IRAN AND ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

There is still a significant possibility of a US/Israeli air attack on Iran during the closing months of this year. A multitude of triggers could set it off. Here's some thinking you might find useful if it does occur.
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Any attack by the US/Israel on Iran will be ostensibly aimed at suppressing the Iranian nuclear program. However, it will quickly evolve into something much larger, an airpower-based EBO (effects based operation). The objective of this EBO will regime change (see the brief: "Collapsing Iran", April 2006, for more details on this) without a ground invasion. It is assumed that by completely disrupting (turning off) the entire country's critical infrastructures (from power to communications to transportation) and isolating the country's leadership (in their bunkers), the country will quickly fragment in hundreds of competing factions.

NOTE: There is a line of reasoning (in various military circles) that the only success the US has had militarily over the last two decades has been from the application of air power. From the two Gulf Wars to Afghanistan, airpower was successful. Ground forces were successful to the extent they mopped up afterwards and quickly withdrew. In contrast, it was only when the Army/Marines attempted to hold ground that the US military ran into trouble. These advocates maintain that the US military should never hold ground in the future and that all applications of conventional military force in the future should primarily be airpower. This line of reasoning is currently being used by advocates of an attack on Iran.

War as a Conflict of Minds
Of course, the Iranian military leadership has anticipated this and believe any future attack against them will be based on airpower/EBO focused on regime change and not a ground invasion. Airpower, to the Iranians, is a form of asymmetric attack since they can't compete in this arena. As a result, the Iranians have developed what they call a "Passive Defense" run by its paramilitary (the Basij), based on the lessons learned by Hezbollah during the 2006 war with Israel. Mansharof and Savyon have explored the tenets of Passive Defense with an excellent article now available on MEMRI. Their planning consists of:

• Concealment of critical facilities and nodes. Likely also parallel communications infrastructure that allows central leadership to communication with local paramilitary forces. Paramilitary elements will be recruited and installed in all critical facilities/infrastructure to help with recovery. Widespread public participation.
  
• Emergency services at the local level that will provide food, water, and other services when they are cut off during the EBO. The Basij is being trained to provide this.
  
• Increased connectivity of infrastructure to neighboring countries to make it more politically sensitive for the US to attack (in short, this connectivity is why conventional warfare is becoming increasingly rare, and why there is so much resistance to an attack on Iran in most quarters).

Selected quotes from Gen. Jalali, head of Basij:

"With military bases and forces around [Iran], America has access to the entire territory of the country. The Islamic Republic of Iran is a political regime that relies upon the [Iranian] people... If the enemy aims to change the regime, it can achieve this by disrupting the [regime's ability] to administer the population. To this end, the enemy will attempt to paralyze infrastructures and the vital institutions of the regime, in order to sow dissatisfaction among the people."

"That is, the enemy will try to destroy the infrastructures [vital to] people's lives, and we must protect the people while providing necessary services. According to some analyses, the [2006] Lebanon war was 'a war of bridges,' because Israel destroyed all bridges in Lebanon, large and small, in order to cut off all land routes. In other words, in that war, the immediate aim was to [destroy] the infrastructures [that permit] administering the population, but the ultimate aim was to render such administration impossible."

Offensive Operations
In addition to Passive Defense, the Iranians are also likely planning asymmetric offensive operations aimed at shortening the engagement -- a form of strategic barrage designed to limit the duration of the EBO. For example, Hezbollah's rocket attacks on Israel during the 2006 war were able to inflict strategic economic/political costs on Israel. These costs ensured that the war was short. In Iran's case, this means a series of attacks (a combination of guerrilla, missile, and small boat attacks) on oil facilities and oil transportation routes with the intent of making the costs to the global economy so great that political pressure will quickly force an end to the engagement.

Comments

[Erik]

Isn't the problem with a sole reliance on air attacks (regardless of the perception of efficacy within sectors of the DoD) precisely that it is solely suppressive? That is, it potentially destroys enemies, but does so at the cost of making new ones and has no capacity for installing new systems of governance?

[Z]

I'm curious, from a technical/tactical point of view, what would serve as a base from which to launch such a campaign? I think S.A., Oman, UAE and Qatar are well aware of the price to them should they provide such a base. I don't think the U.S. could count on the stability of Iraq or Afghanistan. And even 3-4 carriers wouldn't provide the kind of power seen during Gulf War 1 or Kosovo.

