreasing - not only the rate of their successful attacks, but of the plotted attacks as well.

The results can be seen in the inset graph.

What this Means
It's clear that approach that combined system/network collapse and pin-point strikes were effective at slowing the rate of urban/networked terrorism aimed at Israel during this period. However:

• It takes a concerted effort. This theory/experience points to the direction the USAF should be moving: towards UAV/drone systems with pin-point lethality and large volumes of real-time information flows. Ultimately, "cloud" systems (coordinated via stigmergy) that blanket areas with sensors and UAVs with pin-point lethality (far above the level of current weapons systems) will evolve. The USAF is resisting this dominant evolutionary path and will suffer mightily as a result.
  
• It can evoke an evolutionary response. Open source insurgencies can evolve under pressure from this type of targeting (as we saw in Iraq). The dominant method is to fragment into ever smaller groups or ad hoc networks (a bazaar). This evolutionary response reduces the efficacy of the pin-point approach since it exponentially increases the intelligence burden and limits the effectiveness of any disruption achieved. NOTE: Of course, there are alternative, for example: the US chose to "purchase" these groups from the bazaar via the "Anbar Awakening" program.
  
• This method will likely only mitigate strategic attacks that require complex supply chains and planning. Tactical/local operations will suffer much less since they can be accomplished by smaller groups (see point above). Therefore, this method of approach does not lead to any meaningful pacification/peace.

Comments

[Valdis]

It is easy when you have this:

"We just have a list of the key figures - the list of organization leaders, of the so-called 'field commanders', etc."

It is like a map of city, or a menu in restaurant, it is easy to figure out what to do when you have one of those in your hand. But when you don't have a network map, that can help you figure out the leaders, then life becomes more difficult. If you only see fragments, what is local, one step away, you have no idea what the larger system is like and what you should attack.

The real skill the Israelis have is not removing the leaders, but figuring out WHO THEY ARE in the first place! That is their competitive advantage.

[rick]

There is also another real potential downside in 'pin-point' assassinations: They are often not all that pin-point, and the collateral damage has the very real possibility of generating recruits for your enemies. Additionally, most societies, if not their governments, frown on assassination as a tool - it does not provide 'justice'.

[rick]

There is also another real potential downside in 'pin-point' assassinations: They are often not all that pin-point, and the collateral damage has the very real possibility of generating recruits for your enemies. Additionally, most societies, if not their governments, frown on assassination as a tool - it does not provide 'justice', which can lead to social, economic, political and diplomatic repercussions. Arguably, you can wind up being convicted in the world court of public opinion. I believe that that is happening to some extent here in the US; more people are questioning the US's support of Israel, and the damage being done may well out way their operational successes.

[rick]

Apologies for the partial double post

[slapout9]

Hi John , Colonel Warden has been telling the Air Force to do what you have recommended for years!! No OODA loops needed just the 5 rings and some systems thinking. The SECDEF (his recent speech at the Air University) has been listening to the wrong Colonel...it's Warden not Boyd that the Air Force should be following.

PS, still looking for some old stuff on rebuilding communities after Nuke attacks.

[Cavolonero]

Some day soon maybe we'll have a flying hypodermic 'hunter/seeker' thing just like in 'Dune' and can pin-point those guys right in the ass literally !

[greendemon]

Hallo, John. Thanks for the fascinating post.

Thoughts on the ben-Israel article:

I noticed that he did not define the "natural system" model for the scenario to which the Redundancy Efficiency Hypothesis was applied. AFAIK, a natural system has a power-law distribution of node connectivity.
It seems the Israelis achieved success with their strategy of targeted liquidation, based on which we can assume that the target networks do have such a connectivity distribution - at least on the targeted command levels.

Extending this line of thought, I would say that the "enemy" system changed its structure - in response to earlier Israeli policies and strategies - from a typical guerilla resistance movement (low complexity throughout the system) to a much more complex one by establishing higher command levels. Of course, it was made painfully obvious that the trade-off favouring efficiency came with the price tag of reduced resistance to targeted attacks.

Now I wonder: what is the targeted system going to do in response? I can't imagine the "enemy" returning to their previous structure and strategies which gave very limited results.

Cheap short term options they might embrace:
- improve communications security and operational procedure to reduce inadvertent disclosure of information via hidden channels.
More longterm and costly options:
- improve the training and quality of the non-suicider operatives so that the cells can function more autonomously;
- establish a dummy "honeypot" network for detecting enemy agents and obscuring the real activities.

[waugh2k]

I find this most interesting for what it can tell us about how to construct successful networks. Can we turn the analysis on its head and determine what the thresholds are for preventing network collapse? The other side of counter-insurgency is the construction of alternative social networks - in other words, empowering civil society. Or, to put it another way, insurgency for the "right" reasons. Using this approach, I would like to think that there is a way to prevent conflict in the first place.

[zenpundit]

Counterpoint:

Very few states are going to have the wherewithal for PPL/PPS. So they will shake out in the following ways:

a) A small minority will enact the exact opposite of PPS by closing off the country to the outside world and going on a manic spree of indiscriminate democide that grinds down the networks faster than they can recruit new members. Algeria in the 1990's, Guatemala in the the 1970's, the USSR, French Indochina and El Salvador in the 1930's are all examples

b) Even fewer will use a variation of "manuver" and pull a Fujimori style autogolpe that enacts a lightning strike against the dissident elite opposing centers of gravity within the state that sympathize with and aid the insurgency by obstruction or covert assistance, isolating them from power, money and information. Then the insurgents are attacked directly before they can adapt to the loss of patronage.

c) Most regimes will take halfway measures of ineffective brutality, perhaps with loyalist paramilitaries, that invite both hatred and contempt and ultimately de-legitimize the government.

[Azr@el]

I recall that the U.S. military undertook a concerted effort to emulate the wehrmacht after the second world war. This was and is still mocked by those of us that like to point out that the krauts lost that world war (and the one before it) to nations(U.S.&C.C.C.P.) that were able to bring more troops into play with a better system of logistics.

Now again, we have this culture arising of emulating the losers; which the Israelis are when dealing with low level warfare. It's a shame that the U.S. military has been so distorted and overstretched in both it's core responsibilities and it's new mission as point man of the empire that it must outsource it's doctrine to those who aren't doing a very good job of it themselves. Who would have thought that I would live to see the day when the U.S. military dominates foreign policy, usurps the CIA and now is contemplating taking over first response missions in the homeland itself. No greater shame for someone that loves the ideals of the republic then to see this day come to pass.

[Valdis]

>> Can we turn the analysis on its head and determine what the thresholds are for preventing network collapse?

Absolutely! I learned quite a bit about how to build resilient networks and communities by examining how to disrupt terror/crime networks... and vice versa.

BTW, you can NOT practically "prevent network collapse" -- the idea is to delay it, so that the system can repair/adapt itself while still being attacked. The only way to collapse-proof a network is totally impractical in a social/human network of any reasonable size and VERY expensive in a technical/engineered network. You don't build for the "black swan", you build for adaptability.

[waugh2k]

>> You don't build for the "black swan", you build for adaptability.

Couldn't agree more. Thanks for pointing this out; system resilience is the key. We've had plenty of experiments in collapse-proofing networks in the 20th century - they all lead inexorably towards totalitarianism.

[docsharp01]

The USAF is superior to the military in other countries regarding the PPS and network collapse. Excellent talking points and discussion.
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