JOURNAL: Off the Shelf Leverage

How did the Mumbai attackers leverage global infrastructure and technology to facilitate the attack? Noah Shachtman, the editor of Danger Room, lists the ways (read the post in its entirety):

• Boat navigation was by GPS for precision.
  
• Satellite phone, found onboard one of the vessels, for coordination en route.
  
• Constant use of cell phones for tactical communication.
  
• Blackberries for real-time tactical analysis of media coverage (which provided details on the status of forces arrayed against them). Also, an ability to check Web sites, including that of the police, for tactical data and global media coverage for strategic direction. This allowed them to route around attempts to sever their connectivity.
  
• E-mail and remailers for communication to the local media.
  

The evolution towards ever greater leverage continues. It's pretty clear from the above that these guerrillas were better connected to both the tactical and strategic environment than any US and other developed nation military personnel have ever been (the opposition believes in the strategic corporal, why don't we?).

NOTE: The leverage available from off-the-shelf biotech and other DIY (do-it-yourself) advances is en route (at the speed of a Moore's Law Tsunami) and the long tail of potential enemies that will employ them is accelerating with each phase of the global economic melt-down. Unfortunately, we aren't even in the game because we won't even acknowledge the problem.

Comments

[Duncan Kinder]

Mumbai Terrorists Used Pirates' Tactics

http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/12/mumbai-terroris.html

"The commando-style attacks that killed some 200 people in Mumbai, India, last week began with a small-scale amphibious invasion that bears uncanny resemblance to recent pirate attacks off the African coast"

[Sid Vacant]

Well, seems like they used off-the-shelf cocaine too, to keep themselves on constant alert.

http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,593899,00.html

(sorry, it's in german)

By the way: great book of yours, Mr. Robb! Having quite a fight to get it accepted into our university library.

"It's pretty clear from the above that these guerrillas were better connected to both the tactical and strategic environment than any US and other developed nation military personnel have ever been"

Really? Ever?

[g48]

One step that can be taken during an attack is to shut down cellphone, blackberry, and other forms of wireless two-way communication used by the general public, thereby denying its use to the attackers.

Legitimate businesses have landlines. Public safety and military agencies have landlines and mobile radio. These entities should never be in the position of depending on civilian wireless comms for mission-critical connectivity.

One legitimate reason for keeping cellular and suchlike operational during an attack is the off chance that a hostage or other victim will be able to use it to provide critical information that will enable capturing or killing the attackers.

One such instance was the use of cellphone to alert passengers in the 4th plane in the 9/11 attack. This gave them the opportunity to attempt to retake control of the aircraft, which ultimately resulted in that aircraft crashing rather than hitting a target.

Other such incidents need to be evaluated to determine if they add up to a case to leave the cellular and suchlike infrastructure operating during an attack. Each attack scenario will be different and lead to different conclusions.

The other legitimate reason for keeping cellular etc. functional during an attack, is as a means of SIGINT collection, about which no more need be said here.