Also UAE is like 25% Iranian. Qatar semi-openly supported Hizbullah in Doha following the May clashes. And I'm convinced the recent calm in Iraq has been largely purchased from the Iranians. Any question about who wields more influence is answered by looking at what's happening to the SOFA the U.S. has been pushing.

Thanx,
Z

[londamium]

Oh dear, if the thinking is that there is any viable comparison between Iran and Afghanistan or Iraq in either 1991 or 2003 then the US military is punch-drunk on kool-aid.

[londamium]

Z

This is one of the major impediments to John's scenario, and it's one of the reasons why the likelihood of any of this coming to pass remains vanishingly small at present.

A sustained EBO on Iran would be, at least, an order of magnitude larger than Desert Storm, but would have to be accomplished without an international alliance, without a series of UNSC resolutions explicitly authorising such actions - and this is critical when discussing the requirements for "open skies" access for combat operations and the necessary basing options to facilitate such operations, and needs to be accomplished with the twin millstones of Iraq and Afghanistan around the Pentagon's neck.

FWIW, I would imagine that the Iranians will not hesitate to start pinging the US military in Iraq with as much as it can muster ( which is likely to be a lot ) - it'll be perfectly lawful ( which is going to be important in the aftermath ), and would very quickly require the re-tasking of US assets to force protection in Iraq ( and elsewhere ) as opposed to strategic targeting.

[John Robb]

Londamium, You are certainly right. I couldn't imagine the US military:

a) not asking Iraq for permission prior to a use of force,
b) or underestimating the amount of forces required for a major military operation.

[Z]

John, its not moral support the US would need. Do you think that with enough pressure *any* of the Gulf Nations would permit basing for USAF aircraft? Or for that matter even overflight permission?

If not, could the U.S. conduct a such a campaign with Naval air power plus maybe Diego Garcia? I'm no expert so I'm just asking. If you or Marcello are around, I'd love to hear the answer. I tend to agree with Londamium; without Gulf bases, no attack.

I also would add that if they didn't attack Iran when oil was 50$/barrel, why would they do it when its nearly 150? Also, its hurricane season in the gulf of Mexico, so I assume they would want to wait until October. Imagine an Iran war plus Katrina at the same time. Bad luck indeed.

Thanx to all and a great 4th of July, the point of which is to celebrate freedom from tyrannical government. It's a point lost on many of my countrymen who seem to think freedom means being 'protected' by an all seeing, all hearing big brother state.

[WarLord]

Greetings

One word: China!

No matter how the US might rattle our sabres, China would NOT react well to an attack on it's big oil suppler

Then there's the closure of the Stait of Hormuz... Can you say Exocet?

And how do we react when Iran opens the "big toy box" for surrogates in Iraq, Lebananon, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere

This is more shallow thinking like using UAV assasins - we want a painless casulty free war and that goal and all the hi-tech toys are making us STUPID!

Enjoy the journey

WarLord

[Sean Osborne]

I think all of this makes a very good case for my own assessment: due to these pressures upon Shi'a regime in Iran, and the terror they are fearing from possible regime change - it will be the Iranian's who will launch the preemptive strike. It will be against Israel, albeit via Hezbollah and Syria. And it most likely will involve WMD.

Iran would not dare close the Strait of Hormuz - it is the main artery providing the lifeblood of the regime. It's closure would due more to cause popular unrest and insurrection in Iran than we would have to fear from Exocets, C801/802 missiles or swarming small watercraft attacks and short term economic impact. No, the Strait of Hormuz will not be closed for any significant length of time if at all imho.

This war will not be focused on Iran - not yet. This war will initially be focused in the Levant, between the Bekaa, Damascus, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

[adam]

Sean,

"I think all of this makes a very good case for my own assessment: due to these pressures upon Shi'a regime in Iran, and the terror they are fearing from possible regime change - it will be the Iranian's who will launch the preemptive strike."

Go on... Regime change in Iran. Such as? I know its a big theory in the US far-right magazines but there really isn't that much sign of massive popular unrest in Iran. The government itself may not be popular, but that's democracy for you.

Now if the US are talking about invading Iran using proxies (very much like the plan was in Cuba) then frankly it'll be the Bay of Pigs all over again (the Bay of Goats?).

"It will be against Israel, albeit via Hezbollah and Syria. And it most likely will involve WMD."

a) Assuming we mean chemical weapons, the Iranians can do it. But why? For any other option the Iranians don't have nuclear weapons.
b) Why attack Israel? Whats in it for Iran?
c) Why would Syria go to war with Israel at a time when they've started to patch together a meaningful dialogue?
d) Hezbollah aren't looking for another war, they've only just won one. So what would be in it for them?

Now onto the serious examination:

"Iran would not dare close the Strait of Hormuz - it is the main artery providing the lifeblood of the regime."

You'd be surprised what people do when they are at war, which is what we're talking about here. The instant a US bomber crosses the start line you're at war with Iran. This war will enter Iraq pretty quickly, the Iranians will have no reason not to and keeping the Americans off balance will be important. A US bomber that is smashing Baghdad to ruins won't be doing the same to Tehran.

The Iraqis know this and said yesterday that they would not support a US attack on Iran.

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2008/07/05/Maliki_cautions_US_against_Iran_attack/UPI-47341215306714/

The war will also enter Kuwait, its right next door to a key Iranian area. The war may enter Saudi Arabia, its within rocket range. Does any of this sound like a good thing? From a distance it looks like the start of World War 1 all over again.

Back in the 1980s the Iranians tried very hard to close the straits, but had limitations due to some incredibly primitive kit (some of their mines used in 1988 went back to 1908). It still took the combined efforts of 11 Western navies - and they were not actively being shot - at to keep the straits clear. In this scenario the Iranians have every reason to pick off minesweepers and other naval ships.

Since the end of the Iran-Iraq war the Iranians have been thinking quite carefully about the Straits and the long entrances to them. Its their best strategic bottleneck and their only chance of winning the war.

"It's closure would due more to cause popular unrest and insurrection in Iran"

No. Sorry. But they are at war. You'd be surprised what nations can do when you are at war. The Iranians managed to fight the longest land war of the 20th century without caving in, in circumstances that were rather more difficult than not being able to import lots of lamb via the direct route.

Of course if the Americans are planning to starve 70 million people into submission in the Islamic world, how precisely do you think that this is going to play elsewhere?

"than we would have to fear from Exocets, C801/802 missiles or swarming small watercraft attacks and short term economic impact."

Lets look at the short term economic impact. Oil prices would, what, only double from their current $140 a barrel? So that's everything that moves becomes more expensive. The US empire isn't going to collapse because of some water craft, its going to collapse because it cannot borrow any more.

"No, the Strait of Hormuz will not be closed for any significant length of time if at all imho."

Well, lets look at the numbers. In 1984-87 the tanker war saw 500 vessels hit by various weapons. Many required weeks or repair work. But in the 1980s we had a lot more smaller, lighter tankers. Today there are a lot more supertankers. A missile hit that knocks something small out for six weeks is minor, a supertanker out for six weeks is an immense problem as it has a knock on effect everywhere.

"This war will not be focused on Iran - not yet. This war will initially be focused in the Levant, between the Bekaa, Damascus, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem"

So, business as usual. We could say the same at any time since 1967. Frankly I doubt it. If the US starts shooting at Iran, its war, and its war with Iran.

[gbnt73]

Before we start war-gaming the plan, let’s question the relevance of the thinking. The idea of a sustain “EBO” The concept above not is supportable by history or current political or military thought or capabilities. I think those "military circles" you refer to are confined to the USAF and excludes AFSOC -- no other strategic thinkers whom I have heard have much to say about the effectiveness of finality from any air campaign. Yes, Gulf War I included a monstrous amount of destruction, but that was exactly not an EBO, rather, it was linear as linear can get. If we enjoy taxing our air components like that then I guess you could say that was an effective, but attrition-based air campaign. Let's look at the few air strikes in Bosnia. Nothing effective there -- merely hardened resolve against us (I was there early on and spoke with some folks on three of the sides in that war). The effects were embarrassing in Kosovo in 1999 vis a vis the strategic effects of hundreds of tactical deceptions by the Serbs. That one also merely hardened Serbian social resolve against us (remember the bulls-eye t-shirt campaign?)I also make the argument that air strikes were of very little shock-and-awe in OIF, but we did engage in a much improved form of strategic air campaigning. Instigating regime change without a ground campaign in Iran is like saying the USAF defeated the Taliban. Laughable.

Rather, let’s look at what Iran is and is not. It is an enormous country with assets tucked away all over the place. It has modern ADA equipment and doctrine and many layers of forces to assist in the defense and recovery of any facility. Any facility destroyed will be rebuilt and capabilities re-grown, possibly in a distributed manner to make it harder to hit again. The ties between the people and the state are too strong to sever in this manner. There are enough people supporting some localized political aspect of the regime that they are dependent upon it. The Iranian regime is not on the edge of collapse. If it were, we would see alternative political systems arising. I’ll address that in a minute. No, the regime does not consist of facilities (or buildings with BE numbers in targeting circles). That being said, however, most of their facilities are indeed vulnerable to stealth or low-signature air attack -- but think strategically. I mean really strategically. What is a regime?

A regime is not the facilities or buildings or organizations, it is the conglomerate of social, economic, political, security, informational and financial links from the people via social systems to the elites. The people are dependent upon the regime for more than their internet restrictions and enforcement of ankle-to head dress for women -- otherwise there would be no such regime. The regime is still enmeshed too deeply in society to collapse from mere bombing. No country has ever collapsed or changed political direction from an air campaign that did not include WMD (Germany-1945, Japan until Aug 1945, North Korea-1952, Vietnam-1965-1975, Laos-1968-1971, Libya-1986, Iraq 1991, Bosnia 1993-4, Serbia-1999, Iraq-2003) so why would we imagine that Iran would capitulate? Will bombing, however precise or indiscrete, ever solely sever and replace those social dependencies? Emphatically, no.

Can strategic bombing damage the regime? Yes, but with categorical and historically significant limitations. Regime change does not start with loss of facilities. I thought we would have learned that by now. Regime change doesn't even begin with loss of leadership. It starts with alternatives to the regime. What are the viable alternatives to the current regime? Are the Balochs or the Avazis capable of self-determination? They would say yes (of course), but I think they’d fail any sort of test for adequacy and competence in that regard. The Kurds in Iran, just like the Kurds in Iraq, do not want to rule Iran. They just want Kurdistan. So that leaves the non-ethnic-based resistance and opposition groups.

Look at NCRI. They suffer from the same problems as the INC and most of the other opposition groups in exile from Iraq throughout the 1990s – they are in exile and are perceived as living the good life in Paris, London and Ottawa while they avoid the pain of living in Tehran, Ahvaz or Dezful. Therefore, they are not a viable alternative.

Even if there was a viable alternative political system and regime, who is going to run the Psychological Warfare campaign? The US government? Yeah, right. We are exactly inept at that game and regime change of modern country cannot be done without a well-run PsyOp campaign. So, again, we are without a viable course of action and unable to provide the citizens of Iran with a viable alternative political alternative. Where does that leave us?

It leaves an “EBO” bombing campaign on the shelf for when we forget the lessons of history again (probably 10-15 years). There are no viable alternatives to the current Iranian regime. Degradation of the regime right now means – at best – cognitive liberation without real political opportunities or indigenous organization. And that is very dangerous for anyone who wants to seize perceived opportunities that aren’t really there. That means, strategically, we would lose valuable indigenous organizations and leadership who would have been useful later at the right time, instead of dying in battle or in a prison somewhere outside Tehran. At worst, bombing now could cause the society to centralize under the sole form of protection of those precious dependencies: the regime. See Serbia, 1999, Vietnam in the 1960s and 70s, and Germany and Japan in WWII. Let’s not fool ourselves into thinking the USAF provides effective political options -- it is at best a set of shaping or supporting assets.

If you want, I’ll offer an alternative in a future posting.

[Marcello]

Tossing my two cents around.
- Straits of Hormuz.
If Iran gets bombed they would try to close it to raise the pain for the West.
It is not like they could export or import anything while they will be bombed into rubble and blockaded by the USN.
So they have nothing to lose here.
But frankly I don't think they have the assets to do more than raise insurance rates and perhaps closing the merchant traffic for limited periods of time.
The past engagements between the iranian navy and the USN were pretty telling. And the iranians have not improved massively since then in these areas. For example
they attempted to use against the USN Harpoon missiles which were at the time state of the art,with little success. Mines are only useful if you can lay them, which they won't be able to.
Small attack boats have proved very vulnerable to cluster bombs. Asymmetric warfare in general can take you only so far at sea. (once surprise was lost Hezbollah was not able to duplicate its success against the israeli navy). In any case last I heard american strategic oil reserves
were topped, probably with troubles around Hormuz in mind.
- Basing
I have not looked into this deeply. I would recon that usual carrier/cruise missiles/strategic bombers combo could inflict significant damage on the nuclear facilities and the most important and vulnerable infrastructure (oil refineries etc.). But if every single bridge
aqueduct and suspected IRGC cache or meeting place has to be smashed, nearby land based airpower will have to join the fray.
Don't expect such niceties as asking for permissions, at least as far Iraq is concerned. If they are crazy enough to attack Iran they will just do it. What is Maliki going to do? It is not like he won't get a gun pointed towards his head if he whines too much.
The iraqis might make trouble. That will simply means that some of the bombs meant for Iran will be dropped on them, which will help Iran somewhat but nothing more than that. If things went really bad (large bases in iraq about to be overrun or similar) the US can simply increase
the firepower, even using tactical nukes against population centres if needs be.
- China (and Russian and everyone else)
They won't do anything because they can't do anything about it. Military action is not an option and economic ones would be the equivalent of cutting off the nose to spite the face. They will stand back watching the US digging itself deeper.

"It has modern ADA equipment and doctrine and many layers of forces to assist in the defense and recovery of any facility."

Dunno about the recovery part, but their ADA as a whole, despite recent purchases, is anything but modern or massive enough to withstand the american onslaught
without being cut to pieces very quickly.

[Duncan Kinder]

Seeing as how the Shia population of Saudi Arabia is near the oil fields and seeing as how at least some of them are apt to be pro-Iranian, why would Iran need to close the Straits of Hormuz in order to disrupt oil supplies?

[Z]

Marcello,

Last August I was on a flight from Dubai to Frankfurt and from my window seat I got a good look at the straights. It basically looked like a 2 lane highway with bumper to bumper traffic, with the Iranian side being the high ground.

I might have asked you this a couple of years ago, but couldn't the Iranians simply place a ton of simple katyushas on the overlooking hills and fire randomly into the sea lanes? The tankers were packed pretty tightly and the shipping lnes are only 2 miles wide. It seemed simple fire volume would be more than enough to overcome inaccuracy. Granted, damage wouldn't be huge, and oil doesn't catch fire so easily. but it might very well be enough to discourage tankers for a while.

As for Hizbullah's single use of shore to ship missiles, could it be that the Israelis kept their ships out of range thereafter? That option wouldn't be available in the straights. Besides, its not like Iran has to sink an carrier. A tanker will do and is a much easier target than a corvette.

I doubt seriously the U.S. will use nukes on Iran and certainly not Iraq, even if the situation greatly deteriorates. Even in Korea, when severely pressed by the Chinese, the U.S. did not use nukes. It is even less likely today with several countries with nukes and many more with capability to build. This is especially true if the U.S. initiates hostility.

I would agree though, that Iran may be built up in the media into a bigger power than it is...much like Iraq in 1991. It isn't impressive to say the U.S. military beat up a 3rd world nation with no means of self defense.

Thanks,
Z
P.S. were you to game such an attack, could U.S. interests (greater, unchallenged control of the gulf) be advanced?

[Z]

Also, is there such a thing as mini submarines and would they be of any use? What are your thoughts on the following from strategypage.com?

"Iranian Mini-Submarines

December 12, 2005: Iran, apparently with technical help from North Korea, is now building mini-submarines for operations along its coasts, and throughout the Persian Gulf. Two have been built so far. The sub has a two man crew, and can carry three divers, or several naval mines, or a torpedo. The Iranians say they will use the mini-subs to lay mines or launch underwater commando attacks. While the North Koreans provided some technical assistance, the Iranian sub is a local design, smaller than most North Korean mini-subs, which is a reflection of the more turbulent seas found off the Korean coast. In the shallow waters of the Persian Gulf, the Iranian minisubs (which look like an enlarged torpedo, with a glassed over cockpit in the front), can be very difficult to detect. Their range is probably a few hundred kilometers, more than sufficient to reach any targets in the area. However, the United States Navy has spent a lot of time and effort on the problem, and is probably better prepared to deal with minisubs than most navies. North Korea has a fleet of over 60 mini-subs, and apparently Iran wants at least a few dozen."

[Sean Osborne]

adam wrote....
"Go on... Regime change in Iran. Such as?"

I did not say there would be regime change is Iran... I said that regime change is what terrorizes the regime, and it is that terrorization of the regime which will cause them to preempt first - before Israel (or ostensibly the US) were to strike Iran - and that preemption will come from Lebanon (Hezbollah) and Syria, and it will involve WMD.

There will be no invasion of Iran. Their ultimate destiny will be not unlike that of their allies in Syria and Russia.

[WarLord]

But what comes AFTER...

Greetings

Okay lets assume all these EBO guys blowing sunshine up our ass are right (yeah big stretch) but then what?

This is the part that US of A tends to screw the ole pooch. The 'after' part. If we are paying $250> a barrel I'd like to have be for a good reason.

The massive bombing campaign, Iran in shambles, Strait of Hormuz impassable. So the current Iranian leaders are deposed.

By WHO?

And of course what is the collateral damage to all those big ass bombs

First the Iranian Kurds join those in Iraq and Turkey in forming Kurdistan, this foments full scale civil war in Turkey

While the bad guys in Pakistan and Afghanistan et al flow across the Iranian border to turn the country, now a hollow state into a terrorist haven

Congratutations you just created 'Somalia II' but this one with a whole bunch of OIL for the new warlords to buy their toys

If we allow it we deserve what we get...

Enjoy the journey

WarLord

[Marcello]

"Last August I was on a flight from Dubai to Frankfurt and from my window seat I got a good look at the straights. It basically looked like a 2 lane highway with bumper to bumper traffic, with the Iranian side being the high ground."

Note that I am not saying there would not be a significant disruption. Some tanker will likely get brewed and an american destroyer may get unlucky. 200$ barrel or more would not surprise me.
What I am saying is that I don't think they have the capabilities to completely close the straits to merchant traffic for extended periods of time.
For a start I have looked into maritime maps of the area with available depths.
Here is one for example
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/ir655-chart-2888-1580px.html
Maybe I am wrong but I got the impression that those two lanes were for traffic regulation rather than the only possible place where tankers could transit, so there may be some flexibility in that regard, even if of course at the expense of volume of transit. It may be possible to put tankers beyond or at the edge of visual detection range from iranian shore im most of places.

You can try, if you want, to figure maximum detection ranges with this simple tool.
http://radarproblems.com/calculators/horizon.htm. The results are of course the absolute theoretical maximum, practical ones will be significant less than that under most circumstances.
Radar is probably a secondary issue as any iranian surface search radar will have a very short life.

In regards to iranian weapons.
The most common iranian long range artillery would be the good old M46 130mm gun and BM-21 derivatives. The BM-21 has a range of 20km give or take, the M46 a bit more than depending on the ammo used but not huge. So they can't cover more than a portion of the straits. Longer ranger rockets are available but in limited numbers, fired by MRLS with less tubes if not outright single launchers etc. So the concentration of fire would be quite low, assuming that they are not earmarked for use against others targets in first place.
Their antiship missiles are obsolete, copies of copies of Styx and Exocet. They can still sink an unprotected tanker of course but it should be noted that all current frontline USN escorts are dedicated antimissile ships, designed to defend others ships against the far more deadly soviet antishipping strikes.

[Jeff Carr]

I've posted a well-researched study by Caitlan Talmadge which examines the possiblity of Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz over at http://intelfusion.net/wordpress/?p=342.

Her conclusion is that Iran won't be able to fully close the Strait, but it doesn't need to in order to cause significant and serious economic consequences. It only needs to partially disrupt the flow of oil by disabling a small number of VLCCs. Any such disruption would create ripples of negative consequences lasting from 1 to 4 months.

[Marcello]

"Her conclusion is that Iran won't be able to fully close the Strait, but it doesn't need to in order to cause significant and serious economic consequences."

That sounds about just right.

[Z]

@ Marcello and Jeffrey; Thanx

I guess the conclusion is than Iran could do enough damage to make an attack not worth their while, but not enough to totally make the idea inconceivable.

The question, I guess, boils down to; is the White House full of zealots prepared to pay any price or are cooler headed people weighing costs and benefits.

Also, is there any equipment Iran could hypothetically acquire that would allow them to close the straights and keep them closed. Some sort of Russian weapons purchase.

[Duncan Kinder]

"Her conclusion is that Iran won't be able to fully close the Strait, but it doesn't need to in order to cause significant and serious economic consequences."

Given this vulnerability, why is there no pipeline leading directly to the Arabian Sea?

[John Robb]

The Economist:

"Israel is threatening to attack Iran’s nuclear sites. This may not be a bluff."

http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?source=most_commented&story_id=11622496

One thing to ponder: Chatter is trial balloon for the attack and nobody in the White House or Congress gave Israel a RED light.

[John Robb]

Duncan, there is. It's called the Petroline.

[JohnShreffler]

According to Ha'aretz, Admiral Mullen delivered the red light message during his trip to Israel last week. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1000091.html

[londamium]

John

The Israeli "chatter" has been around since 1991 - although the intensity has increased since 2002 - and the one thing that has yet to eventuate from this "chatter" is anything remotely resembling an Israeli attack on Iran.

The function of the chatter is 2-fold: to prevent any normalisation of relations between the US and Iran ( this is the nightmare scenario for Israel ), and to pressure the US political elite into reprising Desert Storm for them ( this has been an Israeli objective since 1991 ). The Israelis simply lack the diplomatic, political, intelligence and military capacities to mount an attack on Iran that has a greater than 10% chance of success. I would imagine that the IAF runs a lot of scenarios - they keep having to update them to account for the steady increase in Iranian air defence capacities - and I would guess that 90% of the time they lose most of their attacking force, largely to fuel starvation.

Marcello

Considering that Hizbullah was able to knock out Israel's most advanced warship, and mount a port denial operation on Haifa for 3 weeks just using 40km range artillery rockets, the odds on the Iranians being able to mount a much larger version of these events is quite high ( actually, it's about 100% ). The current version of the INS Hanit fiasco is that it was hit by an Iranian made Kosar ASM - 'cos our crew was poorly trained, our intel sucked, and we forgot to turn the anti-asm systems on - which suggests that indigenously sourced Iranian kit is probably quite good. There is ample on the record evidence that the Iranians have C-801 and C-802 ASM's ( at least 125 C-802's according to US Naval testimony to Congress in the late 1990's), which are something of a step-up from the capabilities that you're attributing to them, and that's before we go into the speculation about the advanced Russian stuff that they may or may not have.

I'd also note that one of the navigational channels is actually in Iranian territorial waters - so there are going to be all sorts of complex legal and insurance issues for commercial shipping should any shooting start.

Looking at the map, there is a 200km stretch of waterway that the Iranians have geographical dominance over - and at times the waterway is less than 50km wide, and the presence of reefs makes going too close to the Omani side somewhat perilous for shipping. There are at least 4 Iranian islands in the Straits, the largest of which, Qeshm, has an area much larger than Lebanon South of the Litani. Considering that 14 million barrels of crude per day are transiting this region, any interruption is going to melt the global economy - simply reducing the flow by 25% is going to represent an Iranian victory; the big killer comes when you start to consider that US naval/airforce attemtps to keep the Straits open are, on balance, actually likely to do the opposite.

[Marcello]

"which suggests that indigenously sourced Iranian kit is probably quite good."

Short version: they got lucky, simple as that. I will make an example: the first night of desert storm a lone iraqi MIG-25 went up against a flight of F-18s, escorted by F-15 with AWACS support. In theory it should have been a suicide but due to a very lucky combination of piloting skills and favorable circumstances it actually managed to shoot down a F-18 and get back in one piece.
Stuff like that happens at war but what it matters is the rule and not exception. And the rule was the iraqi planes playing the role of turkey. How many others israeli warships did Hezbollah knock out? Zero.

"There is ample on the record evidence that the Iranians have C-801 and C-802 ASM's ( at least 125 C-802's according to US Naval testimony to Congress in the late 1990's), which are something of a step-up from the capabilities that you're attributing to them"

The C-801 are actually the Exocet clones I was talking about. And the C-802 is basically a Harpoon look alike. They, as I noted previously, actually had genuine Harpoon missiles the last time they clashed with the US Navy.Little good it did for them.
And speaking of which those engagements were among the most one sided in the history of naval warfare, so I fail to see why you are assuming that the iranian navy will have the upper hand by default.

"and that's before we go into the speculation about the advanced Russian stuff that they may or may not have."

Even if they have got some advanced weapons under the table, which most likely they don't as Putin isn't out to stir up relations with the US for the heck of it, those would be weapons they haven't trained on and thus of limited effectiviness.

[londamium]

Heh. One shot, one kill. After that little fiasco, the Israelis moved ALL their naval assets out of range, leaving Hizbullah as the undefeated champions with a 100% success rate.

The Israelis declaring that well-known strategic seaway, the Lebanese Coast, off limits to all shipping is a luxury that the the USN/commercial shipping can't avail themselves of in the SoH, as collapsing the global economy isn't a good by-product if you want to have a good military adventure; the Iranians have plenty of cash, plenty of missiles, plenty of launch options and plenty of prime real estate to play in. I don't know what success rate the Iranians assume for their ASM launches, but at 20% there's going to be a fair few nervous breakdowns.

If the US military thought that it could get away with a replay of 1988, they'd have bombed 3 years ago; the fact is they don't think that they can, so they won't, which is why the uniformed military continually brief against it.

Considering that the Israelis were utterly blind as to what was going on 5km from their border, and that the US, which had local political allies aplenty and a large diplomatic/intelligence staff actually on the ground, seems to have been equally clueless, the nasty "surprise" quotient with Iran is going to be very, very high.

Whilst Putin may not have gone out of his way to needlessly antagonise the Bush administration, in 2003, IIRC, his FM did publicly and explicitly declare the Gore-Chernomyrdin era to be over, followed this up with a neat demo of the Yakhonts ASM for the Iranian defence minister, and basically stated that as long they didn't violate the MTCR agreements, which high-end ASM's and SAM's don't, there were no bars in principle to sales to Iran. Considering that the Russians are somewhat pissed over the current anti-missile defence that the US wants to install in Poland and the Czech Republic, they have few incentives not to sell to good cash buyers.

I don't know if the Iranians have actually done any public tests of high-end Russian ASM kit, but they do regular exercises in the Gulf - there's one in progress now - which includes the firing of a variety of ASM's from a variety of platforms. Last year they tested a 300km ASM in the Gulf of Oman during a naval exercise. Now I'm not saying that Iran has the upper hand in a strict military sense, but they're not actually playing the world domination game here, they just have to be good enough spoilers.

[adam]

Marcello,

I suspect that you're right. Iran, with a military budget of $7bn cannot field either as much kit or stuff that is as modern, as the Americans can with a budget of $700bn.

On the other hand you're also wrong about the politics.

First Iran is simply playing for time, not for a win. Every day that they can slow the oil down - not even stop it, just slow it - is a day when stock markets go into frenzies, oil prices rocket, interest rates wobble and so on. And that's just the West.

China will have some very definite things to say about the US actions, and as they control a lot of US debts and manufacturing capacity they have a lot of say.

Second Iran will have to attempt to alter the playing field. Shattering the Iraqi, Saudi and Kuwaiti oil refineries or ports are an obvious target, and they have the people and equipment to do that. The majority of Saudi Shi'ites live in the oil-rich area... It only takes a bomb or two and an oil pipeline is out of action.

If the Iranians get lucky then it doesn't *matter* about the straits, because there won't be any oil for the tanker. The Iranians have a lot to gain in this area, if Saudis oil refineries are a smoking ruin then we cannot attack Irans, as we we'd like at least some oil capacity left in the Middle East - it takes ages to repair an oil refinery.

Third is the Islamic politics. This will be the second US invasion of an Islamic nation of the New Crusades. Its unlikely to play as well as the last one, as Saddam was a very naughty boy, whereas the Iranians aren't. Even so the Iraq invasion saw pro-US feelings around the world vanish. Will the second US invasion see the new ambivalence replaced with anti-US feelings? It could happen.

In short any attack by the US on Iran isn't going to be as quick, clean or as easy as the fly-boys fantasise over. In fact, its going to be a mess.